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Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to explore issues in the Irish labour market from both 
the enterprise and employee perspective over the period 2005-2013.  We draw on 
literature from the areas of job flows, displacement and monopsony.   
Our analysis is primarily based on the unique P35 linked employer-employee 
dataset, containing almost two million employee observations annually.  We also 
link this dataset to the Census of Industrial Production survey in Chapter 3.
1
   
The first chapter introduces the thesis by detailing its main goals, the importance of 
this work, as well as summarizing the following chapters. 
In Chapter 2, we provide an overview of the Irish labour market.  Evidence suggests 
the economy experienced a significant increase in unemployment during the period.  
We also explore aspects of the resulting policy response.   
We investigate job flows in the labour market in Chapter 3.  Results indicate that job 
destruction increased significantly between 2006 and 2010 while job creation 
declined.  When examining the impact of changing export intensity on job creation 
and destruction, our results suggest a small effect. 
In Chapter 4, we estimate the earnings losses of displaced workers.  We focus on two 
displacement events; mass-layoff and closure.  Results indicate that workers who 
experience a mass-layoff incur greater losses relative to those displaced following a 
closure, as do those who switch to a new sector to secure re-employment following 
displacement. 
                                                 
1
 Both sources are available from the Central Statistics Office, Ireland. 
ii 
 
We examine the labour market for evidence of monopsony in Chapter 5.  We find 
that estimated labour supply elasticities to the firm are low, implying that elasticity is 
not infinite as suggested by perfect competition, and so employers possess a degree 
of monopsony power.   
Chapter 6 summarizes the findings, highlights contributions to the literature, outlines 
policy implications and describes possible directions for future research. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
1.1 Overview of the thesis  
This thesis examines the Irish labour market during a period of remarkable change 
between 2005 and 2013.  While the Irish economy experienced exceptional growth 
during the Celtic Tiger
2
 years, it also suffered an unprecedented decline in 2008.  We 
investigate the labour market from both the enterprise and worker perspective using 
linked employer-employee data.  In the first essay (Chapter 3), we estimate the 
magnitude of job flows in the Irish economy over the period 2006-2010, as well as 
investigating the relationship between job creation and destruction and international 
trade.  In the second essay (Chapter 4), we estimate the impact of job displacement 
on the earnings of workers in the Irish economy between 2005 and 2011.  In the third 
essay (Chapter 5), we investigate if there is evidence of monopsony in the Irish 
labour market by estimating enterprise-level labour supply elasticities, using data 
from 2005 to 2013.  The contribution of this thesis is to provide new empirical 
evidence to the relevant literatures.  The thesis also focuses on the Irish labour 
market throughout.   
Exploring each of these issues in the labour market using linked employer-employee 
data is an important contribution.  Firstly, this is the first time that such an extensive 
linked employer-employee administrative dataset has been used in an Irish context.  
Specifically we use the P35 dataset constructed by the Central Statistics Office 
(CSO), using data from the Revenue Commissioners and the Department of Social 
Protection, as well as the CSO’s Business Register.  With all employers required to 
make returns for all their employees, the end results are annual files, commencing in 
                                                 
2
 The Celtic Tiger generally refers to a period between the 1990’s and mid 2000’s when the Irish 
economy experienced high economic growth. 
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2005 with around two million individual observations in each year.  Much of the 
empirical evidence from other studies presented in this thesis is based on survey data 
or a sample of linked employer-employee data.  The P35 dataset contains key 
information on enterprises
3
 and workers including their annual earnings.  The 
coverage of the data facilitates the tracking of individuals and enterprises over time.  
Its size also adds weight to the representativeness of our findings and conclusions. 
Secondly, taking a demand-side perspective in the labour market provides policy 
makers with important information on the allocation of jobs in the economy.  
Through an analysis of job flows, we can unmask the trends in labour market 
employment which may remain hidden when looking at aggregate employment 
changes.  Such trends include differing job creation and job destruction rates by 
enterprise size or sector, as well as an exploration of the role of exporting and 
importing activity on these job flows. Policy makers can use this information to 
identify the importance of job creation in small enterprises, as well as inform their 
assessment of the relationship between involvement in international trade and 
employment growth.  This is investigated in Chapter 3.   
Thirdly, by exploring the supply-side of the labour market, we can identify the 
impact on earnings of employees who are displaced from their jobs, either due to a 
closure or mass-layoff event.  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time 
such an investigation has been conducted in an Irish context.  Understanding the 
magnitude of these losses can help inform any policy response to such events.  The 
earnings losses and future re-employment probabilities of displaced workers may be 
                                                 
3
 An enterprise is defined by the CSO as per EU statistical legislation.  It is the smallest combination 
of legal units that is an organisational unit producing goods or services, which benefits from a certain 
degree of autonomy in decision-making, especially for the allocation of its current resources. An 
enterprise carries out one or more activities at one or more locations (OECD 2016).  
 
3 
 
related to demographic characteristics or other factors such as whether they secure 
re-employment in the same sector or move to another sector after displacement.  This 
is investigated in Chapter 4. 
Fourthly, we provide evidence on the degree of wage setting power of employers.  
As Manning (2003: 336) notes the lack of a good estimate of the elasticity of the 
labour supply curve facing a firm is detracting from the empirical evidence on 
monopsony power.  This is because it is this elasticity that ultimately determines that 
power.  We attempt to fill this gap using our large administrative dataset. 
1.2 Summary of Chapter 2  
In Chapter 2, we provide an overview of the Irish labour market.  There were 
significant changes in employment from 2005-2013 and this chapter provides the 
background and context to the rest of this thesis.  We document employment, 
earnings and migration changes, as well as the policy response of government to 
rising unemployment and declining economic growth.  
1.3 Summary of Chapter 3  
This chapter explores job flows in the Irish economy over the period 2006-2010.  We 
initially focus on NACE Rev.2 sectors B-N and document rates of job creation and 
job destruction across sectors and enterprise-size categories, as well as the 
persistence of job flows.  Given the importance that is placed on export-led growth 
by policy makers in Ireland, we look for evidence on the relationship between 
international trade and job flows in the Irish manufacturing sector.  In order to do 
this, we link our P35 data with Census of Industrial Production (CIP) survey data as 
4 
 
the P35 data does not contain information on enterprises exporting and importing 
activities.
4
  This is the first time these datasets have been linked. 
We follow the methodology of Davis & Haltiwanger (1992) in constructing our job 
flow measures.  This involves computing an employment growth rate by comparing 
enterprise-level employment at year t and t-1.  To sum employment growth across 
enterprises, a weight is defined to account for the size of the enterprise in computing 
job creation and job destruction rates for all enterprises using the P35 data.  Having 
merged the two data sources, we focus on the manufacturing sector and use 
regression to estimate the relationship between employment growth and exporting 
and importing activity. 
This chapter represents the first study to explore job flows using this extensive 
dataset in the Irish labour market.  This is important for two reasons.  Firstly, we 
gain a deeper understanding of the magnitude of job flows and how these have 
changed over the period in question.  Secondly, we contribute to the literature and 
empirical evidence on the relationship between job flows and enterprise size, and 
between job flows and international trade activity of enterprises.   
1.4 Summary of Chapter 4 
In this chapter we estimate the impact of worker displacement on earnings losses 
over the period 2005-2011.  Our available data facilitates the identification of two 
displacement events – enterprise closure and a mass-layoff.  In doing so we are able 
to compare the losses of those affected by each displacement event.  We also 
examine whether securing re-employment in the same sector a worker was displaced 
from matters in explaining earnings losses of these workers.  As well as earnings 
                                                 
4
 Both micro-data sources are available from the Central Statistics Office, Ireland subject to 
successful application for access. 
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losses, we also examine the probability of re-employment after both closure and 
mass-layoff events. 
The approach used in this chapter initially involves implementing propensity score 
matching to match displaced workers with non-displaced workers who have a similar 
propensity to be displaced.  We then use a difference-in-differences estimator to 
estimate earnings losses of the displaced group relative to the non-displaced group of 
workers.  Many of the previous studies that have investigated this issue either used 
survey data or have used a smaller sample of administrative data, when compared to 
this thesis.   
Another important contribution of our work is to consider both closure and mass-
layoff events.  Due to data constraints, some previous empirical studies have focused 
on one of these events.  We add to the existing literature by examining whether the 
earnings losses differ by the type of displacement event.  Also, given the large 
number of workers who are unemployed during the period, this research helps to 
identify if particular groups of workers, such as older workers, are at greater risk of 
displacement and if they suffer larger earnings losses once they re-enter employment 
compared to other groups.   
1.5 Summary of Chapter 5 
The widespread applicability of the classical view of monopsony, with one employer 
and a large number of sellers of labour is questionable.  However in this chapter we 
draw on the previous work of Manning (2003) and others who have extended the 
traditional view of monopsony to a dynamic monopsony model.  Such an approach 
allows for employers to have significant wage setting power, even when there are 
many employers competing for workers.  Using P35 data from 2005-2013, we build 
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on previous empirical work to estimate the firm-level labour supply elasticities.  We 
also explore the role of monopsonistic discrimination in explaining pay differentials 
among groups such as native-immigrant workers and the gender pay gap.   
To estimate these labour supply elasticities our methodology is based on survival 
analysis.  To this end we construct a spell-based panel which allows us to follow the 
labour market transitions of workers.  Our dataset allows the identification of 
transitions to and from employment as well as to and from non-employment.  This 
has not always been possible in previous studies. 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature and evidence on the relevance of 
monopsony, rather than perfect competition, as an explanation of the wage setting 
behaviour of firms. It also adds to the discussion on the role of monopsonistic 
discrimination in explaining wage differentials across segments of the labour market 
such as the native-immigrant wage gap or the gender pay gap.  To the best of our 
knowledge, the dataset used here is more extensive in terms of the number of 
workers included than those used in previous studies. 
1.6 Concluding remarks 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the current knowledge and evidence in the literature 
on job flows, displacement and monopsony.  Each of these essays gives unique 
insights into different aspects of the labour market and represents distinct 
contributions to the literature.  In an Irish context, chapters 4 and 5 represent the first 
time such issues have been explored.  Internationally, the data used in this thesis is 
unique given its coverage. Chapter 3 is a first in an Irish context, given the use of 
administrative data. 
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We focus on Ireland over a period of dramatic changes in the economy and labour 
market, which makes it a particularly interesting study.  This will be highlighted and 
explored in Chapter 2.   
The data used is a unique feature of our work and an important aspect of the 
contribution of this thesis.  The P35 data is extensive and covers all employees in the 
Irish labour market.  This is highly novel as it means we do not rely on survey data 
or a sample of administrative data.  A key advantage of our data is that this coverage 
facilitates the tracking of enterprises and individuals over time and ensures we can 
add to existing knowledge in the areas of job flows, displacement and monopsony.  
A potential drawback of the data is that it does not include as rich a set of 
explanatory variables as may be available through the use of survey data.  However, 
we suggest the universal coverage of employees more than offsets this drawback.   
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Chapter 2 : An Overview of the Irish Labour Market 
2.1 Unemployment and Economic Growth  
Over the past decade, Ireland has experienced both an unprecedented period of 
sustained growth followed by a sharp downturn.  The year of 2008 proved to be a 
dramatic turning point for the Irish economy and by 2009 economic growth slowed 
significantly with year on year GDP growth falling by almost 7%.  As the figure 
below demonstrates, this led to large changes in unemployment which rose from 
approximately 4% in 2005 to over 14% in 2011. 
Figure 2.1 GDP growth and Unemployment rate in Ireland 2005-2013   
 
Source: The World Bank (2016) 
By the end of 2013 the unemployment rate had fallen slightly to 13%.  In this 
turbulent economic environment, any insights that can be obtained about the 
operation of the labour market are likely to be extremely valuable from a policy 
perspective.  
While unemployment increased significantly, the incidence of unemployment was 
not spread evenly across all sectors.  The construction sector (F) was particularly 
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adversely impacted with the numbers in employment falling from over 272,000 in 
quarter 1 of 2007 to just over 184,000 in quarter 1 of 2009.  This fall continued up to 
quarter 1 of 2013 when the number employed was just over 97,000.  Other sectors 
also experienced declines, especially sectors B-E, including the manufacturing sector 
(C), which accounts for a large proportion of total employment within this grouping.  
A general trend of increasing employment up to 2008 was followed by a rapid 
decline thereafter with many experiencing a slight recovery, or at least a lower rate 
of employment decline in 2012/13.
5
  The percentage of workers in part-time 
employment also increased over the period, rising from 17% in 2005 to a high of 
25% in 2013.  At the same time, there was an increase in the percentage of part-time 
workers who reported that they were under-employed, rising from 24% in 2008 to 
33% in 2011,  suggesting that some workers in part-time employment were seeking 
more hours (Central Statistics Office, Ireland 2015b). 
While many sectors experienced a decline in employment, others experienced 
growing employment.  Sectors O, P and Q (broadly classified as the ‘Public Sector’) 
saw large increases in the number employed in public administration & defence (O), 
education (P) and especially human health & social services sector (Q).  This sector 
experienced an expansion of over 63,000 workers between quarter 1 of 2005 and 
quarter 1 of 2013.
5
 
A further trend over the period was the large increase in the long-term unemployed 
(those unemployed for more than 12 months).  In the first quarter of 2005, the long 
term unemployment rate was 1.5% (Central Statistics Office, Ireland 2015b).  
However, by the end of 2012 this figure had increased to over 12%.  Young workers 
aged 15-24 years saw a big increase in unemployment with youth unemployment 
                                                 
5
 See Appendix Table 1.1 for further details. 
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rising significantly from around 8% in 2005 to just over 30% in 2012, after which it 
began to decline slowly (Central Statistics Office, Ireland 2016c).  Such high 
unemployment rates mean the unemployed face a great challenge in securing re-
employment.  For younger workers, lack of work experience and human capital may 
impact in the long-term on their future employability.   
Part of the substantial increase in unemployment can be explained by an increasing 
number of enterprise deaths over the period.  Across NACE sectors B-N there was a 
significant increase in the percentage of deaths, with an average death rate of 5% in 
2006, doubling to a rate of 10% in 2010.
6
  The largest increase occurred in 
construction (F) where deaths increased from 10% in 2006 to 16% in 2009 (Central 
Statistics Office, Ireland 2016a).  These changes across all sectors suggest that there 
has been a sizeable number of jobs destroyed and employees displaced in the Irish 
economy, either due to enterprise deaths or the layoff of workers.  Declining 
economic growth and a rising incidence of unemployment certainly makes securing 
re-employment challenging. 
Much emphasis has been placed on the role that small firms can play in the creation 
of jobs in Ireland.  As part of the Action Plan for Jobs (2012), small firms are said to 
be in a unique position to create jobs in this country.  According to the Central 
Statistics Office (2016d) Business Demography data, there were 185,530 active
7
 
enterprises in Ireland in 2012, the most recent year for which data is available.  Of 
those enterprises, 182,642 are classified as being small with less than 50 employees 
and employ 598,404 employees or 49% of all employees.  The majority of these 
                                                 
6
 See Appendix Table 1.2 for further details. 
7
 Active enterprises have employees and make corporation tax and income tax returns.See 
http://www.cso.ie/en/surveysandmethodology/multisectoral/businessdemography/backgroundnotes/  
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enterprises (168,281) have less than 10 employees and employ about 27% of all 
employees.   
2.2 The earnings of workers  
Not surprisingly, given the turbulent economic conditions, many of those in 
employment experienced falls in employment earnings over the period (Central 
Statistics Office, Ireland 2016b).
8
  There is significant variation in gross average 
weekly earnings across sectors with those in arts, entertainment, recreation and other 
service activities (R,S) earning approximately €468 in Q1 of 2013, while those in the 
electricity, water supply and waste management (D,E) sectors, dominated by semi-
state companies, earn approximately €1,070 per week.  As a result of the significant 
decline in the property market during the period, there is evidence that both the 
construction sector (F) and real estate activities (L) saw declines in weekly earnings 
of 11% and 22% respectively.  Public sector employees (O, P, Q) were not insulated 
from this trend.  Public sector pay cuts were announced in 2009 and this is reflected 
in average weekly earnings falling by between 3% and 5%.  When we look at 
employment and earnings figures together, we see that certain sectors like Industry, 
which includes NACE sectors B-E,  did see a decline in the numbers employed over 
the period.  However, those who remained in employment in these sectors actually 
experienced a slight increase in their wages of 5%.  Thus it seems that those who 
remained in employment in these sectors did not see an adverse impact on their 
wages, with the burden of adjustment appearing to fall on those who lost their jobs. 
Changes in taxation also had an impact on the earnings of workers in both the public 
and private sector.  In 2011, the Universal Social Charge (USC) was introduced.  
Those with gross earnings of less than €13,000 were exempt from the tax while other 
                                                 
8
 See Appendix Table 1.3 for further details. 
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workers pay at rates dependant on their gross income, with rates of up to 8% on any 
income over €100,000. 
2.3 The Government response to rising unemployment  
In response to the high levels of unemployment, the Irish government took a series 
of steps to support job creation and increase employment.  The National Recovery 
Plan 2011-2014 was published in 2010 and placed a strong emphasis on the 
significant role exporting could play in the country’s economic recovery.  The 
relatively small size of the domestic market means that the Irish economy cannot 
rely solely on this market for sustainable long term growth and its export base is of 
great importance for such a small open economy.  With the anticipation of export-led 
growth, there was also an expectation in the Plan that this would lead to the 
generation of employment deemed to be vital for the recovery process.  It recognised 
the need for the creation of sustainable, “high-value” employment opportunities 
(Ireland 2010: 22).  
In 2012, the government launched the Action Plan for Jobs.  This is one of the key 
policy instruments devised to facilitate and support job creation.  It placed an 
emphasis on enhanced co-ordination and co-operation among government 
departments and support agencies.  Its key goal of job creation was achievable partly 
through enhanced exporting activity and export-led growth.  Within the Action Plan, 
the government acknowledges the need for targeted initiatives to support specific 
sectors.  It has indicated that it believes the manufacturing sector will be one of the 
sectors that offer significant job creation potential.  It expects the sector to add 
20,000 jobs within the next five years.  The importance of the sector for the economy 
is highlighted because of its potential contribution to economic growth.  Even though 
the sector accounts for less than 10% of employment, it is responsible for over 30% 
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of GDP  (Ireland 2012a).  While up to date evidence suggests that unemployment is 
falling and economic growth is recovering, the OECD in a 2014 review of the Action 
Plan for Jobs, pointed to a greater need to link targets, actions and outcome 
indicators (OECD 2014). 
The Irish government has taken a number of steps to assist firms.  One such example 
is through Enterprise Ireland which is the government agency responsible for the 
development and growth of Irish enterprises in international markets.  Its support of 
enterprises is focused on their export potential, as well as their job creation potential.  
It has a series of supports to assist businesses in these areas.  Two such supports are 
the ‘Potential Exporters Division’ and the ‘Job Expansion Fund.’  The former is 
designed to assist enterprises with real growth potential to re-orientate from the 
domestic to the international market.  The latter is designed to help enterprises 
achieve growth through increased employment (Department of Jobs, Enterprise and 
Innovation, 2012).   
The Industrial Development Authority (IDA)
9
 has a stated goal of attracting 50% of 
investment in Ireland to locations outside of Dublin and Cork between 2010 and 
2014 (IDA Ireland, 2010).  Regional industrial policy has played a role in Ireland 
since the 1950’s and is another mechanism through which policy makers endeavour 
to facilitate job creation by enterprises.
10
    
As well as efforts to ensure jobs were created and boosting the employment 
prospects of the unemployed through the Action Plan for Jobs, emphasis was also 
placed on the supply-side of the labour market.  Pathways to Work was designed to 
                                                 
9
 The IDA supports overseas companies seeking to establish a base in Ireland. 
10
 Chapter 3 examines the performance of regions in terms of job flows with respect to manufacturing 
enterprises. 
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ensure that new positions and vacancies that arose within enterprises were actually 
filled by unemployed people.  It is essentially a strategy covering the period from 
2012-2015.  The labour market activation policy of the government was built around 
five key strands.  These strands included ensuring individuals have incentives to take 
up employment and that these individuals engaged with government agencies to 
assist them find re-employment.  Institutional reform was identified as being 
required to support labour market activation in an effort to provide a “one-stop-shop” 
for both labour market activation and benefits support (Ireland 2012b).  For example, 
the National Competitiveness Council (2013)
11
 suggested that while a number of 
labour market activation programmes had been launched, there was a need for a co-
ordinated approach to be taken to ensure the unemployed had an awareness of the 
availability of such schemes and know how to access them.  In an effort to address 
this Intreo
12
 offices were being established.  Other new labour activation 
programmes were launched to enhance the employment opportunities of unemployed 
individuals such as JobBridge.
13
   
A particular emphasis was placed on assisting the long-term unemployed find re-
employment.  It was recognised that policies were needed to enhance their 
employability as well as incentivising employers to hire from the pool of 
unemployed individuals.  Employers paid reduced rates of pay-related social 
                                                 
11
 The National Competitiveness Council reports to the Irish government on important 
competitiveness issues, providing advice and recommendations on how it can be improved. 
12
 Intreo act as the single point of contact for unemployed individuals, providing details on income 
activation supports, run by the Department of Social Protection. 
13
 “JobBridge is the National Internship Scheme that provides work experience placements for interns 
for a 6 or 9 month period. The aim of the National Internship Scheme is to assist in breaking the cycle 
where jobseekers are unable to get a job without experience, either as new entrants to the labour 
market after education or training or as unemployed workers wishing to learn new skills”.  See 
http://www.jobbridge.ie/  
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insurance (PRSI)
14
 for new employees hired who had been in receipt of social 
welfare payments for six months or more.
15
 
2.4 Migration and the Irish Labour Market 
In the face of rising unemployment and wage cuts across both the public and private 
sector, labour market participants faced a choice about whether to stay in the Irish 
labour market.  Rapid and significant changes occurred between 2005 and 2013 in 
terms of migration patterns in Ireland.  As can be seen from Figure 2.2
16
, there was a 
large inflow of immigrants annually up to 2007 which then declined steadily up to 
2010.  Barrett (2012) notes that this initial surge in immigration was partly fuelled by 
the fact that only Ireland, the UK and Sweden offered full access to the labour 
market to individuals from the new accession member states following European 
Union (EU) enlargement in 2004.   
Figure 2.2: Migration patterns in Ireland 2006-2013 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office, Ireland (2009, 2012, 2015a) 
According to Barrett and Kelly (2012), there was an 85% increase in the number of 
non-nationals aged over 15 years in Ireland between quarter 3 of 2004 and quarter 3 
of 2007.  Another important factor noted by Barrett (2012) is that Ireland was also 
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entrants in 2013.  
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experiencing rapid employment and economic growth at this time.  This made 
Ireland an attractive location for those seeking to move outside of their home 
country.  The decline in immigrants from the EU accession states was the largest at 
78% between 2006 and 2013.  It appears that reduced employment prospects 
discouraged immigration from these countries to Ireland. 
With such positive prospects up to 2008, immigrants may have been confident of 
their earnings potential in Ireland.  However, there is some evidence of a native-
immigrant wage gap.  It appears that the country of origin of the immigrant worker 
matters in determining the magnitude of this gap.  While Barrett and McCarthy 
(2007) find that having controlled for education and experience, immigrants in 
Ireland earn 18% less than native workers, this hides significant heterogeneity 
among immigrants.  Those from English speaking countries experience relatively 
little, if any, deviations from the wages of natives while those from non-English 
speaking countries can experience gaps of around 31%.   Later work by Barrett et al. 
(2012) suggests that differences in earnings may be related to difficulties 
experienced by immigrants in securing a return to their human capital investments.  
They suggest a possible reason for this could be the failure of employers to recognise 
immigrants’ qualifications.  Specifically they find little evidence of a gap at the 
lower end of the earnings distribution but do find evidence of a native–immigrant 
gap at the higher end of the earnings distribution. 
An interesting feature of the immigrants in Ireland is their level of educational 
attainment.  Evidence from previous Irish studies suggests that immigrants are well 
educated.  Barrett et al. (2006) uses data collected from the 2003 quarter 2 release of 
the Quarterly National Household Survey in Ireland and reports that while over 50% 
of immigrants have third level qualifications, around 30% of the native Irish workers 
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do.  They point out that this differentiates Ireland from other countries such as the 
USA where the immigrants have generally been low skilled workers.  This evidence 
has been supported by later work from Barrett and Duffy (2008) who use 2005 data 
to show that generally, the immigrant population are highly educated.  More recent 
evidence from the CSO (2011) also supports this as seen in Table 2.1 below.  
Table 2.1: Educational attainment levels by nationality April – June 2011; 15-64 
years 
 Country 
Highest level of 
education attained 
(%) 
Irish 
United 
kingdom 
Other EU 
15 
Accession 
States 
Other 
Primary 11 7 2 5 7 
Lower secondary 19 17 5 8 9 
Upper secondary 26 22 19 41 21 
Post Leaving Cert 12 11 9 15 9 
Third Level 32 43 65 31 54 
Source: Central Statistics Office, Ireland (2011) 
In their Quarterly National Household Survey; Educational Attainment Report 
(2011), they find that in quarter 2 of 2011, around one third of Irish Nationals 
between the ages of 15-64 had attained a third level qualification.  This was lower 
than the corresponding figures for UK nationals (43%) and the EU 15 countries 
(65%) that are usually resident in Ireland.  However, it is noted that among 25-34 
year olds, Ireland had the highest percentage of people (48%) with a third level 
qualification among all EU member states. 
Emigration increased from Ireland over the period, with the largest number being 
Irish citizens.  While just over 15,000 Irish citizens emigrated in 2006, this increased 
to over 50,000 in 2013, representing a 233% increase.
17
  With the unemployment 
rate peaking in 2012, it appears that many Irish workers were either unable to secure 
employment or perhaps not satisfied with their employment prospects and decided to 
                                                 
17
 See Appendix Table 1.4 for further details on migration. 
18 
 
emigrate.  While Irish immigrants did return to the Irish labour market, the 
percentage decrease in those returning between 2006 and 2013 is 17%.  It could be 
argued that the unemployment rate may have been even higher over the period if 
migration patterns had not changed so significantly. 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we have provided an overview of some of the changes in the Irish 
economy over the period of the study.  As noted, economic growth fell significantly, 
unemployment increased and migration patterns changed markedly with a large 
increase in emigration and a decrease in immigration.  As we have seen, there was a 
response by policy makers, prioritising an export-led recovery to generate 
employment and economic growth.  Thus this chapter gives an insight into the 
labour market analysed in the remainder of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 : An Analysis of Job Flows in the Irish Economy  
3.1: Introduction  
As documented in Chapter 2, the Irish economy has experienced dramatic changes 
over the last decade, with spiralling unemployment and a significant decline in 
economic growth.  In this context, any insights that can be obtained about the labour 
market and associated job flows are likely to be extremely valuable from a policy 
perspective.  This is achieved through using linked employer-employee data.  While 
not essential for estimating job flows, the dataset utilised in this thesis is large and 
extensive in coverage of enterprises and associated employment levels.  
Focusing only on employment and unemployment levels and associated trends 
within an economy or sector for example is useful, but it should be acknowledged 
that it can hide significant heterogeneity.  As noted by Konings (1995), differing job 
creation and job destruction rates can result in the same net employment change and 
thus may be concealing the degree of volatility or flexibility in the labour market.  
Focusing on job flows provides an opportunity to conduct more detailed analysis of 
employment changes over time and across sectors for example.  By examining job 
creation and job destruction rates, we get more detailed information on employment 
dynamics within the labour market, and at a more disaggregated level also.  We 
know that certain sectors of the economy such as construction have been 
significantly adversely affected by the onset of the recession in Ireland.  While this 
sector has often been highlighted in discussions as suffering a large decrease in 
employment, analysis of the rate of job creation and job destruction within other 
sectors over the period should also be useful in identifying the degree of structural 
change within sectors of the economy.   Such an analysis may identify those sectors 
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or types of enterprises that have a tendency to grow and create jobs over time, as 
well as those that are more likely to contract.   
This research contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways.  The first aim 
of this chapter is to provide a detailed account of job flows in the Irish economy 
using linked employer-employee data which has not been done before.  Initially the 
chapter focuses on the business economy which comprises of NACE Rev. 2 sectors 
B-N.  The magnitude of job flows is examined and they are considered in the context 
of international evidence.  Comparisons are drawn based on enterprise attributes 
such as size and sector.  
Secondly, this chapter examines how job flows within manufacturing enterprises are 
affected by an enterprise’s level of involvement in international trade.  As noted in 
Chapter 2, the Irish government has identified export-led growth as one of the 
primary ways of generating employment and economic growth.  The chapter seeks to 
identify if employment growth rates vary across enterprises that are involved in 
international trade through exporting and importing activity compared to those who 
are not.  Related to this, the impact of exporting and importing activity is also 
investigated to determine the extent to which such activities are associated with job 
creation and job destruction.  This will arm policy makers with vital information on 
the relationship between exporting activities and job creation and job destruction in 
the manufacturing sector.  This chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 3.2 reviews the 
literature in relation to job flows, while section 3.3 describes the data and 
methodology.  Section 3.4 details our findings, while section 3.5 concludes.   
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3.2: Literature Review 
In order to gain a greater understanding of labour market flows, this section reviews 
previous literature and evidence in relation to job flows.  We begin by exploring the 
magnitude of job flows across countries (3.2.1), as well as job flows by industry 
(3.2.2).  We then examine theoretical issues and evidence on the relationship 
between job flows and firm size (3.2.3) and region (3.2.4) before turning to evidence 
on job flows and international trade (3.2.5).  Section 3.2.6 concludes.  
3.2.1 The magnitude of job flows across countries  
We begin by re-asserting here that our focus is on job flows.  Davis, Haltiwanger & 
Schuh (1996a) note that the economic factors that affect worker flows, the hiring and 
separation of workers, can be categorised as either ‘demand-side’ or ‘supply-side.’  
Demand-side issues reflect the fact that employers can create and destroy a 
significant number of jobs on a quarterly basis.  Supply-side events such as 
retirement or family relocation can also occur which cause workers to change 
employment status.  This chapter focuses on the demand-side perspective. An 
examination of job flows can lead to a greater understanding of labour market 
dynamics.  Davis & Haltiwanger (1992) and Lane, Stevens & Burgess (1996) note 
that looking at the net change in employment only could be misleading when 
analysing the labour market as there are often high levels of job creation and 
destruction.  A similar point in made by Lawless & Murphy (2008) who highlight 
that figures on aggregate employment changes can hide significant amounts of job 
creation and destruction within enterprises, with simultaneous job creation and 
destruction occurring. 
We firstly examine evidence on job flows from the US and Canada before turning to 
evidence from European countries.  Much of the earlier work conducted in the US is 
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attributed to Steven Davis, John Haltiwanger and Scott Schuh.  Davis & Haltiwanger 
(1999) review studies conducted on job flows in the US labour market.  It is noted 
that the studies differ in terms of the period of time covered, the sampling interval 
used, how the business unit is defined and also the sectors that are covered.  But 
given this, there are still some noteworthy features of the data.  For example, the 
pace at which jobs are created and destroyed is of interest – approximately 10% of 
jobs are both created and destroyed each year.   
Earlier work of Davis & Haltiwanger (1992) examined gross job creation and 
destruction in the US manufacturing sector between 1972 and 1986.  Specifically 
they measured heterogeneity in employment changes at the level of the 
establishment.  Heterogeneity was measured in terms of gross job creation and job 
destruction as well as employment reallocation.  Their methodology which is 
described in detail in section 3.3.4 has been used widely by others and forms the 
basis for the methodology used in this chapter.  Briefly, they define job creation by 
adding employment gains in growing or new establishments and this is weighted by 
the size of an establishment in a given sector.  Job destruction is based on 
employment losses in declining or exiting establishments within a sector.  Equations 
(3.1) and (3.2) below are adapted from Davis & Haltiwanger (1992: 828). 
POS𝑠𝑡 =  ∑
x𝑒𝑡
X 𝑠𝑡
e⋲ E𝑠𝑡: g𝑒𝑡>0
(g𝑒𝑡) 
 (3.1) 
 
   
NEG𝑠𝑡 =  ∑
x𝑒𝑡
X 𝑠𝑡
𝑒⋲ E𝑠𝑡: g𝑒𝑡<0
|g𝑒𝑡| 
 
 (3.2) 
 
POS𝑠𝑡 is job creation in sector s at time t; NEG𝑠𝑡 is job destruction in sector s at time 
t.  The variable x𝑒𝑡 captures the size of the firm e while X𝑠𝑡 captures the size of the 
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industry firm e belongs to.  As outlined by Hijzen et al. (2010: 623), who follow the 
earlier work of Davis, Haltiwanger & Schuh (1996), employment growth in 
enterprise i between t-1 and t is given by: 
g𝑖𝑡 =
(N𝑖𝑡 − N𝑖𝑡−1)
1/2(N𝑖𝑡 + N𝑖𝑡−1)
 
 
 (3.3) 
 
If we divide by the average employment we make sure that g
𝑖𝑡
 can only take on 
values between -2 and +2 for exiters and new entrants respectively.   
A key feature of their work is the focus on gross job flows rather than worker flows.  
They note job flows are concerned with employment changes at the firm level (or 
industry level) from one period to the next while worker flows reflect movements of 
workers into and out of jobs at the individual level between one period and the next.  
While the focus is on measuring these job flows, their link to and potential impact on 
worker flows is acknowledged.  While worker flows may be driven by for example, 
workers retiring and others being employed into these existing positions, they can 
also be driven by the destruction of existing jobs and the creation of new job 
opportunities.  They report average gross job creation of 9.2% and gross job 
destruction of 11.3%.  These simultaneously high rates persist when narrowly 
defined sectors were examined.  They report this high rate of job reallocation (the 
sum of job creation and destruction) is an indicator of the rate at which jobs are 
reallocated across establishments.   
Davis & Haltiwanger (1999) build on their previous work focusing on the 
measurement of both gross worker and job flows.  They note that the absence of 
timely and complete statistics on worker and job flows is an issue given the 
importance of having a clear understanding of labour market dynamics from a policy 
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and economic point of view.  They focus on the potential of administrative data 
sources for compiling measures of gross job and worker flows, given that this would 
be a relatively inexpensive source.   
Subsequent work by Davis, Faberman & Haltiwanger (2006) also acknowledges the 
importance of administrative data and point out that the development of new datasets 
has led to the emergence of a fuller picture regarding labour market flows in the US.  
One of these is the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) which 
contains matched employer-employee data.  Here the reported rate of job creation 
and destruction varies depending on the source and the sampling interval of the data.  
Using the LEHD data, job creation and destruction rates of about 7% and 5.5% are 
reported between 1993 and 2003 in the US.  Also the magnitude of differences in job 
flow rates across industries is highlighted by the authors, even when these industries 
are broadly defined.  Using Business Employment Dynamics (BED) data from the 
US, the rates of job creation and destruction in manufacturing are reported to be 
4.9% and 5.3% respectively while in the construction sector the corresponding rates 
are 14.3% and 13.9% between 1990 and 2005.   
In another US study, Pinkston & Spletzer (2004) also use data from BED and they 
find a job creation rate of around 15%.  A similar job destruction rate of around 14% 
is reported.  They compare the magnitude of these flows to those found by Davis et 
al. (1996a) who investigate job flow rates in the US manufacturing sector over the 
period 1973-1988.  Davis et al. (1996a) report lower annual rates of 10.3% and 9.1% 
for job creation and job destruction respectively over the period.  Pinkston & 
Spletzer (2004) suggest that the most plausible explanation for this is the difference 
in the sectors covered.  While the earlier work of Davis et al. (1996a) focuses on the 
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manufacturing sector, the work of Pinkston & Spletzer (2004) covers all sectors of 
the economy, not just manufacturing.  It also refers to a later time period. 
Efforts have also been made to compare the magnitude of job flows in the US to 
those of Canada by Baldwin, Dunne & Haltiwanger (1998).  The US data covers the 
period 1972-1993 while the Canadian data spans the period 1973-1992.  The 
manufacturing sector is the focus in both countries.  The measures used by Davis et 
al. (1996a) for computing job flows are implemented here for both countries.  It is 
reported that the patterns between both countries are similar over time when 
examining job creation and destruction, with both job creation and destructions rates 
of 10% in each country annually.         
We now turn our attention to evidence from some European countries, including 
Ireland.  We begin with an Austrian study by Stiglbauer, Stahl, Winter & 
Zweimuller (2003) who also draw comparisons with the results from studies 
conducted in the US.  Using a large administrative dataset which covers all private 
sector employees for the period 1978-1998, it is reported that rates are generally 
comparable in magnitude to those of the US.  Over the period it is found that on 
average, both the job creation and destruction rates were about 9%.  Results are also 
compared to European countries.  Job creation is higher than that reported in 
Germany while it is lower than that of Sweden and Italy.  They suggest that the 
overall pattern with regards to job destruction is similar.  A Danish study by Albaek 
& Sørensen (1998) report a slightly higher rate of job creation and job destruction 
annually and suggest that on average around 12% of new jobs are created while 
approximately 11% of jobs are destroyed each year.  Thus these results are similar to 
those of Davis et al. (1996a). 
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In the UK, Hijzen, Upward & Wright (2010) report the job creation and job 
destruction rates for the economy and also for the manufacturing and services sectors 
separately.  Using data from an Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR) which 
is a database of all businesses in the UK for the period 1997-2008, the average job 
creation rate for the economy is approximately 15% while the job destruction rate is 
around 14%.  In earlier work, Blanchflower & Burgess (1996) use data from three 
waves of the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey in 1980, 1984 and 1990 to 
investigate job creation and destruction in the UK.  Their reported rates are lower 
than those of Hijzen et al. (2010).  They report an increase in the job creation rate 
from around 3.5% in 1980 to around 5.5% in 1990 across all sectors which are 
private manufacturing, private services, private sector, public sector, the union sector 
and the non-union sector.  However, overall the job destruction rate also increased 
slightly from 5.18% to 5.31%.  The increase was most pronounced in private 
services and the public sector. 
In an Irish context, some work has been previously conducted on job flows.  Lawless 
& Murphy (2008) examine job creation and destruction in the Irish manufacturing 
sector for the years 1972 to 2006 using Forfás
18
 survey data which includes the 
Forfás Employment Survey and the Annual Business Survey of Economic Impact.  
They find that even when the Irish economy was booming during the Celtic Tiger 
period, there was a 15% job growth rate in expanding firms while there was a 7% job 
destruction rate in contracting firms.  Lawless (2012) updates some of this previous 
work examining job creation and destruction in Ireland using Forfás survey data 
from 1972 to 2010 and covers firms engaged in manufacturing and internationally 
                                                 
18
Forfás was Ireland’s policy advisory board for enterprise, trade, science, technology and innovation.  
In 2014, it was dissolved and its policy research activities were integrated into the Department of 
Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation.  See https://www.djei.ie/en/ for further details. 
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traded services.  Over the period 1972-2006, the average job creation rate was 10% 
while the average job destruction rate was 8%.  However, in 2010 a dramatic shift 
was noted.  The job creation rate fell to below 5% while the job destruction rate 
increased to 16%.   
Other work in relation to Ireland was conducted by Strobl, Walsh & Barry (1998) for 
the period 1974-1994.  They used the same data source used by Lawless & Murphy 
(2008) and Lawless (2012).  Strobl et al. (1998) suggest that the magnitude of the 
simultaneous creation and destruction of jobs over the period is noteworthy and 
report an average job creation rate of 8.4% and a job destruction rate of 8.9% over 
the period.  Thus in an Irish context, it is apparent that research conducted to date has 
used survey data.   
In contrast to these Irish studies, administrative data is available in other European 
countries such as the UK as previously mentioned, and Finland.  Ilmakunnas & 
Maliranta (2003) examine worker and job flows in the Finnish business sector.  The 
data covers practically the entire work force and spans a period in the 1990’s when 
Finland was in a recession.  As the recession began, the job creation rate decreased 
to a low of 9% in 1992, while the job destruction rate increased to around 19% in the 
same year.  However it is noted that by 1994, the gross job flow rates had returned to 
more normal levels, with both a job creation and destruction rate of around 15%. 
In relation to Northern Ireland, Roper (2004) examines job creation and destruction 
in the manufacturing sector for the years 1973-1993 using data from the Annual 
Respondents Database (ARD).  He reports job creation and job destruction rates are 
lower when compared to some international results from Ireland, Norway, Denmark, 
and the UK.  This difference appears to be more consistent with regards to job 
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creation rather than job destruction.  While noting the difficulty of making 
comparisons across time because of differences in data sources, timing and coverage, 
it is noted that the study by Barnes & Haskel (2002) which covers the entire UK uses 
the same data source as Roper (2004).  Roper (2004) suggests that such differences 
between the two studies may reflect real differences in rates as well as the fact that 
Barnes & Haskel (2002) compute job flow rates at the establishment level while 
Roper (2004) uses data at the enterprise level.  Further, he notes sectoral differences 
in data used in previous studies with many such as Strobl et al. (1998) in Ireland and 
Salvanes (1995) in Norway and in Denmark focusing on the manufacturing sector. 
As well as examining job flows and their associated levels, another aspect of job 
flows discussed in the literature is their volatility and cyclicality.  Baldwin et al. 
(1998) find differences in the variability of job flows.  Job destruction displays a 
greater volatility than job creation.  They also note earlier work by Davis & 
Haltiwanger (1990; 1992), who reported that job destruction in the US 
manufacturing sector is more sensitive to the business cycle than job creation.  This 
is because the standard deviation of job destruction in the US is 2.8 while it is 1.9 for 
job creation over the period.  In relation to Canada, Baldwin et al. (1998) report a 
similar pattern but the size of the difference is not as large with the standard 
deviation of job destruction recorded as 2.6 while that of job creation is 2.1.   
Boeri (1996) explores some of the reasons put forward for why we might expect 
counter-cyclical properties of job turnover.  For example, Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1990) suggest that job creation is a time consuming process.  On the other hand, job 
destruction is not and as a result, it fluctuates more over the business cycle than job 
creation.  Caballero & Hammour (1995) point to the ‘cleansing’ nature of recessions, 
drawing on earlier work of Blanchard & Diamond (1989) noting that in such periods 
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a reduction in the job creation rate is unlikely to be enough, necessitating a rise in the 
magnitude of job destruction.  However, Boeri (1996) questions the results from the 
US where there is statistically significant negative correlation reported between job 
reallocation and net employment growth.  He suggests that these results are not 
related to the flexibility of the labour market in the US where it may be easier for an 
employer to fire an employee compared to some European labour markets.  He 
specifically looks at Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), other 
European countries (France, Germany and Italy), and North America (Canada and 
United States) and finds that, with the exception of the US, other countries have a 
positive or statistically insignificant correlation between job reallocation and net 
employment growth.  He suggests that the US results may be a function of the data 
used.  While much of the data from European countries used is from administrative 
data sources covering manufacturing and services sectors, the US data is drawn from 
a survey of manufacturers only.  On the other hand, Davis & Haltiwanger (1999) 
suggest that the fact that Boeri finds little difference in the volatility of job flows (job 
creation and job destruction) may be due to the time period studied and suggest there 
was little cyclical variation in France or Sweden for example.  Boeri (1996) uses data 
for France for the years 1979 to 1988 and data for Sweden is for 1985 to 1992.   
3.2.2 Job flow rates by industry  
Gross job flow rates can vary hugely across industries as demonstrated by the OECD 
(2009).  They note that with the exception of Haltiwanger, Scarpetta & Schweiger 
(2006), there is little evidence on differences in job flows across countries based on 
comparable cross-country data.  They use data from Haltiwanger et al. (2006) and 
Bartelsman (2008) which is based on data from tax records and national business 
registers.  It is gathered using the same procedures for the countries in question.  
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They find that enterprise characteristics such as age, industry and firm size affect job 
flows across nations.  In particular it is reported that industry-specific effects account 
for a greater proportion of the overall variation in job creation rates (44%) than that 
of the variation in job destruction rates (24%) across countries.  Interestingly, they 
also find a strong correlation across industries between the job creation rate and net 
employment growth.  They interpret this as meaning those industries that are 
responsible for creating more jobs are also the ones where employment grows more 
rapidly.  However, the opposite does not hold in that they report no relationship 
between job destruction and a net decrease in employment.  This seems to suggest 
that industry-specific factors are more important determinants of job creation rather 
than job destruction.  This is in contrast with results of Hijzen et al. (2010).  While 
using UK data as opposed to cross-country data used by the OECD (2009), they do 
not report strong evidence of a correlation between job creation and net employment 
growth.  They do find a strong positive correlation between the job creation and 
destruction rate.   
Sectoral differences are also noted by Lane et al. (1996) in the US.  Later work by 
Baldwin et al. (1998) also analysed the importance of industry as well as year and 
country effects in an effort to explain differences between the US and Canada.  In 
this case regression analysis is used whereby dependent variables are measures of 
job flows such as job creation, destruction, reallocation and net employment growth.  
Country, industry and year are independent variables in these regressions.  
Interestingly, they report that industry has a high degree of explanatory power in 
accounting for variations in job creation, job destruction, and job reallocation.  
Country effects are found to have a very minor role in explaining variations in any of 
the job flow measures.   
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This finding regarding the role of industry is not unique to the US economy.  For 
example, a study of both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms in Taiwan 
over the period 1987-1997 by Tsou, Liu & Hammitt (2001) reports simultaneous job 
creation and destruction across sectors and these rates vary across sectors.  In the 
UK, Hijzen et al. (2010) note the importance of the services industry relative to the 
manufacturing industry in terms of employment, with almost all services sector 
industries growing while the opposite is the case for manufacturing sectors.  Also the 
gross job reallocation rate varied far less in the manufacturing sector.  Across all 
sectors, a similar pattern is noted as found in the previous papers mentioned – job 
creation and destruction occurs simultaneously across sectors and the rates vary 
between sectors.  For example, Hijzen et al. (2010) report a job creation rate of 
around 19% and a job destruction rate of approximately 15% in the construction 
sector, while the textiles component of the manufacturing sector is creating jobs at a 
rate of 8.6% and destroying jobs at a rate of 17.4%.   
3.2.3 Job flow rates and firm size 
As we saw earlier in Chapter 2, much emphasis has been placed on the role that 
small firms can play in the creation of jobs in Ireland.  Here we examine the 
evidence on the role of small firms in the job creation and destruction process. 
In identifying the contribution of small firms to job creation we can go back to the 
work of Birch (1989) in the US who emphasises the important role they can play in 
generating employment.  However, the actual degree to which small and large firms 
contribute to job creation and job destruction has not been agreed by researchers.  
Davis et al. (1996a) were one of the first to suggest their disagreement with the 
notion that small firms were responsible for the majority of job creation and instead 
suggest that it is in fact large firms that should be given this credit as “the 
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conventional wisdom rests on fallacious and misleading interpretations of the data” 
(Davis, et al. 1996a: 62).  They emphasise also that both job creation and job 
destruction figures are higher for small firms, with higher job destruction offsetting 
this higher job creation.  They find that in examining the net employment growth 
rates, they do not exhibit any strong relationship with firm size.  They go on to 
outline three flaws that they believe contribute to the belief that small firms 
contribute disproportionately more to job creation.  These are now explained below.  
They begin with what is termed the size distribution fallacy.  They suggest that this 
fallacy arises as firms can move between size classes from one year to the next.  So 
for example, if a large firm destroys jobs it may be reclassified into the small firm 
category and therefore may lead researchers to believe that there has been an 
increase in job creation when in fact it is just due to a large firm shrinking.  Barnes & 
Haskel (2002) note the use of longitudinal data which follows firms through time 
overcomes this issue. Davidsson, Lindmark & Olofsson (1998) also do not agree 
with the suggestions of Davis et al. (1996a, 1996b) because they suggest that few 
studies are affected by this issue.  They also point out that any resulting bias arising 
from this could run in either direction and affect the computation of job creation and 
destruction rates for both small and large firms.  Therefore as noted by Hijzen et al. 
(2010), there is no reason to suggest that any resulting bias would favour small firms 
more so than larger firms. 
The second issue noted by Davis et al. (1996a: 64) is what they term “netting out 
reality.”  This can arise if job creation is reported as a proportion of net rather than 
gross job creation.  So for example, a small firm may have created 20 jobs between 
year one and year two.  Two other firms may have created 140 jobs and destroyed 
140 jobs respectively.  Thus taking the job creation of small firms as a fraction of net 
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job creation would suggest that they are responsible for 100% of jobs created 
between one year and the next.  However as a fraction of gross job creation, the 
contribution of small firms would be 20/140 = 14%.  But again, as suggested by 
Davidson et al. (1998) and Hijzen et al. (2010), it is not clear why any resulting bias 
would distort results in favour of small firms only. 
The final issue alluded to by Davis et al. (1996a) is the regression fallacy.  It is 
pointed out that this can arise due to transitory fluctuations in firm employment or by 
measurement error if it introduces such transitory fluctuations.  This fallacy arises as 
firms are classified into their respective size classes, using the base year 
employment.  Firms that are classified as large in size have a greater likelihood of 
experiencing recent transitory increase in employment.  Thus large firms are more 
likely to experience a decrease in employment in the following period.  On the other 
hand, small firms are likely to have experienced a transitory decrease in employment 
and thus have a greater likelihood of experiencing an increase in employment in the 
following period.  They subsequently propose two other measures of firm size.  
These measures are average firm size which is average employment in each firm 
over the period and current size which is average employment in the current year and 
previous year.  Davidsson et al. (1998) suggest that while Davis et al. (1996a, 1996b) 
point out a real problem in relation to the regression fallacy, they question the 
significance of the impact on reported rates of job creation in small firms.  
Ultimately, while praising the work of Davis et al. (1996a, 1996b) in terms of their 
contribution to the debate on the role of small firms and job creation, they suggest 
that the methodological issues that are highlighted by them are not likely to be of 
great importance when estimating the role of small firms in relation to job creation.  
They also take issue with the use of average firm size over the sample period which 
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was proposed by Davis et al. (1996a, 1996b) as a possible solution to the regression 
fallacy suggesting it is only preferable if all of the changes in size are due to random 
fluctuations or measurement error.  This is because changes may cause a firms’ 
employment to move upwards or downwards and ultimately affect the average firm 
size estimate.   
In Canada Baldwin & Picot (1995) examine how job creation and destruction rates 
vary between small and large firms in the manufacturing sector.  They use a number 
of employment measures of plant size including average firm employment over the 
period of the study to aid comparisons with the US data.  This average employment 
method is also used by Roper (2004), as well as the initial employment measure.  
While the data used only covers firms with >20 employees, it is reported that small 
firms (20-49 employees) were the only size category to experience a net increase in 
employment between 1974 and 1993, using either method.  However, Baldwin & 
Picot (1995) also propose a classification whereby size is based on the average size 
of the firm in the two years preceding the analysis period to overcome problems with 
the average firm size classification, and this is used by Davidsson et al. (1998) and 
Hijzen et al. (2010).   
In the UK, Hijzen et al. (2010) report that, relative to their share of employment, 
small firms are responsible for a disproportionate amount of job creation (about 
65%) and destruction (about 45%). This is regardless of the chosen firm size 
measure.  An earlier UK study by Blanchflower & Burgess (1996) found a change in 
the job creation and destruction trend at 200 employees.  Firms with less than 200 
employees seem to create more than their share of jobs, while establishments with 
more than 200 employees destroy more than their share of jobs.  The share is 
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computed by dividing job creation in a firm size category by the share of 
employment of firms in that firm size category. 
Broersma & Gautier (1997) examine job creation and job destruction in the Dutch 
manufacturing sector over the period 1978-1991, focusing on both small and large 
firms.  Their data obtained from Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics allows 
them to distinguish between rates for continuing firms and those due to entry and 
exit from the data.  In all cases, there is significant heterogeneity across firm size 
categories.  In general, they find that firms with less than 20 employees have the 
highest rates of both job creation and job destruction and both appear to decline as 
firm size increases.   
Lane et al. (1996) report that small firms (<20 employees) create and destroy jobs at 
approximately three times the rate of the largest firms.  Results from Japan reported 
by Genda (1998) suggest a similar pattern.  Using differing measures of enterprise 
size at the beginning or end of a year for the period 1991-1995, it is reported that 
generally the rates of job creation and destruction decline as firm size increases.  It is 
suggested that the importance of small firms in the process of creating new jobs 
contrasts with results from Davis et al. (1996a).  For example in the US, Davis et al. 
(1996a) report that the share of job creation and destruction in firms with over 100 
employees was around 70%.  This is in contrast with Japan where figures vary from 
around 7% to 23% depending on whether establishment or enterprise size measures 
are used, as well as those of Hijzen et al. (2010) as already outlined. 
3.2.3.1 The persistence of job creation and job destruction 
While some previous research has suggested that small firms have high rates of job 
creation relative to their larger counterparts, a question arises as to how likely 
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employment changes are to persist over following periods.  So if firm e creates 50 
new jobs in year t, what proportion of those jobs will still be in existence in year t+1 
or year t+2?  Similarly for a firm that destroys 50 jobs in year t, how many of those 
jobs are likely to reappear in subsequent years?  The measure of persistence often 
used in the literature focuses on the persistence of a newly created or newly 
destroyed job.  [See for example Davis & Haltiwanger (1992), Davis et al. (1996a)].  
Hijzen et al. (2010) use the following equation to measure persistence;  
Persistence 𝑒,𝑥 =  
N𝑒,𝑡+𝑥 − N𝑒,𝑡−1
N𝑒,𝑡 − N𝑒,𝑡−1
 
where 0 < persistence e,x ≤ persistence e,x-1 < 1 
 
 (3.4) 
 
In this case, Ne is the level of employment in firm e, Nt+x is the year under 
consideration for persistence.  As noted by Hijzen et al. (2010) this measure 
computes the proportion of the change in employment that persists beyond the initial 
year and into year t+1, year t+2 and so on.  In using this formula, it is not possible to 
investigate if an individual who got a job in a certain year still has it in subsequent 
years.  The focus is instead on employment changes at the firm level, rather than on 
individual level employment changes and tracking individuals through time. 
Davis & Haltiwanger (1992) report that changes in employment at the level of the 
establishment are highly persistent.  On average they find that the persistence rate for 
newly created jobs after one year is around 67% while the corresponding job 
destruction rate is about 81%.  In subsequent work, Davis et al. (1996a) investigate 
the persistence rate in the US manufacturing sector between 1973 and 1988.  They 
find that the persistence rate for newly created jobs is about 70% after one year, 
while after two years it is approximately 54%.  Similarly for job destruction, a high 
level of persistence is reported.  It is found to be around 82% after one year and a 
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two year persistence rate of 73% is reported.  While they find lower rates for 
persistence using quarterly data over a similar period, they suggest that the use of 
quarterly data is more likely to be impacted by transitory employment changes that 
are subsequently reversed, perhaps in the following quarter.   
In the UK, Hijzen et al. (2010) also report high one year persistence rates.  They find 
an average one year persistence rate of 75% for job creation and 93% for job 
destruction.  Persistence rates are presented for differing firm size categories.  
Regarding job creation and job destruction, small firms (0-19 employees) appear to 
have a higher persistence rate than large firms (5000+ employees).  They note that 
much of the job destruction in small firms is due to exit, therefore this helps explain 
the high persistence rate.  Barnes & Haskel (2002) report lower persistence rates for 
the manufacturing sector for the period 1981-1990 than Hijzen et al. (2010).  For 
example, Barnes & Haskel (2002) report a one year persistence rate of 57% for job 
creation and a rate of 47% for job destruction in 1989.  Like Hijzen et al. (2010), 
they report that overall job destruction is more persistent than job creation.   
Albaek & Sørensen (1998) examine persistence in the Danish manufacturing sector.  
Persistence rates for job creation and destruction after one year are reported at 70% 
and 58% respectively.  Here results are compared to Davis et al. (1996a) for the US 
manufacturing sector.  While there are similarities between persistence rates for job 
creation, it is suggested that job destruction is more persistent in the US.  Broersma 
& Gautier (1997) also examine persistence in the Dutch manufacturing sector 
focusing on continuing firms.  They find that the persistence of job destruction 
increases with firm size.  In relation to job creation, they find that jobs created in 
small firms are more persistent than jobs created in large firms. 
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Turning to Austria, Stiglbauer et al. (2003) analyse the persistence of newly created 
and destroyed jobs.  This paper does not focus on persistence across firm size 
categories but instead focuses on overall levels and also looks at differences across 
continuing firms and new entrants.  They find that job creation and job destruction 
both display a high degree of persistence.  They also compare results to those of 
Davis et al. (1996a) and find that Austrian rates are slightly higher than those found 
in the US.  Stiglbauer et al. (2003) examine persistence rates for existing firms – 
contracting or expanding firms – and new entrants separately.  Interestingly they find 
little difference in how stable jobs created in new firms are in comparison to existing 
firms.  For example after 10 years, around 25% of newly created jobs by new 
entrants are still in existence.  In expanding firms the figure is around 29%.  As 
noted by the authors, this is interesting because generally new start-ups would be 
considered to be relatively unstable when compared to jobs created in continuing 
firms. 
3.2.4 Job flow rates by region in Ireland  
Some work has been conducted in Ireland to investigate regional differences in job 
flows.  Meyler & Strobl (2000) examine the impact of industrial policy on job 
generation.  Specifically they look at the impact of industrial policy and support 
given through the IDA
19
 designated areas versus non-designated areas.  Such 
designated areas tended to be the least industrialised and most peripheral parts of 
Ireland.  They report that there was a higher job creation rate within the designated 
areas in the 1970’s with jobs created being more likely to survive, while jobs 
destroyed had a greater likelihood of being recovered.  In identifying the factors that 
affect job creation and destruction in both designated and non-designated areas, they 
                                                 
19
 The IDA supports overseas companies seeking to establish a base in Ireland. 
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find that regional industrial policy had a positive effect on job creation in the 
designated areas and did not have a significant effect on the rate of job destruction 
between 1973 and 1982.  
3.2.5 International trade and job flows 
This section outlines the results of recent studies that examine the link between 
international trade and job flows.  As mentioned earlier, there is a strong expectation 
among Irish policy makers that export-led growth is key to the Irish economic 
recovery and the creation of jobs. 
In the US Davis et al. (1996a) investigate the relationship between international trade 
and job flows.  They use two measures of foreign trade exposure.  The first measure 
is an import penetration ratio which is computed by dividing the imports by the sum 
of imports and domestic output.  The second measure is an export share measure 
which is a calculated by dividing exports by domestic output.  Interestingly they find 
no evidence of a systematic relationship between their measures of trade exposure 
and job flows.  In reviewing previous literature on job flows and international 
competition Klein, Schuh & Triest (2003) suggest that the lack of relationship 
reported between international trade and job flows is due to the nature of their 
analysis.  Davis et al. (1996a) use the averages for job flows and international trade 
intensity over a fourteen year period.  Because different factors determine both, 
“there is no well-established theoretical or empirical reason for a connection between 
these two sets of underlying factors that determine long-run averages”  (Klein et al. 
2003: 22-23). Hence they suggest it is more appropriate to examine changes in 
exposure to trade intensity and job flows.  In this case, the expectation of a 
relationship between the two variables is appropriate. 
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Turning to evidence outside of the US, Levinsohn (1999) investigates job creation 
and job destruction patterns in Chile and links this to the trade orientation and size of 
the firm.  Following significant liberalisation of trade in the country, its impact on 
employment patterns is examined.  The data used is described as a “census” of 
manufacturing firms as all firms with at least ten employees are included 
(Levinsohn, 1999: 324).  This is a total of 6,665 plants which were taken from eight 
longitudinal samples and combined to form an unbalanced panel.  Levinsohn (1999) 
follows the approach of Davis & Haltiwanger (1992) for computing job flow rates 
and reports that, even when job destruction was at its greatest in 1982 at 23% and 
employment was shrinking at a rate of 18%, there was still job creation occurring at 
a rate of 5%.  These rates are then examined according to whether a firm is an 
exporter, importer or in the non-tradable group.  He uses an OLS regression to 
estimate the job growth rate and includes year dummies and firm-size dummies.  
However in addition to these, dummy variables were also included to account for 
trade orientation.  Interaction dummies are included to account for the interaction 
between trade orientation and year.  Here weak evidence is found that the rate of job 
creation is higher in the export sector when trade was liberalised in Chile.   
Hijzen et al. (2010) use similar regression techniques to that of Levinsohn (1999) to 
explore the impact of exposure to international competition on employment growth 
rates.  They investigate if involvement in international trade can partly account for 
their observation that job reallocation rates vary across sectors of the UK.  They 
follow the approach of Davis et al. (1996a) to estimate job flows and compute an 
import penetration ratio and the export share for each industry.  Each industry is 
classified on the basis of its change in import and export intensity respectively.  The 
change is computed between the average of the first three year period which covers 
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the years 1997-1999 and the final three year period of 2006-2008.  Industries are 
assigned to quintiles based on how their import or export intensity changed.  A 
simple regression approach is taken to determine if job creation and job destruction 
varies significantly across quintiles.  Similar to Levinsohn (1999), they control for 
year and industry fixed effects by including dummy variables in their regression 
equations for job creation and destruction.  Hijzen et al. (2010) find little evidence of 
a systematic relationship between job creation and the change in import or export 
behaviour.  However, they do find some evidence to support the assertion that job 
destruction is affected by trade exposure.  Industries included in the highest import 
quintile experience higher rates of job destruction.  However, industries that reside in 
the highest export quintile have the lowest rates of job destruction. 
A similar regression approach is adopted by Pisu (2008) in examining job flows and 
international trade involvement using firm level data from Belgium for the period 
1998-2004 in terms of controlling for fixed effects.  A simple (six categories) and 
then detailed (nineteen categories) classification system is used to assign firms 
according to their type of international activities.  Here the employment growth rate 
is regressed on dummies which represent the trade status and size of the firm.  
Whether the simple or detailed classification system is used, it is reported that 
involvement in international markets in some form is associated with a higher 
employment growth rate.  This is particularly true for firms that are just beginning 
their involvement in international markets. 
3.2.6 Conclusion  
In this section we explored literature and empirical evidence on job flows.  We have 
seen that job creation and destruction rates can be high and vary across countries.  
Within countries, sectoral differences can play an important role in understanding the 
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magnitude of job flows and have been attributed with strong explanatory power in 
explaining job flows.  We also noted that the classification of what constitutes a 
‘small’ firm varies across studies.  Whether small firms do contribute more to the 
creation of new jobs, relative to their larger counterparts is at issue.  We do find 
evidence in the literature to support this assertion.  With regards to international 
trade and job flows, the evidence is somewhat limited on the magnitude of the 
impact of exporting and importing activity on job flows.  The measurement of 
exporting and importing activity is important and can impact results.  In response, 
some studies have utilised a measure of changing export or import intensity rather 
than average levels to explore the relationship with job creation and job destruction. 
3.3: Data & Methodology 
This section describes the data used in this chapter and thesis.  It also explains in 
detail the methodology used in the construction of the final panel analysed in this 
chapter as well as how key job flow measures are computed. 
3.3.1 Data sources 
The linked employer-employee P35 data used in this chapter (and thesis) is available 
from the CSO in Ireland.  This dataset constructed by the CSO
20
 was formed by 
merging three data sources.  These are; 
 The P35L data from Revenue Commissioners, 
 The Client Record System (CRS) from the Department of Social Protection, 
 The Central Business Register (CBR) in the CSO. 
As mentioned earlier, an enterprise is defined by the CSO as per EU statistical 
legislation.  It is the smallest combination of legal units that is an organisational unit 
                                                 
20
 See Appendix 12 for details on CSO data access protocols. 
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producing goods or services, which benefits from a certain degree of autonomy in 
decision-making, especially for the allocation of its current resources.  An enterprise 
carries out one or more activities at one or more locations (OECD 2016). The P35L 
data file is the primary source of data which contains information on each registered 
employment in Ireland for the years 2005 to 2010
21
 and so links employee and 
employer details.  A registered employment spell is that which is registered by the 
employer with the Revenue Commissioners.  This data is an administrative source 
based on data collected by the Revenue Commissioners in Ireland.  It contains over 
two million employee observations in each file annually.  It is possible for each 
worker to have more than one employment record.  For example, one person may 
have more than one job in a given year.  As start and end dates associated with each 
employment record are not available, it is not possible to tell if such jobs are 
concurrent or consecutive.  Table 3.1 sets out the number of enterprises and 
employment records associated with each year.  Thus the number of employment 
records may be greater than the numbers in employment generated by the CSO from 
the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS), which is the official source of 
employment and unemployment statistics in Ireland.
22
  It is worth noting at this point 
that the data does not contain a part-time/full-time indicator.  It does contain a 
variable identifying the number of weeks worked associated with an employment 
record.  So if a person worked 40 hours a week for 52 weeks of the year, they would 
have 52 weeks worked, as would a person who worked for 1 hour a week for 52 
                                                 
21
 In Chapter 4 we use data from 2005-2011 while in Chapter 5 we use data from 2005-2013. 
22
 The QNHS defines a person as being in employment if  they worked in the week before the survey 
for one hour or more for payment or profit, including work on the family farm or business and all 
persons who had a job but were not at work because of illness, holidays etc. in the week.  See 
http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/qnhs/quarterlynationalhouseholdsurveyquarter12016/  
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weeks of the year.  The dataset also contains an annual pay variable to identify the 
pay a person received from an enterprise.  This is total taxable pay.
23
 
This file contains a person identifier and an enterprise identifier.  This facilities its 
merger with the CRS to assign person-based attributes which are age, gender and 
nationality.  The availability of an enterprise identifier means the file can be merged 
with the CBR to assign the enterprise-based attributes of the NACE Rev.2 sector it 
belongs to as well as its legal form.   
As mentioned, the available data does not have point in time measurement which 
means it is not possible to identify the exact start and end date of an employment 
record.  Therefore a methodology where year t is compared with year t-1 is used.  
This dataset will hereafter be referred to as the P35 dataset and is the primary data 
source used throughout this thesis. 
The second data source used in this chapter is survey data collected through the 
Census of Industrial Production (CIP) in Ireland for the years 2006 to 2010.  This is 
merged with the P35 dataset and is used in section 3.4.3.  The CIP dataset contains 
over 4,000 enterprise observations per year.  According to the CSO (2016h), the CIP 
is an annual survey sent by the CSO to enterprises with three or more employees, 
primarily engaged in industrial production and this includes the following NACE 
economic sectors; 
 B - Mining and quarrying 
 C - Manufacturing  
 D - Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
                                                 
23
 Pay is total taxable pay.  It is gross pay less employee contributions to health insurance, 
superannuation, union subscriptions and the travel pass scheme. 
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 E - Water supply; sewerage waste management and remediation activities 
The key variables collected include turnover, exports, purchases, additions to capital 
assets and sales of capital assets.  Of particular interest in this chapter is the 
percentage of turnover exported variable.  The percentage of materials imported is 
also included as is the region the enterprise is operating in (CSO, 2016h).  This is the 
first time the CIP and P35 datasets have been linked and offers a unique opportunity 
to examine the impact of export activity on job flows. 
3.3.2 Cleaning the data sources 
Figure 3.1 provides an overview of how the P35-CIP panel was constructed.  The 
details are now described.  Initially each annual P35 data file was examined.  There 
were a number of individually assigned employment records in each file that did not 
have an associated enterprise number.  Therefore it was impossible to identify which 
enterprise these employment records were associated with.  Because of this, these 
observations were deemed to be un-usable for the subsequent analysis and were 
removed from the data file.   
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Figure 3.1: Overview of construction of P35-CIP panel  
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Table 3.1 below details the number of observations that were deleted each year and 
the remaining number of annual observations.  It is important to remember that these 
deleted observations are person-based employment records as opposed to enterprise 
based numbers so they represent the number of employment records, not actual 
enterprises.  So while it is possible to identify the number of individually assigned 
employment records that are removed, it is not possible to identify the number of 
enterprises that are affected.     
Table 3.1: The number of observations removed from data (all NACE sectors) 
Year 
No. of 
employment 
records  
No. of 
employment 
records with no 
enterprise 
number  
No. of 
remaining 
employment 
records with 
enterprise 
numbers 
No. of 
remaining 
individuals 
with 
enterprise 
numbers 
No. of 
remaining 
enterprises 
with 
enterprise 
numbers 
2005 2,659,918 66,494 2,593,424 2,046,661 138,158 
2006 2,776,006 51,230 2,724,776 2,161,081 147,028 
2007 2,958,235 35,609 2,922,626 2,296,046 156,549 
2008 2,834,984 27,614 2,807,370 2,275,552 156,059 
2009 2,444,565 20,060 2,424,505 2,067,732 141,640 
2010 2,329,216 17,329 2,311,887 1,967,863 138,321 
 
In each annual file, there were some individual observations which had a value 
greater than 52 for the number of weeks worked.  These were subsequently assumed 
to be due to an administrative error and the number of weeks worked was assumed to 
be a maximum of 52 per individual.  Also the number of individual employment 
records per enterprise were summed in each year.  This gives the number of 
individually assigned employment records per enterprise in each year.  Importantly, 
this value is used as the enterprise employment value later.  At this point, only 
enterprise level observations are required so one row is retained for each enterprise 
in each year of the dataset.  This means that the dataset is reduced to an enterprise-
level dataset as opposed to an individual-level dataset.  A panel of enterprises is thus 
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formed for the years 2005 to 2010.  At this point it was decided to focus on the 
Business Economy, specifically sectors B-N.  This results in a panel of 689,091 
observations across the years 2005-2010. 
The data was examined and it was decided that if there was a gap in the data for a 
particular year for an enterprise, the employment value for that enterprise would be 
imputed.  This was done to capture data for all enterprises that were essentially 
continuing enterprises but due to a gap in the data, may erroneously be classified as 
exiters and subsequently as entrants again.  This was deemed appropriate as it would 
be misleading, for example, to classify an enterprise as an exiter if they were clearly 
present in all years except one.  So for example, if an enterprise had an observation 
in 2006 and there was no record of the enterprise in 2007, but there was a record in 
2008 and subsequent years, the employment value is imputed as its exclusion is 
assumed to be an administrative error.  The imputed values are linearly interpolated.  
In total, 14,826 values were imputed in the panel.  Table 3.2 below displays the 
number of values imputed in each year.  It also shows the average size of enterprises 
with imputed values.  As we can see, the average size for enterprises with imputed 
values is smaller than those without imputed values across all years.  A possible 
reason for this is could be that small enterprise may have not made a return to 
Revenue, who may have been more active in ensuring compliance from larger 
enterprises. 
 
 
 
49 
 
Table 3.2: Imputed values and enterprise size 
Year 
No. of values 
imputed 
Average size of 
enterprises with imputed 
values 
Average size of 
enterprises with no 
imputed values 
2005 0 - 16.9 
2006 3,472 11.9 17 
2007 3,561 6.4 17 
2008 3,254 4.9 16.2 
2009 4,539 4.3 14.9 
2010 0 - 14.6 
 
The next step was to create variables to identify enterprises that were new entrants or 
those that exited from the data during the 2005-2010 period.  Enterprises are deemed 
to be new entrants if their first appearance in the dataset occurred in years other than 
2005.  Similarly an enterprise was deemed to be an exiter in a given year if the final 
observation for that enterprise was in a year other than 2010.  Also an additional row 
was created for exiters.  In this extra row, the employment value was assumed to be 
0.  This was done to ensure that the employment growth of the enterprise would 
fluctuate only within the range of +2 for new entrants and -2 for exiters.  In total, 
72,639 additional rows with zero employment values were created for exiters.  This 
gave a final panel size of 776,556 observations. Table 3.3 below shows the number 
of enterprises in each year. 
Table 3.3: Number of enterprises per year in NACE sectors B-N 
Year Number of enterprises 
2005 108,150 
2006 127,349 
2007 137,660 
2008 141,109 
2009 136,858 
2010 125,430 
Total  776,556 
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3.3.3 The merging of the P35 and CIP data sources 
We now explain how the P35 and CIP data sets were merged.  As per Appendix 
Table 2.3, there were 25,578 enterprises in the initial CIP dataset varying from 4,620 
in 2006 to 4,782 in 2010.  The merging of the P35 and CIP data was facilitated by a 
common enterprise identifier for each enterprise observation in both datasets.  Thus 
an unbalanced panel is formed.  As a result of this, the sample size was reduced 
considerably as there are a significant number of enterprises that are not covered by 
the CIP as they belong to a different NACE sector.  There are 23,852 matches 
achieved between the P35 and CIP data. 
Initially, one anomaly in the data emerged whereby in 503 cases, an enterprise that 
was an exiter according to the P35 and so had zero employment had a corresponding 
survey match.  In this case, it was decided to eliminate the data from the CIP match 
and follow the P35 data which indicated the enterprise had exited.
24
   
There were also 267 observations that are correctly coded as exiters in the P35, in the 
final row which was created by the researcher to identify exiters.  By construction, 
these enterprises correctly could not have a match in the CIP as this final row in the 
P35 was constructed by the researcher to represent zero employment in the firm and 
to later capture a growth rate of -2 for exiters.  In this case, the merged data was 
amended to count the rows for these firms as matches in the dataset.  Therefore in 
total, there are 770 exiters in the merged dataset.  This change now means there are 
24,119 matches in the merged dataset. 
So we can see that we did not achieve a match for every one of the 25,578 available 
CIP observations even though we might anticipate a one-to-one match between the 
                                                 
24
 This judgement was made following discussions with two individuals responsible for the P35 and 
CIP respectively.  Neither provided a useful explanation for this anomaly.   
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P35 and CIP for each enterprise in each year.  From discussions with the CSO, 
possible reasons were identified for complete one-to-one matches not being achieved 
between enterprises in both datasets.  First, differences may arise because enterprises 
are born and others die at different points in time within the sample period.  For 
example, an enterprise may die within year t, after a CIP survey has been distributed.  
However the enterprise was in existence at the start of the year t and had paid 
employees.  Second, there is an opportunity for an enterprise to apply for an 
exemption from completing the CIP in a particular year.  Third, the CIP covers 
enterprises with three or more employees while the P35 data covers all enterprises, 
regardless of size. 
As seen from Table 3.4 below, larger firms were more likely to achieve a match in 
each year from 2006-2010.  A possible reason for this is that the CSO are 
particularly keen on ensuring that larger enterprises respond to the CIP survey and 
pursue this group to ensure a high response rate.  
Table 3.4: Average firm size for matched enterprises 
Number of matches achieved 
Average enterprise size (no. of 
employment records) 
Enterprise achieves 0 matches (=>in P35 only) 13.03 
Enterprise achieves match in 1 year 14.04 
Enterprise achieves match in 2 years 28.51 
Enterprise achieves match in 3 years 23.71 
Enterprise achieves match in 4 years 22.42 
Enterprise achieves match in 5 years 67.79 
 
Following discussions with the CSO, concerns were raised regarding confidentially 
and sectors B, D and E due to the relatively small number of enterprises involved.  
Therefore, it was decided to remove NACE sectors B, D and E from the analysis.  
The enterprises in the manufacturing sector (C) were retained.  This is not a major 
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limitation as almost 90% of the observations in the CIP are from the manufacturing 
sector.   
As can be seen from Table 3.5 below, the number of manufacturing enterprise 
observations in the merged CIP-P35 dataset varies from year to year.  Over the 
period 2006-2010, there are 22,299 enterprise observations in the P35-CIP dataset. 
Table 3.5: Number of manufacturing enterprise observations in the matched 
P35-CIP dataset, 2006-2010. 
Year Number of enterprises 
2006 4,016 
2007 4,894 
2008 4,806 
2009 4,350 
2010 4,233 
Total 22,299 
 
3.3.4 Methodology 
An enterprise level employment growth rate is computed for all enterprises in the 
P35 data, having formed a panel of all firms for the years 2005 to 2010.  This is done 
prior to merging with the CIP data.  This methodology is used in the UK by Hijzen 
et al. (2010) who follow the work of Davis et al. (1992) in the US.  This chapter 
follows the same approach and draws on the equations used by both which are now 
described.  We begin by computing employment growth g, as per equation 3.3 
explained earlier.   
To sum the growth of employment across enterprises, a weight is defined.  This 
weight (𝑤𝑖𝑡) accounts for the size of the enterprise in calculating the rates of job 
creation and job destruction for all enterprises.  In Equation (3.5), as outlined by 
Hijzen et al. (2010), 𝜀𝑗𝑡 is the set of enterprises in group j at time t or t-1.  The 
grouping j could constitute an industrial sector for example. 
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𝑤𝑖𝑡 =
(𝑁𝑖𝑡+𝑁𝑖𝑡−1)
∑ 𝜀𝑗𝑡𝑖∈ (𝑁𝑖𝑡+𝑁𝑖𝑡−1)
         
 (3.5) 
 
 
The job creation rate, JC𝑖𝑡within a group can be calculated as:  
JCit =  ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡g𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝜖𝜀𝑗𝑡,𝑔>0
 
 (3.6) 
 
 
As noted by Hijzen et al. (2010: 625), this is essentially “employment-weighted 
employment growth for positive values of g𝑖𝑡”. 
The job destruction rate, JD𝑖𝑡, is similarly defined in Equation (3.7)  below for values 
of g𝑖𝑡 which are negative. 
JDit =  ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡|g𝑖𝑡|
𝑖𝜖𝜀𝑗𝑡,𝑔<0
 
 
 (3.7) 
 
The job creation and destruction rate reflect the reallocation of jobs which influences 
the reallocation of workers in the economy.  The job reallocation rate is defined as 
the sum of job creation and job destruction in group j in Equation (3.8) below.  As 
noted by Davis et al. (1996a) and Hijzen et al. (2010), this link between job flows 
and worker flows means that the job reallocation rate can be thought of as a 
‘maximum’ amount of worker shifts that are required given the change or reshuffling 
of job opportunities across sectors. 
JR =  JC𝑖𝑡 + JD𝑖𝑡 
 
 (3.8) 
 
The net job reallocation rate or net employment growth rate is given by the 
difference between the job creation and job destruction rates as shown in equation 
54 
 
(3.9).  This represents the minimum amount of movement of workers required to 
accommodate the job reallocation. 
NET = JC𝑖𝑡 − JD𝑖𝑡   
 
 (3.9) 
 
The excess job reallocation rate for a group of enterprises is defined as the difference 
between JR and NET, as described in equation (3.10).   
EX = JR𝑖𝑡 −  |NET𝑖𝑡| 
 
 (3.10) 
 
It provides a useful measure of offsetting job creation and job destruction within a 
group of firms.  As Hijzen et al. (2010) note, it indicates the number of job changes 
over and above what is required to accommodate the net employment change given 
by NET.   
3.4: Findings 
This section presents the main findings of the descriptive analysis regarding job flow 
rates.  In sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 we focus on the P35 dataset (which covers NACE 
Rev.2 sectors B-N).  This gives an overview of the situation in the business economy 
over the period 2006-2010.  Results are presented for the business economy as a 
whole, for each sector, as well as by enterprise size category.  In section 3.4.3 the 
focus will turn to manufacturing enterprises and the matched P35-CIP data.   
3.4.1 Job flow rates in the Irish economy, NACE Rev. 2 sectors B-N 
We begin by examining the employment growth rate over the period.  As explained 
in the previous section, the employment growth rate git ranges between -2 (for 
exiters) and +2 (for new entrants).  Figure 3.2 displays a simple histogram of the 
employment growth rate.  As can be seen, there are a slightly higher number of 
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exiters than new entrants.  A large number of enterprises experienced a growth rate 
of very close to zero.   
Figure 3.2: The employment growth rate  
 
Table 3.6 shows the average job flow measures for NACE sectors B-N over the 
period 2006-2010.  It appears to be a story of two halves, with the years 2006 and 
2007 having high rates of job creation relative to job destruction.  On the other hand, 
the years 2008-2010 are periods dominated by high job destruction rates and 
negative net employment growth.  The job creation rate was over 17% in 2006 and 
this dropped to 11% in 2009.   
Table 3.6: Job flow rates in NACE sectors B-N, 2006-2010 
Year Job 
creation 
Job 
destruction 
Job 
reallocation 
Net 
reallocation  
Excess 
reallocation 
2006 0.175 -0.076 0.251 0.099 0.152 
2007 0.159 -0.101 0.260 0.058 0.201 
2008 0.110 -0.176 0.285 -0.066 0.220 
2009 0.110 -0.295 0.405 -0.185 0.220 
2010 0.114 -0.193 0.307 -0.080 0.227 
The most dramatic shift occurred in terms of job destruction.  It stood at almost 8% 
in 2006 but by 2009 it had increased to almost 30%.  The net employment growth 
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figures were positive over the years 2006 and 2007 but turned negative in the later 
years as a result of a decline in the job creation rate and an increase in the job 
destruction rate.  As outlined in section 3.3.1, job reallocation is the sum of job 
creation and destruction.  Excess reallocation is the difference between job 
reallocation and net reallocation and measures the amount of job changes over and 
above what is required to accommodate the net employment change. 
3.4.1.1 The cyclicality of job flows 
We can also investigate the cyclical dynamics of job flows over the period.  A simple 
correlation between job creation and destruction yields a correlation coefficient of 
+0.23 (statistically significant at 5% level).  While the magnitude of the coefficient is 
relatively small, it is interesting that it is positive.  As observed in Table 3.6, as we 
approach the onset of the recession in 2008, the job destruction rate increases and the 
job creation rate falls.  However, the cyclical behaviour does not appear to be 
symmetrical.  While job destruction rises dramatically over the period, job creation 
does not fall to the same degree.  We see very little change in the job creation rate 
between 2008-2010, and even a slight increase in 2010.  With regards to volatility 
and job flows, job destruction displays greater volatility than job creation.  This is 
computed by dividing the variance of job destruction by the variance of job creation 
over the period which gives a value of 3.01.  This ratio confirms greater variance of 
job destruction relative to job creation.  The standard deviation of job creation is 
5.3% while for job destruction the value is 9.2%.  Davis & Haltiwanger (1999) find 
that in most of the countries they studied, the variance of job destruction is greater 
than that of job creation.  For example, the variance of job destruction divided by the 
variance of job creation is 2.04 in the US, 1.49 in Canada, 1.48 in Norway and 2.68 
in the Netherlands. 
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Turning to cyclicality, it is possible to examine the correlations between job flows 
and the net employment growth rate, assuming that this is an indicator of the 
business cycle.  Beginning with job creation, we find a correlation coefficient of 
+0.33 between it and net employment growth.  So while job creation moves pro-
cyclically, it is not a particularly strong relationship (although statistically significant 
at the 5% level).  Previous work by Roper (2004), found a corresponding correlation 
of +0.80 for manufacturing firms in Northern Ireland, while Strobl et al. (1998) 
report a slightly higher correlation of +0.87.  It is worth noting that Roper’s work 
refers to the manufacturing sector only.  With regards to job destruction and the net 
employment growth rate, we find job destruction moves counter-cyclically, with a 
correlation coefficient of -0.84 (statistically significant at 5% level).  This is quite 
similar to the earlier work of Strobl et al. (1998) in Ireland (correlation coefficient -
0.96) and Roper (2004) for Northern Ireland (correlation coefficient -0.89).  For the 
Finnish business sector, Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2003) report similarly high 
correlations over the period 1991-1997.   
This evidence shows that Irish enterprises were still creating jobs over the period.  
Even with the onset of the recession, job creation remained stable between 2008 and 
2010.  On the other hand, job destruction rose dramatically.  So it appears that in 
Ireland, enterprises do use job destruction as a means of re-organising production 
when required, rather than reducing the job creation rate.  The rise in job destruction 
is greater than the fall in job creation.   
The job reallocation rate increases up to 2009 in Ireland and while it fell slightly in 
2010, it remained higher when compared to earlier years.  This suggests that it 
moves counter-cyclically – rising in a recession.  This counter-cyclical job 
reallocation results from the greater variance of job destruction relative to job 
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creation.  It suggests much displacement of workers across the economy.  
Ilmakunnas & Maliranta (2003) cite some theoretical reasons for this phenomenon. 
One possible explanation refers to that provided by Caballero & Hammour (1994).  
Essentially it is suggested that less productive firms exit in a recession but when the 
economy begins to recover, there are start-up costs that may slow down new firms 
from becoming established and creating new positions.  In the Irish case here, it 
appears that job reallocation does move counter-cyclically with a correlation 
coefficient of -0.52 (statistically significant at 5% level).  Roper (2004) finds a lower 
correlation of -0.30 for Northern Ireland while Strobl et al. (1998) find a coefficient 
of -0.61 for Irish manufacturing firms.   
Thus our results appear to be closer to those of Davis & Haltiwanger (1999) for the 
US manufacturing sector, supporting the idea that job reallocation is counter-
cyclical.  They contrast somewhat with those of Albaek & Sørensen (1998) for 
Danish manufacturing firms who report a standard deviation of 1.6% for both job 
creation and job destruction.  Therefore they, along with Boeri (1996) as discussed 
earlier, do not find evidence to support the counter-cyclicality of job reallocation. 
It has been suggested by Davis (1998) that it is more appropriate to focus on the 
correlation between excess job reallocation and net employment growth as a measure 
of reallocation activity.  This is because while the job reallocation measure increases 
with rising job creation and job destruction, it also increases with rising net 
employment growth.  The measure of excess reallocation used in this chapter 
removes the net employment growth from the process.  Therefore we are left with 
reallocation in excess of what is required to accommodate the net employment 
growth.  Over the whole period, we see relatively little change in the rate of excess 
reallocation in Table 3.6 and find a correlation coefficient of -0.38 with net 
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employment growth (statistically significant at 5% level).  This suggests that there is 
still a counter-cyclical relationship between excess reallocation and net employment 
growth, although the magnitude of the effect is relatively low.  The OECD (2009) 
examine excess job reallocation rates across a number of countries, controlling for 
industry composition and report that countries with more flexible labour markets due 
to for example, less employment protection, are more likely to have excess job 
reallocation rates of above 25%.  Such countries mentioned include the United 
States, Brazil and the UK.  On the other hand, European countries including Sweden 
and Germany have excess job reallocation rates of less than 15%.  In Ireland in 2006, 
the excess reallocation rate was around 15%.  However, over the following years it 
increased to almost 23%. 
3.4.1.2 The role of enterprise entry and exit 
We now turn our attention to how entry and exit contribute to job creation and job 
destruction respectively.  Table 3.7 breaks the total job creation rates into two 
groups.  The first is job creation caused by enterprise entry and the second is job 
creation caused by enterprise growth.  The job destruction rates are similarly broken 
down into that caused by exit and decline.  Here we observe that the entry of new 
enterprises accounts for 40%
25
 of the job creation on average over the period.  On the 
other hand the exit of enterprises accounts for about 30%
26
 of the job destruction on 
average.  The remainder of job destruction is accounted for by shrinking as opposed 
to exiting enterprises.  This suggests that even during this period of economic 
turbulence in Ireland, new firms were still entering the market and creating new jobs.  
At the same time, job destruction was increasing considerably and much of this is 
                                                 
25
 Using Table 3.7, this is computed by dividing the total average entrants figure (0.054) by the total 
average JC figure (0.134). 
26
 Using Table 3.7, this is computed by dividing the total average exiters figure (-0.051) by the total 
average JD figure (-0.168). 
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attributable to declining enterprises rather than to enterprises that were forced to exit 
from the market.  However it is worth noting that the proportion of job destruction 
attributable to exiting enterprises increased from 23% in 2006 to 41% in 2010.
27
 
Table 3.7: Job creation and destruction; component parts 
 Job creation  Job destruction  
Year Total  Entrants Growth Total  Decline Exit 
2006 0.175 0.061 0.114 -0.076 -0.058 -0.018 
2007 0.159 0.050 0.109 -0.101 -0.070 -0.031 
2008 0.110 0.046 0.064 -0.176 -0.134 -0.042 
2009 0.110 0.070 0.040 -0.295 -0.213 -0.082 
2010 0.114 0.043 0.071 -0.193 -0.113 -0.080 
Average  0.134 0.054 0.080 -0.168 -0.118 -0.051 
 
Next we move to looking at job flows across sectors of the Irish economy.
28
 Table 
3.8 displays the job creation and destruction rates by NACE economic sector and 
year.  There are big variations in the rates across sectors and years.  The most 
dramatic of the changes occurred in the construction sector (F) where the job 
creation and destruction rates were about 25% and 11% respectively in 2006, while 
in 2009 the corresponding rates stood at 8% and 62%.  As was the case in Table 3.6 
above, the job destruction rate is greater than the job creation rate in many sectors 
during the 2008-2010 period, while between 2006 and 2007 the job creation rate was 
greater than the job destruction rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 Using Table 3.7, this is computed by dividing the total average exiter figure for a given year by the 
total average JD figure for that year. 
28
 Appendix Table 2.1 displays the number of enterprises in sectors B-N for the years 2005-2010. 
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Table 3.8: Job creation and job destruction by NACE sector, 2006-2010  
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
B. Mining & 
Quarrying 
JC - - 0.092 0.061 0.028 
JD - - -0.080 -0.273 -0.224 
C. Manufacturing JC 0.108 0.089 0.055 0.076 0.028 
JD -0.065 -0.074 -0.127 -0.232 -0.152 
D. Electricity, Gas, 
Steam & Air 
Conditioning 
JC - - - - - 
JD - - - - - 
E. Water supply & 
sewerage 
JC 0.196 0.200 0.148 0.080 0.128 
JD -0.078 -0.066 -0.149 -0.178 -0.166 
F. Construction JC 0.250 0.203 0.120 0.085 0.141 
JD -0.115 -0.180 -0.364 -0.623 -0.470 
G. Wholesale & 
retail trade 
JC 0.138 0.145 0.087 0.156 0.090 
 JD -0.074 -0.083 -0.122 -0.257 -0.145 
H. Transport & 
storage 
JC 0.124 0.118 0.107 0.052 0.084 
 JD -0.050 -0.096 -0.087 -0.178 -0.135 
I. Accommodation 
& food service 
activities 
JC 0.189 0.173 0.124 0.104 0.138 
 JD -0.102 -0.126 -0.186 -0.327 -0.198 
J. Information & 
Communication  
JC 0.237 0.186 0.174 0.162 0.154 
 JD -0.087 -0.136 -0.120 -0.265 -0.162 
K. Financial & 
Insurance activities 
JC 0.136 0.150 0.055 0.049 0.111 
 JD -0.085 -0.109 -0.122 -0.144 -0.072 
L. Real Estate 
Activities 
JC 0.261 0.205 0.132 0.165 0.179 
JD -0.102 -0.150 -0.176 -0.379 -0.292 
M. Professional, 
Scientific & 
Technical services 
JC 0.211 0.200 0.122 0.105 0.129 
JD -0.071 -0.087 -0.132 -0.265 -0.204 
N. Administrative 
& Support activities 
 
JC 0.182 0.192 0.155 0.137 0.151 
JD -0.067 -0.076 -0.235 -0.343 -0.297 
Note: For confidentiality reasons, results for sector D have been suppressed.  Results for 2006 and 
2007 for sector B have also been removed for the same reason. 
Figure 3.3 follows Hijzen et al. (2010) and plots the job creation and destruction 
rates for each NACE sector against each other.  Many of the sectors that had high job 
creation rates over the period had similarly high job destruction rates.  In some 
sectors, the job destruction rate has exceeded the job creation rate.  The size of each 
circle in the figure represents the employment level in each sector.  The circle 
representing the construction sector (F) displays the highest rate of job destruction 
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over the period relative to the other sectors.  Appendix Table 2.2 shows that over the 
period, the net reallocation rate was negative across many sectors demonstrating that 
on average, many of the sectors are declining.  Exceptions include water supply and 
sewerage (E) information and communication sector (I), financial and insurance 
activities (K) and professional, scientific and technical services (M). 
Figure 3.3: Job creation and job destruction rates by sector 
 
Note: For confidentiality reasons, results for sector D Electricity and Gas have been supressed. 
3.4.2 Job flows and firm size 
This section examines job flows and the firm size category.  Following on from the 
work of Baldwin and Picot (1995), Hijzen et al. (2010) and others, job flows are 
examined using three different measures of firm size, as used by Hijzen et al. (2010).   
 The first measure classifies enterprises by their employment in 2005.  As a 
result, if a firm did not exist in 2005 and entered later, this enterprise is 
automatically assigned to the smallest firm size group (0-9 employees).  As 
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outlined earlier in section 3.2.3, Hijzen et al. (2010) note that this method is 
likely to be affected by the regression to the mean fallacy as initially 
highlighted by  Davis et al. (1996a).   
 The second measure described by Hijzen et al. (2010: 642) as “average 
current year firm size” classifies enterprises into size categories according to 
the average of the current and previous year’s employment (Nt+Nt-1/2).  
Hijzen et al. (2010) note that because this measure includes current size, a 
potential weakness arises from the fact that growth or decline of the 
enterprise affects the chosen size measure. 
 The third measure also used by Hijzen et al. (2010: 642), “average previous 
year firm size” classifies enterprises into size categories using a size measure 
prior to the change in employment.  In section 3.2.3, it is outlined that both 
Davidsson et al. (1998) and Hijzen et al. (2010) use this methodology 
initially employed by Baldwin & Picot (1995).  This helps overcome the 
problem with the second measure above because now the size measure does 
not include the current size of the enterprise.  Therefore, this is the preferred 
measure here. 
These classifications mean that, according to the first and third definitions, all 
entrants are assigned to the smallest category because new entrants have, by 
definition, zero employment in the year before they actually enter.  Because of this 
issue, the analysis is conducted for total job creation and destruction and these shares 
are subsequently broken down in entry and growth (for job creation) and exit and 
decline (for job destruction).  This is useful to assess the employment growth 
performance of enterprises. 
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Table 3.9: Job creation & job destruction proportions by enterprise size  
  Share of JC Share of JD 
 Share of 
employment 
Total Growth Entry Total Decline Exit 
(a)Initial size (N1) 
0-9 0.252 0.732 0.407 1 0.341 0.275 0.491 
10-19 0.084 0.044 0.098 - 0.094 0.098 0.084 
20-49 0.125 0.057 0.125 - 0.132 0.143 0.107 
50-249 0.209 0.076 0.169 - 0.200 0.231 0.130 
>250 0.330 0.091 0.201 - 0.234 0.253 0.188 
(b)Average current year firm size (Nt+Nt-1/2) 
0-9 0.162 0.282 0.200 0.417 0.259 0.187 0.427 
10-19 0.099 0.118 0.123 0.109 0.119 0.123 0.112 
20-49 0.143 0.145 0.162 0.117 0.157 0.171 0.126 
50-249 0.235 0.211 0.241 0.162 0.221 0.255 0.146 
>250 0.360 0.244 0.273 0.195 0.242 0.264 0.190 
(c)Average previous year firm size (Nt-1 + Nt-2/2) 
0-9 0.151 0.633 0.313 1 0.201 0.153 0.306 
10-19 0.098 0.065 0.122 - 0.115 0.116 0.113 
20-49 0.145 0.083 0.156 - 0.159 0.165 0.144 
50-249 0.240 0.104 0.195 - 0.240 0.265 0.185 
>250 0.365 0.115 0.215 - 0.285 0.300 0.253 
 
The results in Table 3.9 show that the share of employment varies depending on the 
enterprise size measure used.  However, the role of small enterprises with less than 
50 employees is fairly consistent.  The employment share ranges from 46% using the 
initial size measure to 39% using the average previous year measure.   
The enterprise size measure used does have an impact on the magnitude of the job 
creation and destruction shares reported.  Using the initial size measure we see that 
small enterprises (<50 employees) account for 83% of job creation and 57% of job 
destruction.  It should be recalled that this is likely to be inflated due to the fact that 
entrants are automatically assigned to the smallest size category.  However even just 
focusing on existing enterprises, we still see that small enterprises account for a 
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greater fraction of jobs created relative to large enterprises with over 250 employees.  
Using the second measure of enterprise size, ‘average current year firm size,’ we can 
see that small enterprises account for about 55% of job creation and 54% of job 
destruction.  Using the third measure we see that small enterprises accounted for 
78% of the jobs created and 48% of job destruction.  Our evidence suggests that 
small enterprises account for a greater proportion of job creation than their 
employment share.  It appears that a large amount of job turnover is attributable to 
small enterprises, particularly micro-firms with less than 10 employees.   
3.4.2.1 Persistence and job flows 
This section examines the persistence of job creation and destruction by year and by 
enterprise size category.  This may be important if there are significant differences in 
how long a newly created position lasts for depending on whether it is in a small or 
large enterprise.  
We begin by exploring persistence by year.  The persistence measure used here is 
that which is described earlier in equation (3.4). Using this method allows the 
calculation of the proportion of a positive change (job creation) or negative change 
(job destruction) in employment that persists through time.  The measure can only 
take on a value between 0 and 1.  This is because it represents the proportion of jobs 
created (or destroyed) in year t that are still in existence (or destroyed) in t+n.  
Therefore by definition, the measure cannot exceed 1 (or 100%) as the maximum 
proportion of jobs that are created (or destroyed) in t and still in existence in t+n is 1 
(or 100%).   
Here in Table 3.10 we can see that 64% of the jobs created in 2006 still existed in 
2007 (t+1).  This falls to 18% in 2010 (t+4).  In 2008, we can see that just 40% of 
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jobs created still existed the following year.  Higher persistence rates are seen with 
regards to job destruction.  This may be due to exiting enterprises which results in a 
permanent decrease in employment.  Overall persistence rates for job destruction are 
slower to decline than those of job creation.   
Table 3.10: Persistence of job creation and destruction by year 
Persistence of jobs created at year t 
Year (t) t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
2006 0.640 0.430 0.259 0.185 
2007 0.523 0.273 0.187 - 
2008 0.400 0.253 - - 
2009 0.536 - - - 
2010 - - - - 
Persistence of jobs destroyed at year t 
Year (t) t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
2006 0.702 0.594 0.536 0.479 
2007 0.807 0.733 0.664 - 
2008 0.900 0.823 - - 
2009 0.853 - - - 
2010 - - - - 
 
Next we turn to the persistence of job creation and destruction by enterprise size 
category, in line with Hijzen et al. (2010).  Table 3.11 shows that the persistence of 
job creation varies little by firm size category.  Enterprises with 250+ employees 
have the highest job creation persistence rates.  But overall there is little difference 
between small (<50) and large (250+) enterprises.  Job destruction is more persistent 
in larger enterprises. 
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Table 3.11: Persistence of job creation and destruction and firm size category 
Persistence of jobs created at year t 
No. of 
employees 
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
0-9 0.547 0.316 0.173 0.076 
10-19 0.496 0.279 0.154 0.076 
20-49 0.497 0.276 0.142 0.070 
50-249 0.505 0.279 0.141 0.074 
250+ 0.581 0.341 0.194 0.110 
Persistence of jobs destroyed at year t 
No. of 
employees 
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
0-9 0.825 0.657 0.436 0.199 
10-19 0.819 0.700 0.536 0.314 
20-49 0.839 0.742 0.585 0.360 
50-249 0.865 0.787 0.644 0.426 
250+ 0.865 0.796 0.642 0.421 
 
3.4.3 Job flow rates in manufacturing sectors  
This section analyses results obtained having merged the P35 and CIP data files.  
The results presented here refer specifically to the manufacturing sector (C).   
3.4.3.1 Job flow rates of all manufacturing firms 
Table 3.12 below presents the job flow rates in this sector based on those enterprises 
included in the CIP-P35 panel of manufacturing enterprises.  A similar pattern can be 
seen here as was observed for NACE sectors B-N regarding the difference between 
the first two years and the latter three years.  The job creation rate exceeded the job 
destruction rate in 2006 and 2007 and the net employment growth was positive.  
However, this changed in 2008 and in 2009 we can see that the job destruction rate is 
four times greater than the job creation rate.  Net employment growth is negative in 
the years 2008-2010. 
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Table 3.12: Job flow rates in the manufacturing sector, 2006-2010 
Year Job 
creation 
Job 
destruction 
Job 
reallocation 
Net 
reallocation  
Excess 
reallocation 
2006 0.105 -0.048 0.154 0.057 0.097 
2007 0.119 -0.090 0.209 0.029 0.180 
2008 0.043 -0.098 0.141 -0.054 0.087 
2009 0.049 -0.190 0.239 -0.141 0.098 
2010 0.060 -0.117 0.177 -0.058 0.119 
 
In Table 3.13 below, we present total job creation by enterprise entry and growth.  
The job destruction rates are similarly broken down into that caused by exit and 
decline.   
Table 3.13: Job creation and destruction; component parts 
 Job creation  Job destruction  
Year Total  Growth Entrants Total  Decline Exit 
2006 0.105 0.073 0.032 -0.048 -0.048 0 
2007 0.119 0.060 0.058 -0.090 -0.047 -0.043 
2008 0.043 0.031 0.012 -0.098 -0.089 -0.008 
2009 0.049 0.025 0.041 -0.190 -0.148 -0.042 
2010 0.060 0.057 0.024 -0.117 -0.093 -0.024 
Average 0.0752 0.0492 0.0334 -0.1086 -0.085 -0.0234 
 
Here we can see that the entry of new enterprises explains 44%
29
 of the job creation.  
This is higher than when NACE sectors B-N were considered in Table 3.7.  On the 
other hand the exit of enterprises accounts for around 21%
30
 of the job destruction on 
average.  The remainder of job destruction is explained by shrinking as opposed to 
exiting enterprises.  This pattern is similar to that reported for all firms in Table 3.7.  
However here we see that on average the contribution of entrants to job creation is 
                                                 
29
 Using Table 3.13, this is computed by dividing the total average entrants figure (0.0334) by the 
total average JC figure (0.0752) 
30
 Using Table 3.13, this is computed by dividing the total average exiters figure (-0.0234) by the total 
average JD figure (-0.1086) 
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higher, while the contribution of exiters to job destruction is lower when we examine 
manufacturing only in comparison to all NACE sectors B-N. 
3.4.3.2 Job flow rates of manufacturing enterprises by sub-sector 
Next we examine the job flow rates by manufacturing sub-sectors and year.  The 
manufacturing sector is split into 13 subsectors.  This gives an indication of the 
relative performance of the various subsectors with respect to their job flows.  The 
sectoral classifications are shown in Table 3.14 below. 
Table 3.14: Manufacturing sub-sectors  
1. Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco  
2. Manufacture of textiles and wearing apparel leather and related products   
3. Manufacture of wood, wood products except furniture; manufacture of straw and plaiting 
materials  
4. Manufacture of paper and paper products; printing and re-production of recorded media  
5. Manufacture of coke and petroleum products ; Manufacture of chemical and chemical 
products; basic pharmaceutical products and preparations  
6. Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  
7. Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  
8. Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment  
9. Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products, electrical equipment  
10. Manufacture of machinery and equipment  
11. Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers and other transport equipment  
12. Manufacture of furniture and other manufacturing  
13. Repair and installation of machinery and equipment  
 
Job creation and destruction rates by sub-sector and year are shown in Appendix 
Table 2.4.  As with the NACE sectors B-N, we can see that significant changes occur 
over the period studied.  In 2006, all of the manufacturing sectors displayed positive 
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net employment growth.  Particularly, sector 5 which incorporates the 
pharmaceutical sector had a high rate of job creation at 12% and a job destruction 
rate of less than 3%, while the manufacture of non-metallic mineral products sector 
(7) had an even higher job creation rate at over 15% and a job destruction rate of less 
than 3%.  By 2010, both have experienced a decline in job creation and an increase 
in job destruction, the increase in job destruction being greater in sector (7).  The 
pharmaceutical sector (5) has maintained lower rates of job destruction over the 
period, when compared to others. 
3.4.3.3 Job flow rates of manufacturing firms by region  
We now examine job flow rates by geographic region.  As there is no location 
identifier in the P35 data, this can only be done for the merged P35-CIP panel.  We 
can see below that Ireland is divided into eight regional authority areas.  Table 3.15 
shows the job creation and destruction rates by region and year.  We can see that in 
2006 and 2007, each region was creating more jobs than it was destroying.  
However, this began to change and in 2009 a big shift had taken place which saw a 
job creation rate of 3% and destruction rate of 17% in Dublin.  The West appears to 
be the region worst affected in 2009 with job creation and destruction rates of 2% 
and almost 30% respectively.  
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Table 3.15: Job flow rates in the manufacturing sector by region and year 
Regional Authority 
Area 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1. Border JC 0.101 0.104 0.046 0.030 0.077 
JD -0.046 -0.052 -0.114 -0.166 -0.102 
2. Dublin JC 0.122 0.067 0.037 0.027 0.039 
JD -0.049 -0.058 -0.104 -0.172 -0.117 
3. Mid-East JC 0.088 0.071 0.033 0.015 0.034 
JD -0.041 -0.068 -0.106 -0.152 -0.029 
4. Midlands JC 0.079 0.088 0.137 0.029 0.062 
JD -0.041 -0.087 -0.083 -0.180 -0.116 
5. Mid-West JC 0.057 0.111 0.030 0.031 0.042 
JD -0.041 -0.086 -0.068 -0.378 -0.152 
6. South-East JC 0.069 0.074 0.051 0.086 0.057 
JD -0.039 -0.078 -0.099 -0.159 -0.088 
7. South-West JC 0.171 0.060 0.042 0.053 0.021 
JD -0.057 -0.084 -0.074 -0.151 -0.294 
8. West JC 0.078 0.070 0.027 0.022 0.113 
JD -0.042 -0.065 -0.105 -0.294 -0.068 
  
3.4.3.4 Job flow rates of manufacturing enterprises & international trade 
This next section presents some descriptive information on enterprises in the P35-
CIP panel and their involvement in international trade.  The measure of exports used 
here is the reported percentage of turnover exported by each enterprise.  The import 
measure is the percentage of materials imported by the enterprise.   
Previous research by Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) analyses the link between export 
activity, import activity and employment in manufacturing firms in France.  As is the 
case in this thesis, they use firm level data to measure exports and imports.  With 
regards to imports, they suggest that two differing employment outcomes may result 
from increasing imports.  Switching suppliers from local producers to less expensive 
foreign suppliers for intermediate goods may positively affect employment.  
However, substituting the production of goods internally with imports may have a 
negative effect on employment.  They find that firms importing final goods tend to 
destroy more jobs than those importing only intermediate inputs.  While we cannot 
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distinguish between imports of intermediates and final goods in our data, we still 
explore its relationship with job creation and job destruction.    
Regarding exporting activity, Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) note that it seems to be 
that growth in employment is associated with growth in exports, citing evidence 
from Bernard and Jensen (1999:1) that “good firms become exporters.” 
Firstly we can see from Table 3.16 that there is a relatively even split between 
enterprises that report being an exporter or not in a given year.  It is interesting to 
note that in 2010, there is an increase in the number of enterprises who report some 
exporting activity and a decrease in the number of enterprises who do not export.  
With regards to imports, it can be seen that over the years 2006-2009, more 
enterprises reported importing some materials rather than not importing any 
materials.  However, in 2010 we can see that those reporting they do not import has 
increased and there is a relatively even split between those who do and do not 
import.   
Also noteworthy are the mean employment figures.  Average employment is higher 
in enterprises that do engage with international markets through importing and/or 
exporting.  Mean employment in general has declined over the period in all 
enterprises, falling from about 60 employees in 2006 to 42 employees in 2010.  It is 
observed also that the standard deviation of employment is quite high and almost 
four times mean employment in some cases.  This suggests that enterprise size is 
widely distributed and so there is significant enterprise-level heterogeneity. 
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Table 3.16: Irish manufacturing employment and trade status, 2006-2010 
 Trade 
status 
No. of 
enterprises 
Mean 
employment 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
2006 All 4,016 59.54 203.99 1 6,365 
 Exporter  
– Yes  
1,833 94.76 244.48 1 4,981 
 Exporter  
– No  
1,823 25.81 47.46 1 661 
 Importer  
– Yes  
2,307 81.48 218.17 1 4,981 
 Importer   
–  No 
1,349 24.30 63.36 1 1,352 
2007 All 4,894 50.04 174.91 0 5,902 
 Exporter 
 – Yes  
2,281 80.33 216.57 0 4,342 
 Exporter  
– No  
2,417 22.36 41.70 0 592 
 Importer  
– Yes  
2,890 69.64 193.37 0 4,342 
 Importer  
–  No 
1,808 19.93 48.84 0 1,144 
2008 All 4,806 45.86 160.97 0 5,247 
 Exporter  
– Yes  
2,276 74.34 225.64 0 5,247 
 Exporter  
– No  
2,421 20.75 45.52 0 986 
 Importer  
– Yes  
2,965 62.30 195.94 0 5,247 
 Importer  
–  No 
1,732 20.05 69.93 0 2,313 
2009 All 4,350 43.01 136.67 0 3,353 
 Exporter  
– Yes  
2,147 68.10 186.92 0 3,353 
 Exporter  
– No  
2,190 18.59 40.42 0 3,353 
 Importer  
– Yes  
2,743 57.18 167.17 0 3,353 
 
 Importer  
–  No 
1,594 18.87 44.15 0 547 
2010 All 4,233 42.05 134.41 0 3,007 
 Exporter  
– Yes  
2,756 52.73 162.92 0 3,007 
 Exporter  
– No  
1,477 22.14 40.57 0 478 
 Importer  
– Yes  
2,181 68.69 181.09 0 3,007 
 Importer  
–  No 
2,052 13.75 29.42 0 480 
Note: Figures for importers and exporters may not sum to the total number of enterprises 
(“All”) as the export/import figure may be missing for some enterprises. 
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Table 3.17 below shows the mean annual employment growth rate for exporters and 
non-exporters, as well as for all enterprises.  Employment growth, computed as a 
change in employment between one year and the next is divided by average 
employment over the period.  The figure is therefore constrained to range between -2 
for exiters and +2 for new entrants.  Employment growth was positive in 2006 and 
2007.  The figure was lower for exporters relative to non-exporters during this time.  
Over the period 2008-2010, we can see that the employment growth rate is negative 
for all enterprises.  However, the value is not as low for the exporters when 
compared to the non-exporters over these years.  It would appear that in 2010, the 
employment growth rate had started to recover slightly, particularly for exporters. 
Table 3.17: Manufacturing employment growth rates by year and export status, 
2006-2010 
 All enterprises Exporter – Yes Exporter – No 
2006 Mean 0.104 0.086 0.111 
 Std Dev 0.449 0.411 0.439 
 Frequency 4,016 1,833 1,823 
 
2007 Mean 0.052 0.032 0.051 
 Std Dev 0.480 0.460 0.469 
 Frequency 4,894 2,281 2,417 
 
2008 Mean -0.038 -0.034 -0.074 
 Std Dev 0.562 0.552 0.519 
 Frequency 4,806 2,276 2,421 
 
2009 Mean -0.241 -0.226 -0.256 
 Std Dev 0.523 0.513 0.526 
 Frequency 4,350 2,147 2,190 
 
2010 Mean -0.179 -0.139 -0.254 
 Std Dev 0.520 0.478 0.585 
 Frequency 4,233 2,756 1,477 
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The employment growth rate is examined by import status in Table 3.18.  In contrast 
to the previous table, here we observe that enterprises who engage in some import 
activity perform less well in terms of employment growth generally, when compared 
to those who do not import.  In 2006 and 2007, importers have a lower employment 
growth rate than non-importers.  Between 2009 and 2010, the employment growth of 
importers is also lower.  The year 2008 however shows a different trend.  While 
employment growth was negative for both importers and non-importers, it was lower 
for non-importers. 
Table 3.18: Manufacturing employment growth rates by year and import 
status, 2006-2010 
 All firms Importer – Yes Importer – No 
2006 Mean 0.104 0.086 0.120 
 Std Dev 0.449 0.400 0.467 
 Frequency 4,016 2,307 1,349 
 
2007 Mean 0.052 0.039 0.046 
 Std Dev 0.480 0.465 0.464 
 Frequency 4,894 2,890 1,808 
 
2008 Mean -0.038 -0.039 -0.081 
 Std Dev 0.562 0.553 0.539 
 Frequency 4,806 2,965 1,732 
 
2009 Mean -0.241 -0.246 -0.232 
 Std Dev 0.523 0.522 0.516 
 Frequency 4,350 2,743 1,594 
 
2010 Mean -0.179 -0.184 -0.174 
 Std Dev 0.520 0.526 0.514 
 Frequency 4,233 2,181 2,052 
 
Overall, we have seen that the job creation and destruction rates have varied across 
sectors and over time in the Irish economy.  Focusing specifically on the 
manufacturing sector above, we have highlighted some differences for exporters and 
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importers.  As outlined in section 3.2.5, some studies such as that by Levinsohn 
(1999) and Pisu (2008) have focused on the possible link between international trade 
involvement and job flows.  Given the important role that exporting firms are 
expected to play in the Irish economic recovery, the manufacturing sector is 
examined to identify the relationship between export and import activity and job 
flows.   
We begin by disaggregating the manufacturing sector into 13 different subsectors as 
set out in Table 3.14.  Enterprises who do engage in some export or import activity 
(ie non-zero exports or imports) were identified and then split into quintiles based on 
the level of their exports (the percentage of turnover exported) and imports (the 
percentage of raw materials imported).
31
  Both Hijzen et al. (2010) and Levinsohn 
(1999) used quintiles to measure exports and imports in their regressions.  One 
benefit of splitting continuous variables like exports and imports into quintiles is that 
it helps avoid the assumption that there is a linear relationship between the 
export/import variables and the employment growth rate.  For example, there may be 
a different effect on employment growth (dependent variable) from a small change in 
exports (independent variable) if exports are at a low level rather than a higher level.  
To assess the role of international trade activity in explaining job creation and 
destruction, regression analysis is used.  To control for fixed effects, industry and 
time dummies are included.  The benefit of such an approach is that it allows for 
heterogeneity among the industrial sectors because each is allowed to have its own 
intercept value.  It is also important to control for time effects here as we know that 
over the period, job creation generally declined while job destruction increased.  
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 The non-exporters and non-importers are the reference categories excluded from the regressions. 
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Following the work of Levinsohn (1999) and Hijzen et al. (2010), we use an OLS 
regression.  The regression is weighted by that given in equation (3.5) earlier.      
𝐠𝒊𝒕
+ = 𝜶 +  ∑ 𝜷𝒒𝑬𝑿𝒒𝒊𝒕 +
𝟓
𝒒=𝟏
∑ 𝜹𝒒 𝑰𝑴𝑷𝒒𝒊𝒕
𝟒
𝒒=𝟏
+ 𝜸𝒕 + 𝒛𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 (3.11) 
 
 
Above, g𝑖𝑡
+  is the employment growth rate value for enterprises experiencing positive 
employment growth, or job creation, where g𝑖𝑡  > 0.  Job destruction is similarly 
computed by defining the employment growth rate, g𝑖𝑡
−  as equal to the employment 
growth rate g𝑖𝑡  for those enterprises where g𝑖𝑡 < 0.  In the case of negative values for 
job destruction, the absolute value was used to aid interpretations of the coefficients.  
The variables 𝐸𝑋𝑞𝑖𝑡 and 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑞𝑖𝑡 are dummy variables to capture export and import 
intensity quintiles respectively that an enterprise belongs to.
32
  When creating 
quintiles (five groups), quartiles (four groups) were created for the imports variable.  
This is due to a large number of enterprises reporting a high level of imports.  While 
there are around 2,600 observations in the first three quartiles, quartile 4 contains 
5,220 observations.  These enterprises have reported imports of raw materials of 
90% or above.  This large number of observations reporting a high level of imports 
contributes to the creation of four rather than five groupings.  The variables 𝛾𝑡 and 
𝑧𝑖𝑡  are vectors of dummy variables to capture industry and time fixed effects 
respectively.  Therefore estimates of 𝛽𝑞 and 𝛿𝑞 can be used to determine if job 
creation and job destruction differs significantly across export and import quintiles.  
Table 3.19 reports our results for the level of export and import activity respectively.  
It seems that trade exposure, through export and import activity, generally has a 
                                                 
32
 Details of the export and import quintiles/quartiles are available in Appendix Table 2.5. 
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negative effect on job creation.  It appears that having the highest level of exports is 
associated with a statistically significant decrease in job creation.  The magnitude of 
the effect is relatively small.  Other export level coefficients are not statistically 
significant.  All importing activity is associated with a decrease in the job creation 
rate, although only levels 2 and 3 are statistically significant. 
Table 3.19:  Job creation, job destruction and level of trade intensity  
 Job creation 
Coefficients 
Job destruction 
Coefficients 
   
β1 -0.00931 -0.0193*** 
 (0.00576) (0.00668) 
β2 0.00697 0.000562 
 (0.00646) (0.00749) 
β3 -0.00795 -0.0110 
 (0.00632) (0.00733) 
β4 0.000311 -0.0327*** 
 (0.00520) (0.00604) 
β5 -0.0229*** -0.0144*** 
 (0.00476) (0.00553) 
δ1 -0.00451 -0.0231*** 
 (0.00573) (0.00665) 
δ2 -0.0190*** -0.0252*** 
 (0.00530) (0.00615) 
δ3 -0.0154*** -0.0394*** 
 (0.00499) (0.00578) 
δ4 -0.00178 0.0198*** 
 (0.00525) (0.00608) 
α 0.126*** 0.0452*** 
 (0.00585) (0.00679) 
   
Observations 21,621 21,621 
Fstat  16.76 67.04 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.020 0.075 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Regarding the level of trade activity and job destruction, the results generally suggest 
that being involved in exporting and importing activity reduces job destruction.   
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Beginning with exporting level, being an exporter reduces job destruction.  The 
exception to this is the second export intensity level which is positive but 
insignificant.  For import levels we again see that being an importer has a negative 
and significant effect on job destruction, except for enterprises with the highest level 
of imports.  Here we see that importing a large percentage of materials has a positive 
and significant impact on job destruction.  So results suggest that involvement in 
international trade does reduce job destruction, except for enterprises who import the 
majority of their materials. 
However as noted earlier, Klein et al. (2003) have cautioned on expecting a 
relationship between the level of trade intensity and the turnover of jobs.  Instead it is 
suggested that it may be more appropriate to examine the changes in trade intensity.  
Because of this a regression is also now used to test if changes in the intensity of 
exporting and importing activity affect job flows.  The dependent variable is the 
employment growth variable 𝑔𝑖𝑡 , as explained previously.  Initially we identify if 
there was a change in export activity from one year to the next for each enterprise.  
Enterprises were then classified into three mutually exclusive groups as either being: 
 A non-exporter in both years;  
 An exporter who experienced a change in trade intensity (ExpQ1-ExpQ5); 
 An exporter who did not experience a change (EX). 
To capture importing activity enterprises were classified in a similar way; 
 A non-importer in both years; 
 An importer who experienced a change in trade intensity (ImpQ1-ImpQ5); 
 An importer who did not experience a change (IMP). 
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Of enterprises that did experience a change in intensity, these were split into export 
intensity quintiles.  These quintiles are essentially quintiles of the changes in export 
intensity.  The change in intensity variable can range between -100 and +100, where 
-100 represents an enterprise that experienced a 100% decline in exporting activity, 
while +100 represents a 100% increase in such activity.   The regression then 
included a series of dummy variables to capture whether a particular enterprise is in 
a given change in export intensity quintile.  Import activity was treated in the same 
way as exporting activity above and details are available in Appendix Table 2.6.  As 
this shows, the first two export and import intensity quintiles capture enterprises that 
have experienced a decrease in export and import intensity.  Therefore, these lower 
quintiles represent enterprises that have experienced a fall in intensity.   Time and 
industry fixed effects were also included as before.  Regression equation (3.12) 
below was used which is similar to equation (3.11) but modified to include variable 
𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡  representing no change in exports and 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 representing no change in 
imports.  The change in export and change in import intensity quintiles are 
represented by the variables 𝐸𝑋𝑄𝑞𝑖𝑡 and 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑄𝑞𝑖𝑡 respectively.  As before, 𝛾𝑡 and 
𝑧𝑖𝑡  are vectors of dummy variables to capture industry and time fixed effects 
respectively.  Therefore estimates of 𝛽𝑞 and 𝛿𝑞 can be used to determine if job 
creation and job destruction differs significantly across export and import intensity 
quintiles.    
 
𝐠𝒊𝒕
+ = 𝜶 + 𝝀𝑬𝑿𝒊𝒕 + ∑ 𝜷𝒒𝑬𝑿𝑸𝒒𝒊𝒕 + 
𝟓
𝒒=𝟏
𝝈𝑰𝑴𝑷𝒊𝒕 + ∑ 𝜹𝒒 𝑰𝑴𝑷𝑸𝒒𝒊𝒕
𝟓
𝒒=𝟏
+ 𝜸𝒕 + 𝒛𝒊𝒕 +  𝜺𝒊𝒕 
  
 
(3.12) 
 
Table 3.20 reports our results.  Beginning with job creation, we see that the 
magnitude of the effect of changing export and import intensity is small and not all 
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quintiles are significant.  Focusing on exports, we see that most of the coefficients 
are negative except for quintile 5 (Q5).  It is worth noting again that the first two 
quintiles represent a decrease in export intensity, while quintiles 3 and 4 account for 
small increases in export intensity.
33
  So it appears that a decrease in export intensity 
(Q1 & Q2) or a small increase in export intensity (Q3 and Q4) is associated with 
lower job creation.   However the magnitude of the effects decreases as the change in 
export intensity increases from Q1 to Q4.  Then we see a positive effect for those in 
the top quintile (Q5), representing those who experience the largest positive change 
in export intensity.  Enterprises in the highest export change intensity quintile have 
higher and significant rates of job creation.   
Turning to imports, we can see that all coefficients are negative, with quintiles 2-4 
being significant.  The magnitude of the negative effect on job creation reduces for 
enterprises in higher import intensity quintiles.  As with export intensity, quintiles 1 
and 2 represent a decrease in importing activity.   
Moving to job destruction, we see that enterprises that are in the lower and higher 
export intensity quintiles have lower rates of job destruction.  The exception to this is 
those enterprises in quintile 3 (Q3), which represents a small positive increase in 
export intensity.  So it appears those experiencing declining or increasing changes in 
export activity are associated with a lower rate of job destruction, while those in 
quintile 3 (Q3) have higher rates of job destruction.  With regards to imports, again 
we see a negative relationship.  Any change in import intensity appears to reduce job 
destruction.  Enterprises in the middle quintile experience the largest effect and we 
see that magnitude of the effect declines as we move to higher quintiles, as changing 
import intensity increases. 
                                                 
33
 See Appendix Table 2.6 for details.  
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Table 3.20:  Job creation, job destruction and change in trade intensity   
 Job creation 
Coefficients 
Job destruction 
Coefficients 
λ -0.00874*** -0.0339*** 
 (0.00261) (0.00609) 
β1 -0.0113*** -0.00487 
 (0.00377) (0.00881) 
β2 -0.0104*** -0.0416*** 
 (0.00333) (0.00778) 
β3 -0.0109*** 0.0400*** 
 (0.00330) (0.00772) 
β4 -0.00194 -0.0395*** 
 (0.00381) (0.00891) 
β5 0.0121*** -0.0179* 
 (0.00455) (0.0106) 
σ -0.0164*** -0.0108 
 (0.00301) (0.00703) 
δ1 -0.00181 -0.0265*** 
 (0.00432) (0.0101) 
δ2 -0.0189*** -0.0152* 
 (0.00354) (0.00828) 
δ3 -0.0148*** -0.0524*** 
 (0.00356) (0.00832) 
δ4 -0.0113*** -0.0387*** 
 (0.00366) (0.00856) 
δ5 -0.00522 -0.0284*** 
 (0.00392) (0.00915) 
α 0.0847*** 0.0491*** 
 (0.00337) (0.00788) 
Observations 15,114 15,114 
Fstat  20.13 49.37 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.036 0.084 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Levinsohn (1999) finds weak evidence that job creation is higher in the export sector 
in Chile following the liberalisation of trade.  Pisu (2008) also finds that involvement 
in international markets is associated with higher employment growth rates in 
Belgium.  Results for the Irish manufacturing sector presented here suggest that there 
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is a positive association between export intensity and job creation for those in the top 
quintile only.  Results suggest a negative effect on job creation for the lower change 
in export intensity quintiles and for all change in import intensity quintiles.  
Regarding job destruction however, we do find support for the assertion that 
involvement in international trade reduces it.  However, it should be noted in both 
cases that the magnitude of the effect is small.  These findings are somewhat similar 
to Hijzen et al. (2010) regarding export activity rather than import activity.  They 
find that industries in the highest import quintile have higher rates of job destruction 
while those in the highest export quintile have lower rates of job destruction.  They 
also report little evidence of a “systematic relationship between job creation rates 
and the change in trade exposure” for UK industries (Hijzen et al. 2010: 635).   
Regarding import activity, we find a negative relationship between changing 
intensity and job destruction.  Increases in intensity reduce job destruction, although 
the magnitude of the effect is small.  It may be that these imports represent 
intermediate goods rather than final goods, although this cannot be stated 
definitively. 
3.5. Concluding remarks 
This chapter uses the P35 dataset, a newly available Irish administrative data from 
the CSO, to examine how job flows have changed over the turbulent economic 
period of 2006-2010 for NACE sectors B-N.  This P35 dataset is then merged with 
survey data from the Census of Industrial Production (CIP) to analyse the 
relationship between job flows and international trade involvement.      
We see that over the period in NACE sectors B-N, there was a dramatic increase in 
job destruction and decrease in job creation.  The construction sector was most 
84 
 
adversely impacted.  Regarding enterprise size, evidence suggests that a large 
amount of job creation and destruction is attributable to small enterprises, 
particularly micro-enterprises with less than 10 employees.  Turning to persistence, 
we find little difference in persistence rates of job flows between small and large 
enterprises.  There is some evidence that job destruction rates appear to be more 
persistent in larger enterprises (250+ employees). 
Moving to the merged P35-CIP data, we observe a similar pattern in job flow rates in 
the manufacturing sub-sectors to that of NACE sectors B-N.  From 2008-2010, we 
see an increase in the job destruction rate and a decline in the job creation rate.  The 
West of Ireland appears to have suffered most with a job destruction rate of nearly 
30% in 2009 in the manufacturing sub-sectors.   
We also examine the role of involvement in international trade with respect to 
employment growth rates.  We begin with a descriptive analysis and observe that 
there was a roughly even number of enterprises who do and do not engage in 
international trade through exporting and importing activity.  Examining 
employment growth rates for exporters and importers revealed differing results.  
While the employment growth rate was negative over the period 2008-2010 it is less 
negative for the exporters when compared to the non-exporters over these years, 
possibly suggesting that exporters were less adversely impacted in terms of 
employment growth.  However, when examining whether enterprises imported or 
not, we see that enterprises who engage in some import activity perform less well in 
terms of employment growth in general when compared do those who do not import.   
Regression results suggest that the magnitude of the effect of involvement in 
international trade on job creation and destruction rates is relatively small.  Export 
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intensity quintiles appear to have a negative impact on job creation, with the 
exception of the highest quintile which has a positive effect.  A similar negative 
impact across quintiles is reported for import intensity.  However, we find some 
evidence that those experiencing either a lower or higher change in export intensity 
are associated with lower rates of job destruction.  Likewise, a change in import 
intensity appears to reduce job destruction.     
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Chapter 4 : The Impact of Displacement on the Earnings of 
Workers  
4.1: Introduction  
Ireland has experienced dramatic changes in its economic environment over the last 
ten years.  As documented in Chapter 2, with the slowdown in economic growth and 
the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, the business environment which employers 
and employees operate in has changed dramatically.  The unemployment rate 
increased from approximately 4% in 2005 to around 14% in 2011 (The World Bank, 
2016).   Many of these unemployed individuals are likely to have involuntarily 
separated from their employers during this time.  Also, as reported in Chapter 3, job 
destruction increased particularly in 2009.  In the labour market, enterprises are also 
constantly entering or exiting, growing or declining.  In this context, workers who 
lose their jobs may face significant adjustment costs.  These include the prospect of 
long spells of unemployment and for those who find a new job, they may have lower 
wages than in their previous job.   
The purpose of this chapter is for the first time in Ireland, to estimate the earnings 
losses of workers who become displaced from their employment.  This research uses 
the extensive and relatively new linked employer-employee P35 dataset available 
from the CSO for the period 2005-2011.  The uniqueness of this dataset stems from 
the fact that it covers virtually all employees in the public and private sector in 
Ireland, consisting of around two million person observations per year.  This chapter 
aims to add to the existing literature in a number of ways.  Firstly, it examines the 
impact of displacement on the earnings of workers.  We focus on two displacement 
events – both closure and mass-layoff.  Relatedly, we examine if the sector an 
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individual finds re-employment in after displacement impacts on their earnings 
losses.  From a policy perspective this chapter is significant.  Given the large number 
of workers who are unemployed, this research helps to identify if particular groups 
of workers, such as older workers, are at greater risk of displacement and if they 
suffer greater earnings losses once they re-enter employment compared to other 
groups.  Also as the Irish economy grew in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, many 
workers migrated there from other countries.  This research offers a unique 
opportunity to identify the differential impact of displacement on earnings for Irish 
versus non-national workers. 
Secondly, we identify which workers are at the highest risk of displacement based on 
both individual and enterprise-level characteristics.  Individual characteristics 
include gender, age and nationality, while the enterprise-level characteristics 
included are the NACE Rev. 2 economic sector of the enterprise and enterprise size.   
A noteworthy feature of the data used in this thesis is that displaced individuals may 
leave the dataset and never re-appear within the analysis period.  Their exit means 
they are no longer in employment and we do not know the reason for this.  It may be 
that they have emigrated.   
This chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 4.2 reviews the literature in relation to 
displacement and the income or earnings losses associated with such events in 
various countries.  Section 4.3 describes the data and the methodology used in this 
study while section 4.4 describes the results and section 4.5 concludes the chapter. 
4.2: Literature Review 
In this section we review the available literature regarding displacement and 
associated earnings losses.  While much of the work conducted on the topic relates to 
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the United Sates, there has also been work undertaken in a number of European 
countries.  The earnings losses associated with displacement are the focus of this 
chapter.  However, we begin this section by firstly identifying what constitutes a 
displacement event and focusing on issues arising from the use of varying definitions 
of the incidence of displacement and the displacement rate. Section 4.2.4 reviews 
evidence on displacement and earnings.  Studies conducted in the US indicate that 
displacement is associated with a negative impact on earnings in both the long-term 
and the shorter term.  In contrast, Huttunen, Møen & Salvanes (2011) note that fewer 
European studies have been undertaken and results from these have been less 
conclusive on the size of the impact of displacement on earnings.   
4.2.1 The definition and incidence of job displacement  
Much work has been undertaken on the incidence of job displacement.  One of the 
main obstacles preventing meaningful cross-country comparisons is the lack of a 
single definition of job displacement.  As noted by Stevens, Crosslin & Lane (1994), 
estimated earnings losses are sensitive to the definition of displacement adopted.  A 
contributory factor to this is that displacement can be defined using survey data or 
administrative data sources.  As well as definitions being self-defined by survey 
respondents or firm defined, the incidence of job displacement can be measured 
differently, with some studies focusing on displacement due to mass-layoffs only 
and others investigating displacements due to both firm closure and mass-layoffs.  
In the US, many studies investigating displacement and earnings losses have used 
data from the Displaced Workers Survey (DWS) administered by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.  Examples include the work of Podgursky (1992), Carrington 
(1993) and Kletzer (1998).  The DWS survey began in 1984 and was distributed at 
two year intervals with the January Current Population Survey (CPS).  “Specifically, 
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these surveys ask workers if in the past five years they have ‘lost or left a job 
because of a plant closing, an employer going out of business, a layoff from which 
[they were] not recalled or other similar reason” (Farber, Hall & Pencavel 1993: 
73).  Thus we can see that this definition does not allow for a distinction to be drawn 
between displacement due to mass-layoff or closure.  However, previous work from 
Gibbons & Katz (1991) does find support for the assertion that the post-displacement 
wages of displaced workers may be influenced by the cause of displacement.  It is 
suggested that when firms have some degree of discretion regarding who is selected 
to be laid off, the labour market – including future employers – can make an 
inference that such workers are of lower ability.  Specifically they find that earnings 
of white-collar workers displaced due to a mass-layoff event are significantly lower 
than those displaced due to a closure event.   
Kletzer (1998) discusses earlier work in relation to job displacement, and relies on 
the previous work of Farber, Haltiwanger & Abraham (1997).  Again DWS survey 
data is used for the period 1984-1996 and displacement is deemed to have occurred 
if workers involuntarily separate from their jobs.  She focuses on issues such as the 
incidence of job displacement, the characteristics of displaced workers in 
comparison to other unemployed workers and the impact of displacement on a 
worker’s earnings.  She cites the work of Farber et al. (1997) describing 
displacement rates.  The displacement rate is computed by “dividing the number of 
workers who have lost at least one job by the number of workers ‘at risk’ of losing a 
job during the relevant time period” (Kletzer, 1998: 117).  This ‘at risk’ group is 
computed based on the number of individuals in employment at the time the DWS 
survey was distributed.  Earlier work by Farber et al. (1993) also used DWS data and 
so use an analogous displacement definition to measure the incidence of 
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displacement.  They find that women have a lower incidence of job loss when 
compared to men (6.2% versus 7.8%).  They also examine the rates of job loss by 
education.  They find a strong negative relationship between the two variables.  This 
is supported by findings presented by Kletzer (1998) that workers with a lower level 
of education are more likely to be displaced compared to workers who have attained 
a higher level of education.   
The OECD (2013) has attempted to overcome this issue of varying definitions by 
investigating the incidence of job displacement across fourteen countries, with an 
attempt made to use common definitions and sample restrictions.  Some countries 
used matched worker-firm data, generally from administrative data sources (eg 
taxation files) and others use survey data.  Firm defined job displacements, usually 
from administrative data sources, are defined as “job separations from firms that, 
from one year to the next, experience an absolute reduction in employment of five 
employees or more and a relative reduction in employment of 30% or more (mass 
dismissal) or that cease to operate (firm closure)” (OECD, 2013: 6).   
When survey data is used in the OECD (2013) study, a self-defined measure is used.  
Displacement is deemed to have occurred when the reasons for leaving a job are 
economic or if a person is dismissed for reasons such as they were unable to do the 
job – dismissal for cause34.  As pointed out by the OECD (2013), the reasons that 
constitute a displacement vary from one country to another which hinders 
comparability across countries.  One of the advantages of administrative data, as 
cited by the OECD (2013), is that because administrative data usually involve larger 
samples, it tends to lead to more accurate measures of the effect on wages and 
                                                 
34
 The OECD (2013) suggests they include dismissal for cause their displacement definition because 
in an number of countries included in the study, it is not possible to distinguish between those 
dismissed for economic reasons and dismissal for cause.   
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earnings after displacement.  On the other hand, self-defined displacement is usually 
measured using data gathered from survey data sources – either household or cross-
sectional.  Such surveys could gather detailed information on workers.  However, the 
sample size is smaller and since information is self-reported, there may be problems 
with bias.  Other sample restrictions imposed in the OECD (2013) study are that 
workers must have one year tenure with the same employer, firms with less than ten 
employees in the year before displacement are excluded, only workers between the 
ages of 20-64 are included, while those who work in some public sector roles are 
omitted.
35
  Also, those who were employed in multiple jobs prior to displacement are 
excluded and those with a single job are retained.  It was not possible to implement 
all restrictions in all countries due to the nature of the data.   
Displacement rates are computed for the various countries from 2000-2008 and 
2009-2010. These time periods are chosen to capture the effect of the economic 
downturn.   These rates are computed by calculating the number of employees aged 
20-64 who are displaced between one year and the next as a fraction of the total 
number of employees aged 20-64 (OECD 2013).  It is reported that there are large 
differences across countries and between the two time periods selected.  A note of 
caution is added here by the authors who suggest that in spite of their efforts to use 
common definitions and sample restrictions across countries, there is still a doubt as 
to whether meaningful comparisons can be made across countries.  However, overall 
rates are relatively low, varying between 1.5% and 7% over the entire period.  In all 
countries examined, except the United Kingdom, the impact of the recession can be 
seen with higher displacement rates. 
                                                 
35
 “Those who work in public administration, defence, for private households or international 
organisations are also excluded” (OECD, 2013: 7). 
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4.2.2 Industry and job displacement 
A feature of the work on displacement has been to examine the incidence of 
displacement by the sector or industry of employment.  While the incidence of 
displacement may increase, this is not necessarily uniformly spread across all sectors 
of the economy.  Turning to evidence from the US, Podgursky (1992) report that one 
of the more interesting findings is that while manufacturing and goods producing 
industries are still responsible for a large proportion of job displacement, there is a 
trend of displacement events shifting away from manufacturing towards service 
producing industries such as retail trade and services.   His findings regarding this 
shifting trend are supported by the work of Farber et al. (1993) who find that while 
the probability of job loss in manufacturing declined by 4% between 1982-83 and 
1990-91, a 4% rise was noted in finance, insurance and real estate over the same 
period.  They cite this as evidence of an increased incidence of job loss in non-goods 
producing industries.  Kletzer (1998) relies on previous estimates produced in Farber 
et al. (1997) and supports Podgursky’s findings that job loss has declined in 
manufacturing and increased in some services sectors, particularly from 1985 
onwards.   
4.2.3 Displacement and worker characteristics  
It is possible that displacement rates may vary according to demographic 
characteristics such as age and gender.  The OECD (2013) attempt to identify 
workers that are at the highest risk of displacement across countries.  They find that 
initially displacement rates for male workers are higher than those for females in 
most countries.  However, once they control for factors such as the industry, 
occupation and contract type, males do not have a greater likelihood of being 
displaced relative to females.  In the US, Kletzer (1998) shows that females have a 
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displacement rate of 15.7% while males have a displacement rate of around 16.4% 
over the study period. 
It appears that older workers and younger workers have a greater risk of being 
displaced in many countries.  The OECD (2013) find that younger workers in the 20-
24 age category have a greater risk of displacement compared to prime aged workers 
(35-44 years) in Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Germany even when controls are 
included for worker and job characteristics.  However in the US and Portugal the 
opposite is reported; younger workers are at a lower risk of displacement.  With 
regards to older workers aged between 55 and 64, in the majority of countries, they 
are found to be at higher risk of displacement compared to prime aged workers.  Not 
surprisingly, those who have less than a secondary level of education are at a greater 
displacement risk.  The effect has increased with the onset of the recession in 2008.   
4.2.4 The impact of displacement on earnings of workers  
We now turn to empirical evidence on the impact of displacement on earnings.  
Evidence from the US is examined with regards to their results and also the methods 
used.  Research in the field has evolved in the methodological approach taken, given 
the availability of administrative data sources.  We begin with evidence from the US.  
Findings from European studies are then examined. 
4.2.4.1 The earnings of displaced workers in the United States  
Much of the work on the impact of displacement on earnings has originated in the 
US.  Ruhm (1991) notes that at the time, while work had been conducted examining 
the impact of permanent lay-offs, little work had been done on the duration 
associated with labour market adjustments regarding a displaced workers’ 
employment and wages.  He reported that displaced workers experience a 
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considerable and long lasting impact on their wages.  Others in the US reporting 
similar findings regarding earnings losses include Jacobson, LaLonde & Sullivan 
(1993).  Their paper is regarded as one of the more influential papers in the area for a 
number of reasons related to their data and the methodology they employed as 
explained below.  Their paper focuses on the earnings losses of displaced, high 
tenure workers in the state of Pennsylvania using administrative data for the period 
1974-1986.  Displaced workers are followed for around thirteen years after they are 
displaced.  Given the importance of the Jacobson et al. (1993) paper, we begin our 
examination of US studies by exploring its methodology and key results. 
In an effort to capture changes across workers over time, Jacobson et al. (1993) pool 
the data for displaced workers for the years 1980-1986.  Dummy variables D𝑖𝑡  are 
constructed to capture the number of quarters (k) before or after a person is 
displaced.  It equals one if displaced and zero otherwise.  As per equation 4.1, they 
regress earnings on these dummies and other variables to control for time varying 
and fixed characteristics.   
𝑦𝑖𝑡= ∝𝑖+ 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑘≥−𝑚
 𝛿𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 (4.1) 
 
 
In equation (4.1) above, taken from Jacobson et al. (1993: 693), 𝛿𝑘 is designed to 
capture the effect of displacement on earnings k quarters after displacement actually 
happened.  Jacobson et al. (1993) explain that the variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡, represents the 
earnings of individual i at time t.  The variable 𝑥𝑖𝑡 captures the time-varying and 
observed characteristics of workers.  Here, due to the information available, this 
vector is limited to interactions between age and sex.  Age squared is also included.  
The ∝𝑖 term is described by Jacobson et al. (2003: 693) as a “fixed effect” which 
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captures the impact of permanent differneces among individuals in relation to both 
observed and unobserved traits or characteristics.    They then alter the model as per 
equation 4.2 to account for a number of other specifications which include worker-
specific time trends, 𝜔𝑖𝑡 (Jacobson et al. 1993: 694).  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∝𝑖+ ω𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑘≥−𝑚
𝛿𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 (4.2) 
 
 
They report that workers displaced due to mass-layoff experience on average a 25% 
reduction in income compared to the non-displaced workers in the control group, 
even six years after the separation event.  They note that this is more likely to be 
attributed to loss of earnings rather than a spell of unemployment.  They arrive at this 
determination having excluded workers with long unemployment spells post-
displacement from the sample.  So while quarterly unemployment rates are lower 
than expected in the year after displacement, they are not very different in later 
periods.  Also they show that displaced workers’ earnings had begun to diverge from 
their expected levels around three years prior to separation.  It is also worth noting 
here that the paper focuses on high tenure workers.  To be included in the sample, 
workers must have had at least six years of tenure at the start of 1980.  As Hijzen et 
al. (2010: 245) point out, it would be reasonable to expect that such workers could 
experience greater income losses relative to a random sample of workers.  
The econometric approach used by Jacobson et al. (1993) is closely followed by 
Stevens (1997) to investigate the long-term impact on wages and earnings losses of 
displaced workers in the USA from 1968-88 using the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics.  The sample size is relatively small at 1,606 workers, 441 of whom 
experience displacement during the sample period.  The sample is dominated by 
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males as only household heads are permitted to answer.  A fixed effects estimator is 
used in an effort to control for unobserved worker characteristics that may be 
correlated with displacement.  Like Jacobson et al. (1993), it is recognised that there 
is a possibility that displaced workers may have unobserved characteristics that 
reduce their wage growth as well as wage level.  Stevens (1997) reports that the 
inclusion of worker-specific time trends makes little difference to results in 
explaining annual earnings and hourly wage changes.  This result is different from 
those reported by Jacobson et al. (1993) who find that when they control for worker-
specific time trends, the estimated losses from displacement are slightly larger.  
Jacobson et al. (1993) suggest that this is evidence against the notion that employers 
displace workers who have more slowly growing earnings.  Other US papers which 
have exploited administrative data sources and use this fixed-effects approach 
include Couch, Jolly & Placzek (2009).  They estimate earnings losses of older 
displaced workers (aged 40 and older) for Connecticut between 1993 and 2004.  
They find that earnings losses for displaced workers increase monotonically with 
age. 
The development of large administrative data sets has facilitated the use of other 
econometric techniques in estimating the impact of displacement on earnings. 
Moving on from before-and-after type studies associated with the DWS, Couch & 
Placzek (2010) set out to measure the earnings losses of displaced workers in 
Connecticut over the twelve year period from 1993-2004 and initially employ the 
methods used by Jacobson et al. (1993) which involve using a fixed effects and time 
trend estimator.  They then extend their work to use matching estimators.  Matching, 
97 
 
or propensity score
36
 matching, is another method for controlling for individual 
heterogeneity that has been used in more recent studies when estimating the cost of 
displacement.  This method involves estimating propensity scores for the displaced 
(treatment) group and matching them to a person in the non-displaced (control) 
group with the same propensity to be displaced.  The propensity scores are computed 
based on a given set of characteristics, prior to the displacement event, and can be 
estimated by a probit or logit.  Couch & Placzek (2010) also compute a differenced 
estimator having matched individuals based on their propensity score.  Due to the 
volatility of employment in small firms, they exclude firms with less than 50 
employees.   
They find that in the quarter directly following displacement through mass-layoff, 
workers’ earnings fall by 32-33%.  This is in comparison to a reported immediate 
loss of 40% by Jacobson et al. (1993).  Measuring earnings losses six years later for 
those displaced due to mass-layoff, Couch & Placzek (2010) report earning losses of 
13-15% while Jacobson et al. (1993) report an estimated loss of 25%.  These results 
from Couch & Placzek (2010) are generated using the same fixed effects estimation 
methods as used by Jacobson et al. (1993) and suggest that these results provide 
evidence in support of their view that results obtained for the state of Pennsylvania 
reflect the time period covered in the study and capture the effects of adverse 
economic conditions.  With regards to results from Couch & Placzek (2010) having 
implemented propensity score matching methods, they report similar findings to 
their fixed effects estimator – those displaced following a mass-layoff event saw a 
12% reduction in their earnings after six years.      
                                                 
36
 According to Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983: 41) suggest “The propensity score is the conditional 
probability of assignment to a particular treatment given a vector of observed covariates.” 
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The receipt of unemployment insurance (UI) is an important indicator of long-term 
losses associated with displacement in the US.  Couch & Placzek (2010) find that in 
both their study and the Pennsylvanian study, there are no longer-term losses for 
those who separate from their job and do not collect UI benefits.  As they note, this 
has important policy implications; those who do become displaced should be assisted 
to find employment as quickly as possible.  Thus this negates the need to apply for 
UI benefits. 
Kletzer (1998) also examines the impact of displacement on earnings in the short 
term and long term.  Citing evidence from Farber et al. (1997), it is reported that 
between 1981 and 1995, post displacement earnings, measured on a weekly basis 
were 13% lower than what workers had been earning prior to being displaced.  
However, it is pointed out that such findings mask a high degree of heterogeneity.  
While some workers who were displaced experienced earnings losses of 25%, there 
was a larger group of workers (30-40%), who experienced an increase in their post-
displacement earnings.  
While the work of Jacobson et al. (1993) is recognised as being a seminal 
contribution, others have identified some possible limitations associated with their 
work.  We now explore some of the strengths and limitations identified. 
Jacobson et al. (1993) exploit administrative data to study displacement, unlike other 
US studies that use survey data from the Displaced Workers Survey (DWS).  As 
noted earlier, the OECD (2013) suggest one of the advantages of using 
administrative data over survey data is that it tends to give a more accurate measure 
of the effect of displacement on subsequent earnings.  While more detailed 
information on worker characteristics may be obtainable through survey data, the 
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sample size tends to be smaller than is available using administrative data and since 
survey responses are self-reported, there may be problems with bias. 
A second strength of the work of Jacobson et al. (1993) is their use of a control 
group to assess earnings losses.  This approach is intended to capture how wages of 
workers would have changed, if they had not been displaced from their job.  This 
was an important feature of their work as it meant that they no longer relied on the 
use of before-and-after type studies which did not use a control group.  These studies 
included for example, Podgursky & Swaim (1987).  Such studies using DWS survey 
data compare the work income of individuals before and after they are displaced and 
do not account for how earnings would have grown if displacement had not occurred.  
This limitation is noted by Kletzer (1998).  The use of a control group therefore 
allows for the earnings of the non-displaced or control group of workers to be 
differenced from those earnings of the displaced group and according to Farber et al. 
(1993) this is the only way of accurately identifying any adverse impact on earnings 
as a result of displacement.  A similar point is noted by the OECD (2013) who 
highlight that the difference-in-differences approach utilised by Jacobson et al. 
(1993) has been widely used in other studies measuring the earnings losses 
associated with displacement. 
A possible limitation of the work of Jacobson et al. (1993), which the authors 
themselves acknowledge, is that the demographic information of workers is limited 
to gender and date of birth.  Clearly other factors could impact on the earnings losses 
of displaced workers.  Because of this, they employ econometric techniques that 
account for the unobserved heterogeneity in the data arising from the lack of other 
worker characteristics as set out in Equations 4.1 and 4.2.  This is done to reduce 
potential bias when estimating the earnings losses of employees.  Also the 
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displacement measure used does not distinguish between workers displaced as a 
result of a mass-layoff or a closure event.  A mass-layoff event is deemed to have 
occurred if firms have downsized by 30% or more below the maximum level in the 
1970’s.  This figure then includes workers who have been displaced due to both 
mass-layoff events and firm closure.   
While the paper by Jacobson et al. (1993) is recognised as being a seminal 
contribution, others such as Couch & Placzek (2010) have raised questions about the 
applicability of Jacobson et al.’s (1993) results in other settings.  They question the 
generalizability of the results given that the period covered was characterised by high 
unemployment and conducted in the state of Pennsylvania which was reliant on 
manufacturing.  Given this, they suggest that findings may not be applicable to areas 
where there is a greater reliance on the services sector as opposed to industrialised 
sectors.  However they do note that the use of administrative data is important as it 
reduced problems such as recall bias inherent in the use of survey data.   
Another noteworthy feature of Jacobson et al. (1993) is that they construct their 
sample to ensure it consists of high tenure workers.   They exclude workers who 
have less than six years of tenure in their jobs prior to displacement.  Podgursky 
(1992) also cited this as a difference with regards to how the US Bureau of Labour 
Statistics construct their sample of displaced workers as they remove individuals 
with less than three years tenure in the job they were displaced from.  He notes that 
not excluding displaced workers from the sample on the basis of tenure has the 
benefit of not eroding the sample size and allows for a greater level of 
disaggregation.  Jacobson et al. (1993) justify their approach by suggesting that such 
high tenure workers are likely to have accrued a certain amount of human capital 
specific to the firm, and are therefore at a higher risk of experiencing earnings losses.  
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As mentioned earlier, this point is noted by Hijzen et al. (2010) who suggest this 
may have impacted the magnitude of earnings losses reported by Jacobson et al. 
(1993).  It may have biased their estimates upwards because workers with such high 
tenure could be expected to experience greater losses if displaced.   
4.2.4.2 The earnings of displaced workers in Europe 
It appears evidence from the US supports the assertion that displacement has a 
negative and lasting impact on earnings.  While less work has been undertaken in 
Europe in analysing job displacement, Huttunen et al. (2011) assert that the available 
evidence from Europe suggests that while those displaced may experience smaller 
earnings losses than their US counterparts, their unemployment spell following 
displacement is likely to be longer.  They question the robustness of previous studies 
due to varying data sources and samples used, as well as definitions of displacement.  
We now move to results from European studies.  The methodology used as well as 
results are outlined and comparisons are drawn with US studies.   
We begin with the work of Couch (2001) in Germany who follows the estimation 
procedure used by Jacobson et al. (1993) to analyse the earnings differences for 
displaced and non-displaced workers and find that in the year of displacement, 
workers experience a 13.5% reduction in their earnings, relative to their pre-
displacement earnings.  He uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for the 
years 1988-1996.  However over the following two years, the size of the losses 
decrease to 6.5% of their pre-displacement earnings.  These losses appear to be 
lower than those cited by US studies such as Jacobson et al. (1993) and Stevens 
(1997). 
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Hijzen et al. (2010) examine the income losses faced by displaced workers in the 
UK.  A key attribute of this work is the use of matched worker-firm data.  The 
dataset allows workers to be followed for up to nine years after the displacement 
event.  Data on workers is also available for the period before they were displaced 
and covers the period 1994-2003.  Like Couch & Placzek (2010), they initially 
follow the methods of Jacobson et al. (1993).  As well as using a difference-in-
differences approach and regression, Hijzen et al. (2010) also go on to use propensity 
score matching.  Their sample includes workers displaced due to both mass-layoff 
and firm closure.  A feature of their work is that they construct five different samples 
which are analysed.  These samples differ for example in how the control group is 
constructed, tenure of employees before displacement, as well as how periods of 
non-employment are treated.  They report that the income losses in the five year 
period following displacement are lower for workers who are displaced from firms 
that experience a mass-layoff (14-25%) relative to those who are displaced due to 
firm closure (18-35%).  In contrast with the results of Jacobson et al. (1993), they 
find that income losses of displaced workers are largely driven by spells of non-
employment experienced by displaced workers.  They find less support for the 
suggestion by Jacobson et al. (1993) that earnings losses were associated with lower 
earnings or wages.  This finding is supported by other European studies below. 
Like Hijzen et al. (2010), the data source used by Carnerio & Portugal (2006) to 
analyse earnings losses of displaced workers following a firm closure in Portugal in 
1994, 1995 and 1996 is also matched worker-firm data from the ‘Quadros Pessoal’ 
survey.
37
  They construct a treatment and control group to analyse displacement.  
The fixed effects model used to estimate earnings losses is based on that formulated 
                                                 
37
 This is annual survey of all firms that have paid employees in Portugal and is administered by the 
Ministry of Employment. 
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by Jacobson et al. (1993).  They find that, even four years after displacement, 
earnings are approximately 10-12% below what would be expected for women and 
men respectively.  Like Hijzen et al. (2010), they find that those who are displaced 
and experience unemployment spells are more adversely affected and experience an 
additional wage penalty.  Thus it appears that finding re-employment quickly is 
important.   
This idea is also supported by Huttunen et al. (2011) who find that displaced 
Norwegian workers who stay in the labour force experience a 3% reduction in 
earnings, relative to their non-displaced counter-parts after seven years.  Similarly, 
evidence from Burda & Mertens (2001) find that displaced German workers who are 
subsequently re-employed do not see a large reduction in the growth of their wages, 
with male workers who are displaced in 1986 and re-employed in 1987 experiencing 
a decrease in wage growth of under 4%, relative to a group in continuous 
employment. They use self-reported displacement status from the German 
Socioeconomic Panel for the years 1985-1994.  Their sample is split into earnings 
quartiles and they find that those in the upper three quartiles experience wage growth 
losses of 17%, which they point out is comparable to estimates from the US.  
However, they also note that a large proportion of displacement in Germany occurs 
towards the lower bound of the wage distribution.  Here they find such displaced 
workers may actually experience slightly positive growth of 2%.   
As this shows, much of the recent work on displacement has exploited the 
availability of new administrative data sources.  This is also the case with Eliason & 
Storrie (2006) who examine the longer-term impact of displacement in Sweden.  
They specifically focus on displacement due to firm closure in 1987 and follow the 
displaced to assess the effect of displacement on their employment status and 
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earnings in subsequent years, as well as the incidence of “insured unemployment”38 
(Eliason & Storrie 2006: 842)  This would include those in employment training 
programmes.  In recognition of the fact that it is desirable to measure how the 
outcomes of those displaced would have changed if they had not been displaced, 
they employ propensity score matching techniques.  Propensity scores are estimated 
based on a large number of individual-specific and establishment-specific factors 
using a logistic regression.  Displaced workers were then matched based on the 
propensity score to the nearest non-displaced worker.  They note that results suggest 
that establishment-specific factors have greater explanatory power when examining 
displacement risk from closure relative to individual factors related to employment 
such as tenure and experience.   
While there is an employment probability differential of about 7% in the year of 
displacement for displaced relative to non-displaced workers, they find that this 
decreases to 2-3% over the following three years.  They find less of a recovery in 
earnings compared to employment probability.  Importantly they note the influence 
of wider macroeconomic conditions on the prospects of displaced workers.  Swedish 
workers displaced in 1987 initially had relatively good prospects of securing re-
employment as the country was experiencing very low unemployment levels of 1.5% 
in 1989 (Eliason & Storrie 2006).  However following this, GDP fell and 
unemployment increased to 8% by 1993.  Displaced workers are vulnerable to 
macroeconomic conditions which can have an impact on both their employment 
prospects in the labour market and subsequent earnings differentials.  The initial 
recovery in employment prospects and earnings of displaced workers was actually 
reversed as the recession took hold in Sweden in the early 1990’s. 
                                                 
38
 The authors note this captures those in receipt of unemployment benefits, including those classified 
as part-time unemployed and those in relevant labour market training programmes. 
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4.2.4.3 Earnings losses and variations across workers; gender, tenure and age in 
the US and Europe 
Given that displaced workers may experience significant and persistent earnings 
losses, Jacobson et al. (1993) seek to determine if these losses are affected by certain 
worker characteristics, particularly age and gender.  Their model allows the pattern 
of earnings losses among workers to differ in terms of their decline prior to 
displacement (dip), the average loss in earnings over the subsequent six quarters 
(drop), and the rate at which earnings recovered after displacement (recovery) 
(Jacobson et al. 1993).  Beginning with gender, while results initially suggest that 
men’s earnings decline by more than women’s on a quarterly basis, it is shown that 
once variables such as age, industry and firm size are controlled for, any difference 
in earnings losses between men and women disappear.  Interestingly, another study 
in the US by Couch & Placzek (2010) report similar findings showing that women 
and men experience a similar monetary loss five years after displacement, although it 
is pointed out that because women’s earnings prior to displacement were lower than 
men’s, this meant that they experienced a greater earnings loss in percentage terms.  
In the UK Hijzen et al. (2010) find that displaced men experience greater earnings 
losses than displaced women.  This contrasts with the above US studies. 
Hijzen et al. (2010) also explore the effect of tenure on earnings losses.  A sample of 
all displaced workers is taken, without imposing the same restriction on tenure as 
Jacobson et al. (1993) noted earlier.  A direct measure of tenure is not available in 
the UK.  However, it is possible to determine if a person was in the same position a 
year earlier.  They report that those with higher tenure experience greater losses 
having become displaced.  This is in line with results from the US and Jacobson et 
al. (1993).   
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Some of the literature on displacement has also examined how the impact on 
earnings varies with the age of the individual.  As noted by Eliason & Storrie (2006), 
a number of reasons may explain why the earnings of older workers could be more 
negatively impacted post-displacement relative to those of younger workers.  For 
example, older workers may have accumulated long tenure within a firm and have a 
high level of firm-specific capital.  If this person is displaced, such skills may not be 
of value to a new employer.  This is also noted by  Couch et al. (2009) who point to 
the work of Becker (1962) and the finding that firm-specific skills of workers can be 
an important factor in explaining wages of individuals.  From a policy perspective, 
Couch et al. (2009) note that workers displaced due to events such as the closure of 
their employer suffer a cost, even though external factors are responsible for a firm 
closure for example.  Therefore, the examination of the earnings losses of displaced 
workers provides an opportunity to examine this aspect of the cost of firm closure.      
As noted by Ichino et al. (2007) both demand-side and supply-side issues can impact 
differentially by age upon the employment opportunities faced by displaced workers.  
An example cited of a demand effect is whereby a worker may experience changes 
in their level of productivity as they get older.
39
  A supply effect could occur if a 
worker was willing to lower their reservation wage and this could be significant in 
explaining their employment prospects.  Alternatively, older workers may be less 
patient when engaging in a job search and so may be willing to accept a lower wage 
if it means securing re-employment more rapidly (Ichino et al. 2007).  They suggest 
that the magnitude of such demand and supply effects may assist in explaining the 
employment rates of younger and older workers.  
                                                 
39
 As noted by Ichino et al. (2007), human capital theory predicts that the age-productivity profile of 
workers would be concave, due to the possibility of skills becoming obsolete as the worker ages or a 
reduced incentive to invest in human capital and training. 
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Work has been conducted in both the US and Europe on the earnings losses of 
displaced older workers.  In general, studies do seem to support the idea that older 
workers suffer greater earnings losses.  For example, Chan & Stevens (1999) find 
that half of workers who are aged 50 and over and displaced, experience a wage loss 
of 19% relative to their pre-displacement earnings.  They point out that there may be 
two opposing effects occurring for those older workers who become displaced.  
Firstly, lower wages for displaced workers seeking re-employment may reduce their 
incentive to work.  Secondly, displaced workers may have had to spend savings or 
deplete assets due to the displacement event and subsequent unemployment spell.  
Therefore, for these individuals, they may be more likely to delay retirement.  
Interestingly they find that men are more likely to be affected by the second scenario 
above while women are more likely to be affected by the first.  They find that those 
aged over 50 who become displaced do seem to find re-employment quickly – 
between 70-75% for women and men respectively.  However, they note that such 
workers have an increased likelihood of exiting from their job within the following 
two years when compared to non-displaced individuals.  But as time passes, they 
report that such displaced individuals have a reduced likelihood of ceasing work, 
relative to the non-displaced.  This could be because such workers may have 
depleted their savings or investments due to the displacement event and are 
conscious of the need to rebuild these as retirement approaches (Chan & Stevens, 
1999).        
Couch (1998) finds a large effect for displaced workers aged between 51-60 years 
who experienced a decrease in earnings of between 30%-39% in the year following 
their displacement.  Later work by Couch et al. (2009) on displaced workers aged 40 
and over find that earnings losses increase as age increases.  They also find that 
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earnings recover faster for younger workers.  Couch & Placzek (2010) continue their 
work in an effort to identify any variations in earnings following displacement 
related to other factors such as age or the industry a worker is employed in.  
Focusing on earnings changes five years after being displaced in a mass-layoff event, 
it is reported that older workers (those born in the 1950’s) see a reduction in their 
annual earnings of about $10,000.
40
  This is more than double the expected losses of 
younger workers.   
These results from the US support those of  Hijzen et al. (2010) for the UK who find 
that older workers are adversely affected by displacement.  Over a five year post-
displacement period, older workers lose almost 40% of the income they were earning 
prior to displacement per year.  For younger workers the figure is lower at 32%.  
These results contrast with the earlier results of Jacobson et al. (1993) where workers 
are grouped into categories based on the decade they were born; either 1930’s, 
1940’s or 1950’s.  They attach less significance to the role that age plays with 
regards to explaining earnings losses of displaced workers.  They report that in 
general the earnings of younger workers recover at a faster rate than those of older 
workers.  Five years after the displacement event, earnings losses of the oldest 
workers are about $522 more than the earnings losses of younger workers.  Overall, 
they conclude that displaced workers’ earnings losses do not have a great 
dependence on the workers’ age.  This conclusion of Jacobson et al. (1993) appears 
to be different to the results of later studies. 
4.2.4.4 Displacement, industry and earnings losses 
Research that has been conducted regarding earnings losses of displaced workers has 
also considered the role of industry.  Firstly, losses may be affected by the industry a 
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 The authors have converted wages to real 2000 values using a Consumer Price Index.  
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worker is initially employed in and subsequently becomes displaced from.  
Secondly, earnings losses of the displaced may be affected by the industry or sector 
that they find re-employment in.  Here the evidence from the US and Europe is 
reviewed.  
In the US, Carrington (1993) explores the role that re-employment of a displaced 
worker in a different industry can play with regards to the magnitude of earnings 
losses.  Their sample is restricted to include male workers between the age of 21 and 
63 years and is drawn from the years 1984, 1986 and 1988.  This leads to a sample 
size of 8,689 displaced workers.  He includes tenure and experience as control 
variables in a regression to identify earnings losses.  In an effort to examine the 
impact of switching industries, a dummy variable is included to capture if the worker 
changed occupation and moved to a different one-digit industry.  He also interacts 
this dummy variable with experience and tenure.  Results suggest that the losses of 
displaced workers are much lower for those who find re-employment in a similar 
type of business.  He goes on to show that the losses for those who switch industry 
or occupation are persistent, even when controls are added to capture the conditions 
in the local labour market.   
These findings are supported by the later work of Stevens (1997) who reports that 
workers who are displaced from their industry appear to suffer long-term reductions 
in their earnings (-24%).  For those displaced but who do not switch industry, 
earnings recover quickly.  However, she does note this does not automatically imply 
that there is causation between switching industry following displacement and a loss 
of earnings.  It is suggested that losses of displaced workers may have been even 
greater had such workers remained in their original sector of employment. 
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The findings of Jacobson et al. (1993) support the findings of the previously 
mentioned studies and suggest that displaced workers who secure re-employment in 
the same industry may experience smaller earnings losses.  One of the reasons for 
this is related to specialised, industry-specific skills that employees may have 
attained over their period of employment.  If these skills are industry-specific and 
their loss translates into earnings losses for workers, the industry or sector of re-
employment for displaced workers may be an indicator of earnings losses.  To 
investigate this, they examine the earnings losses of displaced workers who find re-
employment either (i) in the same sector, (ii) in the same sector but a different 
industry or (iii) in a different sector. With regards to industry, the classification used 
simply refers to either manufacturing or non-manufacturing.  In general, they find 
similar results across each of the three categories above for displaced workers in 
both manufacturing and non-manufacturing.  So it would seem that being displaced 
from one industry or the other does not lead to differences in earnings losses in 
percentage terms.  Those who move to a completely new sector seem to suffer the 
greatest loss.  For example, displaced workers from the manufacturing sector who 
subsequently find re-employment in non-manufacturing have losses amounting to 
38% of their pre-displacement earnings.  A slightly lower figure of 33% is reported 
for those displaced workers in non-manufacturing and who find re-employment in 
manufacturing.  The authors do note that the actual number of displaced workers 
involved is relatively small.   
These findings for the US are also supported by the later work of Couch & Placzek 
(2010) and Couch et al. (2009).  Using a very similar breakdown as Jacobson et al. 
(1993), Couch & Placzek (2010) find that those who moved to a new sector to find 
re-employment following displacement suffered the largest earnings losses of the 
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three categories.  Re-employment in the same sector would seem to play an 
important role in minimising earnings losses after displacement.  This finding is 
echoed in the work of Couch et al. (2009) who analyse the earnings losses of older 
displaced workers.  Industrial sectors were classified as either manufacturing or non-
manufacturing.  Displaced workers who stayed within the exact same sector 
experienced the smallest earnings losses six years post displacement.  Losses
41
 were 
in the range of $1,211 (manufacturing) to $1,655 (non-manufacturing).  Those 
falling into category (ii) experienced even greater losses of $3,767 (manufacturing) 
and $3,607 (non-manufacturing).  Finally, those moving from manufacturing to non-
manufacturing experienced losses of $5,551 and those moving from non-
manufacturing to manufacturing incurred losses of $3,651.   It is noted that when 
explaining earnings losses of displaced workers, firm-specific skills may be more 
important for workers from the manufacturing sector, as suggested by previous 
research [eg Carrington (1993)]. 
A number of European studies investigating the impact of displacement on earnings 
have also examined the role that industry plays in earnings losses.  Burda & Mertens 
(2001) find similar results in Germany with regards to the negative impact of 
switching industries and wage growth.  In analysing wage growth, the sample is split 
into quartiles.  Firstly they report that workers displaced and later re-called to the 
same firm who are in the upper three quartiles of the wage growth distribution have 
higher wages when compared to workers who are not recalled to their previous 
employer.  They also report that after 1988, workers who move to a different 
industry after displacement experience lower wage growth compared to those who 
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 The authors note amounts are in 2000 constant dollars. 
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do not switch following displacement.  It is suggested by Burda & Mertens (2001) 
that this could be seen as evidence of industry-specific human capital. 
Results from Portugal confirm the findings from both Europe and the US cited 
previously.  Carnerio & Portugal (2006) report that those displaced who secure re-
employment in the same industry do not suffer the same magnitude of earnings 
losses as those who switch to another industry.  They also look at gender differences 
with regards to industry switchers and find that women who switch industry 
experience a greater earnings loss than men (13.1% compared to 6.2%).  An 
interesting feature of their work is that they attempt to identify the contribution of (i) 
job tenure, (ii) unemployment and (iii) switching industry to the earnings losses of 
displaced men and women relative to non-displaced men and women in Portugal.  
For both men and women it appears that three years after job displacement, job 
tenure is the most important factor in explaining 12% of the earnings differential that 
exists between displaced workers and those who are not displaced.  Switching 
industry is less important in explaining the difference.  For men, it explains between 
14-24% of the above earnings gap, while for women it explains 16-31% of the 
earnings gap.   
In the UK, Hijzen et al. (2010) also examine the role of industry in explaining 
displacement costs across individuals.  They suggest that their sample may be more 
representative than that of Jacobson et al. (1993) as they use a random sample of 
displaced workers, whereas the sample used by Jacobson et al. (1993) only includes 
high tenure workers as previously outlined.  Here they do not examine the impact of 
switching industry but do report the losses associated with displacement from either 
manufacturing or services.  They find that the losses associated with displacement 
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from the manufacturing sector are slightly greater than those associated with 
displacement from the services sector. 
4.2.5 Conclusion  
Here we have examined literature and empirical evidence in relation to displacement.  
Earlier studies used survey data to estimate displacement effects, but later studies 
have exploited the availability of administrative data.  This has facilitated the use of 
more advanced methods of estimating earnings losses by for example, combining 
matching techniques with difference-in-differences estimators.   
While much work has been pioneered and conducted in the US, evidence from 
Europe is also available.  These European studies have generally reported smaller 
earnings losses for those displaced.  However, it is worth noting that the duration of 
the unemployment spell may matter in explaining these losses.  While Jacobson et al.  
(1993) suggest that this is not important, Hijzen et al. (2010) suggest it is key in 
accounting for the magnitude of losses. 
The reported evidence suggests older workers appear to be particularly adversely 
impacted by displacement and experience large earnings losses.  We have also seen 
that being re-employed within the same sector is important for displaced workers in 
order to minimise earnings losses.  Those who find employment in a new sector 
following displacement experience greater earnings losses compared to those who do 
not switch sectors.     
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4.3: Data and methodology 
In this section we provide an overview of how the cohorts were constructed (4.3.1) 
as well as the implementation of propensity score matching (4.3.2) and finally we 
outline our estimation methodology (4.3.3). 
4.3.1 Overview of data and construction of cohorts 
We begin by describing the dataset used and details of how the panels for the closure 
and mass-layoff samples are constructed.  The data used is the P35 dataset available 
from the CSO.
42
  The available data covers the years 2005-2011.  A panel was 
created using each annual data file.  A separate panel is created for the closure group 
and mass-layoff groups respectively.  The panel construction process was very 
similar for both – the key difference being the use of a closure or mass-layoff 
identifier.  The objective here is to create separate annual datasets or cohorts of 
displaced and non-displaced workers.   
Employment is computed for each enterprise in each year, based on the number of 
individually assigned employment records attached to the enterprise.  As is the case 
with many administrative data sets, such as the New Earnings Survey (NES) in the 
UK, the P35 data does not record the reason for an individual separating from their 
job.  So we cannot definitively identify whether a separation is voluntary or 
involuntary.  As a consequence, we use the P35 data to define the displacement 
events.  Closure and mass-layoff events are defined as below:   
 An enterprise is identified as having closed if its final year in the data was not 
2011.  An employee is identified as being displaced due to a closure event if 
their employer at time t no longer exists at t+1.   
                                                 
42
 Further details on the dataset are also provided in Chapter 3. 
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 An individual is identified as having experienced a mass-layoff event if they 
leave their current employer following a decrease in employment at that 
enterprise of 30% or more between t and t+1. 
Based on these definitions, the mass-layoff sample does not include firm closures.  
To measure the change in employment in the mass-layoff sample, the enterprise had 
to be in existence at t+1.  Therefore the mass-layoff sample does not include those in 
the closure sample.  It is however possible for a enterprise to experience a mass-
layoff at time t and a closure event at t+n, where n>=1.  An example below in Table 
4.1 illustrates this point.  Here the enterprise experiences a decrease in employment 
of 50% between 2006 and 2007.  Therefore a mass-layoff event is deemed to have 
occurred in this enterprise in 2006.  Later we see that 2008 is the last year this 
enterprise appears in the dataset.  There are no observations for 2009-2011 and so it 
is clear that a closure event does not incorporate a mass-layoff event. 
Table 4.1: An example of displacement events  
Year Enterprise 
ID 
Employment Last 
year 
Employment 
change (%) 
Closure Mass-
layoff 
2005 16 300 N 0 0 0 
2006 16 300 N 0 0 1 
2007 16 150 N -50 0 0 
2008 16 150 Y 0 1 0 
 
While we retain all enterprises in the closure sample, we impose an enterprise size 
restriction in the mass-layoff sample.  Enterprises with less than 50 employees are 
excluded from the sample.
43
  Otherwise, an enterprise with 6 employees at time t and 
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 As a robustness check, we also conducted analysis on the mass-layoff sample, without imposing 
this restriction.  The findings are presented in Appendix 4.  We see that estimated earnings losses are 
less than those of the restricted sample.  We believe that this provides evidence to support the use of 
the restricted sample as the unrestricted sample may include far more voluntary separations - possibly 
to higher paying jobs which may reduce the magnitude of earnings losses. 
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4 employees at time t+1 could be identified as experiencing a mass-layoff event.  
Given that our interest here is in those workers displaced involuntarily, we impose 
this restriction.  This is consistent with previous studies such as Jacobson et al. 
(1993) and Couch & Placzek (2010).      
An indicator is constructed to identify employees with one job in a given year for 
which they worked more than 30 weeks.  The data does not include a full-time/part-
time indicator.
44
  It does include the number of weeks a person worked in each year.  
However, a person who worked just 1 hour in a week is classified as working for 1 
week, the same as a person who worked 40 hours a week over 5 days.  By focusing 
on employees with just one job in the relevant year and who worked more than 30 
weeks, we are likely to capture those most affected by a displacement event as they 
would have only had one job and been working for a large part of the year.  This is a 
key indicator for identifying the treatment and control groups.  While such workers 
may have more than one job in other years, those identified as being treated or 
untreated in a given cohort can only have one job.  So for example, the “2006 
displaced (treated) group” comprises of the group who conform to this criteria of 
having a single job, are working more than 30 weeks and experience displacement in 
2006, while the “2006 non-displaced (control) group” comprises of the group who 
conform to the criteria of having a single job, are working more than 30 weeks and 
do not experience displacement in 2006.  As there is no direct measure of tenure 
available, we do not attempt to impose restrictions on the sample based on tenure.  
This is in line with the work of Podgursky (1992) who does not exclude displaced 
workers on the basis of tenure from their sample, which has the benefits of not 
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According to Central Statistics Office, Ireland (2015b), the number of those in part-time 
employment as a percentage of those in employment increased from 17% in quarter 1 2005 to 25% in 
quarter 1 of 2011. 
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eroding the sample size and allows for a greater level of disaggregation when 
analysing the data.   
If an individual was not in employment in a given year, there would be no 
observation or row for that person in that year.  To form a balanced panel, the dataset 
is expanded to include a row for each individual in each year.  In the situation where 
the individual was not in employment, the new row contains only the individual’s 
identification number, age, gender and nationality.  Then in each year, a dummy 
variable is constructed to identify if the person is in the treatment (displaced due to 
either closure or mass-layoff) or control (non-displaced) group.    
A limitation of the data is that it is not possible to identify the order of the job spells 
for each individual because there are no start and end dates recorded with each 
employment record.  So if a person has more than one employment record in a year, 
we do not know whether such jobs were concurrent or consecutive or the length of 
the gap between them, if any.  Therefore, in order to form a balanced panel and 
retain one row per individual per year, it was necessary to decide how to treat such 
observations.  It was decided to retain the record and associated enterprise number 
where the individual worked the greatest number of weeks.  This was done in an 
effort to retain the enterprise record associated with a workers main job as well as to 
give a true reflection of the employment earnings of such workers.  Given the goal of 
the chapter is to estimate earnings losses, such an approach is important.  In an effort 
to retain information on pay
45
 and weeks worked, their pay and weeks worked are 
summed and represented in the single employment record for that year which is 
retained, before the other is dropped from the panel.   
                                                 
45
 As explained in Chapter 3, pay is total taxable pay.  It is deflated using the Consumer Price Index 
[Base year=2011]. 
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For each individual, the following key variables are retained; 
- Age of employee                                     - Gender 
- Nationality of employee       - Annual pay received by employee 
- Weeks worked        - NACE Rev.2 sector of the enterprise 
- A displacement dummy  
This process is repeated for each year or cohort.  Within each cohort, we identify our 
treatment group (displaced due to either closure or mass-layoff) and our control 
group (non-displaced).  For example, the 2005 treatment group consists of those who 
experienced a displacement (either closure or mass-layoff) between 2005 and 2006, 
while the control group are those who did not experience a displacement between 
2005 and 2006. 
To facilitate our estimation procedure, a relative time variable is constructed.  This 
variable is a measure of time relative to the displacement event, t.  For example, t=0 
in 2005 for those in the 2005 treatment and control groups.  This relative time 
variable allows for the analysis of displacement events across time.  In this way, for 
all those displaced, the displacement event is deemed to have occurred at t=0.  Thus 
within each cohort, there are 7 relative time observations covering the years 2005-
2011.  For example, if a person was displaced in 2007 (t=0), their employment 
records are available for t=-1, or 2006 and t=-2, 2005.  We also have an observation 
for this person at t=1 (2008), t=2 (2009), t=3, (2010) and t=4 (2011).  If this person 
secured re-employment elsewhere, the record will include an enterprise identifier, 
NACE Rev.2 sector, the weeks worked and the pay the individual received.  If there 
was no employment record for this person in a year, they will be identified as having 
missing values for the following variables; weeks worked, enterprise identifier and 
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NACE Rev.2 code.  An example is seen in Table 4.2.  This Irish male worker (id=6) 
was displaced (D=1) in 2007 (t=0) at the age of 38 from enterprise 22 in sector F and 
so is in the 2007 cohort.  This person was unemployed in 2008 and 2009 and secured 
re-employment in enterprise 57 in 2010.    
Table 4.2: Example of displaced person and associated variables 
Year Relative 
time 
Cohort Person 
ID 
Enterprise 
ID 
Displaced 
(D)  
Pay (€) Age Gender Nationality NACE 
sector 
2005 -2 2007 6 22 1 50,000 36 M IRE F 
2006 -1 2007 6 22 1 51,000 37 M IRE F 
2007 0 2007 6 22 1 52,000 38 M IRE F 
2008 1 2007 6 . 1 0 39 M IRE . 
2009 2 2007 6 . 1 0 40 M IRE . 
2010 3 2007 6 57 1 48,000 41 M IRE G 
2011 4 2007 6 57 1 48,000 42 M IRE G 
Having constructed an employee-based panel for each cohort, each of the files for 
the cohorts 2005-2011 are saved.  Within each cohort we have identified our 
treatment and controls groups.  Displaced workers are matched within each cohort 
with non-displaced workers.  Section 4.3.2 explains the choice and implementation 
of matching procedure used in the analysis.   Once this matching procedure below is 
conducted within each cohort, the matched cohorts are stacked.  This results in 6 
cohorts (2005-2010)
46
 of treatment and control groups which are followed from t=-5 
to t=+6, or 12 time periods.  Ultimately as noted by Hijzen et al. (2010: 248), this 
enables the estimation of the pooled effect of the displacement event at each time 
period t, across each year of displacement.   
4.3.2 Matching procedure 
As discussed earlier, the paper by Jacobson et al. (1993) was influential in the 
analysis of the earnings losses of displaced workers for a couple of reasons.  Firstly, 
they exploited administrative data (as used in this thesis) and secondly, this 
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 While we have data for 2011, it is not possible to define displacement events given that it is the 
final year. 
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facilitated the move from before-and-after type studies such as Podgursky & Swaim 
(1987) to the use of a control group to measure the earnings losses.  Since then, 
matching methods have been used in numerous studies to estimate treatment effects, 
in which displacement is the treatment event [eg Couch & Placzek (2010) for the 
US; Hijzen et al. (2010) for the UK].  Individuals could be split into a treatment 
group who are displaced workers and untreated or control group who are not 
displaced.  The basic problem in measuring the impact of a treatment such as 
displacement on employment prospects or earnings is that the outcome is observable 
for an individual in either the treatment or control group, but never both.  If we 
assume 𝐷𝑖 measures treatment and equals 1 if the individual i is subject to the 
treatment and zero otherwise, the outcome for each individual is measured as Yi(D).  
The effect of the treatment could be measured as;  
   τi = Yi(1) − Yi(0) 
 
 (4.3) 
 
Ideally we would like to know how the outcome for those who were in the treatment 
group would have been affected if they had not been subject to the treatment.  But 
for a given individual it is not possible to observe both Yi(1) and Yi(0).   
One possible suggestion could be to assume that the mean outcome for the control 
group is applicable to the treatment group.  However, this gives rise to potential 
selection bias problems.  Those who are displaced may have different characteristics 
to those who are not displaced which may ultimately affect their prospects in the 
labour market.  In this case, factors that affect the treatment are also likely to impact 
on the outcome variable.  One method to overcome this is through matching. This 
matching process involves pairing those in the treatment group with those in the 
control group who have similar observable characteristics (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002).  
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In this chapter, we examine the incidence of displacement.  Those who are displaced 
and in the treatment group may have different characteristics to those who are not 
displaced and in the control group, and these characteristics may be related to 
subsequent displacement and an associated impact on earnings. 
4.3.2.1 Propensity Score Matching 
One way of matching is to use propensity scores.  Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983: 41) 
suggest “The propensity score is the conditional probability of assignment to a 
particular treatment given a vector of observed covariates.”  An option here is to 
match displaced individuals with non-displaced individuals who have similar 
characteristics or attributes prior to the displacement event and so have a similar 
propensity to be displaced. 
The individual-level variables used in the matching process in this chapter are a 
person’s age, age squared, gender and nationality.  Regarding nationality, individuals 
were spilt into groups.  These groups are Irish nationals, UK and Northern Ireland, 
Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia and finally the rest of the world.   
We also have information on enterprise characteristics which are used in the 
matching procedure.  These include firm size and the NACE Rev.2 sector an 
enterprise belongs to.
47
  Regarding NACE Rev.2 sector, four categories were 
created.  The first includes NACE sectors A-F, group 2 contains sectors G-U 
(excluding K, M, N, O, P, Q), group 3 covers sectors K, M and N, while group 4 
covers sectors O, P, and Q.  Enterprise size category is also used.  As noted by 
Hijzen et al. (2010: 253), such pre-displacement firm characteristics could prove to 
“be important if selection is non-random with respect to firm types.”   
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 See Appendix Table 5.1 for further details. 
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Displaced individuals are matched with non-displaced individuals within each cohort 
for the years 2005-2010.
48
  It was decided to match displaced individuals with non-
displaced individuals within the same cohort.  This was done in an effort to 
maximise the potential success of matching in identifying the impact of displacement 
on earnings, given the relatively short span of available data.  It is also important to 
acknowledge that a relatively limited set individual characteristics is available here, 
namely age, gender and nationality of the worker.  Others such as Hijzen et al. 
(2010) have matched on pre-displacement characteristics such as the wage and firm 
size at t=-4.  They do not include measures from t=-3 to t=0 in order to allow for 
genuine pre-displacement effects that may occur.  Unfortunately, given the duration 
of the available data, this was not possible and matching was implemented within 
each cohort.  However, we do include firm size and NACE sector as mentioned 
above.  While we acknowledge the somewhat limited set of characteristics used in 
the matching procedure, they are similar to some of the variables available to and 
used by Hijzen et al. (2010) in their UK study.
49
  In an effort to offset the limited set 
of characteristics, we use propensity score matching and difference-in-differences to 
estimate losses. To construct an accurate counter-factual – what would have 
happened to displaced workers if they had not been displaced, we use a control 
group.  While propensity score matching allows us to control for unobserved worker 
heterogeneity, difference-in-differneces allows us to accurately measure the 
difference between the displaced and non-displaced group in their before and after 
difference in income.  As noted by Jacobson et al. (1993), another option to estimate 
earnings losses would be to compare earnings of the displaced before and after the 
displacement event.  However, this does not accurately capture what would have 
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 Propensity score matching is implemented using the psmatch2 command in STATA 11.  This is a 
user-written command by Leuven & Sianesi (2003). 
49
 Hijzen et al. (2010) also have details on occupation and union coverage. 
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happened to earnings if the worker had not been displaced (Keltzer, 1999).  A 
difference-in-differences framework, used in conjunction with propensity score 
matching helps overcome this and so improves accuracy of estimated earnings 
losses.   
Regarding estimating the propensity scores, Caliendo & Kopeninig (2005) note that 
little advice is available when selecting an appropriate functional form.  However, 
logit and probit models are typically used when the treatment case is binary.  Both 
tend to produce similar results.  In this chapter a probit model is used. 
The next decision to be taken concerns the matching procedure to be used once the 
propensity scores have been computed.  Nearest-neighbour matching is one of the 
most straightforward matching procedures.  A unit in the displaced group is matched 
with a unit in the non-displaced group which has the closest propensity score.  This 
type of matching can take place with and without replacement.  Dehejia & Wahba 
(2002) point out that an advantage of matching with replacement is that each treated 
observation can be matched to the nearest untreated observation, even if it has been 
used in the matching process already, thus reducing bias.  However, given the large 
sample size used in this chapter, it was determined that matching without 
replacement would not adversely cause bias and that it would be possible to match 
displaced with non-displaced individuals with a very close propensity score.
50
 
To ensure the closeness of the propensity score match, a caliper was used.  This 
overcomes the problem that may arise if the nearest neighbour in the control group 
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Hijzen et al. (2010) also use nearest neighbour propensity score matching without replacement.  
Depending on the sampling restrictions used in that study, sample size for the displaced workers 
varied between 1,311 and 6,775 individuals while the control group consisted of between 168,682 and 
341,570 individuals. 
Eliason & Storrie (2006) use nearest neighbour matching with replacement and propensity score 
matching.  Here a sample of 4,397 displaced and 115,696 non-displaced workers were used.  Thus the 
size of the control group may have influenced their decision to match with replacement.   
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that a treated person is matched with is far away in terms of propensity score.  Thus 
the caliper acts as an allowable range within which a match can be made.  The main 
objective here is to improve the quality of the match.  One of the issues with the use 
of a caliper as noted by Smith & Todd (2005) is that prior to the matching process, it 
is difficult to determine an appropriate tolerance level.  In this chapter, a caliper of 
0.001 and 0.002
51
 was used in the closure and mass-layoff samples respectively, thus 
giving greater confidence in the quality of matches achieved.  Caliendo & Kopeinig 
(2005) note the suggestion of Smith (2000) that asymptotically, all propensity score 
matching estimators should give the same results because as the size of the sample 
increases, the estimators become closer to comparing matches which are exactly the 
same.  With the large sample size in this study, such an observation is important. 
4.3.2.2 Assessing Common Support  
In conducting propensity score matching, it is necessary to investigate the common 
support in relation to the matching procedure.  This is done to ensure that given the 
set of covariates X in the model, it is not possible to perfectly predict being in either 
the treatment or control group.  So for each value of X there should be treated and 
control observations.  Essentially we want to ensure we are comparing comparable 
people (Eliason & Storrie, 2006).  This means ensuring that there is enough overlap 
between the treatment and control groups to allow for comparability.  Heckman, 
Lalonde & Smith (1999) describe this as ensuring that individuals with the same X 
values should have some positive probability of being in either the treatment or 
control group.
52
  We can produce a histogram of the propensity score for the 
treatment and control groups.  This is a visual representation of the extent to which 
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 A slightly higher caliper was used in the mass-layoff sample as the lower caliper of 0.001 was 
resulting in an inability to find matches in a number of cases. 
52
 In this chapter, this was assessed using the psgraph command in STATA 11.   
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the distributions of the propensity scores in the treatment and control groups overlap.  
By examining the resulting histograms we see that the treatment and control groups 
have a similar range of propensity scores and therefore it is suggested that there is 
enough overlap between the displaced and non-displaced groups to make reasonable 
comparisons.
53
  It was determined that there was no common support problem.  
Given the size of the potential control group, this is not surprising.  This evidence of 
overlap is a positive result and implies that the distribution of the X covariates for 
displaced and non-displaced workers overlap.   
4.3.2.3 Assessing Balance and the quality of matches 
Balancing tests
54
 are performed to ascertain the extent of differences that remain 
after matching between the treatment and control groups.  We are essentially 
comparing the situation before and after matching to determine if there are any 
differences remaining after conditioning on the propensity score (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2005).   
In attempting to establish the displacement effect, we can gain confidence in the 
propensity score method by checking the results of the balance tests.  We wish to 
ensure that in estimating the displacement effect, conditional on the propensity score, 
the two outcomes of (i) the wages of the displaced and (ii) the wages of the non-
displaced are independent of the actual displacement event.  Assuming independence 
conditional on the observables, the X covariates should be balanced between the 
displaced and non-displaced groups.  If it is found that there is a lack of balance, this 
may point to a misspecification in the propensity score matching model used.  
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 The graphs generated for each sample and cohort are available in Appendix Table 6.1 and 
Appendix Table 6.2. 
54
 This can be implemented using pstest in STATA 11.   
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Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) and more recently Dehejia & Wahba (2002), have 
emphasised the importance of checking that the balancing condition is satisfied. 
There are a number of options to assess the balancing property and the impact of 
matching on the characteristics of individuals in the data.  One option is to examine 
the bias or standardised difference for all of the X covariates used in the propensity 
score matching model.  It is calculated as the difference in means between the 
treatment and control group for each X covariate such as age, divided by the average 
variance in the age variable for the treatment and control groups.  Ideally, the 
standardised difference will be low because this points to a greater degree of 
similarity between the treatment and control groups, given the set of X covariates 
included.  Girma & Gorg (2007) follow Rosenbaum & Rubin (1985) in suggesting 
that a value of 20 is large enough to be considered a serious problem.   Caliendo & 
Kopeinig (2005) note that there is no formal criterion on how to assess the size of the 
bias, but suggest that a decrease in bias below 3-5% is seen as successful.  Here we 
find that in the matched samples, the percentage bias is close to zero and the 
percentage bias reduction is generally over 90%.
55
 
Another approach to balance testing involves using t-tests to compare the mean of 
the X covariates before and after the matching procedure.  One might expect that 
before matching statistically significant differences may exist between the treatment 
and control groups on their observable characteristics.  However, after matching we 
would expect balance in the X covariates and that there would be no significant 
difference remaining across the treatment and control groups.  Therefore we would 
expect a large reduction in the number of t-tests which indicate the presence of such 
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 See Appendix Table 6.1 and Appendix Table 6.2 for details. 
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statistically significant differences.  This was the case in Hijzen et al. (2010) who 
report that their matching procedure removed almost all of the differences between 
the treatment and control groups for both the closure and mass-layoff samples.   
Our results of the balancing tests suggest that matching on the observable 
characteristics has been useful.  The results of the t-tests for the closure and mass-
layoff samples are presented in Table 4.3.  We can see that in the unmatched data, 
the treatment and the control group are different in terms of their observable 
characteristics as denoted by the significant t-test results for variables.  However, it 
is clear that after matching, all of these differences have been removed in each 
cohort. 
Table 4.3: Results of Balancing Tests  
Cohort Closure sample Mass Layoff sample 
 Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
2005 15/15 0/15 10/12 0/12 
2006 15/15 0/15 10/12 0/12 
2007 14/15 0/15 11/12 0/12 
2008 12/15 0/15 11/12 0/12 
2009 12/15 0/15 11/12 0/12 
2010 14/15 0/15 11/12 0/12 
Note: Each cell of the table denotes the fraction of t-tests that are significant (at the 5%) level in the 
mean between the displaced and non-displaced groups. 
 
A final measure is the pseudo-𝑅2.  This measure denotes how well the X covariates 
explain the probability of participation in the treatment and control group.  It would  
be expected that matching would eliminate any systematic differences in the 
distribution of the covariates between both the treatment and control groups and so 
the pseudo-𝑅2 should be relatively low (Caliendo & Kopeinig 2005).  In all cases 
here, the pseudo-𝑅2 in the matched sample is zero.55 
The results of the propensity score matching for the closure sample are presented in 
Appendix Table 7.1.  This shows the conditional probability of being a displaced 
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worker in a given year.  The results are estimated using a probit model.  The 
dependent variable used here is a displacement dummy taking on a value of 1 if the 
individual is displaced and 0 otherwise.  The variables used to predict the probability 
of displacement are age, age squared, gender, nationality group, NACE Rev.2 group 
and enterprise size category group. The estimation results for the closure sample 
across the years 2005-2010 indicate that in the years 2005, and 2007-2009, being 
male was positively associated with displacement.  Age is generally negatively 
associated with displacement.  Turning to sector dummies,
56
 we see that in general, 
being in Nace groups 1-3 increases the probability of displacement relative to Nace 
group 4.  Similarly for enterprise size
57
 we see that being in smaller firms increases 
the probability of displacement relative to those in the largest firm size category of 
250+ employees.  Finally, nationality dummies
58
 are generally negative, with many 
insignificant in earlier years indicating that being in these nationality groups may 
decrease the probability of displacement relative to the ‘Rest of the world’ group.   
Moving to the mass-layoff sample,
59
 we examine the conditional probability of a 
worker being displaced due to a mass-layoff event.  Nace sector dummies are 
positive and significant and so being in groups 1-3 increases the predicted 
probability of displacement due to mass-layoff, relative to the base group of Nace 
group 4.  The gender variable is positive and significant between 2007-2010 
suggesting that being male has a positive effect on the probability of displacement.  
Unlike the closure sample, many of the nationality variables are positively related to 
the displacement probability in the mass-layoff sample suggesting that some groups 
are more likely to be displaced relative to the ‘Rest of the World’ group.  The Irish 
                                                 
56
 The omitted NACE dummy is group 4. 
57
 The omitted firm size category dummy is “250+ employees.” 
58
 The omitted nationality grouping is “Rest of the world.” 
59
 See Appendix Table 7.2 for detailed results. 
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worker nationality dummy is negative in all years and significantly related to the 
displacement probability in four of the six years, relative to the ‘Rest of the world’ 
group.  Finally the enterprise size dummy is negative in earlier years and positive in 
later years, although not always statistically significant, suggesting a decreased 
probability of displacement in earlier years followed by an increased probability of 
displacement in later years, relative to the enterprise size group of 250+ employees.  
Table 4.4 displays the number of displaced workers before and after the 
implementation of the propensity score matching.  As can be seen, the matching 
procedure resulted in all of displaced workers being matched successfully with a 
non-displaced worker in each cohort.   
Table 4.4: The number of displaced workers in the before and after matching  
Year 
Number of displaced workers 
Closure sample Mass-layoff sample 
Before matching  After matching  Before matching  After matching  
2005 10,221 10,221 1,979 1,979 
2006 14,120 14,120 2,270 2,270 
2007 20,516 20,516 3,005 3,005 
2008 45,258 45,258 8,079 8,079 
2009 32,452 32,452 4,656 4,656 
2010 29,963 29,963 2,232 2,232 
 
4.3.3 Estimation methodology  
Following the matching cohorts are stacked, resulting in 6 cohorts which are 
followed from t=-5 to t=+6, or 12 time periods.  We now turn to the estimation of 
the effect of displacement for the closure and mass-layoff samples respectively. 
Earlier we explained how individuals were allocated to treatment and control groups.  
We wish to measure the earnings losses of those individuals in the displaced or 
treatment group.  We are endeavouring to establish what would have happened to 
their earnings on average if they had not been displaced.  We could simply examine 
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the earnings of workers before and after the displacement event but as noted by 
Kletzer (1998) earlier, this does not take into account how earnings would have 
changed if the displacement event had not occurred.   
Having a control group facilitates the more accurate measurement of counter-factual 
income.  It is important to note that both a closure and mass-layoff event may be 
non-random.  As noted in the literature,
60
 those who experience a mass-layoff event 
are unlikely to have been selected at random – they may have been specifically 
selected by their employer.  In the case of a closure event being signalled well in 
advance of the event, employees with good opportunities in the labour market may 
choose to leave in advance of the closure.   Given that non-random assignment to the 
treatment and control group may be a feature of the data, it is possible that there is an 
associated permanent unobserved component of income that may be impacted.  
Therefore, a difference-in-differences estimate can be used as was the case in 
Jacobson et al.’s (1993) influential paper described earlier.  As noted by Hijzen et al. 
(2010: 252), this method captures the difference between the displaced (treated) and 
non-displaced (control) groups “in their before-after difference in income.” 
In estimating counter-factual income, the choice of the pre-displacement period is 
important.  For example, Hijzen et al. (2010) choose the average differences in 
income of the treatment and control group between periods t=-4 and t=-8.  They do 
this in an effort to capture the permanent unobserved income component as 
mentioned earlier.  If we select a time period closer to the displacement event, we 
risk picking up some genuine pre-displacement fall in earnings.  While we 
acknowledge this risk, unfortunately with the time-span of the existing dataset, it is 
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 See Hijzen et al. (2010), von Wachter & Bender (2006) , Gibbons & Katz (1991). 
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not possible to select this exact base period.  However, our base period is t=-5 and it 
is suggested that this is sufficiently in advance of the displacement event. 
As mentioned earlier, we have incorporated a relative time variable in each cohort.  
Having stacked all cohorts, this facilitates the estimation of the pooled effect of 
displacement, at each relative time period.  We proceed by creating an interaction 
term between our dummy variable which identifies if a person was displaced or not 
and our relative time variable within each cohort.  The coefficient on this variable, 
𝛿𝑘, is our difference-in-differences estimate of the earnings losses of the treatment 
group.  Equation 4.4 below is drawn from Hijzen et al. (2010).    
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∝𝑖+ ∑ 𝛾
𝑘
6
𝑘=−5
 𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘
6
𝑘=−5
𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑘 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 (4.4) 
 
 
Here 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the earnings of worker
61
 i at time t.  Each 𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑘 is a dummy variable which 
is equal to one if t=k and zero otherwise.  ∝𝐢 is intended to account for an individual 
unobserved income component or individual ‘fixed’ effect.  Di is our displacement 
dummy which is equal to one if the person is displaced and zero otherwise.
62
  This 
regression equation is used separately in both the closure and mass-layoff samples, 
where displacement represents a closure event in the closure sample or mass-layoff 
event in the mass-layoff sample.   
We now proceed to present our findings in section 4.4. 
                                                 
61
 Pay is deflated using the Consumer Price Index [Base year=2011].  
62
 As it is possible for individuals to be in more than one cohort, the standard errors are clustered 
using the individual identifier number.   
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4.4: Findings  
This section describes the main findings regarding the impact of displacement on 
individuals.  Before estimating earnings losses, we begin by briefly exploring the 
numbers displaced and the associated displacement rates (4.4.1).  Further details are 
available in Appendix 3.  Section 4.4.2 explores the impact of displacement on 
workers with respect to their probability of employment and crucially, their earnings 
losses are estimated in section 4.4.3. 
4.4.1 Displacement rates in the closure and mass-layoff samples   
We begin by identifying the displacement rate and follow the definition used by the 
OECD (2013).  The displacement rate is calculated as the number of those displaced 
in a given cohort as a proportion of all employment records in that cohort.  The 
numbers reflect the numbers displaced and total employment records prior to the 
implementation of the propensity score matching described earlier.   
Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 display the numbers displaced due to firm closure and mass-
layoff over the period.  As we can see, the numbers displaced have increased 
considerably over the period, peaking in 2008 with 45,258 and 8,079 workers 
displaced in the closure and mass-layoff samples respectively.  It is important to 
recall that the mass-layoff sample excludes enterprises with less than 50 employees, 
while the closure sample includes all enterprises and their employees.  
Table 4.5: Displacement numbers, employment records and displacement rate 
for 2005-2010 (Closure) 
Year Number displaced Total employment records Displacement % 
2005 10,221 1,301,122 0.8% 
2006 14,120 1,353,178 1.0% 
2007 20,516 1,439,831 1.4% 
2008 45,258 1,477,869 3.1% 
2009 32,452 1,391,772 2.3% 
2010 29,963 1,376,848 2.2% 
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At the same time, the number of employment records was increasing up to 2008 and 
then decreased subsequently.  While at the lower end of the scale, these results are 
within the range found by the OECD (2013) who reported rates of between 1.5% and 
7%.  In most countries, the impact of the recession was visible with higher 
displacement rates in the period 2009-2010 relative to 2000-2008.  This is broadly in 
line with the Irish evidence here although the spike in Irish displacement rates occurs 
in 2008.  In the mass-layoff sample in Table 4.6, we observe that fewer workers are 
displaced each year, resulting in a lower displacement rate in each year. 
Table 4.6: Displacement numbers, employment records and displacement rate 
for 2005-2010 (Mass-Layoff 30%) 
Year Number displaced Total employment records Displacement % 
 2005  1,979 812,302 0.24% 
2006 2,270 840,841 0.27% 
2007 3,005 893,760 0.34% 
2008 8,079 935,248 0.86% 
2009 4,656 928,486 0.50% 
2010 2,232 898,055 0.25% 
 
The numbers displaced are broken down by gender in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 
below.  The number and percentage of displaced males are generally greater than 
females.  These results are in line with those of Kletzer (1998) in the US who reports 
that females have a lower displacement rate than men.  Again 2008 stands out as the 
year with the greatest number of displacements for males and females in both the 
closure and mass-layoff samples.   
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Table 4.7: Displacement numbers, employment records and displacement rate 
by gender for 2005-2010 (Closure) 
 Males Females 
Year Number 
displaced 
Total 
employment 
records 
Displacement 
% 
Number 
displaced 
Total 
employment 
records 
Displacement 
% 
2005 6,528 700,869 0.9% 3,693 600,253 0.6% 
2006 8,485 738,326 1.1% 5,635 614,852 0.9% 
2007 14,203 778,790 1.8% 6,313 661,041 1.0% 
2008 27,007 787,478 3.4% 18,251 690,391 2.6% 
2009 19,033 722,777 2.6% 13,419 668,995 2.0% 
2010 17,711 687,694 2.6% 12,252 689,154 1.8% 
 
Table 4.8: Displacement numbers, employment records and displacement rate 
by gender for 2005-2010 (Mass-Layoff 30%) 
 Males Females 
Year Number 
displaced 
Total 
employment 
records 
Displacement 
% 
Number 
displaced 
Total 
employment 
records 
Displacement 
% 
2005 1,096 399,376 0.3% 833 412,926 0.2% 
2006 1,054 417,796 0.3% 1,216 423,045 0.3% 
2007 1,978 435,849 0.5% 1,027 457,911 0.2% 
2008 5,376 453,262 1.2% 2,703 481,986 0.6% 
2009 3,141 440,156 0.7% 1,515 488,330 0.3% 
2010 1,404 421,507 0.3% 828 476,548 0.2% 
 
4.4.2 The probability of employment and displacement  
We now move to analysis of the matched closure and mass-layoff groups using the 
matching procedure as described in section 4.3.2.  Displaced individuals were 
matched with non-displaced individuals with a similar propensity to be displaced.  
As described, this was done separately for both the closure and mass-layoff samples 
in an attempt to identify the impact of a displacement event on those affected.  
Particularly here we focus on the probability of a displaced worker finding re-
employment relative to their non-displaced counter-parts, as well as the impact on 
their earnings.  We begin by examining the pooled data for all years, before later 
splitting the cohorts and examining the experience of displaced workers before and 
after 2008 in section 4.4.3.5.     
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An employment dummy variable, 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 is constructed which equals one if an 
individual is in employment and zero otherwise.  Each 𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑘 is a dummy variable 
which is equal to one if t=k and zero otherwise.  This is essentially the relative time 
variable described earlier.  Equation (4.5) below is estimated separately for the 
treatment and control groups and so it is possible to identify the pooled effect of 
displacement on the probability of employment at each value of t across all years of 
displacement. 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛾
𝑘
6
𝑘=−5
 𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 (4.5) 
 
The probability of employment, 𝛾𝑘 , and associated confidence intervals for 
displaced and non-displaced workers are depicted in Figure 4.1.
63
  As we can see, 
displaced workers have a much lower probability of employment relative to those 
who are not displaced.   
Figure 4.1: Probability of employment of displaced and non-displaced workers 
a) Closure       
  
                                                 
63
 See Appendix Table 8.1 for regression output. 
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b) Mass-Layoff 
 
We observe that those displaced as a result of a mass-layoff have a lower probability 
of employment in the period after displacement compared to those who are displaced 
as a result of an enterprise closure.  Workers displaced due to enterprise closure have 
a 54% probability of being in employment at t=1, while those displaced following a 
mass-layoff have a 27% probability.  So it appears that the type of displacement 
event matters in explaining the employment prospects of displaced workers in 
Ireland.  We will return to this issue again, as subsequent evidence appears to 
support the idea that the type of displacement event also plays a role in determining 
the post-displacement earnings experience of workers.  
It is noteworthy that displaced workers in both the closure and mass-layoff samples 
do not experience a large recovery in their probability of employment.  With this in 
mind, we look at the level of attrition of displaced workers from the sample.  We can 
see in Table 4.9 that as time progresses, the rate of attrition from the sample 
increases, as those in earlier cohorts have a longer time-span to find re-employment.  
However, we do see that the mass-layoff group have a higher rate of attrition.  For 
example, 49% of those displaced due to a mass-layoff in 2006 never re-appear in 
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employment compared to 23% of those displaced due to closure.  It is possible that 
some of these individuals have emigrated but we cannot say this definitively.   
Table 4.9: Numbers and % of displaced workers who do not reappear in the 
sample 
 Closure Mass Layoff 
Year No. of 
displaced 
who never 
reappear in 
panel 
No. of 
displaced 
workers 
% of 
displaced 
workers 
who never 
re-appear 
No. of 
displaced 
who never 
reappear in 
panel 
No. of 
displaced 
workers 
% of 
displaced 
workers 
who never 
re-appear 
2005 2,149 10,221 21% 535 1,979 27% 
2006 3,183 14,120 23% 1,112 2,270 49% 
2007 7,046 20,516 34% 1,850 3,005 62% 
2008 13,465 45,258 30% 5,385 8,079 67% 
2009 13,407 32,452 41% 3,387 4,656 73% 
2010 13,834 29,963 46% 1,418 2,232 64% 
 
If we look at the attrition by nationality, we find that in the closure sample it is Irish 
workers who constitute the greatest number workers who do not re-appear in the data 
following displacement.  In the mass-layoff sample, there is a more even split 
between Irish and non-Irish workers and attrition from the sample in 2007 and 2008, 
with both groups being almost equal in terms of numbers who do not re-appear after 
displacement.  While we can only speculate, it is possible that many workers, both 
Irish and non-Irish may have emigrated.  This is in line with earlier evidence 
presented in chapter 2. 
Table 4.10: Numbers of displaced workers who do not reappear in the sample 
by nationality  
 Closure  Mass-Layoff 
Year Irish  Non-Irish  Irish  Non-Irish  
2005 1,792 357 412 123 
2006 2,145 768 863 249 
2007 4,924 2,122 919 931 
2008 10,061 3,404 2,951 2,434 
2009 10,090 3,317 2,591 769 
2010 10,898 2,963 1,063 355 
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With regards to age, we do find evidence that a greater number of younger workers 
in the 26-45 age groups exit from the sample following displacement in both the 
closure and mass-layoff samples, compared to other age categories, as evidenced in 
Table 4.11 below.  So it does appear that the attrition of younger workers from the 
sample increases with the onset of the recession around 2008. 
Table 4.11: Numbers of displaced workers who do not reappear in the sample 
by age category   
Closure  
Year  
16-25 
years 
26-35 
years 
36-45 
years 
46-55 
years 
56-64 
years 65 years+ 
 Number Number Number Number Number Number 
2005 243 515 538 366 315 172 
2006 400 799 763 556 446 219 
2007 1,137 2,096 1,643 1,206 666 298 
2008 1,955 3,957 3,190 2,227 1,544 592 
2009 1,871 3,866 3,300 2,367 1,456 547 
2010 1,753 3,865 3,459 2,544 1,617 596 
Mass-layoff 
2005 130 155 - - - - 
2006 180 321 256 1950 - - 
2007 442 733 309 215 - - 
2008 1,294 2,181 934 521 371 455 
2009 376 1,145 771 618 - - 
2010 206 488 366 211 - - 
Note: Some figures are suppressed for confidentially reasons. 
To determine if there are gender differences arising regarding the probability of 
employment, we examine the experience of males versus females.  These are 
displayed in Figure 4.2 below.
64
  We see a similar trend here – those displaced as a 
result of a mass-layoff have a lower probability of employment.  However, there are 
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 See Appendix Table 8.2 for regression output. 
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differences between males and females.  We observe that displaced males have a 
lower probability of employment relative to displaced females.  Over the time period 
considered here, these differences persist.  
Figure 4.2: The probability of employment of displaced males and females 
workers 
a) Closure       
    
  b) Mass Layoff 
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It is possible that the probability of employment may be impacted by other 
individual characteristics such as the age of the worker and their nationality.  Older 
workers, with higher tenure and firm-specific capital may find it more difficult to 
secure re-employment following a displacement event compared to non-displaced 
workers.  Figure 4.3 below examines the probability of employment for those aged 
26-35 and displaced compared to those aged 56-64 years for both samples.
65
  In both 
samples we see that the probability of re-employment for those aged 56-64 years is 
lower than that of younger workers.  It is also clear that those older workers 
displaced due to a mass-layoff event experience a much lower probability of 
employment after a displacement event.  For example at t=1, those aged 56-64 years 
in the mass-layoff sample have a probability of re-employment of 18% compared to 
46% for those displaced following an enterprise closure.    
For both samples, the probability of employment does not recover to the pre-
displacement level and older workers in the closure sample experience a declining 
trend after displacement.  In the mass-layoff sample, the probability of employment 
of older workers hovers around 20% in the post-displacement years.  However as we 
move further from the displacement event, it is clear that the confidence intervals 
around the estimates widen, suggesting greater variation in the experience of 
displaced workers.  It appears displaced workers of all ages may face greater 
competition in securing re-employment, although it appears that older displaced 
workers face an even greater challenge.  
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 See Appendix Table 8.3 for regression output. 
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Figure 4.3: The probability of employment of displaced 26-35 year olds and 
displaced 56-64 year olds  
a) Closure         
  
b) Mass Layoff  
 
4.4.3 Earnings losses and displacement  
As highlighted in section 4.2.4, much of the previous work on displacement has 
examined the impact of displacement on workers’ subsequent earnings.  Here we 
investigate the impact of displacement due to closure and mass-layoff events on 
workers’ employment earnings.  In order to further investigate the impact of 
displacement on earnings, we estimate equation (4.4) described earlier.  The 
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resulting difference-in-differences estimates and associated confidence intervals are 
graphed below. 
Figure 4.4: The earnings losses of displaced workers 
a) Closure         
  
b) Mass Layoff  
 
Looking at the entire period in Figure 4.4,
66
 the mass-layoff sample does appear to 
experience greater earnings losses relative to the closure sample.  While displaced 
workers in the closure sample experience losses of around €13,500 at t=1, those in 
the mass-layoff sample experience earnings losses of just over €27,000 at t=1.  This 
represents losses of 36% and 69% for the closure and mass-layoff samples 
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 The associated regression output is in Appendix Table 8.4. 
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respectively, relative to their earnings immediately before displacement at t=0.  
Although earnings do recover for both samples, they do not reach their pre-
displacement level in the time period considered. 
This evidence of smaller losses for the closure group is consistent with the theory 
and evidence provided by Gibbons & Katz (1991).  They suggest that if firms have 
discretion over who is selected for layoff, as they would in a mass-layoff event as 
opposed to a closure event, the market will assume that those who are subject to 
layoff are of lower ability.  Because of this, those displaced through mass-layoff may 
receive a lower post-displacement wage, relative to the closure group.  Those 
affected by the closure are different because all employees are let go and thus a 
negative signal is not sent to the market, as is the case with the mass-layoff event.  
Evidence from the Irish labour market presented here would seem to support this 
theory.   
However, these results differ somewhat from those of Hijzen et al. (2010) who report 
lower income losses for the mass-layoff group relative to the closure group in the 
UK.  While the time period post-displacement in this chapter is limited to six 
periods, it appears that displaced workers are adversely impacted, particularly those 
in the mass-layoff sample, with earnings not recovering to their pre-displacement 
level in the six time periods after displacement.  This contrasts with Huttunen et al. 
(2011) and Burda & Mertens (2001) who both find little impact on the post-
displacement earnings or wage growth of workers.
67
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 The earnings losses of displaced workers were also estimated with the inclusion of cohort dummies.  
Results are presented in Appendix Table 8.5 and Appendix Figure 8.1.  As this shows, their inclusion 
has very little impact on estimated losses. 
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In both samples, we see evidence of a dip in the pre-displacement earnings or an 
Ashenfelter’s ‘dip’ (Ashenfelter 1978).  This is particularly true in the mass-layoff 
sample.  Ashenfelter (1978) found that wages of participants in training programmes 
had a tendency to decline in the period before they entered a training programme.  In 
the context of this study, such a dip would be identified by a decrease in the pre-
displacement earnings of the displaced group.  This could be explained by 
enterprises implementing a shorter working week or cutting back on overtime in an 
effort to cut costs.  A potential consequence of such a dip is that difference-in-
differences estimates may understate the impact of displacement on the earnings 
losses of displaced workers. 
A possible way of avoiding this is to do as Hijzen et al. (2010) have done and choose 
a base period which is well in advance of the displacement event and prior to a dip 
occurring.  Given the limited number of years that data was available for in this 
study, such an approach was not possible.  However, while we acknowledge the 
potential for over-estimation of earnings losses, we feel that the magnitude of the dip 
is relatively small, particularly in the closure sample and proceed with our 
estimation.  Also, given the large sample and the use of propensity score matching, 
this helps ensure close matching between treatment and control groups.   
4.4.3.1 Displacement and earnings losses – individual characteristics  
We further explore the earnings losses by looking at differences associated with 
gender, age and nationality.  This is done using equation (4.4) and splitting the 
closure and mass-layoff samples by gender, age and nationality respectively.  
Percentage losses relative to the base period of t=0 immediately prior to 
displacement are reported in parentheses.   
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Beginning with gender, males appear to experience a greater earnings loss compared 
to females in both samples in Figure 4.5.
68
  In the closure sample, males experience a 
loss of just over €16,200 (38%) with females experiencing a loss of just under 
€10,000 (32%) at t=1, relative to the previous period.  However in the mass-layoff 
sample, displaced males experience a loss of over €30,000 (70%) at t=1 with the 
corresponding figure for females standing at just over €20,000 (68%).   
Figure 4.5: Earnings losses of displaced workers and gender 
a) Closure        
 
b) Mass Layoff  
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 See Appendix Table 8.6 for regression output. 
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This is consistent with evidence from Hijzen et al. (2010) who report that displaced 
men experience greater earnings losses when compared to displaced women.  As 
mentioned earlier, this finding is different to some of the results presented for the 
US.  Couch & Placzek (2010) suggest that five years after displacement, men and 
women experience similar losses.  It is possible in the Irish case that men were 
displaced from sectors such as construction, traditionally male-dominated, which 
were more adversely affected by the downturn and thus experienced larger earnings 
losses immediately after displacement.  As reported in Chapter 2, this sector alone 
experienced a decrease in employment of almost 163,000 workers between 2007 and 
2011.
69
  Consistent with earlier observations, both males and females in the mass-
layoff group experience greater earnings losses than those in the closure sample. 
Turning to age, empirical work in both the US and Europe does suggest that older 
workers experience a greater earnings loss in comparison to younger workers.  It is 
possible for example, that older workers have been working with one employer for a 
long period of time and acquired significant firm-specific capital which may be of 
little value to a potential new employer after displacement.  In the US, Couch (1998) 
finds that older workers aged 51-60 years experience a loss of 30-39% in the year 
after displacement.  In the UK, Hijzen et al. (2010) report that, examining a five year 
post displacement period, displaced workers experience a loss of 40% relative to 
what they were earning the year before the displacement event.   
Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 below show the earnings losses associated with each age 
category.
70
  We generally observe that the younger categories experience smaller 
earnings losses when compared to older age categories.  As previously, the mass-
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 See Appendix Table 1.1 for further details. 
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 See Appendix Table 8.8 and Appendix Table 8.8. 
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layoff group display greater losses immediately after displacement.  For example, 
while 54-64 year olds in the closure sample experience a loss of around €15,000 
(37%), those in the mass-layoff group experience a loss of almost €29,000 (69%) at 
t=1.  The losses for the closure sample are very similar to those of Couch (1998), 
while again we see that the mass-layoff sample is more adversely impacted.  We do 
observe wider confidence intervals in the mass-layoff sample, attributable to the 
smaller sample size. 
Figure 4.6: Earnings losses of displaced workers and age category (closure) 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Earnings losses of displaced workers and age category (mass-layoff)  
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The losses of older workers are also displayed in Figure 4.8 and compared to the 
losses of younger displaced workers.  As already noted older workers, especially 
those displaced as result of a mass-layoff are particularly adversely impacted 
immediately after displacement with losses of 69%, although they do show signs of 
recovery, albeit with wide variation.   
Figure 4.8: Earnings losses of displaced workers aged 26-35 and 56-64 years 
 
Younger workers displaced due to closure appear to suffer the smallest losses 
representing a 34% fall in earnings in the period after displacement and recover 
quickly.  This contrasts with a 68% loss for such workers displaced due to a mass-
layoff.  At t=6, the earnings losses of these workers in the closure sample are 
approaching their pre-displacement level.   
This supports the work of Couch et al. (2010) who find that earnings recover faster 
for younger workers.  In our case this appears to be true, particularly for those 
displaced due to closure.  As seen in Figure 4.3 earlier, younger displaced workers 
also have a higher probability of employment compared to older displaced workers. 
149 
 
We also investigate the role of nationality with respect to earnings losses.  We begin 
by examining the average age of Irish and non-Irish workers.  As we can see in 
Table 4.12 below, displaced Irish workers are four years older than non-Irish 
workers in the closure sample and six years older than non-Irish workers in the mass-
layoff sample.  The average age of displaced Irish workers is the same in both 
samples while non-Irish displaced workers are slightly younger in the mass-layoff 
sample.   
Table 4.12: Average age for displaced workers in each cohort 
Nationality & 
Displacement 
event 
Cohort 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Closure  
Displaced Non-Irish 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 
Displaced Irish 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 
Mass-Layoff  
Displaced Non-Irish 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 
Displaced Irish 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 
 
In examining the losses of such workers, and in light of their average age, we focus 
on those aged 26-45 years.  In Figure 4.9
71
 we observe that the losses of those in the 
closure sample are less than those in the mass-layoff sample following displacement.  
In the mass-layoff sample, these losses represent a 70% fall in earnings for Irish 
workers and a 68% fall for non-Irish workers, relative to their earnings immediately 
before displacement.  On the other hand in the closure sample, we observe smaller 
percentage losses for Irish workers. Irish workers displaced as a result of closure 
experience losses of 34%, while non-Irish workers see earnings fall by 37% in the 
period after displacement.  The confidence intervals associated with the losses of 
non-Irish workers are wider.  As noted, the mass-layoff sample size is considerably 
                                                 
71
 See Appendix Table 8.10 for regression output. 
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smaller than that of the closure sample.  Overall, the magnitude of the losses is 
similar for both nationality groups but the trend of mass-layoff workers experiencing 
greater losses is continued.   
Figure 4.9: Earnings losses of displaced Irish and non-Irish workers 
a) Closure       b) Mass Layoff  
 
b) Mass Layoff 
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Next we explore the losses of displaced workers who find re-employment in the 
same sector they were displaced from and those who were displaced and move to a 
new sector of employment, relative to those who are not displaced.  We do this for 
both the closure and mass-layoff samples.   As noted earlier, evidence from the US 
from Jacobson et al. (1993), Couch et al. (2009) and Couch & Placzek (2010), as 
well as Burda & Mertens (2001) in Europe suggests that finding re-employment in a 
different sector after displacement can have a negative impact on subsequent 
earnings relative to those who stay within the same sector to secure re-employment. 
Displaced workers are identified as being either (i) industry switchers, (ii) industry 
stayers or (iii) unemployed.  A worker is deemed to be an industry switcher if the 
industrial classification of the enterprise they secure re-employment in after 
displacement is different to the industrial classification of the enterprise they were 
displaced from.  The first employment record following displacement is identified, 
which allows for the possibility that an individual may have an intervening 
unemployment spell.  A worker is classified as unemployed if there is no 
employment record in all periods following displacement. 
To identify the earnings losses of displaced industry switchers and stayers, earnings 
𝑦𝑖𝑡  is regressed on a series of interaction terms as per the equation (4.6).  
Specifically, 𝐷𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to one if an individual is 
displaced and finds employment in another sector, and zero otherwise. The next 
variable of 𝐷𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to one if an individual is displaced 
and stays in the same sector after displacement, and zero otherwise.  The variable 
𝑁𝑜𝐷𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable and equal to one if an individual is not displaced 
and switches sectors and zero otherwise.  Finally, 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 is another dummy 
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variable equal to one if a person is unemployed in all periods following 
displacement, and zero otherwise. 
The 𝛾𝑘 coefficient represents the earnings of non-displaced workers who stay 
employed in the same industry.  Therefore, all earnings losses (or increases) 
described are relative to this group of workers. 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = ∑ 𝛾
𝑘
6
𝑘=−5
 𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑘 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑘
6
𝑘=−5
𝐷𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑘 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑘
6
𝑘=−5
𝐷𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑘
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
6
𝑘=−5
𝑁𝑜𝐷𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + ∑ 𝜎𝑘
6
𝑘=−5
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑘 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 (4.6) 
 
 
Firstly we observe in Figure 4.10
72
 that all displaced workers suffer large losses but 
the losses are greater for those who switch industry.  Secondly as noted previously, it 
appears that the mass-layoff group suffer a greater penalty, with losses of over 
€23,000 (53%) at t=1 for those who switch to another industry.  This is in 
comparison to losses of around €10,000 (36%) at t=1 for the group of workers from 
the closure sample who switch to another industry.  Displaced workers who stay in 
the same industry after displacement experience losses of 13% and 26% respectively 
in the closure and mass-layoff samples at t=1.   
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 See Appendix Table 8.10 for regression output. 
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Figure 4.10: The earnings changes of displaced workers who switch or stay in 
the same sector following displacement 
a) Closure         
 
b) Mass Layoff  
 
This trend of greater losses for the group of displaced switchers from the mass-layoff 
sample versus displaced switchers from the closure sample continues in the periods 
after displacement.  Both closure and particularly the mass-layoff switchers appear to 
experience losses prior to the displacement event, which is generally not the case for 
the displaced stayers.  Interestingly, we observe that the earnings losses of the 
displaced switchers do recover quickly and at t=5 they actually appear to have 
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smaller losses that the displaced stayers, although we do note the widening 
confidence intervals for both sets of workers in both samples.   
As we observed earlier in Chapter 2, the construction sector was particularly 
adversely impacted by the economic recession in the period under investigation.  In 
particular we observed a large decrease in employment over the period as well as a 
decrease in earnings.  We now explore the earnings of those who were displaced 
from the construction sector either due to a closure or mass-layoff event in Figure 
4.11.
73
  Equation (4.6) is used and this time the sample includes only those from the 
construction sector.  
Figure 4.11: The earnings changes of displaced workers in the construction 
sector (F) who switch or stay in this sector following displacement relative to 
non-displaced stayers 
 a) Closure        
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 See Appendix Table 8.11 for regression output. 
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b) Mass Layoff  
 
Again we can see that both displacement events cause large losses for workers.  As 
was the case earlier, displaced switchers who move to another sector either as a 
result of closure or mass-layoff suffer greater losses (54% and 83% respectively) 
relative to those who are displaced and secure re-employment in the same sector in 
the period following displacement (43% closure and 44% mass-layoff).  Interestingly 
we observe in the closure sample that displaced industry switchers experience a 
recovery in their earnings and from t=3 their earnings losses are smaller than those 
who stayed within the construction sector.  We note a similar trend in the mass-
layoff sample.  While the mass-layoff group of switchers experience losses of over 
€30,000 (83%) at t=1, earnings appear to recover and losses are less than those who 
stay in that sector, although after t=4, results are not statistically significant.   
We also examine the earnings losses by nationality for workers.  Both the closure 
and mass-layoff samples are split into nationality groupings and equation (4.4) is 
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applied as before.  In Figure 4.12 below we see in general across nationalities, those 
displaced due to mass-layoff experience greater earnings losses.
74
 
Figure 4.12: Earnings losses of displaced workers and nationality 
a) Closure         
 
b) Mass Layoff  
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 See Appendix Table 8.12 for regression output. 
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Exploring nationality groups, we see evidence of a greater negative effect on the 
earnings of the displaced in the mass-layoff sample.  Irish workers, the largest group 
in the sample, experience losses of 36% following a closure event and 70% in the 
period following a mass-layoff event. The largest percentage losses are experienced 
by the group of Eastern European workers in the mass-layoff sample who see a fall 
in earnings of 80% after displacement.  The variation in losses is greater in the mass-
layoff sample. 
4.4.3.2 Displacement and earnings losses – enterprise characteristics  
We now examine more closely the earnings losses with regards to industry in Figure 
4.13.
75
  Broad sectoral groups are examined – NACE sectors (B-E) are in one 
grouping while the services sectors (G-U) are in another.   
Figure 4.13: Earnings of displaced workers and sector of employment at 
displacement 
a) Closure        
 
 
                                                 
75
 See Appendix Table 8.13 for regression output. 
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b) Mass Layoff  
 
Beginning with the closure sample and the services sector (G-U) we see earnings 
losses of just under €10,000 (33%) in the time period following displacement, while 
those in the industry (B-E) group experience losses of over €16,000 (35%).  Earnings 
losses appear to recover quickly and even surpass their pre-displacement level for 
those in services sector (G-U).  The confidence intervals associated with the services 
sector are also narrower than industry sectors.  For the industrial sectors (B-E), an 
initial recovery is not sustained and begins to fall again after t=3.   
Turning to the mass-layoff sample, we observe greater losses, as well as greater 
variability in losses relative to the closure sample.  As highlighted earlier, the mass-
layoff sample is smaller.  However, we do see a different trend by sectoral grouping 
here with those in the services sector experiencing greater losses than the industry 
(B-E) group (75% and 65% respectively).  As noted earlier, Hijzen et al. (2010) 
report that the losses of those displaced from the services sector are slightly greater 
than the losses of those displaced from manufacturing.  Our results for the mass-
layoff sample are similar.  On the other hand in the closure sample, those displaced 
from the services sectors experience smaller losses relative to those displaced from 
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the industry sectors (B-E).  So it appears workers in the services (G-U) sector are 
less adversely impacted by displacement due to closure rather than mass-layoff. 
4.4.3.3 Earnings losses and unemployment 
It is possible that the reported earnings losses are driven by non-employment spells.  
We have assumed income of zero for out-of-work periods for displaced workers.
76
  
This is in line with the work of Jacobson et al. (1993).  We spilt both samples based 
on their post displacement employment status.  Specifically displaced workers are 
grouped into seven categories.  These are those re-employed in the year after 
displacement and six further groups representing those unemployed for between one 
and six periods after displacement.  Non-displaced workers are split into two groups 
– one representing those who are in continuous employment and another 
representing those who do experience an unemployment spell.
77
  Relative time 
dummies are also created for each of the above groups.  Pay is then regressed on 
each group above and the associated relative time dummies, with the exclusion of the 
control group – workers who are not displaced and have no employment gap.78   
In both samples we see in Figure 4.14 that those who are re-employed immediately 
in the period after displacement suffer the smallest earnings losses.  This result 
seems to support that of Hijzen et al. (2010) who suggest that income losses are 
largely driven by spells of non-employment.  However, we do see evidence here of 
declining losses for this group as time progresses.   Our results here generally point 
to a recovery in earnings for those who are displaced, but particularly in the mass-
layoff sample we note the widening confidence intervals as time progresses. 
                                                 
76
 While this due to non-employment, it is also possible that this is due to sample attrition due to 
immigration for example.   
77
 For clarity, four groups are included in Figure 4.14. 
78
 See Appendix Table 8.14 for full regression output. The standard errors are clustered using the 
individual identifier number.   
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Figure 4.14: Earnings losses and unemployment spell 
a) Closure 
 
b) Mass Layoff  
 
4.4.3.4 Test for pooling  
At this stage, it was decided to investigate if pooling all of the cohorts for analysis 
was appropriate.  Given the large increase in the number of displacements in 2008 in 
both the closure and mass-layoff samples, it is possible that a structural break may 
have occurred here and so pooling the data for all cohorts from 2005-2010 may not 
be ideal.  Thus a likelihood ratio (LR) test of the null hypothesis that there is no 
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change or structural break is conducted against the alternative that there is a 
structural break.
79
  In this case, the full pooled model is tested against the pre 2008 
periods (2005, 2006, 2007 cohorts) and the post 2008 period (2008, 2009 and 2010 
cohorts).  The results of the LR provide evidence against the null hypothesis and so 
we continue the analysis by splitting the sample into these two time periods.   
4.4.3.5 Earnings losses and displacement pre and post 2008 
Before the onset of the recession, workers who lost their jobs had more of an 
opportunity to find re-employment.  This is certainly the case for workers who 
experience a displacement due to a closure event.  As before in equation 4.5, the 
probability of employment is estimated by regressing an employment dummy on a 
relative time variable for both the displaced and non-displaced groups in both the 
closure and mass-layoff samples respectively.  As seen in Table 4.13
80
 there is less 
of a difference in the probability of employment in the initial time periods after 
displacement in the closure sample.  We see that at t=1 and t=2, those displaced 
before 2008 have a slightly higher probability of employment compared to those 
displaced after 2008.  However for those displaced after 2008, we see the trend is 
increasing, and by t=3, the probability of employment is almost 60%.     
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 See Appendix Table 9.1 and Appendix Table 9.2 for LR test results. 
80
 See Appendix Table 10.1 for regression output. 
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Table 4.13: The probability of employment for the closure sample 
Relative time Closure pre 2008 Closure post 2008 
t=-4 - 0.727 
t=-3 - 0.782 
t=-2 - 0.849 
t=-1 0.832 0.910 
t=0 1 1 
t=1 0.563 0.534 
t=2 0.574 0.570 
t=3 0.535 0.594 
t=4 0.508 - 
t=5 0.522 - 
t=6 0.511 - 
Note: All coefficients are significant at the 1% level. 
Turning to the mass-layoff sample, the probability of employment for those 
displaced before 2008 is around 35% in the year following displacement at t=1 as 
seen in Table 4.14.
81
  For those displaced in the post 2008 group, the probability of 
employment is just over 23% at t=1.  It appears those displaced in the later cohorts 
may have found it increasingly difficult to find re-employment.   
Table 4.14: The probability of employment for the mass-layoff sample 
Relative time Mass-Layoff pre 2008 Mass-Layoff post 2008 
t=-4 - 0.658 
t=-3 - 0.622 
t=-2 - 0.726 
t=-1 0.823 0.898 
t=0 1 1 
t=1 0.353 0.233 
t=2 0.360 0.242 
t=3 0.361 0.241 
t=4 0.341 - 
t=5 0.382 - 
t=6 0.409 - 
Note: All coefficients are significant at the 1% level. 
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 See Appendix Table 10.2 for regression output. 
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In estimating earnings losses,
82
 we find the same continuing trend – the mass-layoff 
sample experience greater losses than those in the closure sample.  Examining 
earnings losses of those displaced pre 2008 and post 2008 in both samples in Figure 
4.15,
83
 we observe little difference in earnings losses at t=1 for the closure sample.  
Earnings losses pre 2008 are around €12,000 (40%) compared to roughly €13,000 
(35%) for the post 2008 group.  So it appears those who experience displacement 
due to closure before 2008 have slightly greater losses in percentage terms relative to 
their pre-displacement level. 
Figure 4.15: Earnings losses of displaced workers pre and post 2008 
a) Closure        
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82
 Equation 4.4 is used and the sample is split into two periods. 
83
 See Appendix Table 10.3 for regression output. 
164 
 
b) Mass Layoff 
 
However, we see that workers displaced due to mass-layoff pre 2008 experience loss 
of around €20,000 (63%) compared to almost €29,000 (72%) for those displaced 
after 2008.  As evidenced in Table 4.13 and Table 4.14, those displaced pre 2008 
generally experienced a higher probability of employment and this was most obvious 
in the mass-layoff sample.  Those displaced as a result of a mass-layoff post 2008 
appear to suffer the largest earnings losses.   
To examine gender differences in earnings losses pre and post 2008, the basic 
equation (4.4) is again used and altered to split samples by gender and pre and post 
2008.  As we see in Figure 4.16
84
, those displaced following a mass-layoff suffer the 
greatest earnings losses compared to those in the closure sample.  Also, male 
workers appear to suffer a greater fall in earnings relative to female workers.   In the 
post 2008 period, males and females in the mass-layoff sample experience losses of 
72% and 73% respectively, while those males and females in the closure sample 
have estimated losses of 37% and 31% respectively.  Generally, male workers are 
                                                 
84
 See Appendix Table 10.4 for regression output. 
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most adversely affected and experience greater percentage losses except those in the 
post 2008 mass-layoff group, where female earnings losses are one percentage point 
greater as cited previously.   
Figure 4.16: Earnings losses of displaced workers and gender; pre and post 
2008 
a) Closure         
 
b) Mass Layoff  
 
As observed earlier, earnings losses of displaced workers differed by nationality.  
Here we examine those losses pre and post 2008.  Consistent with earlier 
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observations, Figure 4.17
85
 shows that the mass-layoff group again suffer the 
greatest wage penalty.  Both Irish and non-Irish workers suffer greater losses than 
their closure counterparts.  In particular we see that that Irish workers displaced after 
2008 due to mass-layoff suffer the largest earnings losses at t=1.  In the closure 
sample, we see that it is Irish workers, pre and post 2008 that suffer the greatest 
losses.   
Figure 4.17: Earnings losses of displaced workers and nationality; pre and post 
2008 
a) Closure        
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 See Appendix Table 10.5 for regression output. 
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b) Mass Layoff 
 
Earlier in Chapter 2 we observed that the manufacturing sector in Ireland was one of 
the few sectors to experience wage growth over the period 2008 to 2011.  Here we 
examine the fate of those displaced in that sector in Figure 4.18.
86
  In the closure 
sample, those displaced before 2008 experience a slightly larger fall in earnings at 
t=1 relative to those displaced after 2008 at t=1.  It also appears that the earnings of 
this group are somewhat slower to recover and at t=3, the losses of the pre 2008 
group are slightly greater than those displaced in the post 2008 group.  However, in 
the mass-layoff group, those displaced after 2008 see a greater fall in their earnings 
after displacement from the manufacturing sector.  The magnitude of the losses of 
the mass-layoff group is greater when compared to the closure sample.  Interpreting 
these losses as percentage losses between t=0 and t=1, those displaced due to 
closure before 2008 experience a 47% fall in earnings, compared to 25% for those 
displaced after 2008.  On the other hand, the losses of those in the post 2008 mass-
                                                 
86
 See Appendix Table 10.6 for regression output. 
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layoff group represent an 81% fall in earnings from period t=0 to t=1.  Those in the 
pre 2008 group experienced smaller losses of 54%. 
Figure 4.18: Earnings losses of displaced manufacturing workers; pre & post 
2008 
a) Closure         
 
b) Mass Layoff
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4. 5: Concluding remarks 
We examined the displacement experience of workers in Ireland for those who 
experience a mass-layoff event or a closure event in the period 2005-2011 using the 
P35 linked employer-employee dataset.  This large dataset facilitates the successful 
matching of displaced individuals in a treatment group with non-displaced workers 
in a control group.  We use propensity score matching to achieve this.    
We find that those who are displaced following a mass-layoff are more adversely 
impacted in terms of their earnings losses relative to those displaced following an 
enterprise closure.  This suggests that an unfavourable information signal may be 
sent to the market regarding workers displaced through a mass-layoff event.  At the 
same time, this was a period of severe economic turbulence which made securing re-
employment in a comparable paying job more challenging for all displaced workers, 
but particularly it seems for the mass-layoff group.  Also for the displaced, securing 
re-employment quickly is important.  When we explore the earnings losses of those 
before and after 2008, we can see evidence of the impact of the recession in the 
greater earnings losses for those displaced after 2008, in both samples.  Now the 
magnitude of the losses for those in the mass-layoff sample is even greater.  In both 
cases, earnings losses appear to persist for a long period after displacement.   
It appears that earnings losses vary depending on whether an individual secures 
employment in the same sector that they have been displaced from, with those 
switching to a new sector experiencing a larger wage penalty.  While suffering 
greater losses than those who stayed within the same sector, it is interesting to note 
that after t=5, the earnings losses of switchers are actually less than those who were 
displaced and secured re-employment in the same sector.  It is possible that 
individuals displaced in the 2005 cohort were facing into a very different labour 
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market in 2006 to secure re-employment, compared to those displaced in later years.  
As evidenced earlier in Chapter 2, unemployment in Ireland was less than 5% in 
2005 which facilitated mobility across sectors for those searching for re-
employment, possibly without suffering a large wage penalty.    
We do find evidence that older workers also experience greater losses when 
compared to younger workers.  They also have a lower probability of employment.  
Such findings are consistent with those of Couch et al. (2009) who report that 
earnings losses increase as age increases.  We also see that earnings do recover faster 
for younger workers particularly for those in the closure sample. This is not 
surprising given that we saw younger workers have a higher probability of 
employment after displacement.  If such losses are related to lack of skills or 
training, there is a role for government to address these issues.    
Male workers are more likely to experience greater earnings losses compared to 
female workers.  We know that the male dominated construction sector (F) was 
adversely impacted by the recession, with increased enterprise deaths and reduced 
employment, as observed in Chapter 2.  From a policy perspective, ensuring 
adequate skills provision for such workers would seem to be vital, given that we 
might expect more of these workers required to switch to another sector to secure re-
employment.      
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Chapter 5 : Is there Evidence of Monopsony in the Irish Labour 
Market? 
5.1 Introduction  
In this chapter we estimate the wage elasticity of labour supply to the firm in the 
Irish labour market.  Under the assumption of perfect competition, the labour supply 
curve to the firm is horizontal i.e. perfectly elastic.  It implies employers possess 
little wage setting power and are constrained to pay workers the prevailing wage in 
the market.  A decrease in wages would result in the employer losing all their 
workers.  Whether this is an accurate assertion can be tested by estimating the labour 
supply elasticity to the firm.  In contrast to the perfectly competitive situation, 
monopsonistic competition would suggest the labour supply curve to the firm is not 
perfectly elastic, and so employers possess a degree of wage setting power.  In fact, 
monopsonistic discrimination could occur if employers are able to distinguish 
between groups with different labour supply elasticities and so exploit their market 
power by paying those with lower elasticities lower wages.  
This chapter makes a number of distinct contributions to the literature.  Firstly, we 
build on previous work and use linked employer-employee data and survival analysis 
to estimate the firm level
87
 labour supply elasticities in the Irish labour market.  In 
doing so we exploit the P35 dataset from 2005-2013.  This dataset is highly valuable 
given its coverage of all employees in Ireland and this is a key strength in 
comparison to other studies.  This is the first time such work has been conducted in 
Ireland using such an extensive administrative data source.  In fact, there are few 
studies conducted in the area that use administrative data for any country.  Notable 
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 As described in Chapter 1, the P35 data contains information on enterprises.  We use the word 
‘firm’ rather than enterprise here, in line with previous literature in the area. 
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exceptions are Hirsch & Jahn (2015) who study native-immigrant wage differentials 
in Germany and Hirsch, Schank & Schnabel (2010) who use the same German data 
source to estimate gender differences in labour supply elasticities.  However the 
dataset used in this chapter is much larger, with over 1.9 million individuals included 
in the final panel, in comparison to approximately 300,000 in both German papers.  
Crucially for the period the data is available for, we can distinguish between 
separations to employment and non-employment as well as recruitment from 
employment and non-employment.  
Secondly, this research offers a unique insight into the relevance of monopsonistic 
discrimination in the Irish labour market.  We examine the role of monopsonistic 
discrimination in explaining differences in the pay of native and immigrant workers 
in the Irish labour market.  As mentioned, previous work by Hirsch & Jahn (2015) 
has investigated the usefulness of monopsonistic discrimination in explaining native-
immigrant wage differentials in Germany.  Here we focus on the Irish labour market 
during a turbulent economic period which saw positive net migration between 2005 
and 2008 and negative net migration between 2009 and 2013 (CSO 2014a).  
Separately we also estimate male and female firm level labour supply elasticities to 
explore the role of monopsonistic discrimination in explaining male and female 
wage differentials. 
The next section (5.2) explores literature and theoretical issues in relation to 
monopsony and also whether this as a useful tool for examining the native-
immigrant wage differentials as well as gender differentials in Ireland.  Section 5.3 
and 5.4 detail the methodology and data respectively, while section 5.5 presents our 
findings.  Finally, section 5.6 concludes the chapter. 
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5.2 Literature Review  
The classical view of monopsony is the ‘one company town’ where there is one 
employer and a large number of workers to supply labour.  As noted by Hirsch et al. 
(2010) early work in the area of monopsony by Robinson (1933) assumed 
monopsony power existed in this sense of a single employer.  This single employer 
then had a significant wage setting power.  This employer had the ability to set 
wages that were lower than the marginal productivity of the workers.  The elasticity 
of labour supply to the firm was important because “the more inelastic the labour 
supply, the lower are wages relative to productivity” Barth & Dale-Olsen (2009: 
589).  This implies that employers can exploit market power by paying lower wages 
to groups with more inelastic labour supply.  Because there are relatively few 
examples, if any, of this is the modern world, the applicability of the traditional 
monopsony model is questionable, when considering wage differences among 
workers in the labour market.   
More recent work by Manning (2003) and others has extended and developed the 
traditional view of monopsony to a new or ‘dynamic’ monopsony model which 
allows for employers to have significant power, even when there are numerous firms 
competing for employees.  The model is referred to as ‘dynamic’ by Boal & Ransom 
(1997) and Manning (2003) due to constantly changing nature of the labour market.  
Their monopsony model allows for more than one employer, or a large number of 
small employers, who each face an upward sloping labour supply curve.  In light of 
this assertion regarding the labour supply curve, it is necessary to consider the 
sources of monopsony power that allow employers to manipulate wages and why 
labour markets may not be perfectly competitive.  These are preferences and search 
frictions.  Bhaskar & To (1999: 191) outline a model of monopsonistic competition 
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that allows workers to have different preferences over the non-monetary aspects of 
the job, which they refer to as allowing for “horizontal job differentiation.”  So for 
example, some workers may have a preference to work in a particular location.  The 
fact that workers take both the wage and non-wage aspects of the job into 
consideration gives some wage setting power to employers.   
Additionally, monopsony power can be derived from search frictions in the labour 
market and these are outlined by Manning (2003) who as mentioned is credited to a 
large extent with developing the dynamic monopsony model.  His model is described 
in section 5.3.  He makes two assumptions which “can be stated very simply: there 
are important frictions in the labour market; employers set wages” (Manning, 2003: 
3).  Ultimately these frictions give the employer a degree of market power - this 
allows them to have some degree of power when setting wages.  He notes the 
identification of these frictions begins with the work of Robinson (1933).  Such 
frictions essentially arise from three sources; heterogeneous preferences of workers, 
search frictions and mobility costs.  For example, workers may not have information 
on potential employers, workers may have preferences for non-financial components 
such as medical insurance to form part of their remuneration package or workers 
may not be geographically mobile and seek employment in a particular location.  In 
any case such frictions, or elasticity inhibiting factors, will result in employers 
possessing a degree of monopsony power as a result of the firm labour supply curve 
not being infinitely elastic.  Profit maximizing employers may exploit this power and 
pay lower wages to workers with low labour supply elasticities to the firm.  Clearly, 
it must be possible for employers to distinguish between these groups (for example, 
men versus women; natives versus immigrants).  If one group has a lower labour 
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supply elasticity relative to another, it may be possible for employers to set lower 
wages for this group.   
It is worth noting that while the existence of an upward sloping labour supply curve 
to the firm due to search frictions supports the idea of firms having wage setting 
power, it does not automatically imply that they use it.  They may be “unable to take 
full advantage of it because of the institutions and environment in which it operates.” 
(Ransom & Oaxaca 2010: 283)  For example, minimum wage laws and equal pay 
legislation restrict the wage setting power of firms.  However, Ransom & Oaxaca 
(2010) describe a situation where it is plausible to imagine that firms do have scope 
to exert some monopsony power in the context of male and female workers by 
assigning female workers to lower paying jobs. 
Such search frictions as described above are also a key feature of Burdett & 
Mortensen's (1998) model which Manning (2003: 36) describes as “a general 
equilibrium version of the dynamic monopsony model.”  In exploring differences in 
labour supply elasticities between men and women, both Barth & Dale-Olsen (2009) 
and Ransom & Oaxaca (2010) use this Burdett & Mortensen (1998) model.  It allows 
for the estimation of labour supply elasticities to the firm by estimating the 
separation rate elasticity to employment with respect to the wage.  In their model, 
employees search for jobs and will leave their current employer if the wage on offer 
at another employer is higher.  Thus the wage rate plays a crucial role – by adjusting 
it, employers can influence the rate employees separate from their employer and how 
successful they are at attracting new recruits.  Specifically, a wage increase leads to 
less separations and the firm also finds it easier to recruit. However, this approach 
only considers the elasticity of separations to employment and recruitment from 
employment in other firms.  It does not allow for separations to non-employment and 
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recruitment from non-employment to be sensitive to the wage.  As noted by Ransom 
& Oaxaca (2010: 270) “Since both separation to and hires from unemployment are 
inelastic with respect to the wage, the only sources of elasticity of the firm’s labor 
supply are job-to-job moves.”  This is a restrictive assumption and Manning (2003) 
builds on the model of Burdett & Mortensen (1998) in an effort to incorporate the 
fact that transitions related to non-employment may also be sensitive to the wage.   
In many previous papers it has not been possible to allow for both separations and 
recruitment from non-employment to be responsive to the wage, due to the nature of 
the available data.  As noted by Ransom & Oaxaca (2010: 271) “Unfortunately, the 
more sophisticated models he suggests require much more detailed data than is 
available to us.”  Therefore the ability to include both transitions to and from 
employment and non-employment is a key advantage of this chapter.  Few studies 
have been able to follow the extensions to Manning’s (2003) search model which 
allow for such wage responsive transitions with respect to non-employment, with 
notable exceptions being Hirsch et al. (2010) and Hirsch & Jahn (2015) for Germany 
as well as Booth & Katic (2011) for Australia.   
As we proceed, it is important to note that the focus here is on the labour supply 
elasticity at the firm level, as opposed to the market level.  At the market level, the 
labour supply curve captures the decision to supply labour to the market or not.  But 
as Hirsch et al. (2010: 292) point out, “From the perspective of a single firm, 
however, it does not matter whether an individual supplies labor generally, but 
whether he or she supplies it to this firm or not.”  In the model of monopsonistic 
discrimination it is the firm level labour supply elasticity that matters.  Another 
added dimension to this is that individuals making decisions to supply labour to a 
given firm, rather than to the market, could be coming from employment as well as 
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non-employment.  Therefore it is reasonable to expect that the labour supply 
elasticity at the firm level is likely to be different to the labour supply elasticity at the 
market level.   This idea has been supported by previous empirical studies.  For 
example, there are a number of studies which have shown that female labour supply 
is more elastic than males at the market level [see Heckman (1993) and Blundell & 
Macurdy (1999)].   However, this is not necessarily the case at the firm level.  We 
now explore findings from previous studies which estimate the labour supply 
elasticity to the firm of different groups, specifically males versus females and 
natives versus immigrants.  
5.2.1 Gender and labour supply elasticities 
The new monopsony model allows for employers to possess some wage setting 
power.  In exploring the gender pay gap, Robinson (1933) demonstrated that if an 
employer is a monopsonist, it is profitable from their perspective to pay different 
wages to male and female workers even though they may be equally productive, 
provided their labour supply elasticities differ.  While the assumption of a 
monopsonist as a single employer is restrictive, the new monopsony model allowing 
for more than one employer has renewed interest in the applicability of monopsony 
in explaining the gender pay gap.     
Manning (2003: 195) identifies that when explaining wages of workers, “the 
monopsonistic approach to labour markets adds other factors to the list of possible 
determinants of wages.”  These factors are the rate at which workers transition in the 
labour market and the reservation wage.  The key implication of this, he notes, is that 
equally productive male and female workers may experience wage differentials if 
their labour market transition rates are not equal. 
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A number of papers have recently investigated the usefulness of monopsonistic 
discrimination as a means of understanding the gender pay gap [see Hirsch et al. 
(2010) for Germany, Ransom & Oaxaca (2010) for the USA, Barth & Dale-Olsen 
(2009) for Norway].  These papers find that the labour supply elasticity of females at 
the firm level is less elastic than that of males.  As noted earlier, the work of Ransom 
& Oaxaca (2010) for the USA and Barth & Dale-Olsen (2009) for Norway make 
more restrictive assumptions than Hirsch et al. (2010).  The US study uses less 
extensive data covering one retail firm which had between 54-61 stores over the 
period 1976-1986.  Both the Norwegian and German studies use administrative data. 
These steeper labour supply curves may enable firms to exercise discrimination in 
their wage setting practices, paying different wages to males and females.  Such 
lower labour supply elasticity for female workers at the firm level could arise for a 
number of reasons, such as “different preferences over the non-wage characteristics 
of the job and a higher degree of immobility” (Hirsch et al. 2010: 292).  For 
example, the location of the firm or the ability to work part-time may be more highly 
valued by female employees relative to males and so gives employers a degree of 
wage setting power.  These results contrast with earlier work by Manning (2003) 
who did not find differences in the firm labour supply elasticities of male and female 
workers.  He used four survey data sets, two from the US and two from the United 
Kingdom (UK).
88
  
5.2.2 Native-immigrant wage elasticities  
Another aim of this chapter is to investigate if monopsony explains some of the 
native-immigrant wage differential in Ireland.  There has been little empirical work 
                                                 
88
 The US datasets used are the  Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY), while the UK datasets are the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and 
Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
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conducted which examines the labour supply elasticities of native and immigrant 
workers to determine the role of monopsonistic discrimination in explaining any of 
the native-immigrant wage gap.  One notable exception to this is the work conducted 
by Hirsch & Jahn (2015) who use linked employer-employee data to examine if 
there is monopsonistic discrimination against immigrants in Germany.  Their main 
finding is that there are differences in the labour supply elasticities of native and 
immigrant workers.  Having controlled for unobserved heterogeneity, immigrants 
have a lower labour supply elasticity than German workers.  Also, evidence suggests 
that when human capital and workplace differences are controlled for, immigrant 
workers earn less than German workers.  They come to the conclusion that 
monopsonistic discrimination explains “the entire unexplained native-immigrant 
wage differential” (Hirsch & Jahn, 2015: 501).   
A useful feature of their work is their exploration of the reasons why such a wage 
differential may exist.  These include differences in human capital among native 
versus immigrant workers, discrimination against immigrants, the inability of 
potential employers to assess productivity differences between native and immigrant 
workers and finally, employers may possess a higher degree of monopsony power 
over immigrant rather than native workers (Hirsch & Jahn, 2015).  The usefulness of 
the monopsonistic discrimination model for explaining native-immigrant wage 
differentials rests on the existence of differences in labour supply elasticities of the 
two groups.  Both Dale-Olsen, Roed & Schone (2014) and Hirsch & Jahn (2015) 
explore reasons why one might expect immigrants to have a lower labour supply 
elasticity than native workers.  For example, immigrant workers may lack 
proficiency in the language of the country they move to, or they may lack knowledge 
of local employers or institutions and organisations which could help them secure 
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employment.  Dale-Olsen et al. (2014: 5) specifically refer to “chain migration.”  
Essentially this means that immigrant workers are more likely to move to locations 
where other immigrants from their home country may have moved to, or to “form 
enclaves” (Hirsch & Jahn 2015: 504).  This behaviour limits the geographic mobility 
of workers in their host country.  These examples could potentially enable employers 
to engage in monopsonistic discrimination and pay immigrant workers lower wages 
relative to native workers.    
While we have highlighted reasons why you may expect immigrant workers to 
supply labour less elastically to the firm, it is also reasonable to expect that 
immigrants might actually have a higher labour supply elasticity to the firm than 
native workers.  Again both Dale-Olsen et al. (2014) and Hirsch & Jahn (2015) 
explore this possibility.  It may be that immigrant workers are in fact more mobile 
than native workers.  Given that they have already moved from their home country, 
and possibly family and friends, there is good reason to believe that this mobility 
will mean that they may be guided to locate to areas with better employment 
opportunities or wages within their host country.  A study in the USA by Borjas 
(2001) finds that wages and employment opportunities do in fact guide immigrants 
when choosing where to locate in their host country.  Particularly he finds that “new 
immigrants who have particular skills to offer are more likely to reside in those states 
that happen to offer the highest wages for those skills” (Borjas 2001: 118).  It is also 
possible that immigrant workers could actually be more concerned about the 
pecuniary rather than non-pecuniary aspects of the job which may limit employer 
monopsony power.  For example, immigrant workers may initially plan on staying in 
the host country for a pre-defined amount of time and be primarily concerned about 
maximizing their earnings before returning to their host country, rather than 
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receiving fringe benefits or perks associated with their job, as an alternative to 
pecuniary rewards.  Thus as noted by Hirsch & Jahn (2015), it is not immediately 
obvious whether the labour supply elasticities of immigrants to the firm will be 
greater than or less than the labour elasticities of native workers. 
5.2.3 Conclusion  
Here we have examined literature and empirical evidence in relation to monopsony 
in the labour market.  Manning (2003) is credited to a large extent with extending the 
traditional view of monopsony to allow for many employers to compete for workers.  
Monopsony power can arise as a result of frictions in the labour market.  These 
frictions which may inhibit labour supply elasticity mean that employers possess a 
degree of monopsony power, which may be exploited by paying lower wages to 
workers with low labour supply elasticities to the firm.  
Previous studies have explored the usefulness of monopsonistic discrimination in 
explaining the gender pay gap as well as native-immigrant wage elasticities.  Hirsch 
et al. (2010) and others have reported that the labour supply elasticity of females at 
the firm level is less elastic than that of males.  This contrasts with the earlier work 
of Manning (2003) who did not find differences in the firm labour supply elasticities 
of males and females.  In relation to monopsonistic discrimination and immigrants, it 
is not immediately apparent from a theoretical point of view whether immigrant 
workers would supply labour more or less elastically to the firm relative to native 
workers.  Hirsch & Jahn (2015) do find that immigrants have a lower labour supply 
elasticity to the firm compared to German workers. 
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5.3 Methodology 
Our starting point for estimating the firm level labour supply elasticities draws on the 
work of Manning (2003) where he sets out his model of ‘dynamic’ monopsony.  His 
underlying model has been used and refined by others including Hirsch et al. (2010) 
and Ransom & Oaxaca (2010) who examine gender pay differences, Hirsch et al. 
(2013) examine the cyclicality of employers’ monopsony power and Hirsch & Jahn 
(2015) explore the existence of employers’ monopsonistic discrimination of 
immigrant versus native workers.  Given the importance of Manning’s work, and 
that it is also used in this chapter, his model is described now, drawing on Manning 
(2003: 96-104).   
His work begins with the recognition that the supply of labour to the firm is related 
to the recruits to the firm (𝑅) and the separation rate (𝑆) of employees from the firm.  
Importantly, recruitment and separation are a function of the wage, (w).  It is 
assumed that the rate at which workers leave the firm (𝑠) depends negatively on the 
wage paid by the firm and the number of workers recruited by the firm (𝑅) is 
positively related to the wage paid.  The firm’s employment this period (𝑁𝑡) is 
therefore related to its employment in the last period, the wage, the recruitment rate 
and the separation rate as below; 
𝑁𝑡 =  [1 − 𝑠(𝑤𝑡)]𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝑅(𝑤𝑡) 
 
 (5.1) 
 
 
Therefore, the wage has a direct impact on the labour supply to the firm and the firm 
can use the wage to influence this supply.  The steady state, which implies total 
separations from the firm must equal total recruits to the firm, is thus;  
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𝑁(𝑤) =
𝑅(𝑤)
𝑠(𝑤)
    
 (5.2) 
 
From equation (5.2) above we can derive the long run firm level labour supply 
elasticity below as;  
𝜀𝑁(𝑤) = 𝜀𝑅(𝑤) − 𝜀𝑠(𝑤)  (5.3) 
 
The work of Manning (2003) incorporates some of the earlier work of Burdett & 
Mortensen (1998), which according to Hirsch & Jahn (2012: 7) “can be thought of as 
a dynamic equilibrium model of monopsonistic competition.”  The model implies 
that firms recruit workers from other employers who pay lower wages and in this 
way, the recruits hired by one employer are the separators from another employer.  
Manning (2003: 97) has demonstrated that the recruitment elasticity (𝜀𝑅(𝑤) ) is the 
negative of the separation elasticity (𝜀𝑠(𝑤)), implying that the labour supply elasticity 
is twice the separation rate elasticity, as below. 
𝜀𝑁(𝑤) = −2𝜀𝑠(𝑤)  (5.4) 
 
Using the above equation is helpful as it shows that you only require knowledge of 
the separation rate elasticity to estimate the labour supply elasticity of the firm.  
Because of this, it has been used in a number of studies, including Barth & Dale-
Olsen (2009) and Ransom & Oaxaca (2010).  However, it is useful to be able to 
distinguish between moves to and from employment and moves to and from non-
employment.  At the same time, the assumption is made that such transitions, 
including those to and from non-employment, are related to the wage.  As Hirsch et 
al. (2012) note, this is a plausible assumption.  For example, a worker on a low wage 
may believe they are better off leaving their job, being unemployed and receiving 
unemployment benefit/insurance.  By identifying separations to employment (𝜀
𝑆𝑤
𝑒
) 
184 
 
and non-employment (𝜀
𝑆𝑤
𝑛
), and the share of separations to employment (𝜃𝑆) as 
well as recruits from employment (𝜀
𝑅𝑤
𝑒
) and non-employment (𝜀
𝑅𝑤
𝑛
), and the share 
of recruits from employment (𝜃𝑅), Manning (2003) suggests the labour supply 
elasticity of the firm can be estimated as below; 
𝜀𝑁(𝑤) =  𝜃𝑅𝜀𝑅𝑤
𝑒 + (1 − 𝜃𝑅)𝜀𝑅𝑤 
𝑛 − 𝜃𝑆𝜀𝑆𝑤
𝑒 − (1 − 𝜃𝑆)𝜀𝑆𝑤
𝑛   (5.5) 
 
Clearly, the use of this equation is dependent on having appropriate data to measure 
the components as identified above.  Such an approach has been used by Hirsch et al. 
(2010).  Booth & Katic (2011: 361) also follow equation (5.5) but make some further 
simplifying assumptions;  
𝜀𝑆𝑤
𝑒 = −𝜀𝑅𝑤
𝑒   (5.6) 
 
 
𝜀𝑆𝑤
𝑛 = −𝜀𝑅𝑤
𝑛   (5.7) 
 
 
𝜃𝑅 =  𝜃𝑆  (5.8) 
 
 
Given the data available in this current study, it is not necessary to make the 
assumptions above in equations (5.6)-(5.7) and this study will follow the approach of 
Hirsch et al. (2010), in only incorporating equation (5.8) above.  As they note, “In 
the steady state, the share of recruits from employment and the share of separations 
to employment must be the same.” (Hirsch et al. 2010: 298)  Therefore we define;  
𝜃 =  𝜃𝑅 =  𝜃𝑆.    (5.9 ) 
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Manning (2003: 100) has shown that “the estimated co-efficient of the log wage ?̂?𝑤  
can be used to obtain an estimate of (𝜀𝑅𝑤
𝑛 ) from (𝜀?̂?𝑤
𝑒 ) by subtracting ?̂?𝑤  from the 
latter.” (Hirsch et al. 2010: 298)  Using this along with equation (5.9) means the long 
run labour supply elasticity of the firm can be estimated as: 
𝜀𝑁(𝑤) =  −(1 + 𝜃)?̂?𝑤 
𝑒 − (1 − 𝜃)(?̂?𝑤 
𝑛 + ?̂?𝑤 )   (5.10 ) 
 
As noted by Hirsch et al. (2010), (?̂?𝑤 
𝑒 ) gives an approximate estimate of  (𝜀𝑆𝑤
𝑒 ), 
the separation rate elasticity to employment while (?̂?𝑤 
𝑛 ) gives an approximate 
estimate of (𝜀
𝑆𝑤
𝑛
),  the separation rate elasticity to non-employment.  ?̂?𝑤 , the 
estimated coefficient of log wage, can be used as an approximate estimate of (𝜀?̂?𝑤
𝑒 ), 
the recruitment rate elasticity from employment. 
We will follow a similar procedure as Manning (2003) and Hirsch et al. (2010) for 
estimating equation (5.10 ).  This involves a number of steps as set out by Hirsch et 
al. (2010); 
1. Estimate the separation rate elasticity to employment and non-employment 
separately to obtain the associated wage elasticities; 
2. Use a logit model to estimate the probability that a hire comes from 
employment; 
3. Determine the share of recruits from employment and separations to 
employment, or 𝜃 above; 
4. These estimates can be combined as per equation (5.10 ) to give an estimate 
of the long run labour supply elasticity of the firm. 
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We follow Hirsch et al. (2010) as we begin with a given number of workers, W 
(numbered w=1,….W) and N employment spells (i=1,….N) who work for K firms 
(k=1,….K).  It is possible for one worker to have more than one spell in the data.  
One row per spell is retained in the data.  In this way, there is no issue with time-
varying covariates.  We have a vector of covariates per spell related to the worker or 
the firm characteristics, denoted by 𝑥.  These are the age of the worker, their gender 
and nationality.  The NACE Rev. 2 sector of the firm is also included.  Finally, the 
natural logarithm of the real average weekly wage
89
 per spell is included for each 
spell. We model the instantaneous separation rate to employment and non-
employment respectively, of the i-th spell at time t, conditional on  𝑥𝑖 from two 
separate hazard rate models. 
In the present study, the baseline hazard is assumed to follow the Weibull 
distribution.  As noted by Røed and Zhang (2002) the Weibull model has been 
extensively used in other studies that analyse unemployment duration.   
The Weibull implies that the hazard distribution follows the form:  
𝜆(𝑡) = 𝛾𝑝𝑡𝑝−1  (5.11 ) 
 
The Weibull model is flexible because it allows for the hazard to monotonically 
increase or decrease.  This is monotonically increasing if 𝑝 > 1 and monotonically 
decreasing if 𝑝 < 1, where 𝜆(𝑡)is the hazard rate, 𝛾= the hazard and 𝑝= the shape 
parameter.  We model the separation rate to non-employment below as:     
𝑠𝑛 = exp(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) 𝛾𝑝𝑡𝑝−1  (5.12 ) 
 
                                                 
89
 The wage is deflated using the Consumer Price Index [Base year =2011]. 
187 
 
where 𝑥𝑖  is a vector of individual and firm characteristics.  Since the natural 
logarithm of the real wage is included as an explanatory variable also, its coefficient 
?̂?𝑤 
𝑛  gives an approximate measure of the separation rate elasticity to non-
employment.  We follow Manning (2003) and Hirsch et al. (2010) in assuming that 
the separation rate to non-employment and employment are independent.  Therefore 
two estimations are employed – one for separations to non-employment and one for 
separations to employment.  The separation to non-employment estimation is 
conducted using the whole sample, while when estimating the separation rate to 
employment we remove spells that enter non-employment before estimation.  Thus 
given that a worker has not entered non-employment, then the individual can either 
remain in the same job or move to a new one.  Thus the sample is restricted to those 
in employment only.  This follows the method of Manning (2003) who restricts the 
sample when estimating separations to employment to workers who are in 
continuous employment.   
We also estimate the wage elasticity of the share of recruits hired from employment 
as a logit model.  The dependent variable is a binary variable taking on a value of 
one if the recruit comes from employment and zero otherwise.  We use the same 
vector of independent variables as before, including the natural log of real average 
wage over the spell. 
Pr[𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖] =  𝑥′𝑖𝛽  (5.13 ) 
 
The final estimate needed to compute the firm-level labour supply elasticity is the 
share of recruits hired from employment as a proportion of all recruits.   
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5.4 Data 
The P35 data used here is for the years 2005-2013.  The unique coverage of the data 
allows for the construction of measures to identify movement into and out of 
employment.  A key feature of the data is that it is possible to differentiate between 
transitions that represent movements from one job to another and those that are 
transitions from a job to non-employment and vice-versa.  Given that the data covers 
virtually all employees in Ireland, it provides a unique opportunity to observe labour 
market movements of workers and estimate wage elasticities.  For each employment 
record we have the following variables; a firm and person identification number, the 
year of employment, the number of weeks a person worked at the firm, the pay they 
received in that year, the person’s age, gender and nationality, the NACE Rev.2 
sector of the firm and its legal form. 
While the size of this dataset is its unique selling point, it does pose some challenges.  
The data does not contain an indicator of whether a person is working full-time or 
part-time.  Therefore, it was not possible to just retain all full-time employees as was 
done by Hirsch et al. (2010).  Individuals who held multiple jobs within a given year 
also pose a challenge.  It is not immediately identifiable whether job spells are 
concurrent or consecutive and we attempt to identify a person’s main job in a given 
year, if they had multiple jobs.  We are therefore focusing on those with a high 
attachment to the labour market, as was the approach essentially followed by Hirsch 
et al. (2010).  Therefore a new variable was created to capture the total number of 
weeks a person worked in a given year.  If a person had just one job, this was the 
same as the weeks worked variable.  However, if they had more than one job, this 
new variable captures the total number of weeks worked.  A restriction was imposed 
on the data whereby an employment record was removed if it represented 
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employment of less than 26 weeks and the person had a total number of weeks 
worked in that year of over 52 weeks.  For example, in the table below, the 
employment record for person 1 in enterprise 32 is eliminated in 2006 for this 
reason.  However, it is important to note that this was only done in cases where an 
employment record did not have the same enterprise number in the preceding or 
following year.  This approach was taken to ensure that short employment spells that 
were part of genuine transitions were not removed.  We can see below
90
 that both 
employment records for person 3 in 2006 are retained. 
Table 5.1: Example of treatment of multiple record data 
Year Person ID Enterprise ID Weeks Weeks Total 
2006 1 30 52 67 
2006 1 32 15 67 
2007 1 30 52 52 
2008 1 30 52 52 
2006 3 121 36 58 
2006 3 142 22 58 
2007 3 142 52 52 
2008 3 142 52 52 
2009 3 142 52 52 
 
Also, if people had multiple employment records in a year which meant that 
employment spells overlapped, the spell with the largest number of weeks worked is 
retained.  Again this is done in an effort to retain the dominant job spell for an 
individual.  A spell variable is also constructed to identify the employment spell, 
while another is used to ensure the employment order within the spell is correct.  We 
can see in Table 5.2 below
91
 that the employment of person 9 in enterprise 113 is 
identified as their first employment spell while their time in employment in 
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 This is for illustrative purposes only and is not actual data. 
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 This is for illustrative purposes only and is not actual data. 
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enterprise 155 is identified as spell 2.  The order of the years within the respective 
spells are identified by the employment order variable.  
Table 5.2: Identifying spell and employment order 
Year Person 
ID 
Enterprise 
ID 
Weeks Weeks 
Total 
Spell Employment 
order 
2006 9 113 42 42 1 1 
2007 9 113 52 52 1 2 
2008 9 113 30 52 1 3 
2008 9 155 22 52 2 1 
2009 9 155 52 52 2 2 
2010 9 155 52 52 2 3 
5.4.1 Constructing the sample  
Having sorted the data into a useable form, key separation and recruitment variables 
are constructed.  These are; 
- Separations to employment                -  Separations to non-employment 
- Hiring from employment   -  Hiring from non-employment 
While it is possible to identify when a person moves to another job, if there is no 
employment record in the following year it is assumed the person is in “non-
employment.”  There are many possible explanations for this.  It could be that the 
person is unemployed and seeking employment, that they chose to leave the labour 
market, emigrated from the country, or that that they are deceased and so on.  It is 
not possible to make a definitive statement regarding their labour market status, 
given the information in the dataset.  All we can say is that they are not in paid 
employment for an enterprise – we can only speculate as to the reason why. 
The data does not identify the start and end date of an employment record.  We 
construct an identifier to capture the beginning and end of a job spell with an 
enterprise.  To identify the start and end of a spell we begin by identifying the initial 
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year that a person begins employment with an enterprise.  So a person may begin one 
job in 2006 and another job in 2009 for example.  We identify the order of these 
spells as 1 and 2 respectively.  We then identify the beginning of a spell as the first 
observation within a given spell, while the end of a spell is identified as the final 
observation within that given spell.  For example, an individual would be deemed to 
be separating to non-employment if they were at the end of a job spell and they work 
less than 50 weeks in that year.  Or if the final employment record for a person 
occurs in a year before 2013, for example in 2008, this person is said to separate to 
non-employment.  A tenure variable is constructed to identify the number of weeks 
worked within a spell and this is our key duration measure.  Table 5.3 contains two 
examples. 
In Table 5.3
92
 Person 1 is working with enterprise 22 until 2010 and then moves to 
employment in enterprise 63.  The spell with enterprise 22 is identified as spell 1 
while the spell with enterprise 63 is identified as spell 2, beginning in 2011 and 
ending in 2013.  Since 2013 is the final year of the data, this is identified as the 
‘end.’  There is no employment record for person 2 in 2005.  They appear in the data 
for the first time in 2006.  They are identified as being hired from non-employment 
in 2006 and work with that enterprise until 2008.  There is no employment record for 
this person in 2009, so they are identified as separating to non-employment in 2008.  
The person is then hired from non-employment by firm 19 in 2010, their second 
employment spell.  This is the last employment record for this person so they are 
identified as separating to non-employment in 2010. 
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 This is for illustrative purposes only and is not actual data. 
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Table 5.3: Example of employment records and key transition variables  
Year Person 
id 
Enterprise 
id 
Begin End Spell Total 
Weeks 
Separation 
to_emp 
Separation 
to non-
emp 
Hiring 
from_e
mp 
Hiring 
from 
non-
emp 
2006 1 22 1 0 1 18 0 0 0 1 
2007 1 22 0 0 1 52 0 0 0 0 
2008 1 22 0 0 1 56 0 0 0 0 
2009 1 22 0 0 1 52 0 0 0 0 
2010 1 22 0 1 1 52 1 0 0 0 
2011 1 63 1 0 2 52 0 0 1 0 
2012 1 63 0 0 2 45 0 0 0 0 
2013 1 63 0 1 2 52 0 0 0 0 
2006 2 14 1 0 1 40 0 0 0 1 
2007 2 14 0 0 1 42 0 0 0 0 
2008 2 14 0 1 1 3 0 1 0 0 
2010 2 19 1 1 2 35 0 1 0 1 
 
At this stage, there are 3,300,156 individuals in the dataset.  Without yet making any 
further adjustments to the panel, we have the following number of transitions over 
the period 2005-2013: 
Table 5.4: The number of transitions for the period 2005-2013  
Transition type Total  
Separations to employment 907,218 
Separations to non-employment 4,678,176 
Hirings from employment  907,218 
Hirings from non-employment  3,821,506 
 
As observed in Table 5.4 the number of transitions to and from non-employment is 
quite high relative to the transition to and from employment.  Approximately one 
third of the hirings from non-employment represent individuals who appear in the 
data for the first time.  This could be a young person entering the labour market for 
the first time or a person who has immigrated to the country.   
It is possible to identify these new entrants who are classified as transitioning from 
non-employment by their nationality.  Table 5.5 below shows a simple breakdown of 
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Irish versus non-Irish workers over the period.  We see that 2006 and 2007 saw large 
numbers of individuals appearing in the data for the first time.  Both groups decline 
significantly with the onset of the recession.  For the non-Irish group in 2009, 
numbers of new entrants had decreased by 77% compared to 2006. 
Table 5.5: Those from non-employment in panel for first time by nationality 
Year Irish Non-Irish 
2006 179,133 158,166 
2007 127,575 149,824 
2008 82,100 92,229 
2009 48,409 37,094 
2010 50,104 35,792 
2011 58,123 36,489 
2012 62,351 40,566 
2013 63,080 42,858 
TOTAL 670,875 593,018 
 
As outlined earlier, it was not possible to keep only those in full-time employment in 
the data.  All individuals, regardless of age are included in the data.  The youngest 
workers are aged 16 years old.  Younger workers may still be in education and may 
take up employment for short periods or take up seasonal work.  Therefore, these 
workers are likely to move into and out of employment relatively often.  Given the 
objective of this chapter is to investigate if there is evidence of monopsony in the 
Irish labour market through estimating wage elasticities, a restriction is imposed to 
only include employment records for those aged 21-55.  Other papers have imposed 
similar restrictions.  For example, Hirsch et al. (2010) keep only workers aged 16-55.  
The upper limit is chosen to ensure that transitions to non-employment are not due to 
a person retiring early.  Booth & Katic (2010) and Hirsch & Jahn (2015) use the 
same upper limit of 55 years.  Their lower bounds are 25 years and 18 years 
respectively.  By imposing this restriction, we endeavour to ensure that the sample 
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includes individuals with a high attachment to the labour market.  Therefore, an 
employment spell is removed from the data if the worker is less than 21 years at the 
start of the spell, or more than 55 years at the end of the spell.  This results in 
2,677,485 observations being removed from the data.   
We follow Hirsch & Jahn (2015) in excluding workers who transition due to closing 
and down-sizing plants.  In our data, as in theirs, we are unable to distinguish 
between voluntary and involuntary separations.  Therefore by omitting downsizing 
and closing enterprises, we are more likely to capture voluntary separations.  A firm 
is deemed to have closed if the final record for a firm is not 2013.  A mass-layoff is 
deemed to have occurred in a firm if employment decreased by 30% or more from 
one year to the next.  As a result, 444,881 observations are removed. 
The removal of closing and downsizing plants, as well as retaining individuals aged 
between 21-55 years of age results in a sample size of 9,670,360 observations 
spanning nine years. 
As the next step in creating the panel, left censored and some unusable observations 
were removed.  A spell may be left censored if an event occurred before a subject 
was under observation.  In our case, this could mean that a person in employment in 
2005 (the first year of available data) could have experienced a transition to 
employment or from unemployment before 2005.  Therefore these observations are 
removed.  Also, partial years at the end of a spell may be censored and so these are 
also removed. 
The final step in constructing the panel was to collapse the data to keep one row or 
observation per spell.  A wage variable was constructed to represent the average 
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weekly wage over the spell.
93
  It was therefore possible for each person to have more 
than one row if they had multiple spells.  The final dataset consists of 1,936,048 
individuals representing 3,611,390 spells.  Thus the mean number of spells per 
individuals is 1.87 (SD=1.25).  Given that it is possible for one person to experience 
multiple spells, the number of spells is greater than the number of individuals in the 
dataset. 
Table 5.6: The number of spells and individuals  
No. of spells No. of individuals Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 1,020,228 52.7 52.7 
2 498,783 25.76 78.46 
3 229,762 11.87 90.33 
4 104,224 5.38 95.71 
5 45,938 2.37 98.08 
6 20,288 1.05 99.13 
> 6 16,825 0.46 99.59 
TOTAL 1,936,048 0.04 100 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.6, 90% of workers had 3 spells or less over the period, 
with less than 1% having more than 6 spells.  Figure 5.1 below details the number of 
transitions in the panel for all workers over the period 2005-2013.  As observed, 
there are 353,850 workers
94
 in the dataset in 2005, while there are just over one 
million individuals in the panel in 2013.  The final sample included 39,200 ‘stayers’.  
These are workers who remained in employment with the same firm from 2005 to 
2013.  As noted earlier, it is not possible to determine why a person is not in 
employment and therefore we examine transitions via non-employment.  We can see 
                                                 
93
 Wage was divided by weeks per spell.  The wage is then logged.  While we know the number of 
weeks a person worked per year, we do not know how many days/hours they worked within that 
week. 
94
 There were 616,264 individuals excluded when left censored observations were removed from the 
sample. 
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that a high number of the separations and hirings taking place are via non-
employment, while much less take place via employment.   
Figure 5.1:  The transitions of workers  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
5.4.2 Investigating non-employment durations  
Given the relatively high numbers of transitions via non-employment compared to 
others such as Hirsch et al. (2010) for Germany, it was decided to investigate non-
employment duration further.  Table 5.7 shows the average non-employment 
duration of workers in the panel.  Around 6% of workers who experience a non-
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employment spell experience a non-employment duration of less than 4 weeks, while 
36% of workers experience a non-employment duration of 52 weeks or more. 
Table 5.7: Non-employment durations 
Non-employment duration Percentage (%) 
< 1 month 5.80 
>= 1 month & < 3 months 11.20 
> =3 months & < 6 months 13.28 
> =6 months & < 1 year 33.91 
1 year + 35.81 
 
This can be compared to OECD data on unemployment durations for Ireland.  The 
table below shows these durations for Ireland over the period 2005-2013.  We see 
that the unemployment durations of less than one month have decreased from 9% in 
2005 to 4% in 2013.  On the other hand, the percentage of those unemployed for one 
year or more has increased from 33% in 2005 to 61% in 2013.   
Table 5.8 : Unemployment durations for Ireland 
Year & Duration 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Percentage (%) 
< 1 month 9 23 9 8 8 4 4 4 4 
> 1 month & < 3 
months 
24 10 24 26 20 12 10 10 10 
> 3 months & < 6 
months 
18 7 19 20 20 14 11 11 11 
> 6 months & < 1 
year 
17 18 18 19 24 21 16 14 14 
1 year + 33 32 30 27 29 49 59 62 61 
Source: OECD (2015)
95
  
Therefore it appears that our reported non-employment durations are broadly in line 
with those of the OECD. 
Other evidence also suggests that there has been an increase in the number of 
temporary employment contracts, as opposed to permanent contracts.  Table 5.9 
shows that the percentage of people in temporary employment (as a percentage of all 
                                                 
95
 No explanation is offered by the OECD (2015) for the high figure reported for <1 month in 2006 
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in employment) in Ireland has increased from 3.7% in 2005 to around 10% in 2013.  
If we look at younger workers in particular, we see that this group has experienced 
an increase in those employed on a temporary basis, with just over 33% of this age 
group being in temporary employment in 2013.    
Table 5.9: Incidence of permanent & temporary employment in Ireland  
YEAR 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
ALL PERSONS 
Share of permanent 
employment 
96.3 94 91.5 91.4 91.2 90.4 89.8 89.8 90 
Share of temporary 
employment 
3.7 6 8.5 8.6 8.8 9.6 10.2 10.2 10 
AGED 15-24 
Share of permanent 
employment 
88.4 84.9 78.8 78 75.4 69.9 66.2 65.1 66.9 
Share of temporary 
employment 
11.6 15.1 21.2 22 24.6 30.1 33.8 34.9 33.1 
Source: Central Statistics Office, Ireland (2016g) 
Further evidence from the CSO (2016j) shows that of those who are in temporary 
employment, the numbers reporting the reason as ‘could not find a permanent job’ 
has increased from 28.4% in Q1 of 2009 to 77.2% in Q2 of 2013.  This big increase 
suggests that many workers have to accept temporary employment and this is 
contributing to the high number of transitions to and from non-employment, as 
observed in Table 5.4.  
These figures are supported by data from the Live Register
96
  in Ireland which shows 
the large jump in casual and part-time workers as displayed in Figure 5.2.  Such 
workers could be captured in the data used in this thesis as those experiencing 
multiple job spells, possibly with short duration.   
 
                                                 
96
The Live Register is used to provide a monthly series of the numbers of people registering for 
Unemployment Assistance/Benefit or for various other statutory entitlements at local offices of the 
Department of Social Protection.  The Live Register is not designed to measure unemployment.  It 
includes part-time workers (those who work up to three days a week) and seasonal and casual workers 
entitled to Jobseeker’s Benefit (JB) or Jobseeker’s Allowance (JA)  (CSO, 2016i). 
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Figure 5.2: Number of casual & part-time workers, 2005-2013
97
 
 
Source: CSO (2016e) 
At the same time as this large increase occurred, we can see in Table 5.10 that the 
length of time someone is on the Live Register can be quite short.   
Table 5.10: Live Register unemployment durations (‘000’s) 
 Bi –annual results 
Duration 
2009
H1 
2009
H2 
2010
H1 
2010
H2 
2011
H1 
2011
H2 
2012
H1 
2012
H2 
2013
H1 
<3 months 169 160 156 151 150 149 142 143 138 
>= 3 & < 6 months 74 72 65 56 49 45 43 40 39 
>=6  & < 12 months 70 93 94 76 71 57 61 49 54 
=1 year + 71 87 117 148 169 180 184 188 186 
>= 1 & < 2 years 34 43 63 78 79 68 59 55 52 
>=2  & < 3 years 12 15 21 31 43 53 53 45 38 
>=3 years + 25 29 33 39 47 58 72 88 96 
TOTAL 454 500 550 577 609 610 614 608 604 
Under 3 months as 
% of total 
37% 32% 28% 26% 25% 24% 23% 24% 23% 
Source: Central Statistics Office, Ireland (2016f) 
For example, we see that between 2009 and 2013, the percentage of those registering 
for unemployment assistance/benefit for less than 3 months varied between 37% in 
                                                 
97
 Casual work is work in which You are normally employed for periods of less than a week; The 
number of days and the days of the week you work varies with the level of activity in the business; 
and; have no assurance of being re-employed in the job when a period of employment ends.  See 
http://www.citizensinformationboard.ie/downloads/relate/relate_2011_11.pdf for further details. 
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2009 to 23% in 2013.  This helps in our understanding of why the number of 
transitions via non-employment may be high. 
5.4.3 The transitions of Irish and non-Irish workers 
Next we disaggregate the data presented in Figure 5.1 to show the transitions for 
Irish and non-Irish workers in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4.  All workers and their 
spells are coded as being either Irish or non-Irish based on their reported nationality.  
We have 1,231,039 Irish workers and 708,062 non-Irish workers in the panel over 
the period 2005-2013.
98
  There are 2,336,718 and 1,274,672 spells associated with 
Irish and non-Irish workers respectively.  As before, left censored observations were 
removed from the panel.  This contributes to the relatively low number of individuals 
in the sample in 2005 for both Irish and non-Irish workers. 
We see that relative to the number of individuals in both samples in 2013, non-Irish 
workers experience a greater number of transitions via non-employment.  The mean 
number of spells per Irish worker is 1.89 and is 1.80 for non-Irish workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98
 This gives a total number of people as 1,939,101, which is 3,053 more than reported earlier.  This 
increased number is due to non-Irish workers changing nationality during the period, so that while 
initially identified as non-Irish in one spell, the same person could be identified as Irish in a later 
spell.  Nationality is self-reported. 
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Figure 5.3:  The transitions of Irish workers  
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Figure 5.4:  The transitions of non-Irish workers  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
5.5 Findings   
To estimate labour supply elasticities at the firm level, thereby determining whether 
monopsonistic discrimination can provide an explanation of a native-immigrant 
wage differential, as well as male versus female differences, we use the econometric 
approach outlined earlier.  We do this initially for all workers, then for Irish and non-
Irish workers (5.5.6) and finally for male and female workers (5.5.7).  We fit 
Weibull hazard models for the instantaneous separation rates to employment and 
non-employment.  By including the logged real average weekly wage per spell in 
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these estimations we arrive at estimates of the separation rate elasticities to 
employment and non-employment.  We also estimate a logit model for the 
probability that an individual is hired from employment to obtain their wage 
elasticity.  Finally, we calculate the proportion of recruits from employment.  These 
estimates are then inserted into equation (5.10) to arrive at an estimate of the firm-
level labour supply elasticity.  We include the same covariates in all estimations.  
These include a gender dummy variable, age at the start of the spell, nationality 
group
99
 and the economic sector
100
 the enterprise belongs to.    
In estimating the elasticities we include both worker and firm characteristics as 
described above.  These variables are included in an effort to control for differneces 
across workers and firms which may help explain wage variations across workers 
and firms.  Hirsch et al. (2010) also include establishment and worker controls.  With 
their more detailed information on workers and enterprises, a rich set of control 
variables are included.  Thus this may help enhance the accuracy of the elasticity 
estimates.  We therefore proceed by using the NACE sector as a control variable.  
While the inclusion of establishment size was considered, Hirsch et al. (2010) note 
that in dynamic monopsony models, such as those of Burdett & Mortensen (1998), 
the use of enterprise size as a control variable should not matter as it can be 
increased by paying higher wages.  Hirsch et al. (2010) find that their original results 
are robust to its inclusion.   
                                                 
99
 Nationality is grouped into six categories.  The purpose is to create groups that are broadly similar 
in terms of geographic location of country of origin.  These groups are Ireland, UK & Northern 
Ireland, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia and the Rest of the World.  
100
 NACE Rev.2 sectors are grouped into 6 categories. The purpose is to create groups that are 
broadly similar in terms industrial sector of employment.  These groups are Agriculture (A), Industry 
(B-E), Construction (F), Business Economy services (G-N), Public sector (O, P, Q) and Other 
Activities (R, S, T, U and unknown). 
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We note that Manning (2003) does not control for “firm-specific determinants of 
transition behaviour” due to the nature of the available data being individual or 
household based (Hirsch et al. 2010: 298).  Also, Ransom & Oaxaca (2010) do not 
include firm-specific controls in their estimations. 
Having considered using firm fixed effects, we firstly note the lack of use of this 
approach in the literature and secondly that our data in this thesis is essentially short 
in years and wide in terms of firm observations.  Therefore there was the potential 
that that such an econometric approach could bias results.  The availability of 
additional years of data would make such an approach more feasible. 
5.5.1 Transitions to employment (all workers) 
We begin by estimating the separation rate elasticity to employment for all workers 
as described in Figure 5.1.  We follow Manning (2003) and Hirsch et al. (2010) and 
only include spells that do not end in non-employment in the estimation.  This 
reduces the number of spells included in the analysis to 1,211,936, which includes 
469,949 failures.   
The primary effect of interest is the impact of the wage on the separation rate to 
employment.  Therefore we have included the log of the real average weekly wage 
over the spell as an explanatory variable.  We would expect that there would be a 
negative effect– the higher the wage paid, the lower the separation rate.   
Other variables may also influence the separation rate to employment.  The age of 
the worker may have an effect.  The age of the workers at the start of the spell is also 
included as an explanatory variable.  If we ascribe to the view that there are search 
frictions in the labour market and that workers accumulate human capital as they get 
older, we would anticipate that older workers may be in better paying jobs and are 
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less likely to leave their job when compared to younger workers.  As a result, we 
may expect that there is a negative relationship between age and the separation rate 
to employment.  
Gender may also play a role.  One could argue that women have a lower attachment 
to the labour market.  In a study of job mobility in the Irish labour market, Bergin 
(2009) sets out two possible scenarios.  In the Barron et al. (1993) model, workers 
differ in their attachment to the labour market.  For those who are less attached, they 
may take jobs that involve less training, and as a result, have less to lose by moving 
jobs so possibly are more mobile.  On the other hand, it could be that women are 
more constrained by non-market issues and so are less mobile than men, and less 
likely to move between jobs.  A similar point is made by Hirsch et al. (2010) who 
note that job moves by females may be more associated with non-pecuniary aspects 
of the job.  
We also include sectoral and nationality dummies as outlined already.  This allows 
us to determine if any particular sector or nationality grouping is more or less likely 
to separate to employment. 
Estimations of the elasticity of separation are displayed in Table 5.11.
101
  They show 
that the relationship between the log weekly wage and the separation rate to 
employment is negative and significant – the higher the wage, the lower the 
separation rate.  A 1% fall in the wage is associated with an increase in separations 
to employment of 0.377%. 
Other results also confirm with our priors.  We see that age has a negative and 
significant effect as predicted.  The gender dummy is positive and significant 
                                                 
101
 Detailed output is available in Appendix Table 11.1. 
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implying that being male is positively associated with moving to another job.  Each 
nationality dummy has a negative relationship with the transition to employment 
variable except the third group, ‘Western Europe’ which is positive.  This implies 
that relative to the ‘Rest of the World’ base group, the ‘Western Europe’ group of 
workers are more likely to separate to employment, while the other groups are less 
likely to separate to employment.  NACE sector group coefficients for 
‘Construction’ and the ‘Business Economy’ are positive, implying that these groups 
are more likely to separate to employment relative to the base category of ‘Other 
activities.’ 
Appendix Table 11.1 reports the results of a Wald test which tests if the hazard is 
constant or not.  The test statistic is -99.6 and is significant at the 1% level.  
Therefore we can reject the hypothesis that the hazard is constant at this level. The 
shape parameter  p = +0.907.  As p<1, it implies the hazard is monotonically 
decreasing.  This result is supported by the survival graph and cumulative hazard 
curve in Appendix Figure 11.1. 
5.5.2 Transitions to non-employment (all workers) 
Estimates of the elasticity of separations to non-employment are displayed in Table 
5.11
102
 with detailed results are available in Appendix Table 11.1. 
Again estimation is conducted by fitting a Weibull hazard model for the separation 
rate to non-employment.  This time we do not restrict our sample and so include all 
3,611,390 observations in the estimation which includes 2,399,454 failures, as 
shown in Figure 5.1.  As before, the key variable of interest is the impact of the wage 
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 In presenting our results, we follow the work of Hirsch et al. (2010) and Hirsch & Jahn (2015). 
207 
 
on the separation rate elasticity to non-employment.  All the variables included in the 
model are the same as outlined in 5.5.1.   
As with the transition to employment, we expect the effect of the wage variable to be 
negative – the higher the wage, the lower is the separation rate to non-employment.  
We would anticipate similar effects for age.  As a worker gets older, it’s more likely 
that they will achieve a better job match and so would be less likely to leave and 
enter non-employment.  On the other hand, Hirsch et al. (2010) point out that older 
workers who are considering retirement may be offered attractive retirement options 
or may be drawn by generous welfare payments for older workers.
103
   
The estimated coefficients generally have the expected signs.  The wage variable is 
negative and significant suggesting that the higher the wage, the lower the separation 
rate to non-employment.  Specifically, a 1% fall in the wage is associated with an 
increase in separations to non-employment of 0.715%.  As before, age is negative – 
as a person gets older, the separation rate to non-employment decreases.  Male 
workers display an increasing likelihood of separating to non-employment relative to 
female workers.  Regarding nationality, as with transitions to employment, we see 
that relative to the ‘Rest of the World’ group, the ‘Western Europe’ group is more 
likely to transit to non-employment, while other groups are less likely to do so.  
Turning to sector, we see that individuals in the construction sector are more likely 
to transition to non-employment relative to those in the ‘Other activities’ group, with 
other groups less likely to do so.   
The Wald test statistic is -648.57, therefore we can reject the hypothesis that the 
hazard is constant at the 1% level.  If we look at the shape parameter p, we see it has 
                                                 
103
 We have attempted to mitigate this risk by restricting the sample to workers less than 55 at the end 
of their employment spell. 
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a value of +0.74 which is <1.  As before, this implies the hazard is monotonically 
decreasing.  Parametric graphs are displayed in Appendix Figure 11.2. 
5.5.3 Hiring from employment (all workers) 
We now turn to hiring from employment and fit a logit model for the probability that 
a hire comes from employment.  Full results are displayed in Appendix Table 11.1 
while the coefficient on log wages is displayed in Table 5.11.  Here we would expect 
a positive coefficient – the higher the wage, the higher the probability that a hire 
would be recruited from employment.  So firms that pay higher wages find it easier 
to recruit.  Manning (2003: 104) points out that “This implies that the wage elasticity 
of recruits from employment is higher than the wage elasticity of recruits from non-
employment.” 
We observe that the relationship between the log wage and the hiring from 
employment variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.  A 1% 
increase in wages is associated with a 0.995% increase in hirings from employment.  
Males are less likely to be hired from employment relative to females.  We see that 
with the exception of the ‘Public Sector’ group, all other groups are less likely to be 
hired from employment than the reference group of ‘Other activities.’ 
5.5.4 Obtaining estimates of the labour supply elasticities 
By combining the results discussed above we can obtain an estimate for the long-run 
wage elasticity of the firm using equation (5.10).  One final calculation is needed – 
the share of recruits from employment is computed as a ratio of the number of all 
recruits from employment divided by the number all recruits.  This gives a share of 
0.205.  Hirsch et al. (2010) assume that in the steady state, the share of recruits from 
employment equals the share of separations to employment. We compute the share 
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of separations to employment as 0.164.  Given the small differences between these 
shares, we opt to use share of recruits from employment, as is consistent with 
Manning (2003), Hirsch et al. (2010) and Hirsch & Jahn (2015).   
Table 5.11: Estimating the long-run wage elasticity of labour supply to the firm 
Parameter & Results   
Elasticity of separations to employment (?̂?𝒘 
𝒆
) -0.377*** 
(0.002) 
Elasticity of separations to non-employment (?̂?𝒘 
𝒏 ) -0.715*** 
(0.001) 
Estimated coefficient of log wage in logit model for 
probability hire comes from employment  (?̂?𝒘 ) 
0.995*** 
(0.002) 
Share of recruits from employment (𝜽) 0.205 
Estimated wage elasticity of firms labour supply 0.231 
Note: Estimated coefficients are taken from Appendix Table 11.1. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
The estimated wage elasticity of the firms’ labour supply is obtained according to Equation (5.10). 
 
As we can see from Table 5.11, the estimated labour supply for all workers is low at 
0.231.  This would suggest the Irish labour market is not perfectly competitive and 
the labour supply curve to a single firm is not infinitely elastic.  Our results here 
suggest that labour supply curve to a firm is in fact inelastic or upward sloping as 
would be predicted by the ‘new’ monopsony literature.   
5.5.5 Discussion 
In an effort to put our results in context compared to other studies, Table 5.12 
reproduces Booth & Katic (2011: Table 4) which compares the separation and labour 
supply elasticities of the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia.  The 
results for the US and UK are drawn from Manning (2003). 
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Table 5.12: Estimates from previous studies  
 Country  
Parameter & Results  United States 
(US) 
United 
Kingdom (UK) 
Australia 
(AUS) 
 PSID NLSY BHPS LFS HILDA 
Elasticity of separations to 
employment  
0.867 0.359 0.631 0.529 0.376 
Elasticity of separations to non-
employment 
0.892 0.850 0.632 0.578 0.282 
Share of separations to employment  0.620 0.78 0.63 0.56 0.77 
Elasticity of labour supply curve   1.38 0.68 0.75 0.75 0.709 
Note: The authors choose to omit the negative sign from the separation elasticities to aid comparisons 
It is worth noting that the share of recruits from employment in our sample is lower 
than estimates obtained for other countries.  This is due to the high number of 
transitions via non-employment in the sample, which was investigated earlier.  For 
example, Manning (2003) reports shares of between 0.56 and 0.78 for datasets under 
consideration from the US and UK.  In Australia, Booth & Katic (2011) report a 
share of 0.77.  For Germany, Hirsch et al. (2010) find share figures of 0.525 and 
0.579 for males and females respectively.  It seems that in the Irish labour market 
transitions via non-employment are more common, as outlined in section 5.4.2, and 
this contributes to a relatively lower reported share (𝜃) figure of 0.205.  This 
relatively low share and overall elasticity, along with the evidence presented when 
investigating non-employment durations in 5.4.2 would seem to suggest that the Irish 
labour market is somewhat unique when compared to others. Our overall elasticity of 
labour supply to the firm figure of 0.231 suggests that employers do in fact possess a 
degree of monopsony power.   
5.5.6 Elasticity of labour supply of Irish versus non-Irish workers 
We now turn to the issue of investigating monopsonistic discrimination against 
immigrants in Ireland.  We take the same approach as before except this time we 
split the sample in two – Irish and non-Irish workers.  All estimations are obtained 
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assuming a Weibull distribution as before with the same set of explanatory variables.  
Summary results are displayed in Table 5.13.
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Table 5.13: Estimating the long-run wage elasticity of labour supply to the firm 
of Irish and Non-Irish workers 
 Nationality 
Parameter & Results Irish workers Non-Irish 
workers 
Elasticity of separations to employment (?̂?𝒘 
𝒆
) -0.358*** 
(0.003) 
-0.427***  
 (0.005) 
Elasticity of separations to non-employment 
(?̂?𝒘 
𝒏 ) 
-0.711*** 
(0.002) 
-0.709*** 
(0.002) 
Estimated coefficient of log wage in logit 
model for probability hire comes from 
employment  (?̂?𝒘 ) 
1.046*** 
(0.003) 
0.827*** 
(0.005) 
Share of recruits from employment (𝜽) 0.240 0.144 
Estimated wage elasticity of firms labour 
supply 
0.189 0.387 
Note: Estimated coefficients are taken from Appendix Table 11.2.   
Standard errors are shown in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
The estimated wage elasticity of the firms’ labour supply is obtained according to Equation (5.10). 
 
We begin as before by examining the separation rate to employment and non-
employment for Irish and non-Irish workers.  It is clear that non-Irish workers are 
more sensitive to wages when shifting to employment, while Irish workers are more 
sensitive to the wage when shifting to non-employment.  Specifically, a 1% fall in 
the wage is associated with a 0.427% and 0.358% increase in separations to 
employment for non-Irish and Irish workers respectively, and the difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  For separations to non-employment, a 1% 
fall in the wage will result in a 0.711% increase in the separations for Irish workers, 
and 0.709% for non-Irish workers. Again, this difference is statistically significant at 
the 1% level.  Overall the evidence suggests that there is not a large separation 
response to a change in wages.  This is interesting, as it suggests that there are other 
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factors that are tying workers to firms.  This is in line with what is suggested by 
Manning (2003) in relation to monopsony – there are frictions in the labour market 
which mean if an employer cuts wages, workers will not necessarily be induced to 
leave.  Therefore the employer has market power arising from these frictions.  
We also observe that the probability a hire comes from employment increases with 
the wage offered as expected, with the wage coefficient higher for Irish workers, and 
the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.  This may be due to non-
Irish workers being newly arrived in the country and so more likely to be coming 
from non-employment. 
Finally, it is possible to compute the estimated wage elasticity to the firm and we 
find a lower elasticity for Irish workers (0.189) relative to non-Irish workers (0.387).  
It is possible that immigrants could be more driven by pecuniary considerations than 
Irish workers.  Given that these workers have made the decision to travel to and 
work in Ireland, they are a mobile group.  As mentioned earlier, search frictions and 
mobility costs limit elasticity.  But for this group, moving location in search of a 
higher paying job may not be so problematic.  On the other hand, the mobility of 
Irish workers may be inhibited by social and family considerations.  This reduced 
mobility may enhance the monopsony power of employers with regards to wage 
setting for Irish workers, relative to non-Irish workers.  
In order to investigate this differential further, it was decided to disaggregate the 
immigrant group into regional categories.  These are UK & Northern Ireland, 
Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia and the Rest of the World.  Summary results 
are displayed in Table 5.14.  Additional rows have been added to display the 
elasticity ranking and also the mean age of the workers in each nationality grouping.  
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As can be seen, Eastern European and Western European workers have the highest 
elasticities.  We also see that the average age of workers in these groups is lower 
than the other groups.  Such younger workers are possibly less tied to a location and 
are more driven by pecuniary considerations.  On the other hand, Irish workers or 
those from the UK & Northern Ireland are older.  This could imply that they are 
more likely to have a family or put down roots in a particular location.  As a result, 
employers may be able to exert a greater degree of monopsony power over those 
groups. 
Table 5.14: Estimating the long-run wage elasticity of labour supply to the firm 
by nationality group 
 NATIONALITY  
Parameter & Results Irish UK & 
NI 
Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Asia  Rest of 
World  
Elasticity of 
separations to 
employment (?̂?𝒘 
𝒆 ) 
-0.358*** 
(0.003) 
-0.280***  
(0.013) 
-0.724***  
(0.017) 
-0.616***  
(0.009) 
-0.318***  
(0.016) 
-0.302***  
(0.012) 
Elasticity of 
separations to non-
employment (?̂?𝒘 
𝒏 ) 
-0.711*** 
(0.002) 
-0.585*** 
(0.005) 
-0.858*** 
(0.007) 
-0.812*** 
(0.004) 
-0.702*** 
(0.007) 
-0.619*** 
(0.005) 
Estimated coefficient 
of log wage in logit 
model for probability 
hire comes from 
employment  (?̂?𝒘 ) 
1.046*** 
(0.003) 
0.751*** 
(0.011) 
0.934*** 
(0.012) 
1.091*** 
(0.009) 
0.628*** 
(0.012) 
0.731*** 
(0.010) 
Share of recruits from 
employment (𝜽) 
0.240 0.173 0.146 0.131 0.217 0.126 
Estimated wage 
elasticity of firms 
labour supply 
0.189 0.191 0.765 0.454 0.329 0.242 
Elasticity ranking 
(highest to lowest) 
6 5 1 2 3 4 
Mean Age  
 
32.0 35.5 29.9 29.7 30.5 31.5 
Note: Estimated coefficients are taken from Appendix Table 11.3.   
Standard errors are shown in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
The estimated wage elasticity of the firms’ labour supply is obtained according to Equation (5.10). 
 
Table 5.15 further examines how elasticity changes with age for workers of all 
nationalities.  The youngest cohort of workers has the highest labour supply 
elasticity and we see that this generally declines with age.  We observe that the 36-45 
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and 46-55 age groups have the lowest labour supply elasticities.  This is in line with 
the suggestion earlier that as workers get older, they may become less mobile, 
possibly due to family commitments. 
Table 5.15: Estimating the long-run wage elasticity of labour supply to the firm 
by age category  
 AGE categories  (years) 
Parameter & Results 21-25  26-35 36-45 46-55 
Elasticity of separations to employment 
(?̂?𝒘 
𝒆 ) 
-0.668*** 
(0.006) 
-0.330*** 
(0.004) 
-0.221*** 
(0.006) 
-0.304*** 
(0.008) 
Elasticity of separations to non-
employment (?̂?𝒘 
𝒏 ) 
-0.836*** 
(0.003) 
-0.757*** 
(0.002) 
-0.578*** 
(0.003) 
-0.495*** 
(0.003) 
Estimated coefficient of log wage in logit 
model for probability hire comes from 
employment  (?̂?𝒘 ) 
0.951*** 
(0.006) 
1.096*** 
(0.004) 
0.872*** 
(0.004) 
0.822*** 
(0.006) 
Share of recruits from employment (𝜽) 0.139 0.236 0.237 0.225 
Estimated wage elasticity of firms labour 
supply 
0.662 0.149 0.049 0.119 
Elasticity ranking (highest to lowest) 1 2 4 3 
Note: Estimated coefficients are taken from Appendix Table 11.4.   
Standard errors are shown in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
The estimated wage elasticity of the firms’ labour supply is obtained according to Equation (5.10). 
 
We disaggregate by both nationality groups and age in Table 5.16.  This shows the 
importance of both age and nationality in explaining elasticity differences across 
workers.  For prime aged workers in age categories 2 and 3, we note that Irish 
workers have lower labour supply elasticities relative to workers from the UK & 
Northern Ireland, Western Europe and Eastern Europe.  This suggests that employers 
possess a higher degree of monopsony power over Irish workers.  The results 
support our earlier suggestions that Irish workers may be less mobile compared to 
those of other nationalities.  In general we see that the youngest age cohort has the 
highest labour supply elasticities within each group, suggesting a higher degree of 
mobility.  The highest elasticity is reported for the Asian grouping and we see that 
the Irish group has a lower elasticity when compared to all other groups. 
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Table 5.16: Estimating the long-run wage elasticity of labour supply to the firm 
by nationality & age group 
IRELAND  Age categories  
Parameter & Results 21-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 
Elasticity of separations to employment 
(?̂?𝒘 
𝒆 ) 
-0.639*** 
(0.007) 
-.272*** 
(0.005) 
-0.246*** 
(0.006) 
-0.334*** 
(0.009) 
Elasticity of separations to non-employment 
(?̂?𝒘 
𝒏 ) 
-0.820*** 
(0.003) 
-0.756*** 
(0.003) 
-0.583*** 
(0.003) 
-0.513*** 
(0.004) 
Estimated coefficient of log wage in logit 
model for probability hire comes from 
employment  (?̂?𝒘 ) 
0.970*** 
(0.006) 
1.20*** 
(0.005) 
0.908*** 
(0.005) 
0.873*** 
(0.007) 
Share of recruits from employment (𝜽) 0.160 0.284 0.271 0.253 
Estimated wage elasticity of firms labour 
supply 
0.615 0.031 0.076 0.150 
Elasticity ranking (highest to lowest) 1 3 4 2 
United Kingdom & Northern Ireland  Age categories  
Parameter & Results 21-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 
Elasticity of separations to employment 
(?̂?𝒘 
𝒆 ) 
-0.568*** 
(0.045) 
-0.286*** 
(0.022) 
-0.251*** 
(0.021) 
-0.259*** 
(0.033) 
Elasticity of separations to non-employment 
(?̂?𝒘 
𝒏 ) 
-0.773*** 
(0.016) 
-0.654*** 
(0.009) 
-0.531*** 
(0.009) 
-0.418*** 
(0.012) 
Estimated coefficient of log wage in logit 
model for probability hire comes from 
employment  (?̂?𝒘 ) 
0.786*** 
(0.048) 
0.827*** 
(0.019) 
0.696*** 
(0.017) 
0.619*** 
(0.024) 
Share of recruits from employment (𝜽) 0.085 0.191 0.194 0.174 
Estimated wage elasticity of firms labour 
supply 0.604 0.201 0.167 0.138 
Elasticity ranking (highest to lowest) 1 2 3 4 
Western Europe  Age categories  
Parameter & Results 21-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 
Elasticity of separations to employment 
(?̂?𝒘 
𝒆 ) 
-1.02*** 
(0.046) 
-0.761*** 
(0.024) 
-0.508*** 
(0.032) 
-0.460*** 
(0.063) 
Elasticity of separations to non-employment 
(?̂?𝒘 
𝒏 ) 
-0.988*** 
(0.013) 
-0.906*** 
(0.010) 
-0.620*** 
(0.014) 
-0.430*** 
(0.024) 
Estimated coefficient of log wage in logit 
model for probability hire comes from 
employment  (?̂?𝒘 ) 
1.340*** 
(0.041) 
1.030*** 
(0.017) 
0.651*** 
(0.022) 
0.424*** 
(0.042) 
Share of recruits from employment (𝜽) 0.068 0.178 0.189 0.152 
Estimated wage elasticity of firms labour 
supply 0.760 0.795 0.579 0.535 
Elasticity ranking (highest to lowest) 2 1 3 4 
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Table 5.16 continued: Estimating the long-run wage elasticity of labour supply 
to the firm by nationality & age group continued 
Eastern Europe Age categories  
Parameter & Results 21-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 
Elasticity of separations to employment 
(?̂?𝒘 
𝒆 ) 
-0.853*** 
(0.020) 
-0.563*** 
(0.013) 
-0.348*** 
(0.027) 
-0.236*** 
(0.045) 
Elasticity of separations to non-employment 
(?̂?𝒘 
𝒏 ) 
-0.967*** 
(0.008) 
-0.813*** 
(0.006) 
-0.619*** 
(0.010) 
-0.498*** 
(0.016) 
Estimated coefficient of log wage in logit 
model for probability hire comes from 
employment  (?̂?𝒘 ) 
1.12*** 
(0.021) 
1.13*** 
(0.013) 
0.828*** 
(0.024) 
0.642*** 
(0.038) 
Share of recruits from employment (𝜽) 0.099 0.162 0.118 0.092 
Estimated wage elasticity of firms labour 
supply 0.800 0.389 0.205 0.127 
Elasticity ranking (highest to lowest) 1 2 3 4 
ASIA Age categories  
Parameter & Results 21-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 
Elasticity of separations to employment 
(?̂?𝒘 
𝒆 ) 
-0.791*** 
(0.035) 
-0.376*** 
(0.022) 
0.371*** 
(0.036) 
0.307*** 
(0.073) 
Elasticity of separations to non-employment 
(?̂?𝒘 
𝒏 ) 
-0.841*** 
(0.015) 
-0.750*** 
(0.010) 
-0.496*** 
(0.016) 
-0.293*** 
(0.034) 
Estimated coefficient of log wage in logit 
model for probability hire comes from 
employment  (?̂?𝒘 ) 
0.499*** 
(0.030) 
0.611*** 
(0.017) 
0.746*** 
(0.026) 
0.592*** 
(0.051) 
Share of recruits from employment (𝜽) 0.169 0.226 0.255 0.241 
Estimated wage elasticity of firms labour 
supply 1.209 0.569 -0.652 -0.608 
Elasticity ranking (highest to lowest) 1 2 3 4 
Rest of the World  Age categories  
Parameter & Results 21-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 
Elasticity of separations to employment 
(?̂?𝒘 
𝒆 ) 
-0.746*** 
(0.033) 
-0.336*** 
(0.017) 
-0.135*** 
(0.022) 
-0.164*** 
(0.049) 
Elasticity of separations to non-employment 
(?̂?𝒘 
𝒏 ) 
-0.726*** 
(0.010) 
-0.643*** 
(0.007) 
-0.556*** 
(0.009) 
-0.381*** 
(0.018) 
Estimated coefficient of log wage in logit 
model for probability hire comes from 
employment  (?̂?𝒘 ) 
0.672*** 
(0.032) 
0.743*** 
(0.015) 
0.791*** 
(0.018) 
0.483*** 
(0.033) 
Share of recruits from employment (𝜽) 0.070 0.131 0.173 0.155 
Estimated wage elasticity of firms labour 
supply 0.848 0.293 -0.036 0.103 
Elasticity ranking (highest to lowest) 1 2 4 3 
Note: Estimated coefficients are taken from Appendix Table 11.5 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
The estimated wage elasticity of the firms’ labour supply is obtained according to Equation (5.10). 
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5.5.7 Elasticity of labour supply of male and female workers 
We now turn our attention to gender differences within our sample.  As discussed 
earlier, previous work in the area by Hirsch et al. (2010) and Barth & Dale-Olsen 
(2009) have examined whether there are differences in the firm level labour supply 
elasticities of males and females.  Hirsch et al. (2010) suggest that for females, job 
transitions may be less motivated by monetary considerations and they may have 
stronger preferences over the non-wage characteristics of the job, such as where the 
job is located – how close the job is to home for example.   
The summary results are presented in Table 5.17 for all male and female workers in 
the sample.  If we look at the elasticity of separations, we observe that females’ 
separations to employment are more sensitive to the wage than male separations and 
the differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.  On the other hand, male 
workers are more sensitive to the wage when shifting to non-employment than 
female workers, and again differneces are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Hirsch et al. (2010) suggest that if monopsonistic discrimination is an important part 
of explaining a gender pay gap then females would be expected to have a lower 
separation rate elasticity to employment than males and so less responsive to wage 
changes.  Clearly we do not find evidence of this, with our results suggesting that 
monetary considerations have a greater influence on a female’s decision to separate 
to employment than for males.  Our findings are however in line with Booth and 
Katic (2011) for Australia. 
On the other hand, we find that male separations to non-employment are more 
sensitive to the wage than female separations, and although the difference is not 
large it is statistically significant at the 1% level.  Our findings regarding the 
separation rate to non-employment are again in line with Booth and Katic (2011) for 
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Australia, and also for Hirsch et al. (2010) for Germany and Manning (2003) for the 
UK.  Overall we find that female labour supply to the firm is more elastic than the 
labour supply of males. 
Table 5.17: Estimating the long-run wage elasticity of labour supply to the firm 
by gender 
 Gender 
Parameter & Results Males Females 
Elasticity of separations to employment (?̂?𝒘 
𝒆
) -0.362*** 
(0.004) 
-0.415 *** 
(0.004) 
Elasticity of separations to non-employment 
(?̂?𝒘 
𝒏 ) 
-0.735***  
(0.002) 
-0.721***  
(0.002) 
Estimated coefficient of log wage in logit 
model for probability hire comes from 
employment  (?̂?𝒘 ) 
0.985 *** 
(0.003) 
1.02 ***  
(0.003) 
Share of recruits from employment (𝜽) 0.188 0.225 
Estimated wage elasticity of firms labour 
supply 
0.227 0.277 
Note: Estimated coefficients are taken from Appendix Table 11.6 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
The estimated wage elasticity of the firms’ labour supply is obtained according to Equation (5.10). 
 
It is also possible that the labour supply elasticities of men and women may differ by 
the age of the workers.  You might expect that very young males and females are 
equally mobile with little difference in their responsiveness to wages.  But as 
workers get older, it could be suggested that all workers may become less mobile 
due to family commitments for example and so monetary considerations may be less 
important.  Older women may be concerned by the proximity of child care.  In the 
case of male workers, they are less likely to have experienced interruptions to their 
labour supply, while females’ tenure may be more affected by child care 
responsibilities.  Summary results are presented in Table 5.18.
105
  Barth & Dale-
Olsen (2009: 593) suggest “A prerequisite for the theory of monopsonistic 
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 Detailed results are available in Appendix Table 11.7. 
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discrimination to provide a reasonable explanation for the gender wage gap is that 
worker turnover of women is less sensitive to wages than that of men’s worker 
turnover.”  We find evidence to support this only for workers up to the age of 35.   
Table 5.18: Estimating the long-run wage elasticity of labour supply to the firm 
by gender & age category  
MALE Age categories 
Parameter & Results 21-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 
Elasticity of separations to employment 
(?̂?𝒘 
𝒆 ) 
-0.714*** 
(0.009) 
-0.355*** 
(0.006) 
-0.137*** 
(0.008) 
-0.198*** 
(0.012) 
Elasticity of separations to non-
employment (?̂?𝒘 
𝒏 ) 
-0.826*** 
(0.004) 
-0.803*** 
(0.003) 
-0.595*** 
(0.004) 
-0.489*** 
(0.005) 
Estimated coefficient of log wage in 
logit model for probability hire comes 
from employment  (?̂?𝒘 ) 
0.959*** 
(0.009) 
1.11*** 
(0.006) 
0.859*** 
(0.006) 
0.706*** 
(0.008) 
Share of recruits from employment (𝜽) 0.117 0.212 0.231 0.199 
Estimated wage elasticity of firms 
labour supply 
0.680 0.188 -0.034 0.068 
Elasticity ranking (highest to lowest) 1 1 2 4 4 8  3 7 
  
FEMALE Age categories 
Parameter & Results 21-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 
Elasticity of separations to employment 
(?̂?𝒘 
𝒆 ) 
-0.644*** 
(0.007) 
-0.308*** 
(0.006) 
-0.302*** 
(0.008) 
-0.396*** 
(0.011) 
Elasticity of separations to non-
employment (?̂?𝒘 
𝒏 ) 
-0.848*** 
(0.003) 
-0.721*** 
(0.003) 
-0.566*** 
(0.004) 
-0.548*** 
(0.005) 
Estimated coefficient of log wage in 
logit model for probability hire comes 
from employment  (?̂?𝒘 ) 
0.954*** 
(0.008) 
1.09*** 
(0.005) 
0.889*** 
(0.022) 
0.954*** 
(0.009) 
Share of recruits from employment (𝜽) 0.160 0.264 0.244 0.253 
Estimated wage elasticity of firms 
labour supply 
0.658 0.118 0.132 0.193 
Elasticity ranking (highest to lowest) 1 2 4 6 3 5 2 3 
Note: Estimated coefficients are taken from Appendix Table 11.7 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
The estimated wage elasticity of the firms’ labour supply is obtained according to Equation (5.10). 
The ranking in black is the within males and female groups respectively, the numbers in red are the 
overall ranking across males and females. 
 
Looking at Table 5.18 above, we observe that men have higher labour supply 
elasticities to the firm in the 21-25 & 26-34 age groups.  On the other hand, females 
supply labour less elastically, although the magnitude of the differences between 
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groups is small.  However, all differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
These results are in line with Hirsch et al. (2010) suggesting that women may be less 
mobile.   
However, in higher age categories we see a reversal with women having higher 
elasticities.  Now it appears that men may be less mobile than women.   
Table 5.19: The real mean weekly wage for males and females 
 Age categories & Mean wage per spell (€) 
 21-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 
Males  415.74 (0.399) 579.93 (0.570) 744.82 (1.992) 762.11 (4.779) 
Females  361.67 (0.311) 491.43 (0.520) 496.41 (1.502) 455.94 (2.295) 
Difference  54.07 88.50 248.41 306.18 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
If we look at Table 5.19, we see that across all age categories, men earn a higher 
mean weekly wage than women.  Initially this difference is relatively low at €54 in 
the youngest age category.  However, this increases to around €306 in the oldest age 
category.  These higher wages for the male group may suggest they could be the 
primary earner in households with a male and female.  So while males have a higher 
weekly wage per spell than females,  we saw in Table 5.17 that they supply labour 
less elastically than females, possibly suggesting males are less driven by pecuniary 
considerations.  Earlier work in Ireland by McGuinness, Kelly, Callnan, & O'Connell 
(2009) finds a gender wage gap of around 8% when education, labour market 
experience, and firm and job characteristics are controlled for.  Without controls, the 
gap was around 22%. 
Conversely, females have a lower mean wage per spell than males and have a higher 
wage elasticity to the firm.  It may be that the lower relative wages of the female 
workers make monetary considerations more important to them when considering 
their labour supply decisions and contribute to a higher degree of mobility relative to 
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their male counterparts.  As pointed out by Hirsch et al. (2010: 292) “profit-
maximising firms may take advantage of gender specific differences in supply 
elasticities by exercising pay discrimination, that is, paying different wages to 
women and men, ceteris paribus.” The lower supply elasticity of male workers 
would imply employers potentially have the power to engage in monopsonistic 
discrimination against older men.  
It is important to note that, as Ransom & Oaxaca (2010) point out, while a low 
labour supply elasticity to the firm suggests that firms may possess wage setting 
power, it does not mean that they are able to exercise it.  Clearly there are constraints 
on their wage setting power such as minimum wage laws and anti-discrimination 
laws for example.  So “The firm faces an upward-sloping labor supply curve – it has 
market power due to market frictions – but is unable to take full advantage of it 
because of the institutions and environment in which it operates” (Ransom & Oaxaca 
2010: 283).  While the power to assign workers fulfilling the same role a different 
salary is constrained, it may be possible to assign workers to lower paying roles.  
While not formally testing this, Ransom & Oaxaca (2010) suggest that if male 
workers had a higher separation elasticity with respect to the wage, assigning them to 
higher paying jobs (and assigning women to lower paying jobs, given they have a 
lower separation rate elasticity) could be an optimal strategy in an effort to reduce 
turnover costs without altering the wage bill.  This explanation could plausibly be 
applied to workers up to the age of 35 in our study.  For older age categories, 
generally we see separation rate elasticities are greater for female workers and they 
experience lower wages per spell. 
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5.6 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we explore the labour supply elasticities of workers in the Irish labour 
market.  In doing so, we follow the literature on new monopsony as extending by 
Manning (2003) and others.  In this new dynamic model of monopsony, the power of 
the firm to set wages is related to the labour supply elasticity at the level of the firm.  
Through focusing on the responsiveness of labour market transitions to the wage, it 
is possible to estimate the labour supply elasticity to the firm.  This would not have 
been possible without the use of the P35 data which covers all employees in the Irish 
economy which allowed the estimation of wage elasticities to and from non-
employment as well as to and from employment.  We are thus able to construct a 
panel containing almost two million individuals over the period 2005-2013 which 
was analysed using methods of survival analysis. 
Overall we find that the estimated labour supply elasticities to the firm are relatively 
low.  This implies that elasticity is not infinite as suggested by perfect competition, 
and so employers may possess a degree of monopsony power in wage setting.   
In exploring the elasticities further, we divide the population into native and 
immigrant workers and separately, male and female workers.  We find that native 
Irish workers have a lower labour supply elasticity to the firm (0.189) than non-
native workers (0.387).  This contrasts with the evidence of Hirsch & Jahn (2015) 
who find that immigrants in Germany supply labour less elastically than native 
workers.  Thus we find evidence of more severe frictions for Irish relative to 
immigrant workers in Ireland.  As suggested earlier, Irish workers may be inherently 
less mobile than their immigrant counterparts and this lack of mobility potentially 
gives employers greater monopsony power over native workers.  In Chapter 2 we 
observed that non-Irish workers had a high level of third level educational attainment 
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in almost all cases, suggesting that immigrant workers in Ireland are well educated 
and so are possibly driven by pecuniary considerations, and seeking a return on their 
human capital investment.  The fact that they have left their native country and 
secured employment in the Irish labour market shows that the immigrants are a 
mobile group and this may be contributing to their higher labour supply elasticity. 
In the case of gender, we find that females supply their labour slightly more 
elastically (0.276) than male workers (0.227).  However, differences do emerge 
when we split the data and look at different age categories.  Up to the age of 35 we 
see that males supply labour more elastically than females but this is reversed for 
workers over the age of 35.  For older male workers, family considerations might act 
as a mobility-inhibiting factor.  We saw evidence that male workers earn more than 
female workers per employment spell and this gap increases with age.   
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Chapter 6 : Conclusion  
6.1 Summary of the thesis  
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the Irish labour market over a turbulent 
economic period.  Specifically we investigated issues related to both the demand-
side and supply-side of the labour market.  In order to gain an understanding of the 
Irish labour market and provide an overview of the time period of 2005-2013, 
Chapter 2 documented evidence regarding unemployment, earnings and migration.  
We observed that unemployment increased significantly, accompanied by a sharp 
decline in economic growth.  As the economic crisis evolved, migration patterns 
shifted, with an increase in emigration and decrease in immigration.  While many 
sectors experienced declining earnings, others such as Industry sectors (B-E) 
experienced an increase in earnings.    
In addition, we noted some of the policy responses to the changing economic 
circumstances.  Of particular relevance here was the emphasis placed on the role of 
exporting activity in potentially contributing to improved employment and economic 
growth.  This contextualises part of the analysis in Chapter 3. 
In Chapter 3 we focused on job flows in the Irish labour market.  We initially 
concentrated on enterprises in NACE Rev.2 sectors B-N and found that the period of 
2006-2010 could be sub-divided into two sub-periods, characterised by very 
different trends in terms of job flows.  Earlier years up to 2007 were associated with 
higher rates of job creation relative to job destruction.  From 2008 onwards, we 
observed that job destruction was greater than job creation.  Certain sectors, such as 
construction, saw a large increase in their job destruction rate over the period.  In 
light of the discussion in the literature regarding the role of small firms in job 
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creation and destruction, we also examined this.  When we compare the Irish labour 
market with international evidence on jobs flows, we note the key differentiating 
feature is the dramatic rise in job destruction that occurred in the Irish labour market 
in 2009.  At the same time, even with rising unemployment and job destruction, we 
still see that enterprises were creating jobs.  So while the labour market was 
experiencing great turbulence, job creation remained somewhat resilient.  We find 
evidence that, as in the US, job reallocation is counter-cyclical.  Interestingly, this 
contrasts somewhat with some of the evidence presented earlier from other European 
countries [eg Albaek & Sorensen (1998)]. 
We found that small firms accounted for a greater proportion of job creation and job 
destruction than their employment share would imply.  This highlights the 
importance of small firms in an Irish context and is in line with UK evidence 
presented by Hijzen et al. (2010).  
We then turned our focus to the manufacturing sector to estimate the impact of 
international trade activity (exporting and importing activity) on job creation and job 
destruction.  To do this, we merged the P35 linked employer-employee data with the 
CIP survey data.  Descriptive evidence points to higher mean employment for those 
engaged in international trade.  While employment growth was generally negative 
over the period, it was less negative for those who export and import, compared to 
non-exporters and non-importers.  Estimates obtained from regressions suggest that 
there was a positive association between export intensity and job creation and this 
exists only for those in the top quintile.  For lower quintiles 1 and 2 which 
represented those enterprises experiencing declining trade intensity, our findings 
pointed to a negative effect on job creation.  Turning to job destruction however, we 
did find some support for the suggestion that exporting and importing activity 
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reduces it.  However, it should be noted in the case of both exports and imports, that 
the magnitude of the effect was small.  Thus the Irish labour market appears to be 
somewhat similar to other labour markets, such as the UK where Hijzen et al. (2010) 
find a small effect of international trade on job flows.    
In Chapter 4 we turned our attention to workers in the labour market.  Specifically, 
we estimated the impact of displacement on the earnings of workers.  We noted 
earlier in Chapter 2 that there was a large increase in unemployment during the 
period of the study and so many of these workers may have found it challenging to 
secure re-employment.  We identified two displacement events – closure and mass-
layoff.  The extensive P35 dataset allowed for the implementation of propensity 
score matching to match displaced with non-displaced workers.     
Our difference-in-differences estimates suggested large losses for displaced workers.  
This contrasts somewhat with other labour markets.   In particular we found that the 
type of displacement event matters.  Those displaced due to a mass-layoff experience 
a greater fall in earnings compared to those who are displaced due to a closure event.  
This contrasts with results for the UK reported by Hijzen et al. (2010) who found 
that those displaced due to a closure experience greater losses.  Male workers 
experienced greater losses as did older workers.  We also provided estimates of the 
losses of those who either switch sectors or stay in the same sector after 
displacement and found that those who switch sectors to find employment after 
displacement suffer greater losses.  This finding is similar to evidence from other 
labour markets highlighted in section 4.2.        
In Chapter 5 we focused on the wage elasticity of labour supply to the firm.  
Through obtaining an estimate of this, it is possible to determine if there is evidence 
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of monopsony in the labour market.  The methodology employed was based on 
survival analysis and the available data contributed to our ability to identify 
transitions to and from employment as well as transitions to and from non-
employment.  We also provided elasticity estimates to investigate the relevance of 
monopsonistic discrimination in explaining pay gaps between native and immigrant 
workers, as well as between males and females. 
We find that the labour supply elasticity to the firm is 0.231.  This suggests that the 
labour supply to the firm is not perfectly competitive and is characterised by an 
upward sloping labour supply curve.  This figure is low relative to some of the 
evidence cited earlier from Manning (2003) and Hirsch et al. (2010) for example.  
However, in the Irish labour market, we noted that many a workers appear to 
transition via non-employment.  In investigating non-employment durations, we 
found that many non-employed workers experience short non-employment spells.  
Particularly we noted evidence from the CSO (2016e) which demonstrated the large 
increase in part-time and casual workers over the period of investigation.  This 
dramatic increase coincides with the onset of the recession in 2008 and would appear 
to be a rather unique feature of the labour market.  It suggests a changing labour 
market in which employers may be less inclined to offer full-time positions and 
instead are relying more on part-time contracts to fill vacancies.   
Next we investigated differences in labour supply elasticities across groups of 
workers.  We found a lower elasticity for Irish workers (0.189) relative to non-Irish 
workers (0.387) and suggested this may be due to mobility differences between the 
groups.  We suggested that the non-Irish group may be more mobile in the search for 
work and so are more driven by monetary considerations.  This in turn limits the 
monopsony power of employers.  With regards to gender, we found that male 
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workers have slightly lower labour supply elasticity to the firm compared to their 
female counterparts.  This contrasted with previous studies and could imply females 
are more mobile and more driven by monetary considerations than males.  In an 
effort to explore this further we examined the estimates by age and gender.  While 
there was little differences between estimates for younger groups, older male 
workers have lower labour supply elasticities to the firm.  We suggested family 
considerations could act as mobility inhibiting factors for these older male workers, 
giving employers some degree of monopsony power.   
6.2 Contributions to the literature  
This thesis has contributed to several strands of the literature related to labour 
markets.  In each chapter, one of the important contributions was to provide Irish 
evidence.  In fact to the best of our knowledge, Chapters 4 and 5 constituted a first in 
the Irish literature.  While work has been conducted on job flows in Ireland 
previously, Chapter 3 was the first to examine job flows using this linked employer-
employee data.  It was also the first to match the P35 and CIP data sources and 
estimate the impact of international trade on job flows.  However, in the remainder 
of this section we will highlight contributions to the international literature. 
The work in Chapter 3 is one of the first to examine job flows with such a large 
linked employer-employee dataset.  Many of the earlier studies identified in section 
3.2 used survey data and focused specifically on the manufacturing sector.  We are 
thus adding to empirical evidence on the magnitude of job flows as well as issues 
such as the contribution of small versus large firms to job flows.  As outlined, there 
is not consensus in the literature on the contribution of small and large firms to job 
flows.  Our results point to an important role for small firms in the job creation and 
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destruction processes.  They account for a greater proportion of job creation and job 
destruction than their employment share. 
Secondly, this chapter contributes to the existing body of knowledge examining the 
relationship between international trade and job flows.  While data here is limited to 
the manufacturing sector, the data coverage is extensive within that sector.     
Chapter 4 has contributed to the literature and empirical evidence on the impact of 
displacement on the earnings of workers.  Again here the data used is a unique 
feature of our work.  Also while many previous studies such as Jacobson et al. 
(1993) and Couch & Placzek (2010) focus on mass-layoff events only, we analyse 
closure events also.  This is important as we found the type of displacement event 
matters in explaining earnings losses post-displacement.  We found larger losses for 
those displaced due to a mass-layoff event.  
Secondly, our methodology employs propensity score matching and difference-in-
differences to estimate the earnings losses of displaced workers, building on the 
approach of Couch & Placzek (2010) for example.  While some previous studies 
used survey data [see Podgursky (1992), Carrington (1993) and Kletzer (1998)], the 
availability of administrative data has allowed for the application of such matching 
techniques.  Our approach here is enhanced by the size and coverage of our dataset 
which to our knowledge, is unique and a first in the literature. 
Chapter 5 contributes to the relatively recent work on the role of monopsony in 
explaining the elasticity of labour supply to the firm.  To the best of our knowledge, 
we are the first to use such an extensive linked employer-employee dataset.  A 
limitation of some previous studies was the inability to estimate transitions to and 
from employment as well as transitions to and from non-employment.  We overcome 
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this with our data and employ the methodology of survival analysis to estimate the 
wage elasticity of labour supply to the firm. 
This chapter also contributes to the recent attempts to investigate if monopsonistic 
discrimination can play a role in explaining native-immigrant wage differentials as 
well as gender wage differentials.  Our results contrast with previous findings of 
Hirsch & et al. (2010) and Hirsch & Jahn (2015) with regards to native-immigrant 
labour supply elasticities and male-female labour supply elasticities respectively.  In 
the case of immigrants we suggested that this group has demonstrated their mobility 
in the act of immigrating to Ireland, and this could act as an explanation for reduced 
monopsony power of employers in their treatment of immigrants relative to native 
workers.  Turning to gender, we suggested that age matters when exploring gender 
differneces in labour supply elasticities.  While females had a higher labour supply 
elasticity than males in general, our results changed when we broke down by age and 
gender.  Up to the age of 35 years, males supply labour more elastically than 
females.  But after 35 years, this trend is reversed. 
6.3 Policy implications  
There are several policy implications that arise from this thesis.  In Chapter 3 we 
provide evidence on job flows across sectors.  This gives policy makers an insight 
into which sectors have had a tendency to grow and create jobs and those which have 
contracted.  Those workers who lose employment in sectors with negative 
employment growth may find it more difficult to secure re-employment in the same 
sector.  Thus, it identifies workers who may benefit from skills conversion 
programmes.  Ensuring an adequate talent pool for those sectors with positive net 
employment growth is important.       
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We also provide evidence on the role of small firms with regards to their job creation 
potential.  We observed that they account for a larger fraction of job creation and job 
destruction that their employment share would imply.  This would seem to suggest 
that support offered to small firms is warranted.  For example the Action Plan for 
Jobs referred to in Chapter 2, places an emphasis on supporting small and medium 
size enterprises to create employment.    
In Chapter 2 we outlined how policy makers have advocated the potential of export-
led growth to lead to increased employment after the economic crisis which began in 
2008.  In Chapter 3, we provided some evidence related to the manufacturing sector 
and the impact of export intensity on job creation and job destruction over the period 
2006-2010.  We found that only the highest export intensity quintile was associated 
with higher rates of job creation.  Lower intensity quintiles, representing decreasing 
exporting activity, were associated with lower job creation.  Overall, the magnitude 
of the effect on job creation across quintiles was small.  There is evidence that lower 
and higher export intensity was associated with lower rates of job destruction.  Thus 
it is possible that the measures in the Action Plan for Jobs to support and enhance 
exporting activity of Irish enterprises could help to strengthen the relationship 
between exporting activity and job creation.   
The research in Chapter 4 has implications for support and assistance offered to 
displaced workers.  Firstly, we saw that those displaced due to a mass-layoff 
experienced greater earnings losses that those displaced following a closure event.  
We suggested that this could be related to a negative signal relayed to future 
employers, given that such workers had been ‘selected’ by their employers.  This 
may warrant greater engagement with such workers to assist in their employment 
search post-displacement.  
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Furthermore, this chapter highlighted the adverse effects on those who are displaced 
and securing re-employment in another sector.  We observed that this group of 
‘switchers’ experienced greater losses that those ‘stayers’ who secured re-
employment in the same sector.  This may be because such switchers lack the 
required human capital and skills in their new sector of employment.  Thus there is a 
role for ensuring these workers have access to information and supports to facilitate 
good skills matches between employers and employees.  From Chapter 2 we know 
that many of those who became unemployed were from the construction sector and 
so these workers had little opportunity to find re-employment within this sector 
during the time period.   
In Chapter 5 we found that the estimates of the wage elasticity of labour supply to 
the firm are relatively low and are not infinitely elastic as would be expected if the 
labour market was perfectly competitive.  This has implications for policy makers if 
they model labour markets on the assumption that they are perfectly competitive.  
For example, we know the predicted effects of a minimum wage on employment 
imply a positive effect if a monopsonistic labour market is assumed, or a negative 
effect if a perfectly competitive labour market is assumed.  Thus we see that the 
predicted effects of policy intervention could be misleading if the incorrect 
assumption is made about the labour market. 
6.4 Directions for future research   
Although this thesis has shed light on several important topics in the labour market, 
there are many directions that future related work could take. 
With the available data, is possible to explore the earnings of workers in relation to 
the legal form of the enterprise.  Specifically the data records whether an enterprise 
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is a branch of a foreign company or not.  Thus it would be possible to explore wage 
differences across domestic firms and those that are a branch of a foreign company.  
This has been explored in the literature by Heyman et al. (2007) for example. 
The addition of further annual observations and variables to this dataset would 
expand its applicability to other areas of the labour market research as well as to the 
areas under investigation here.  For example in Chapter 3, the time period in question 
is relatively short and covers a period of severe economic turbulence.  Thus a longer 
data set would also capture the potential impact of measures in the Action Plan for 
Jobs to support exporters and potential exporters. 
A longer data set would also be beneficial in relation to the other work conducted in  
this thesis.  For example in Chapter 3, we investigated the relationship between 
export-growth in the manufacturing sector only.  A broader study across sectors 
would be useful to make more wide-scale assertions.   
In terms of estimating earnings losses, a longer dataset would allow us to follow the 
approach of Hijzen et al. (2010) and select a base period for measuring income 
losses a number of periods before the displacement event.  With the relatively short 
data span here, it was not possible to take such an approach.  In Chapter 5, more 
annual observations would mean capturing more spells of employment and non-
employment, as well as associated labour market transitions.  
The availability of additional variables would further enhance the dataset and 
analysis of job flows.  For example, we do not know the age of the enterprise.  There 
is much discussion in the job flows literature on the importance of enterprise size 
versus age effects.  Lawless (2013) has investigated this in an Irish context using 
survey data and found that enterprise age may be more important than size in 
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explaining the contribution to job creations rates.  Other variables which would 
provide opportunities for further research include education, tenure of workers as 
well as ownership information in relation to the enterprise.  These could all assist in 
further exploring earnings losses associated with displacement in the labour market, 
as well as exploring monopsony in the labour market. 
In estimating earnings losses associated with displacement, it could be possible to 
incorporate unemployment assistance into the analysis.  This is somewhat 
complicated by the fact that the level of benefits is dependent on time in employment 
and the number of dependent children for example.  If it was possible to identify 
employee tenure, we could obtain another estimate of earnings losses.  This has been 
done previously in the literature [see Hijzen et al. (2010) for example]. 
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Appendix 1 : Data tables for Chapter 2 
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Appendix Table 1.1: Seasonally adjusted series of persons aged 15 years 
employed and classified by NACE Rev.2 Economic Sector (‘000’s)  
    
 
 
 
 
NACE Rev.2 Economic 
Sector 
Quarter and Year 
 Q1 
2005 
Q1 
2006 
Q1 
2007 
Q1 
2008 
Q1 
2009 
Q1 
2010 
Q1 
2011 
Q1 
2012 
Q1 
2013 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing (A) 
110.6 111.7 109.6 118.3 104.3 82.5 85.4 82.3 97.9 
Industry (B-E) 296.4 289.7 305.1 286.6 269.6 248.3 240.9 237.2 238.0 
Construction 226.7 248.8 272.5 258.0 184.4 131.8 109.5 104.2 97.2 
Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
(G) 
266.2 285.0 297.4 319.5 292.1 275.9 271.9 271.8 274.9 
Transportation and 
storage (H) 
92.3 93.3 93.8 94.7 94.7 93.4 94.3 90.0 88.6 
Accommodation and food 
service activities (I) 
114.2 119.2 135.9 134.4 125.1 133.2 112.6 119.8 122.8 
Information and 
communication (J) 
64.2 70.5 66.8 72.2 73.6 76.3 73.0 79.2 78.3 
Financial, insurance and 
real estate activities (K-
L) 
90.7 93.3 101.4 105.9 105.8 105.5 100.7 101.9 100.5 
Professional, scientific 
and technical activities 
(M) 
97.0 103.9 108.5 112.0 105.0 103.2 103.7 98.1 104.2 
Administrative and 
support service activities 
(N) 
68.5 73.4 74.7 84.4 69.4 62.6 66.2 63.9 60.9 
Public administration 
and defence; compulsory 
social security (O) 
93.4 104.4 102.6 104.4 106.8 105.8 105.2 100.0 95.6 
Education (P) 121.5 134.3 141.1 138.4 149.9 146.8 146.7 144.7 145.3 
Human health and social 
work activities (Q) 
186.5 194.1 213.8 223.6 225.5 236.5 237.1 241.7 249.6 
Other NACE activities 
(R-U) 
90.5 90.7 95.9 99.7 98.4 93.8 99.6 98.4 99.6 
Unemployed 84.1 94.6 101.8 114.9 231.8 286.7 311.3 325.3 294.4 
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Appendix Table 1.2: Percentage of Enterprise deaths (as % of active 
enterprises) 
                            NACE Rev.2 Economic Sector                                                         
Year  
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Industry (B to E) 3% 5% 6% 9% 7% 
Mining and quarrying (B)       -     - 6%     -     - 
Manufacturing (C) 3% 5% 6% 9% 7% 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (D)     -     - 7%     -      - 
Water supply, sewerage, waste management and 
remediation activities (E) 
3% 6% 6% 10% 7% 
Construction (F) 6% 10% 15% 16% 11% 
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles (G) 
4% 5% 6% 9% 7% 
Transportation and storage (H) 5% 6% 8% 11% 8% 
Accommodation and food service activities (I) 6% 6% 7% 10% 8% 
Information and communication (J) 7% 7% 9% 11% 9% 
Financial and insurance activities excluding activities 
of holding companies (K-642) 
4% 6% 7% 9% 6% 
Real estate activities (L) 7% 7% 8% 10% 8% 
Professional, scientific and technical activities (M) 4% 6% 7% 10% 8% 
Administrative and support service activities (N) 4% 6% 8% 11% 7% 
Annual Average across sectors  5% 6% 7% 10% 8% 
Source: Central Statistics Office, 2016a  
Note: “-“ figures are unavailable for confidentiality reasons 
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Appendix Table 1.3: Average Weekly Earnings (Seasonally Adjusted) (Euro) by 
Type of Economic Sector NACE Rev 2 and Quarter  
 
NACE Rev.2 Economic 
Sector 
Quarter and Year 
 2008Q1 2009Q1 2010Q1 2011Q1 2012Q1 2013Q1 % Δ 
All NACE economic 
sectors 
705.08 709.59 691.42 689.96 692.67 691.62 -2% 
Mining and quarrying (B) 907.86 817.58 828.56 870.08 918.76 921.33 1% 
Manufacturing (C) 742.52 781.81 773.39 775.11 782.84 788.28 6% 
Construction (F) 737.9 772.18 742.14 684.32 674.4 658.97 -11% 
Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
(G) 
513.28 505.11 496.23 502.11 514.32 523.86 2% 
Transportation and 
storage (H) 
770.22 750.07 696.15 725.31 719.98 734.6 -5% 
Accommodation and food 
service activities (I) 
349.53 343.03 332.39 324.59 316.36 306.65 -12% 
Information and 
communication (J) 
944.2 948.64 919.15 951.74 976.57 1027.88 9% 
Financial and insurance 
activities (K) 
1120.63 992.29 1027.84 1034.46 1011.76 1033.9 -8% 
Real estate activities (L) 763.69 677.15 577.15 537.32 626.7 597.26 -22% 
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities (M) 
786.26 823.24 830.73 718.09 831.39 802.95 2% 
Administrative and 
support service activities 
(N) 
501.71 492.15 482.56 485.42 486.07 501.47 0% 
Public administration and 
defence; compulsory social 
security (O) 
961.73 981.97 930.15 908.62 925.12 933.6 -3% 
Education (P) 849.66 894.57 855.46 852.44 856.25 828.1 -3% 
Human health and social 
work activities (Q) 
730.37 756.34 721.56 730.17 721 695.53 -5% 
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation (R) 
459.11 463.69 467.43 407.49 450.06 496.79 8% 
Other service activities (S) 547.22 506.52 465.95 452.17 501.32 484.26 -12% 
Industry (B to E) 780.84 809.25 801.51 798.75 816.77 816.36 5% 
Electricity, water supply 
and waste management 
(D,E) 
1152.26 1181.08 1128.55 1086.98 1074.21 1069.57 -7% 
Financial, insurance and 
real estate activities (K,L) 
978.4 946.92 1003.45 993.25 982.05 985.72 1% 
Arts, entertainment, 
recreation and other 
service activities (R,S) 
484.66 469.82 454.62 420.31 468.45 483.24 0% 
Source: (Central Statistics Office, Ireland 2016b) 
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Appendix Table 1.4: Immigration and Emigration by Nationality, 2006-2013
106
   
Nationality 
Year 
000’s 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
% change  
2006-2013 
Immigration 
Irish  18.9 30.7 23.8 23 17.9 19.6 20.6 15.7 -17% 
UK 9.9 4.3 6.8 3.9 2.5 4.1 2.2 4.9 -51% 
Rest of EU 15 12.7 11.8 9.6 11.5 6.2 7.1 7.2 7.4 -42% 
EU 13
107
 49.9 85.3 54.7 21.5 9.3 10.1 10.4 10.9 -78% 
Rest of World 16.4 19 18.6 14.1 6.0 12.4 12.4 17.1 4% 
TOTAL 107.8 151.1 113.5 73.7 41.8 53.3 52.7 55.9 -48% 
Emigration  
Irish 15.3 12.9 13.1 19.2 28.9 42.0 46.5 50.9 233% 
UK 2.2 3.7 3.7 3.9 3.0 4.6 3.5 3.9 77% 
Rest of EU 15 5.1 8.9 6.0 7.4 9.0 10.2 11.2 9.9 94% 
EU 13
107
 7.2 12.6 17.2 30.5 19.0 13.9 14.8 14.0 94% 
Rest of World 6.2 8.2 9 11.0 9.3 9.9 11.1 10.3 66% 
TOTAL 36.0 46.3 49.2 72.0 69.2 80.6 87.1 89.0 147% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
106
 Source: (Central Statistics Office, Ireland 2012; Central Statistics Office, Ireland 2015a) 
Note 1: Rest of EU15 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Portugal) 
Note 2: Figures for 2012/2013 are preliminary 
 
107
 EU 13 includes 10 countries that joined 1/5/04 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungry, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia); Bulgaria, Romania who joined 1/1/07 and Croatia who 
joined 1/7/13.  
Figures for 2006-2009 are based on EU 12 (ie (EU13 minus Croatia) 
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Appendix 2 : Data tables and results for Chapter 3 
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Appendix Table 2.1: NACE Rev. 2 sectors B-N and number of enterprises, 
2005-2010 
NACE 
economic 
sector 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
B. Mining & 
Quarrying 
241 266 291 312 307 280 
C.  
Manufacturing  
8,221 9,105 9,591 9,762 9,565 8,965 
D. Electricity, 
Gas, Steam & 
Air 
Conditioning  
56 64 70 81 100 114 
E. Water 
supply, 
sewerage  
406 466 542 592 582 584 
F. Construction  
 
28,429 35,088 38,502 38,124 33,372 25,718 
G. Wholesale & 
Retail Trade  
26,549 29,995 31,548 32,400 32,243 31,200 
H. Transport & 
Storage 
5,272 6,086 6,586 6,808 6,764 6,410 
I. 
Accommodation 
& Food service  
11,131 12,916 13,494 13,848 13,941 13,694 
J. Information 
& 
Communication  
4,595 5,589 6,215 6,552 6,584 6,444 
K. Financial & 
Insurance 
activities 
2,718 3,145 3,425 3,668 3,986 3,914 
L. Real Estate 
activities 
2,631 3,230 3,547 3,690 3,727 3,533 
M. Professional, 
Scientific & 
Technical 
services 
12,698 15,107 16,792 17,824 18,232 17,654 
N. 
Administrative 
& Support 
activities 
5,203 6,292 7,057 7,448 7,455 6,920 
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Appendix Table 2.2: Mean job flow rates by NACE Rev2 sector  
NACE economic 
sector  
Job 
creation 
Job 
destruction 
Job 
reallocation 
Net 
reallocation  
Excess 
reallocation 
B. Mining & Quarrying 
(1) 
 
0.076 -0.106 0.182 -0.030 0.152 
C. Manufacturing (2) 
 
0.087 -0.132 0.219 -0.045 0.175 
D. Electricity, Gas, 
Steam & Air 
Conditioning (3) 
- - - - - 
E. Water supply, 
sewerage (4) 
0.152 -0.126 0.278 0.027 0.251 
F. Construction (5) 
 
0.168 -0.300 0.467 -0.130 0.336 
G. Wholesale & Retail 
Trade (6) 
0.116 -0.127 0.244 -0.010 0.233 
H. Transport & Storage 
(7) 
 
0.099 -0.106 0.205 -0.007 0.199 
I. Accommodation & 
Food service activities 
(8) 
0.150 -0.178 0.327 -0.028 0.299 
J. Information & 
Communication (9) 
0.191 -0.163 0.354 0.027 0.327 
K.  Financial & 
Insurance activities 
(10) 
0.105 -0.094 0.199 0.011 0.187 
L. Real Estate activities 
(11) 
 
0.192 -0.214 0.405 -0.022 0.384 
M. Professional, 
Scientific & 
Technical services 
(12) 
0.154 -0.150 0.304 0.004 0.300 
N. Administrative & 
Support activities 
(13) 
0.180 -0.184 0.364 -0.004 0.360 
Note: For confidentiality reasons, results for sector D have been supressed. 
Appendix Table 2.3: Number of enterprise observations in the CIP, 2006-2010. 
Year Number of enterprises 
2006 4,620 
2007 5,558 
2008 5,589 
2009 5,029 
2010 4,782 
Total 25,578 
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Appendix Table 2.4: Job creation and job destruction by manufacturing 
subsector, 2006-2010  
Manufacturing 
sub-sector 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1. JC 0.079 0.092 0.068 0.039 0.068 
JD -0.057 -0.048 -0.071 -0.130 -0.052 
2. JC 0.108 0.072 0.047 0.031 0.051 
JD -0.061 -0.080 -0.092 -0.173 -0.122 
3. JC 0.106 0.052 0.043 0.014 0.036 
JD -0.045 -0.076 -0.201 -0.376 -0.159 
4. JC 0.065 0.076 0.047 0.015 0.046 
JD -0.072 -0.082 -0.075 -0.134 -0.112 
5. JC 0.123 0.048 0.027 0.135 0.030 
JD -0.023 -0.027 -0.040 -0.093 -0.097 
6. JC 0.117 0.115 0.034 0.020 0.054 
JD -0.065 -0.077 -0.154 -0.241 -0.130 
7. JC 0.156 0.085 0.054 0.008 0.012 
JD -0.023 -0.037 -0.122 -0.363 -0.248 
8. JC 0.127 0.109 0.067 0.054 0.050 
JD -0.069 -0.062 -0.126 -0.260 -0.216 
9. JC 0.087 0.173 0.015 0.065 0.110 
JD -0.053 -0.082 -0.096 -0.651 -0.118 
10. JC 0.098 0.092 0.044 0.045 0.056 
JD -0.040 -0.038 -0.085 -0.020 -0.181 
11. JC 0.068 0.029 0.112 0.005 0.037 
JD -0.017 -0.227 -0.054 -0.136 -0.069 
12. JC 0.072 0.076 0.036 0.063 0.070 
JD -0.043 -0.098 -0.080 -0.273 -0.112 
13. JC 0.284 0.122 0.069 0.030 0.063 
JD -0.044 -0.041 -0.081 -0.177 -0.123 
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Appendix Table 2.5: The level of trade intensity quintiles 
Variable  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Export Δ level 1 2,476 4.209 2.684 1 9 
Export Δ level 2 2,208 14.86 3.2288 10 20 
Export Δ level 3 2,132 29.37 6.2449 21 42 
Export Δ level 4 2,270 66.15 13.905 43 90 
Export Δ level 5 2,207 98.61 2.3574 91 100 
      
Import  Δ level 1 2,671 5.966 3.872 1 14 
Import  Δ level 2 2,595 28.080 9.1264 15 47 
Import  Δ level 3 2,600 70.575 13.035 48 90 
Import  Δ level 4 5,220 99.528 1.5431 91 100 
 
Appendix Table 2.6: The change in trade intensity quintiles 
Variable  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Export Δ intensity 1 974 -32.714 29.041 100 -7 
Export Δ intensity 2 1,044 -2.685 1.649 -6 -1 
Export Δ intensity 3 881 2.099 1.094 1 4 
Export Δ intensity 4 856 10.241 3.852 5 16 
Export Δ intensity 5 874 39.628 25.418 17 100 
      
Import  Δ intensity 1 1,237 -72.216 29.486 -100 -22 
Import  Δ intensity 2 1,365 -9.240 5.340 -21 -3 
Import  Δ intensity 3 1,252 0.472 1.723 -2 3 
Import  Δ intensity 4 1,112 9.021 4.132 4 18 
Import  Δ intensity 5 1,219 57.416 27.683 19 100 
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Appendix 3 : Displacement, individual and firm characteristics 
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Here we provide some details on displacement rates by worker and firm 
characteristics.  As appropriate, we refer to previous empirical evidence    
 Displacement and age  
The displacement rate is also computed for age categories.  This is potential useful in 
identifying if particular age groups are at greater risk of displacement.  Individuals 
are divided to age categories below; 
- Category 1: 16-25 years old   -    Category 2: 26-35 years old 
- Category 3: 36-45 years old   -    Category 4: 46-55 years old 
- Category 5: 56-64 years old   -    Category 6: 65 + years old  
Appendix Table 3.1: Displacement number and rates by age category, 2006-
2010 (Closure) 
Year 
1: 16-25 years 2: 26-35 years 3: 36-45 years 4: 46-55 years 5: 56-64 years 6: 65 years+ 
Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate 
2005 2,185 1.0% 3,100 0.8% 2,372 0.7% 1,494 0.6% 844 0.7% 226 1.7% 
2006 2,892 1.4% 4,485 1.1% 3,194 1.0% 2,144 0.9% 1,122 0.9% 283 2.0% 
2007 4,271 2.0% 6,727 1.5% 4,775 1.4% 2,940 1.1% 1,395 1.0% 408 2.7% 
2008 6,677 3.2% 14,587 3.1% 11,452 3.2% 7,559 2.7% 4,039 2.8% 944 5.8% 
2009 5,109 2.8% 10,221 2.3% 8,022 2.3% 5,465 2.1% 2,863 2.1% 772 4.9% 
2010 4,237 2.7% 9,592 2.2% 7,682 2.2% 4,991 1.8% 2,674 1.9% 787 4.9% 
 
Appendix Table 3.2: Displacement number and rates by age category, 2006-
2010 (Mass-Layoff) 
Year 
1: 16-25 years  2: 26-35 years  3: 36-45 years  4: 46-55 years  5: 56-64 years  6: 65 years + 
Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate 
2005 519 0.4% 639 0.3% 341 0.2% 319 0.2% - - - - 
2006 440 0.1% 662 0.0% 532 0.0% - - - - - - 
2007 776 0.1% 1,185 0.1% 521 0.0% 320 0.0% - - - - 
2008 2,067 1.6% 3,201 1.1% 1,453 0.6% 798 0.4% - - - - 
2009 567 0.1% 1,684 0.1% 1,101 0.1% 792 0.1% - - - - 
2010 320 0.3% 763 0.3% 590 0.3% 351 0.2% - - - - 
Note: Some values have been suppressed for confidentiality reasons  
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As we can see from the tables above, the displacement rates are relatively high in the 
younger age categories 1 and 2 in both samples. While the numbers and rates 
increase in all age categories in 2008, we observe higher rates in the younger age 
categories.  Those in category 4 and aged 46-55 years have a slightly lower 
displacement rate when compared to other age categories.  Previous work by the 
OECD (2013) has found that the displacement rate is highest for the youngest and 
oldest workers.  Our evidence here is broadly consistent with that, particularly for 
the youngest workers (category 1: 16-25 years) and oldest workers (category 6: 65 
years +).  As we saw earlier in chapter 2, the unemployment rate was particularly 
high for younger workers under the age of 25.  This would clearly impact on the 
employment prospects of these younger displaced workers.  
 Displacement and nationality   
The final individual characteristic used to examine the displacement rate by is 
nationality.  Here employees are categorised according to their nationality as below; 
- Category 1: Irish   - Category 2: UK and Northern Ireland 
- Category 3: Western Europe   - Category 4: Eastern Europe 
- Category 5: Asia    - Category 6: Rest of the world 
As can been seen from Appendix Tables 3.3 and 3.4, all country categories 
experienced an increasing number of displacements over the period.    For all groups 
and both samples, we observe that 2008 sees a dramatic increase in displacement, 
relative to previous years.  For Irish workers, the rate of displacement increases from 
under 1% in both samples in 2005 to 3% in 2008 for the closure sample and just over 
0.6% in the mass-layoff sample.  The highest rate of displacement occurs in the 
closure sample in 2008 with workers in the ‘Rest of the world’ group experiencing 
displacement rates of over almost 4%.  In the mass layoff sample, we see that the 
group of non-Irish workers see a large increase in their rate of displacement, relative 
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to the increase for Irish workers.  Finally, it is worth noting that while the rate of 
displacement declined in 2009 and 2010, so did the number of employment records.   
Appendix Table 3.3: Displacement numbers and rates by nationality, 2005-2010 
(Closure) 
Year 1: Irish 2: UK and NI 3: Western 
Europe 
4: Eastern 
Europe 
5: Asia 6: Rest of the 
world 
Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate  Number  Rate Number Rate Number Rate 
2005 10,975 0.8% 532 1.0% 182 0.6% 795 1.3% 256 1.2% 246 0.9% 
2006 12,190 1.0% 558 1.3% 293 1.2% 1,577 1.8% 293 1.3% 302 1.2% 
2007 15,758 1.3% 793 1.8% 379 1.4% 3,091 2.6% 414 1.6% 574 2.0% 
2008 36,831 3.0% 1,724 3.6% 840 2.7% 4,434 3.5% 812 2.7% 1,304 3.8% 
2009 25,158 2.2% 1,112 2.4% 646 2.2% 3,741 3.2% 755 2.4% 1,107 3.3% 
2010 23,423 2.1% 1,054 2.3% 602 2.2% 3,174 2.9% 822 2.8% 1,006 3.2% 
 
Appendix Table 3.4: Displacement numbers and rates by nationality, 2005-2010 
(Mass-Layoff) 
Year 1: Irish 2. Other nationality 
Number Rate Number Rate 
2005 1,629 0.2% 350 0.4% 
2006 1,864 0.3% 406 0.4% 
2007 1,672 0.2% 1,333 1.0% 
2008 4,982 0.6% 3,097 1.9% 
2009 3,627 0.5% 1,032 0.6% 
2010 1,637 0.2% 595 0.5% 
Note: A detailed breakdown by nationality group was not possible for confidentially reasons  
 Displacement and firm size  
Moving from individual to firm characteristics, we examine the incidence of 
displacement by firm size and NACE Rev.2 sector. Staring with firm size, all firms 
are divided into 5 categories based on the number of employment records which are; 
- Category 1: 1-9 employment records            - Category 2: 10-19 employment 
records 
- Category 3: 20-49 employment records       - Category 4: 50-249 employment 
records 
- Category 5: 250+ employment records 
We can see from below that micro firms with <9 employment records account for a 
significant amount of the numbers displaced.  In 2008, over 16,000 individuals were 
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displaced due to firm closure.  According to data from the CSO, these micro firms 
account for around 87% of all enterprises and 20% of employment in 2008
108
.  The 
high displacement rates suggest much volatility for employees of small firms.  In the 
mass layoff sample, we see a similar trend of increasing displacement up to 2008. 
Appendix Table 3.5: Displacement number and displacement rate by firm-size 
category for 2005-2010 (Closure) 
Year 
1: 1-9 records 2: 10-19 records 3: 20-49 records 
4: 50-249 
records 
5: 250+ records 
Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate 
2005 4,675 2.6% 1,604 1.5% 1,637 1.1% 1,572 0.7% 733 0.1% 
2006 5,945 3.2% 1,728 1.6% 2,117 1.3% 2,038 0.8% 2,247 0.4% 
2007 9,316 4.8% 2,826 2.4% 2,865 1.7% 2,414 0.9% 2,095 0.3% 
2008 15,603 7.6% 4,432 3.7% 5,372 3.0% 9,433 3.4% 10,418 1.5% 
2009 12,637 6.4% 3,735 3.2% 4,006 2.4% 5,848 2.3% 6,226 1.0% 
2010 13,609 7.1% 3,606 3.3% 3,621 2.3% 4,275 1.7% 4,852 0.7% 
 
Appendix Table 3.6: Displacement number and displacement rate by firm-size 
category for 2005-2010 (Mass Layoff) 
Year 
4: 50-249 records 5: 250+ records 
Number Rate Number Rate 
2005 469 0.3% 1,510 0.2% 
2006 540 0.3% 1,730 0.3% 
2007 831 0.4% 2,174 0.3% 
2008 3,029 1.5% 5,050 0.7% 
2009 1,395 0.7% 3,261 0.5% 
2010 731 0.4% 1,501 0.2% 
 
 Displacement and industry 
Finally we examine the displacement number by NACE Rev.2 sector.  The table 
below shows the numbers displaced by NACE sector over the period 2005-2010 due 
to firm closure (C) and mass-layoff (M).  As we can see a similar trend to the 
previous tables is observed with 2008 seeing the largest number of displacements 
across the sectors for both samples.  There is a particularly large increase in the 
                                                 
108
 Source: 
http://www.cso.ie/px/pxeirestat/Statire/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?maintable=BRA08&PLanguage=0  
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construction sector (F) for both samples.  The manufacturing sector (C) also 
experienced a large increase in displacements over the period from to over four 
thousand for both samples. 
Work in the US in the early 90’s by Podgursky (1992) and Farber et al. (1993) 
examined the incidence of displacement across industries.  Both found possible 
evidence a shift in the incidence from goods-producing industries towards service 
industries.  This trend is not detected here in the time-period covered and we 
generally observe an increase in displacements across all sectors, particularly up to 
2008. 
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Appendix Table 3.7: The number displaced by NACE sector; 2005-2010 
[Closure (C) & Mass-layoff (M)] 
NACE Sector 
YEAR 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 C M C M C M C M C M C M 
1. Agriculture, 
Forestry, Fishing 
(A) 
182 - 195 - - - 610 - 805 - 654 - 
2. Mining and 
Quarrying (B) 
- - - - - - 113 727 223 - - - 
3. 
Manufacturing 
(C) 
868 639 668 480 1,737 383 4,527 916 2,643 883 3,832 250 
4. Electricity, 
Gas, Steam, Air 
conditioning, 
Water supply (D) 
& (E) 
- - - - 326 - - - 223 - - - 
5.Construction 
(F) 
2,745 - 3,146 159 7,029 422 8,878 1,240 4,913 809 4,405 256 
6. Wholesale and 
Retail trade; 
repair of motor 
vehicles (G) 
2,107 454 2,769 208 3,222 238 7,329 892 5,614 595 5,608 211 
7. 
Transportation 
& Storage (H) 
322 - 332 191 618 - 870 252 1,352 379 1,083 - 
8. 
Accommodation 
& Food service 
activities (I) 
1,300 100 1,699 142 1,766 549 3,005 1,140 5,305 133 3,411 501 
9. Information & 
Communication 
(J) 
383 - 476 - 1,288 137 1,632 261 1,025 258 834 212 
10. Financial 
services, 
Insurance (K) 
358 - 2,062 168 518 - 1,381 149 777 211 1,250 - 
11. Real estate 
activities (L) 
184 - 290 - 222 - 602 108 584 - 444 - 
12. Professional, 
scientific & 
technical 
activities (M) 
575 - 796 - 1,113 143 2,951 338 2,375 194 1,990 138 
13. 
Administrative 
& support 
activities (N) 
386 - 786 360 1,118 744 2,296 1,086 2,138 395 1,625 202 
14. Public 
administration & 
Defence (O) 
66 267 - - - - 3,624 - 1,211 243 317 - 
15. Education (P) 36 - - - - - 1,974 - 352 - 560 - 
16. Human 
Health and 
Social work 
activities (Q) 
124 - 247 378 329 - 3,815 147 1,506 440 1,629 - 
17. Arts, 
entertainment & 
recreation (R) 
176 128 191 - 230 107 345 - 471 - 882 - 
18. Other 
services 
activities; 
activities of 
households; 
Extraterritorial 
bodies (S, T , U) 
358 - 350 - 519 - 1,212 - 935 - 1,330 - 
Note: Some figures in the mass-layoff sample have been suppressed for confidentiality reasons 
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Work in the US in the early 90’s by Podgursky (1992) and Farber et al. (1993) 
examined the incidence of displacement across industries.  Both found possible 
evidence a shift in the incidence from goods-producing industries towards service 
industries.  This trend is not detected here in the time-period covered and we 
generally observe an increase in displacements across all sectors, particularly up to 
2008. 
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Appendix 4 : Findings from the unrestricted mass-layoff sample  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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Here we briefly report findings from the unrestricted mass-layoff sample.  As we can 
see from the above, the mass-layoff group experience losses of almost €20,000 
(42%) in the period following displacement.  Earnings do show signs of recovery but 
they do not return to their pre-displacement level within the period in question.  
When we compare these losses to those of the restricted mass-layoff sample, we see 
that these earnings losses here are smaller than those of the restricted sample.  Thus 
we suggest the findings from the restricted sample is more representative of workers 
displaced due to mass-layoff.  This unrestricted sample may be capturing voluntary 
as well as involuntary separations and so may not give a truly accurate picture of the 
earnings losses of displaced workers. 
Appendix Figure 4.1: Earnings losses of mass-layoff workers     (unrestricted 
sample) 
 
Looking at gender differneces in the restricted sample we see that male workers 
experience greater losses when compared to female workers.  Again this is the same 
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as reported for the restricted mass-layoff sample, but we see that the group that 
reported losses are smaller in the unrestricted sample. 
Appendix Figure 4.2:  Earnings losses of mass-layoff workers by gender 
(unrestricted sample) 
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Appendix 5 : Nationality, Nace Rev.2 sectors and Firm size 
categories used in matching 
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Appendix Table 5.1: Overview of Nationality, NACE Rev.2 sector and Firm size 
categories used in matching 
(A) Nationality groups 
 
Nationality Group  Countries  
Group 1 Ireland 
Group 2 UK, Northern Ireland, Isle of Man 
Group 3 Western Europe  
Group 4 Eastern Europe 
Group 5 Asia  
Group 6 Rest of the world  
 
(B) Age categories  
Age Category  Years  
1 16-25 years  
2 26-35 years  
3 36-45 years 
4 46-55 years 
5 56-64 years 
6 65+ years 
 
(C) NACE sector groups 
 
NACE Group NACE Rev.2 Sectors  
Group 1 A, B, C, D, E, F 
Group 2 G, H, I, J, L, R, S, T, U 
Group 3 K, M, N  
Group 4 O, P, Q 
 
(D) Firm size groups  
 
Firm size group Firm size (no. of employment records) 
Group 1 0-9 
Group 2 10-19 
Group 3 20-49 
Group 4 50-249 
Group 5 250+ 
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Appendix 6 : Results of Common support & Balance tests 
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Appendix Figure 6.1: Graphs used to assess Common Support; Closure and 
Mass-Layoff samples 
 Closure  
2005       2006 
 
2007        2008 
 
2009       2010 
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 Mass layoff 
2005      2006 
 
2007       2008 
 
 
 
2009      2010 
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Appendix Table 6.1: Balance Test results; Closure sample 
(a) 2005 
Variable  Mean 
Treated    Control 
%bias %bias 
Reduction 
T-test 
t            p>|t| 
        
sexd2 Unmatched  0.63869 0.53888 20.4  20.17 0 
 Matched   0.63869 0.63908 -0.1 99.6 -0.06 0.954 
age Unmatched  37.009 38.179 -9.4  -9.69 0 
 Matched   37.009 37.001 0.1 99.3 0.05 0.964 
age2 Unmatched  1531.9 1605.4 -7.2  -7.4 0 
 Matched   1531.9 1531 0.1 98.7 0.06 0.95 
natd1 Unmatched  0.85217 0.88869 -10.9  -11.68 0 
 Matched   0.85217 0.85236 -0.1 99.5 -0.04 0.969 
natd2 Unmatched  0.03728 0.03009 4  4.23 0 
 Matched   0.03728 0.03737 -0.1 98.6 -0.04 0.971 
natd3 Unmatched  0.01243 0.01584 -2.9  -2.75 0.006 
 Matched   0.01243 0.01243 0 100 0 1 
natd4 Unmatched  0.0589 0.03555 11  12.67 0 
 Matched   0.0589 0.05909 -0.1 99.2 -0.06 0.953 
natd5 Unmatched  0.02152 0.01432 5.4  6.1 0 
 Matched   0.02152 0.02152 0 100 0 1 
firmscd1 Unmatched  0.45739 0.12883 77.4  98.29 0 
 Matched   0.45739 0.45729 0 100 0.01 0.989 
firmscd2 Unmatched  0.15693 0.07862 24.5  29.2 0 
 Matched   0.15693 0.15625 0.2 99.1 0.13 0.893 
firmscd3 Unmatched  0.16016 0.11836 12.1  13.01 0 
 Matched   0.16016 0.16045 -0.1 99.3 -0.06 0.954 
firmscd4 Unmatched  0.1538 0.18391 -8  -7.83 0 
 Matched   0.1538 0.1539 0 99.7 -0.02 0.985 
naced1 Unmatched  0.37628 0.24877 27.8  29.67 0 
 Matched   0.37628 0.37677 -0.1 99.6 -0.07 0.942 
naced2 Unmatched  0.47256 0.34602 25.9  26.77 0 
 Matched   0.47256 0.47275 0 99.8 -0.03 0.978 
naced3 Unmatched  0.12905 0.14026 -3.3  -3.25 0.001 
 Matched   0.12905 0.12905 0 100 0 1 
 
Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
 
Sample  Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
Raw  0.110 
Matched 0.000 
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(b) 2006 
Variable  Mean 
Treated   Control     
% bias       % bias  
                 reduction 
        T-test          
   t            p>|t| 
sexd2 Unmatched  0.60092 0.54943 10.4 
 
12.23 0 
 
Matched   0.60092 0.60071 0 99.6 0.04 0.971 
age Unmatched  36.874 38.315 -11.7 
 
-14.03 0 
 
Matched   36.874 36.861 0.1 99.1 0.09 0.931 
age2 Unmatched  1515.8 1615.3 -9.8 
 
-11.74 0 
 
Matched   1515.8 1514.7 0.1 99 0.08 0.932 
natd1 Unmatched  0.79795 0.85876 -16.2 
 
-20.6 0 
 
Matched   0.79795 0.79851 -0.2 99.1 -0.12 0.906 
natd2 Unmatched  0.03676 0.03032 3.6 
 
4.43 0 
 
Matched   0.03676 0.03676 0 100 0 1 
natd3 Unmatched | 0.01983 0.01742 1.8 
 
2.17 0.03 
 
Matched   0.01983 0.01962 0.2 91.2 0.13 0.898 
natd4 Unmatched  0.10567 0.06093 16.2 
 
22.03 0 
 
Matched   0.10567 0.10567 0 100 0 1 
natd5 Unmatched  0.01962 0.01561 3.1 
 
3.82 0 
 
Matched   0.01962 0.01926 0.3 91.2 0.22 0.829 
firmscd1 Unmatched  0.42103 0.13147 68.4 
 
100.68 0 
 
Matched   0.42103 0.42103 0 100 0 1 
firmscd2 Unmatched  0.12238 0.08143 13.6 
 
17.66 0 
 
Matched   0.12238 0.12195 0.1 99 0.11 0.913 
firmscd3 Unmatched  0.14993 0.12209 8.1 
 
10.04 0 
 
Matched   0.14993 0.15028 -0.1 98.7 -0.08 0.934 
firmscd4 Unmatched  0.14752 0.19319 -12.2 
 
-13.69 0 
 
Matched   0.14752 0.14759 0 99.8 -0.02 0.987 
naced1 Unmatched  0.28711 0.25802 6.5 
 
7.86 0 
 
Matched   0.28711 0.28732 0 99.3 -0.04 0.969 
naced2 Unmatched  0.43251 0.34774 17.4 
 
21.03 0 
 
Matched   0.43251 0.43265 0 99.8 -0.02 0.981 
naced3 Unmatched  0.25807 0.14129 29.5 
 
39.51 0 
 
Matched  0.25807 0.25793 0 99 0.03 0.978 
 
 
Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
 
Sample  Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
Raw  0.090 
Matched 0.000 
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(c) 2007 
Variable  
Mean 
Treated        Control % bias 
% bias 
reduction  
            T-test          
       t                p>|t| 
        
sexd2 Unmatched 0.69229 0.54296 31.1 
 
42.67 0 
 
Matched 0.69229 0.69283 -0.1 99.6 -0.12 0.906 
age Unmatched 36.437 38.407 -16.2 
 
-23.13 0 
 
Matched 36.437 36.419 0.1 99.1 0.14 0.885 
age2 Unmatched 1477.6 1621.8 -14.4 
 
-20.43 0 
 
Matched 1477.6 1475.5 0.2 98.6 0.21 0.835 
natd1 Unmatched 0.75122 0.83431 -20.6 
 
-31.69 0 
 
Matched 0.75122 0.75146 -0.1 99.7 -0.06 0.954 
natd2 Unmatched 0.03797 0.03085 3.9 
 
5.84 0 
 
Matched 0.03797 0.03797 0 100 0 1 
natd3 Unmatched 0.01833 0.0186 -0.2 
 
-0.29 0.774 
 
Matched 0.01833 0.01803 0.2 -7.1 0.22 0.825 
natd4 Unmatched 0.14598 0.07994 21 
 
34.46 0 
 
Matched 0.14598 0.14623 -0.1 99.6 -0.07 0.944 
natd5 Unmatched 0.0192 0.01672 1.9 
 
2.75 0.006 
 
Matched 0.0192 0.01935 -0.1 94.1 -0.11 0.914 
firmscd1 Unmatched 0.45408 0.12959 76.4 
 
136.21 0 
 
Matched 0.45408 0.45394 0 100 0.03 0.976 
firmscd2 Unmatched 0.13775 0.08004 18.6 
 
30.11 0 
 
Matched 0.13775 0.13775 0 100 0 1 
firmscd3 Unmatched 0.13965 0.12015 5.8 
 
8.52 0 
 
Matched 0.13965 0.13955 0 99.5 0.03 0.977 
firmscd4 Unmatched 0.16641 0.19142 -6.5 
 
-9.05 0 
 
Matched 0.16641 0.1667 -0.1 98.8 -0.08 0.937 
naced1 Unmatched 0.4595 0.24812 45.3 
 
69.42 0 
 
Matched 0.4595 0.45964 0 99.9 -0.03 0.976 
naced2 Unmatched 0.38336 0.34932 7.1 
 
10.15 0 
 
Matched 0.38336 0.38375 -0.1 98.9 -0.08 0.935 
naced3 Unmatched 0.13399 0.14651 -3.6 
 
-5.04 0 
 
Matched 0.13399 0.1336 0.1 96.9 0.12 0.908 
 
 
Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
 
Sample  Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
Raw  0.115 
Matched 0.000 
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(d) 2008 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Treated     Control %bias 
% bias 
Reduction  
T-Test 
      t          p>|t| 
sexd2 Unmatched 0.59673 0.53515 12.4 
 
25.87 0 
 
Matched 0.59673 0.5966 0 99.8 0.04 0.968 
Age Unmatched 38.358 38.514 -1.3 
 
-2.7 0.007 
 
Matched 38.358 38.343 0.1 90.9 0.17 0.862 
age2 Unmatched 1620.4 1629 -0.9 
 
-1.8 0.072 
 
Matched 1620.4 1618.9 0.1 83.3 0.21 0.833 
natd1 Unmatched 0.80061 0.8201 -5 
 
-10.61 0 
 
Matched 0.80061 0.80094 -0.1 98.3 -0.12 0.901 
natd2 Unmatched 0.03761 0.03164 3.3 
 
7.12 0 
 
Matched 0.03761 0.03767 0 98.9 -0.05 0.958 
natd3 Unmatched 0.01847 0.0212 -2 
 
-3.98 0 
 
Matched 0.01847 0.01818 0.2 89.5 0.32 0.747 
natd4 Unmatched 0.09744 0.0855 4.1 
 
8.92 0 
 
Matched 0.09744 0.09753 0 99.3 -0.04 0.964 
natd5 Unmatched 0.01741 0.01896 -1.2 
 
-2.38 0.017 
 
Matched 0.01741 0.01726 0.1 90 0.18 0.859 
firmscd1 Unmatched 0.34476 0.12961 52.3 
 
132.09 0 
 
Matched 0.34476 0.34482 0 100 -0.02 0.983 
firmscd2 Unmatched 0.09793 0.08097 5.9 
 
12.98 0 
 
Matched 0.09793 0.09786 0 99.6 0.03 0.973 
firmscd3 Unmatched 0.1187 0.12175 -0.9 
 
-1.96 0.05 
 
Matched 0.1187 0.11856 0 95.7 0.06 0.951 
firmscd4 Unmatched 0.20843 0.18924 4.8 
 
10.25 0 
 
Matched 0.20843 0.20856 0 99.3 -0.05 0.961 
naced1 Unmatched 0.31424 0.22624 19.9 
 
43.89 0 
 
Matched 0.31424 0.31435 0 99.9 -0.04 0.971 
naced2 Unmatched 0.33132 0.36341 -6.7 
 
-13.98 0 
 
Matched 0.33132 0.3315 0 99.4 -0.06 0.955 
naced3 Unmatched 0.14645 0.15353 -2 
 
-4.12 0 
 
Matched 0.14645 0.14629 0 97.8 0.07 0.948 
         
 
Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
 
Sample  Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
Raw  0.049 
Matched 0.000 
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(e) 2009 
Variable   Mean 
Control       Treated 
% Bias % bias 
reduction 
  T-Test 
   t            p>|t| 
sexd2 Unmatched 0.5865 0.51949 13.5  23.88 0 
 Matched 0.5865 0.58659 0 99.9 -0.02 0.981 
Age Unmatched 38.27 38.853 -4.8  -8.64 0 
 Matched 38.27 38.249 0.2 96.3 0.22 0.827 
age2 Unmatched 1618.5 1653.4 -3.4  -6.17 0 
 Matched 1618.5 1616.4 0.2 93.8 0.27 0.79 
natd1 Unmatched 0.77388 0.81726 -10.8  -19.94 0 
 Matched 0.77388 0.77428 -0.1 99.1 -0.12 0.903 
natd2 Unmatched 0.03427 0.03335 0.5  0.91 0.362 
 Matched 0.03427 0.03411 0.1 83.3 0.11 0.914 
natd3 Unmatched 0.01991 0.0217 -1.3  -2.19 0.028 
 Matched 0.01991 0.01969 0.2 88 0.2 0.844 
natd4 Unmatched 0.115 0.08181 11.2  21.47 0 
 Matched 0.115 0.11512 0 99.6 -0.05 0.961 
natd5 Unmatched 0.02296 0.02212 0.6  1.01 0.312 
 Matched 0.02296 0.0228 0.1 81.6 0.13 0.896 
firmscd1 Unmatched 0.38941 0.13629 60  129.78 0 
 Matched 0.38941 0.38941 0 100 0 1 
firmscd2 Unmatched 0.11509 0.08323 10.7  20.45 0 
 Matched 0.11509 0.11525 -0.1 99.5 -0.06 0.951 
firmscd3 Unmatched 0.12344 0.12058 0.9  1.56 0.118 
 Matched 0.12344 0.12335 0 96.8 0.04 0.971 
firmscd4 Unmatched 0.1802 0.18822 -2.1  -3.65 0 
 Matched 0.1802 0.18027 0 99.2 -0.02 0.984 
naced1 Unmatched 0.27139 0.19918 17.1  32.09 0 
 Matched 0.27139 0.27157 0 99.7 -0.05 0.958 
naced2 Unmatched 0.47103 0.3768 19.2  34.59 0 
 Matched 0.47103 0.47137 -0.1 99.6 -0.09 0.931 
naced3 Unmatched 0.16301 0.15648 1.8  3.2 0.001 
 Matched 0.16301 0.16242 0.2 91 0.2 0.84 
 
Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
 
Sample  Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
Raw  0.063 
Matched 0.000 
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(f) 2010 
Variable   Mean 
Treated       Control 
% bias % bias 
reduction 
T-Test 
t             p>|t| 
sexd2 Unmatched 0.5911 0.4989 18.6  31.58 0 
 Matched 0.5911 0.5913 0 99.8 -0.05 0.96 
age Unmatched 38.664 39.53 -7.2  -12.5 0 
 Matched 38.664 38.644 0.2 97.7 0.2 0.84 
age2 Unmatched 1646.9 1702.9 -5.5  -9.57 0 
 Matched 1646.9 1644.9 0.2 96.4 0.23 0.816 
natd1 Unmatched 0.77906 0.82614 -11.8  -21.22 0 
 Matched 0.77906 0.77956 -0.1 98.9 -0.15 0.883 
natd2 Unmatched 0.03504 0.03261 1.3  2.34 0.019 
 Matched 0.03504 0.03491 0.1 94.5 0.09 0.929 
natd3 Unmatched 0.02006 0.02011 0  -0.06 0.952 
 Matched 0.02006 0.01982 0.2 -370.3 0.2 0.838 
natd4 Unmatched 0.1055 0.07776 9.6  17.67 0 
 Matched 0.1055 0.10576 -0.1 99 -0.11 0.915 
natd5 Unmatched 0.0269 0.02071 4.1  7.41 0 
 Matched 0.0269 0.0266 0.2 95.1 0.23 0.82 
firmscd1 Unmatched 0.45419 0.13391 75.1  159.03 0 
 Matched 0.45419 0.45406 0 100 0.03 0.974 
firmscd2 Unmatched 0.12035 0.07973 13.6  25.55 0 
 Matched 0.12035 0.12035 0 100 0 1 
firmscd3 Unmatched 0.12085 0.11538 1.7  2.93 0.003 
 Matched 0.12085 0.12098 0 97.6 -0.05 0.96 
firmscd4 Unmatched 0.14268 0.18161 -10.6  -17.32 0 
 Matched 0.14268 0.14278 0 99.7 -0.04 0.972 
naced1 Unmatched 0.30037 0.17306 30.3  57.32 0 
 Matched 0.30037 0.3007 -0.1 99.7 -0.09 0.929 
naced2 Unmatched 0.45363 0.3678 17.5  30.45 0 
 Matched 0.45363 0.45359 0 100 0.01 0.993 
naced3 Unmatched 0.16237 0.15321 2.5  4.35 0 
 Matched 0.16237 0.1623 0 99.3 0.02 0.982 
        
 
Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
Sample  Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
Raw  0.096 
Matched 0.000 
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Appendix Table 6.2: Balance Test results; Mass Layoff sample  
(a) 2005 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Treated    Control % bias 
% bias 
reduction 
T-Test 
   t           p>|t| 
sexd2 Unmatched 0.55382 0.49117 12.6 
 
5.57 0 
 
Matched 0.55382 0.55382 0 100 0 1 
age Unmatched 35.293 38.307 -24.6 
 
-11.28 0 
 
Matched 35.293 35.316 -0.2 99.2 -0.06 0.954 
age2 Unmatched 1404 1608.3 -20.8 
 
-9.33 0 
 
Matched 1404 1405.9 -0.2 99.1 -0.06 0.953 
natd1 Unmatched 0.82314 0.8918 -19.7 
 
-9.81 0 
 
Matched 0.82314 0.82314 0 100 0 1 
natd2 Unmatched 0.02931 0.02839 0.5 
 
0.24 0.807 
 
Matched 0.02931 0.0288 0.3 44.7 0.09 0.925 
natd3 Unmatched 0.02779 0.01797 6.6 
 
3.28 0.001 
 
Matched 0.02779 0.02779 0 100 0 1 
natd4 Unmatched 0.07226 0.02995 19.3 
 
11.01 0 
 
Matched 0.07226 0.07276 -0.2 98.8 -0.06 0.951 
natd5 Unmatched 0.01819 0.01577 1.9 
 
0.87 0.387 
 
Matched 0.01819 0.01819 0 100 0 1 
firmscd1 Unmatched 0.23699 0.21085 6.3 
 
2.85 0.004 
 
Matched 0.23699 0.23699 0 100 0 1 
naced1 Unmatched 0.35068 0.20059 34.1 
 
16.65 0 
 
Matched 0.35068 0.35068 0 100 0 1 
naced2 Unmatched 0.40829 0.27552 28.3 
 
13.2 0 
 
Matched 0.40829 0.40829 0 100 0 1 
naced3 Unmatched 0.08691 0.13272 -14.7 
 
-6 0 
 
Matched 0.08691 0.08691 0 100 0 1 
 
Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
 
Sample  Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
Raw  0.032   
Matched 0.000 
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(b) 2006 
Variable  
Mean 
Treated    Control %bias 
%bias 
reduction 
T-Test 
     t             p>|t| 
sexd2 Unmatched 0.46432 0.5009 -7.3 
 
-3.48 0 
 
Matched 0.46432 0.46432 0 100 0 1 
age Unmatched 37.633 38.401 -6.4 
 
-3.09 0.002 
 
Matched 37.633 37.631 0 99.8 0 0.996 
age2 Unmatched 1565.2 1614.8 -5.1 
 
-2.43 0.015 
 
Matched 1565.2 1564.9 0 99.6 0.01 0.994 
natd1 Unmatched 0.82115 0.86559 -12.2 
 
-6.2 0 
 
Matched 0.82115 0.82115 0 100 0 1 
natd2 Unmatched 0.037 0.02845 4.8 
 
2.45 0.014 
 
Matched 0.037 0.037 0 100 0 1 
natd3 Unmatched 0.02952 0.01996 6.2 
 
3.25 0.001 
 
Matched 0.02952 0.02952 0 100 0 1 
natd4 Unmatched 0.08018 0.05096 11.8 
 
6.32 0 
 
Matched 0.08018 0.08018 0 100 0 1 
natd5 Unmatched 0.01322 0.01709 -3.2 
 
-1.42 0.155 
 
Matched 0.01322 0.01322 0 100 0 1 
firmscd1 Unmatched 0.23789 0.2181 4.7 
 
2.28 0.023 
 
Matched 0.23789 0.23789 0 100 0 1 
naced1 Unmatched 0.29207 0.20426 20.4 
 
10.36 0 
 
Matched 0.29207 0.29163 0.1 99.5 0.03 0.974 
naced2 Unmatched 0.26652 0.28077 -3.2 
 
-1.51 0.131 
 
Matched 0.26652 0.26652 0 100 0 1 
naced3 Unmatched 0.24097 0.14083 25.7 
 
13.69 0 
 
Matched 0.24097 0.24141 -0.1 99.6 -0.03 0.972 
 
 
 
 
Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
 
Sample  Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
Raw  0.017 
Matched 0.000 
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(c) 2007 
Variable  
Mean 
Treated       Control %bias 
%bias 
reduction 
T-Test 
t             p>|t| 
sexd2 Unmatched 0.65824 0.49083 34.4 
 
18.33 0 
 
Matched 0.65824 0.6579 0.1 99.8 0.03 0.978 
age Unmatched 33.861 38.473 -39.4 
 
-21.29 0 
 
Matched 33.861 33.826 0.3 99.2 0.12 0.907 
age2 Unmatched 1280.2 1620.8 -35.7 
 
-19.09 0 
 
Matched 1280.2 1276.5 0.4 98.9 0.15 0.878 
natd1 Unmatched 0.55641 0.84318 -65.9 
 
-43.09 0 
 
Matched 0.55641 0.55607 0.1 99.9 0.03 0.979 
natd2 Unmatched 0.03827 0.02903 5.1 
 
3.01 0.003 
 
Matched 0.03827 0.03794 0.2 96.4 0.07 0.946 
natd3 Unmatched 0.10782 0.02088 36 
 
33.07 0 
 
Matched 0.10782 0.10815 -0.1 99.6 -0.04 0.967 
natd4 Unmatched 0.24759 0.06818 50.8 
 
38.82 0 
 
Matched 0.24759 0.24792 -0.1 99.8 -0.03 0.976 
natd5 Unmatched 0.01797 0.01861 -0.5 
 
-0.26 0.794 
 
Matched 0.01797 0.01797 0 100 0 1 
firmscd1 Unmatched 0.27654 0.2101 15.5 
 
8.92 0 
 
Matched 0.27654 0.2772 -0.2 99 -0.06 0.954 
naced1 Unmatched 0.27088 0.19545 17.9 
 
10.4 0 
 
Matched 0.27088 0.27088 0 100 0 1 
naced2 Unmatched 0.39434 0.28587 23 
 
13.13 0 
 
Matched 0.39434 0.39368 0.1 99.4 0.05 0.958 
naced3 Unmatched 0.30349 0.13791 40.7 
 
26.25 0 
 
Matched 0.30349 0.30416 -0.2 99.6 -0.06 0.955 
         
 
Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
 
Sample  Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
Raw  0.089 
Matched 0.000 
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(d) 2008 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Treated   Control %bias 
%bias 
reduction 
T-Test 
t            p>|t| 
sexd2 Unmatched 0.66543 0.48672 36.8 
 
32.01 0 
 
Matched 0.66543 0.66543 0 100 0 1 
age Unmatched 33.886 38.487 -39.5 
 
-34.82 0 
 
Matched 33.886 33.887 0 100 -0.01 0.994 
age2 Unmatched 1279.8 1621.1 -36 
 
-31.31 0 
 
Matched 1279.8 1279.8 0 100 0 0.997 
natd1 Unmatched 0.61666 0.82568 -47.9 
 
-49.16 0 
 
Matched 0.61666 0.61678 0 99.9 -0.02 0.987 
natd2 Unmatched 0.03317 0.02981 1.9 
 
1.77 0.077 
 
Matched 0.03317 0.0328 0.2 89 0.13 0.895 
natd3 Unmatched 0.0562 0.02371 16.6 
 
19 0 
 
Matched 0.0562 0.05607 0.1 99.6 0.03 0.973 
natd4 Unmatched 0.22181 0.07698 41.5 
 
48.32 0 
 
Matched 0.22181 0.22193 0 99.9 -0.02 0.985 
natd5 Unmatched 0.02451 0.02086 2.5 
 
2.29 0.022 
 
Matched 0.02451 0.02451 0 100 0 1 
firmscd1 Unmatched 0.37492 0.21281 36.2 
 
35.38 0 
 
Matched 0.37492 0.37517 -0.1 99.8 -0.03 0.974 
naced1 Unmatched 0.36193 0.18308 41 
 
41.29 0 
 
Matched 0.36193 0.36193 0 100 0 1 
naced2 Unmatched 0.33457 0.29797 7.9 
 
7.16 0 
 
Matched 0.33457 0.33445 0 99.7 0.02 0.987 
naced3 Unmatched 0.28382 0.14374 34.7 
 
35.63 0 
 
Matched 0.28382 0.28395 0 99.9 -0.02 0.986 
 
 
Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
 
Sample  Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
Raw  0.099 
Matched 0.000 
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(e) 2009 
Variable  
Mean 
Treated   Control %bias 
%bias 
reduction 
T-Test 
t            p>|t| 
sexd2 Unmatched 0.67461 0.47494 41.2 
 
27.22 0 
 
Matched 0.67461 0.67461 0 100 0 1 
age Unmatched 38.404 38.949 -4.6 
 
-3.17 0.002 
 
Matched 38.404 38.391 0.1 97.5 0.06 0.956 
age2 Unmatched 1613.5 1653.8 -4.1 
 
-2.82 0.005 
 
Matched 1613.5 1612.3 0.1 96.9 0.06 0.952 
natd1 Unmatched 0.77899 0.8261 -11.9 
 
-8.45 0 
 
Matched 0.77899 0.77921 -0.1 99.5 -0.02 0.98 
natd2 Unmatched 0.0421 0.03113 5.8 
 
4.29 0 
 
Matched 0.0421 0.04231 -0.1 98 -0.05 0.959 
natd3 Unmatched 0.03759 0.02327 8.3 
 
6.45 0 
 
Matched 0.03759 0.03716 0.3 97 0.11 0.913 
natd4 Unmatched 0.093 0.07318 7.2 
 
5.18 0 
 
Matched 0.093 0.09321 -0.1 98.9 -0.04 0.972 
natd5 Unmatched 0.0204 0.02284 -1.7 
 
-1.11 0.267 
 
Matched 0.0204 0.02062 -0.1 91.2 -0.07 0.942 
firmscd1 Unmatched 0.29961 0.22811 16.3 
 
11.59 0 
 
Matched 0.29961 0.29983 0 99.7 -0.02 0.982 
naced1 Unmatched 0.37135 0.1674 47.2 
 
37.12 0 
 
Matched 0.37135 0.37178 -0.1 99.8 -0.04 0.966 
naced2 Unmatched 0.31014 0.28691 5.1 
 
3.49 0 
 
Matched 0.31014 0.31014 0 100 0 1 
naced3 Unmatched 0.17182 0.14178 8.3 
 
5.86 0 
 
Matched 0.17182 0.17139 0.1 98.6 0.05 0.956 
         
 
Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
 
Sample  Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
Raw  0.038 
Matched 0.000 
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(f) 2010 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Treated   Control %bias 
%bias 
reduction 
T-Test 
t            p>|t| 
Variable Matched Treated Control %bias |bias| t p>|t| 
sexd2 Unmatched 0.62903 0.47085 32.2 
 
14.95 0 
 
Matched 0.62903 0.62858 0.1 99.7 0.03 0.975 
age Unmatched 37.703 39.446 -15.2 
 
-7.14 0 
 
Matched 37.703 37.682 0.2 98.8 0.06 0.952 
age2 Unmatched 1553.4 1688.9 -14.1 
 
-6.61 0 
 
Matched 1553.4 1551.3 0.2 98.5 0.07 0.943 
natd1 Unmatched 0.73342 0.82782 -23 
 
-11.79 0 
 
Matched 0.73342 0.73342 0 100 0 1 
natd2 Unmatched 0.02778 0.03093 -1.9 
 
-0.86 0.39 
 
Matched 0.02778 0.02733 0.3 85.8 0.09 0.927 
natd3 Unmatched 0.04077 0.02298 10.1 
 
5.6 0 
 
Matched 0.04077 0.04122 -0.3 97.5 -0.08 0.94 
natd4 Unmatched 0.1241 0.07312 17.2 
 
9.23 0 
 
Matched 0.1241 0.1241 0 100 0 1 
natd5 Unmatched 0.03271 0.02206 6.5 
 
3.42 0.001 
 
Matched 0.03271 0.03315 -0.3 95.8 -0.08 0.933 
firmscd1 Unmatched 0.32751 0.23202 21.4 
 
10.67 0 
 
Matched 0.32751 0.32796 -0.1 99.5 -0.03 0.975 
naced1 Unmatched 0.26971 0.15497 28.3 
 
14.95 0 
 
Matched 0.26971 0.27016 -0.1 99.6 -0.03 0.973 
naced2 Unmatched 0.48522 0.28549 41.9 
 
20.86 0 
 
Matched 0.48522 0.48477 0.1 99.8 0.03 0.976 
naced3 Unmatched 0.194 0.14808 12.2 
 
6.1 0 
 
Matched 0.194 0.194 0 100 0 1 
         
Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
 
Sample  Pseudo-𝑹𝟐 
Raw  0.095 
Matched 0.000 
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Appendix 7 : Propensity score matching results  
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Appendix Table 7.1: Propensity score matching results; Closure sample 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
VARIABLES d_closure d_closure d_closure d_closure d_closure d_closure 
sexd2 0.001 -0.021*** 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.002* -0.010*** -0.017*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
age2 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
natd1 -0.109*** -0.098*** -0.192*** -0.133*** -0.197*** -0.219*** 
 
(0.030) (0.024) (0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
natd2 -0.022 -0.018 -0.065*** -0.053*** -0.166*** -0.166*** 
 
(0.036) (0.030) (0.024) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) 
natd3 -0.100** -0.009 -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.158*** -0.122*** 
 
(0.045) (0.034) (0.028) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) 
natd4 0.018 0.126*** 0.000 -0.081*** -0.061*** -0.115*** 
 
(0.034) (0.026) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
natd5 0.093** 0.058* -0.019 -0.135*** -0.115*** -0.014 
 
(0.040) (0.035) (0.029) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) 
firmscd1 1.005*** 0.770*** 0.956*** 0.808*** 0.742*** 0.881*** 
 
(0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
firmscd2 0.765*** 0.446*** 0.634*** 0.444*** 0.405*** 0.507*** 
 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
firmscd3 0.627*** 0.382*** 0.484*** 0.340*** 0.285*** 0.364*** 
 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
firmscd4 0.447*** 0.192*** 0.354*** 0.383*** 0.255*** 0.230*** 
 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
naced1 0.662*** 0.617*** 0.755*** -0.074*** 0.323*** 0.516*** 
 
(0.023) (0.020) (0.017) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) 
naced2 0.580*** 0.661*** 0.553*** -0.241*** 0.282*** 0.316*** 
 
(0.022) (0.019) (0.016) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
naced3 0.516*** 0.906*** 0.541*** -0.161*** 0.265*** 0.336*** 
 
(0.024) (0.019) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
_cons -3.231*** -2.939*** -2.804*** -1.918*** -2.166*** -2.151*** 
 
(0.051) (0.044) (0.038) (0.026) (0.029) (0.031) 
      
Observations 1,285,192 1,328,344 1,416,153 1,454,277 1,378,761 1,365,468 
LR chi
2 
 13,137.46 14,143 24,758.34 19,882.29 19,460.79 27,641.12 
Prob>chi
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1102 0.0904 0.1154 0.0493 0.0633 0.0959 
       
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 7.2: Propensity score matching results; Mass Layoff sample 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
VARIABLES d_mass d_mass d_mass d_mass d_mass d_mass 
       
sexd2 0.003 -0.115*** 0.147*** 0.149*** 0.171*** 0.0888*** 
 (0.015) (0.0144) (0.0138) (0.00943) (0.0112) (0.0149) 
Age -0.040*** -0.0145*** -0.0411*** -0.0518*** -0.0114*** -0.00789* 
 (0.004) (0.00368) (0.00338) (0.00234) (0.00294) (0.00405) 
age2 0.000*** 0.000196*** 0.000479*** 0.000572*** 0.000151*** 0.000110** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
natd1 -0.199*** -0.0129 -0.209*** -0.310*** -0.0476 -0.161*** 
 (0.046) (0.0510) (0.0375) (0.0221) (0.0320) (0.0374) 
natd2 -0.147** 0.0838 -0.000551 -0.178*** 0.0639 -0.190*** 
 (0.062) (0.0623) (0.0492) (0.0322) (0.0408) (0.0555) 
natd3 -0.061 0.0891 0.391*** 0.0285 0.100** -0.0318 
 (0.064) (0.0652) (0.0430) (0.0291) (0.0419) (0.0514) 
natd4 -0.001 0.0967* 0.218*** 0.00722 -0.0511 -0.0907** 
 (0.054) (0.0564) (0.0392) (0.0237) (0.0359) (0.0418) 
natd5 -0.157** -0.0252 -0.113* -0.138*** -0.00634 0.0533 
 (0.072) (0.0765) (0.0593) (0.0355) (0.0473) (0.0542) 
firmscd1 -0.079*** -0.0161 -0.00563 0.171*** 0.0203* 0.0121 
 (0.018) (0.0168) (0.0146) (0.00936) (0.0119) (0.0154) 
naced1 0.457*** 0.356*** 0.719*** 1.059*** 0.555*** 0.767*** 
 (0.023) (0.0208) (0.0317) (0.0244) (0.0161) (0.0301) 
naced2 0.373*** 0.193*** 0.708*** 0.788*** 0.314*** 0.763*** 
 (0.022) (0.0207) (0.0307) (0.0244) (0.0162) (0.0285) 
naced3 0.117*** 0.391*** 0.880*** 1.071*** 0.369*** 0.686*** 
 (0.030) (0.0213) (0.0314) (0.0246) (0.0179) (0.0307) 
Constant -2.095*** -2.691*** -2.520*** -2.039*** -2.738*** -3.187*** 
 (0.086) (0.0903) (0.0800) (0.0547) (0.0682) (0.0927) 
       
Observations 809,695 826,122 879,004 920,533 915,577 887,179 
LR chi
2 
 897.13 536.53 3,561.13 9,147.01 2,205.14 1,669.09 
Prob>chi
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0323 0.0171 0.0887 0.0988 0.0377 0.0535 
       
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 8 : Regression results for closure and mass-layoff 
samples (all time periods) 
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Appendix Table 8.1: Regression output for Figure 4.1  
 Closure 
Displaced 
Closure   
Non-displaced 
Mass Layoff  
Displaced 
Mass Layoff 
Non-
displaced 
VARIABLES emp emp emp emp 
     
2.rel_time_group 0.727*** 0.759*** 0.658*** 0.717*** 
 (0.00170) (0.00142) (0.00503) (0.00445) 
3.rel_time_group 0.782*** 0.808*** 0.622*** 0.703*** 
 (0.00130) (0.00108) (0.00342) (0.00302) 
4.rel_time_group 0.829*** 0.861*** 0.703*** 0.785*** 
 (0.00119) (0.000994) (0.00312) (0.00275) 
5.rel_time_group 0.891*** 0.930*** 0.878*** 0.919*** 
 (0.00113) (0.000943) (0.00294) (0.00259) 
6.rel_time_group 1*** 1*** 1*** 1*** 
 (0.00109) (0.000911) (0.00280) (0.00248) 
7.rel_time_group 0.542*** 0.933*** 0.272*** 0.927*** 
 (0.00109) (0.000911) (0.00280) (0.00248) 
8.rel_time_group 0.572*** 0.829*** 0.285*** 0.807*** 
 (0.00122) (0.00102) (0.00296) (0.00261) 
9.rel_time_group 0.565*** 0.756*** 0.298*** 0.722*** 
 (0.00142) (0.00119) (0.00337) (0.00298) 
10.rel_time_group 0.508*** 0.690*** 0.341*** 0.672*** 
 (0.00201) (0.00168) (0.00491) (0.00433) 
11.rel_time_group 0.522*** 0.672*** 0.382*** 0.656*** 
 (0.00273) (0.00228) (0.00641) (0.00566) 
12.rel_time_group 0.511*** 0.657*** 0.409*** 0.614*** 
 (0.00421) (0.00352) (0.00939) (0.00830) 
     
Observations 1,067,710 1,067,710 155,547 155,547 
Fstat  - - - - 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.752 0.853 0.695 0.835 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 8.2: Regression output for Figure 4.2 
 Closure 
Displaced 
Males 
Closure 
Displaced 
Females 
Mass-Layoff 
Displaced 
Males 
Mass-Layoff 
Displaced 
Females 
VARIABLES emp emp emp emp 
     
2.rel_time_group 0.738*** 0.712*** 0.678*** 0.619*** 
 (0.00223) (0.00262) (0.00607) (0.00888) 
3.rel_time_group 0.783*** 0.780*** 0.645*** 0.578*** 
 (0.00169) (0.00200) (0.00411) (0.00605) 
4.rel_time_group 0.826*** 0.835*** 0.714*** 0.680*** 
 (0.00153) (0.00187) (0.00375) (0.00552) 
5.rel_time_group 0.888*** 0.895*** 0.902*** 0.836*** 
 (0.00145) (0.00177) (0.00360) (0.00504) 
6.rel_time_group 1*** 1*** 1*** 1*** 
 (0.00140) (0.00172) (0.00345) (0.00476) 
7.rel_time_group 0.509*** 0.595*** 0.262*** 0.290*** 
 (0.00140) (0.00172) (0.00345) (0.00476) 
8.rel_time_group 0.534*** 0.632*** 0.275*** 0.300*** 
 (0.00156) (0.00193) (0.00364) (0.00502) 
9.rel_time_group 0.517*** 0.643*** 0.270*** 0.342*** 
 (0.00180) (0.00228) (0.00420) (0.00563) 
10.rel_time_group 0.464*** 0.589*** 0.303*** 0.392*** 
 (0.00250) (0.00335) (0.00637) (0.00769) 
11.rel_time_group 0.477*** 0.593*** 0.347*** 0.419*** 
 (0.00349) (0.00434) (0.00883) (0.00939) 
12.rel_time_group 0.484*** 0.559*** 0.381*** 0.444*** 
 (0.00529) (0.00690) (0.0124) (0.0145) 
     
Observations 650,783 416,927 98,339 57,208 
Fstat  - - - - 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.744 0.768 0.710 0.672 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 8.3: Regression output for Figure 4.3  
 Closure  
26-35 years 
Closure  
56-64 years 
Mass layoff 
26-35 years 
Mass layoff 
56-64 years 
VARIABLES emp emp emp emp 
     
2.rel_time_group 0.737*** 0.807*** 0.602*** 0.861*** 
 (0.00299) (0.00557) (0.00843) (0.0141) 
3.rel_time_group 0.787*** 0.851*** 0.589*** 0.841*** 
 (0.00227) (0.00423) (0.00555) (0.0106) 
4.rel_time_group 0.834*** 0.876*** 0.690*** 0.871*** 
 (0.00208) (0.00395) (0.00504) (0.00990) 
5.rel_time_group 0.897*** 0.904*** 0.888*** 0.903*** 
 (0.00197) (0.00376) (0.00482) (0.00918) 
6.rel_time_group 1*** 1*** 1*** 1*** 
 (0.00191) (0.00363) (0.00462) (0.00877) 
7.rel_time_group 0.580*** 0.452*** 0.272*** 0.181*** 
 (0.00191) (0.00363) (0.00462) (0.00877) 
8.rel_time_group 0.603*** 0.465*** 0.287*** 0.153*** 
 (0.00213) (0.00407) (0.00486) (0.00932) 
9.rel_time_group 0.597*** 0.436*** 0.291*** 0.189*** 
 (0.00248) (0.00479) (0.00553) (0.0112) 
10.rel_time_group 0.548*** 0.334*** 0.335*** 0.220*** 
 (0.00352) (0.00710) (0.00835) (0.0155) 
11.rel_time_group 0.577*** 0.299*** 0.394*** 0.197*** 
 (0.00484) (0.00928) (0.0116) (0.0189) 
12.rel_time_group 0.565*** 0.273*** 0.426*** 0.170*** 
 (0.00757) (0.0142) (0.0165) (0.0296) 
     
Observations 341,327 89,761 56,931 11,221 
Fstat  99,724.92 25,913.58 11,730.68 3,795.97 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.763 0.761 0.694 0.788 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 8.4: Regression output for Figure 4.4 
 Closure  Mass 
Layoff 
VARIABLES pay2 VARIABLES pay2 
    
1.d_ closure 81.1 1.d_mass -109.0 
   (1,034) 
1.d_ closure #2.rel_time_group -1,487*** 1.d_mass#2.rel_time_group -2,215*** 
 (180.5)  (809.1) 
1.d_ closure #3.rel_time_group -1,228*** 1.d_mass#3.rel_time_group -3,150*** 
 (206.9)  (900.1) 
1.d_ closure #4.rel_time_group 1,816*** 1.d_mass#4.rel_time_group -3,720*** 
 (216.8)  (928.9) 
1.d_ closure #5.rel_time_group -2,939*** 1.d_mass#5.rel_time_group -4,734*** 
 (224.4)  (948.4) 
1.d_ closure #6.rel_time_group -3,914*** 1.d_mass#6.rel_time_group -6,123*** 
 (227.2)  (961.1) 
1.d_ closure #7.rel_time_group -13,689*** 1.d_mass#7.rel_time_group -27,124*** 
 (234.1)  (971.4) 
1.d_ closure #8.rel_time_group -9,339*** 1.d_mass#8.rel_time_group -22,964*** 
 (251.0)  (1,002) 
1.d_ closure #9.rel_time_group -6,894*** 1.d_mass#9.rel_time_group -18,375*** 
 (258.9)  (1,014) 
1.d_ closure #10.rel_time_group -6,828*** 1.d_mass#10.rel_time_group -15,544*** 
 (283.3)  (1,050) 
1.d_ closure #11.rel_time_group -5,873*** 1.d_mass#11.rel_time_group -14,221*** 
 (322.3)  (1,096) 
1.d_ closure #12.rel_time_group -6,084*** 1.d_mass#12.rel_time_group -10,382*** 
 (394.1)  (1,203) 
Constant 29,683*** Constant 35,389*** 
 (171.6)  (729.7) 
    
Observations 2,001,473 Observations 284,346 
Fstat  4,039.67 Fstat  1,147.37 
Prob > F 0.000 Prob > F 0.000 
R-squared 0.0562 R-squared 0.165 
    Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 8.5: Regression output for earnings losses with cohort dummies  
 Closure  Mass 
Layoff 
VARIABLES pay2 VARIABLES pay2 
    
1.d_ closure 81.18 1.d_mass -109.0 
 (248.5)  (1,034) 
1.d_ closure #2.rel_time_group -1,488*** 1.d_mass#2.rel_time_group -2,197*** 
 (180.5)  (809.6) 
1.d_ closure #3.rel_time_group -1,283*** 1.d_mass#3.rel_time_group -3,241*** 
 (206.9)  (900.1) 
1.d_ closure #4.rel_time_group -1,834*** 1.d_mass#4.rel_time_group -3,762*** 
 (216.8)  (928.6) 
1.d_ closure #5.rel_time_group -2,937*** 1.d_mass#5.rel_time_group -4,677*** 
 (224.3)  (948.2) 
1.d_ closure #6.rel_time_group -3,914*** 1.d_mass#6.rel_time_group -6,123*** 
 (227.2)  (960.8) 
1.d_ closure #7.rel_time_group -13,690*** 1.d_mass#7.rel_time_group -27,124*** 
 (234.1)  (971.2) 
1.d_ closure #8.rel_time_group -9,339*** 1.d_mass#8.rel_time_group -22,964*** 
 (250.9)  (1,002) 
1.d_ closure #9.rel_time_group -6,894*** 1.d_mass#9.rel_time_group -18,375*** 
 (258.8)  (1,014) 
1.d_ closure #10.rel_time_group -6,829*** 1.d_mass#10.rel_time_group -15,544*** 
 (283.1)  (1,049) 
1.d_ closure #11.rel_time_group -5,873*** 1.d_mass#11.rel_time_group -14,221*** 
 (322.4)  (1,096) 
1.d_ closure #12.rel_time_group -6,085*** 1.d_mass#12.rel_time_group -10,382*** 
 (394.1)  (1,203) 
Constant 32,103*** Constant 35,968*** 
 (236.9)  (739.5) 
    
Observations 2,001,473 Observations 284,346 
Fstat  3458.20 Fstat  1201.27 
Prob > F 0.000 Prob > F 0.000 
R-squared 0.059 R-squared 0.172 
    Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Figure 8.1: Earnings losses for closure and mass-layoff samples (with 
cohort dummies included) 
 Closure 
 
 Mass-layoff  
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Appendix Table 8.6: Regression output for Figure 4.5 
 Closure sample – Males & Females  
 Closure  
Males  
Closure  
Females 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 
   
1.d_closure -75.74 326.1 
 (354.8) (270.3) 
1.d_closure#2.rel_time_group -1,665*** -1,235*** 
 (259.9) (201.1) 
1.d_closure#3.rel_time_group -1,451*** -1,041*** 
 (296.0) (233.2) 
1.d_closure#4.rel_time_group -2,082*** -1,357*** 
 (310.6) (242.6) 
1.d_closure#5.rel_time_group -3,363*** -2,284*** 
 (321.8) (248.2) 
1.d_closure#6.rel_time_group -4,669*** -2,733*** 
 (325.7) (250.5) 
1.d_closure#7.rel_time_group -16,230*** -9,723*** 
 (336.2) (257.1) 
1.d_closure#8.rel_time_group -10,896*** -6,857*** 
 (358.9) (282.5) 
1.d_closure#9.rel_time_group -8,015*** -5,019*** 
 (369.3) (296.1) 
1.d_closure#10.rel_time_group -7,670*** -5,205*** 
 (399.4) (336.4) 
1.d_closure#11.rel_time_group -6,489*** -4,874*** 
 (460.4) (378.4) 
1.d_closure#12.rel_time_group -7,044*** -4,349*** 
 (554.6) (472.9) 
Constant 35,242*** 21,174*** 
 (246.1) (181.3) 
   
Observations 1,222,873 778,600 
Fstat  2,965.24 1,338.23 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.073 0.037 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Mass Layoff sample – Males & Females  
 Mass layoff 
Male 
Mass layoff 
Female 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 
   
1.d_mass -133.9 -674.3 
 (1,359) (1,259) 
1.d_mass#2.rel_time_group -2,303** -1,952* 
 (1,062) (1,019) 
1.d_mass#3.rel_time_group -3,032** -2,976*** 
 (1,185) (1,110) 
1.d_mass#4.rel_time_group -3,595*** -3,434*** 
 (1,222) (1,152) 
1.d_mass#5.rel_time_group -4,492*** -4,988*** 
 (1,244) (1,183) 
1.d_mass#6.rel_time_group -6,499*** -4,870*** 
 (1,263) (1,188) 
1.d_mass#7.rel_time_group -30,620*** -20,508*** 
 (1,275) (1,210) 
1.d_mass#8.rel_time_group -25,796*** -17,480*** 
 (1,317) (1,249) 
1.d_mass#9.rel_time_group -21,191*** -13,180*** 
 (1,333) (1,265) 
1.d_mass#10.rel_time_group -18,401*** -11,177*** 
 (1,391) (1,322) 
1.d_mass#11.rel_time_group -17,691*** -10,076*** 
 (1,483) (1,375) 
1.d_mass#12.rel_time_group -13,438*** -5,993*** 
 (1,635) (1,524) 
Constant 40,958*** 24,976*** 
 (972.8) (859.5) 
   
Observations 180,164 104,182 
Fstat  1,007.86 535.20 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.182 0.148 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 8.7: Regression output for Figure 4.6 
  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 16-25 
years  
26-35 
years 
36-45 
years 
46-55 
years 
56-65 
years 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 pay2 pay2 pay2 
      
1.d_closure -3,943*** -3,115*** 314.4 -1,038 1,194 
 (260.5) (299.0) (537.0) (728.2) (954.2) 
1.d_closure#2.rel_time_group 652.9*** -536.6** -2,243*** -1,268** -1,739** 
 (209.9) (218.8) (381.7) (519.8) (708.3) 
1.d_closure#3.rel_time_group 1,092*** 446.5* -1,607*** -775.3 -2,509*** 
 (234.4) (248.5) (438.1) (593.0) (818.9) 
1.d_closure#4.rel_time_group 1,039*** 105.5 -1,938*** -1,211* -3,265*** 
 (245.4) (264.2) (459.6) (623.0) (838.3) 
1.d_closure#5.rel_time_group 921.8*** -772.2*** -3,365*** -2,434*** -4,278*** 
 (252.1) (273.0) (475.3) (649.0) (870.2) 
1.d_closure#6.rel_time_group 859.4*** -1,563*** -4,649*** -3,472*** -5,311*** 
 (252.6) (276.2) (481.4) (653.3) (892.5) 
1.d_closure#7.rel_time_group -5,386*** -11,050*** -16,194*** -14,648*** -15,201*** 
 (261.3) (288.6) (496.1) (677.1) (910.8) 
1.d_closure#8.rel_time_group -1,696*** -6,151*** -11,581*** -10,303*** -11,077*** 
 (271.8) (317.7) (540.8) (727.8) (970.8) 
1.d_closure#9.rel_time_group 10.54 -3,617*** -8,541*** -7,761*** -8,560*** 
 (282.6) (336.0) (563.6) (751.3) (985.6) 
1.d_closure#10.rel_time_group 481.0 -3,375*** -8,779*** -8,555*** -8,861*** 
 (308.5) (397.5) (636.4) (832.1) (1,060) 
1.d_closure#11.rel_time_group 995.1*** -2,319*** -7,530*** -7,390*** -7,617*** 
 (367.1) (490.5) (748.0) (935.9) (1,110) 
1.d_closure#12.rel_time_group 1,048** -2,862*** -8,085*** -7,681*** -6,041*** 
 (492.7) (661.9) (933.0) (1,138) (1,178) 
Constant 13,290*** 28,163*** 36,485*** 36,723*** 31,797*** 
 (180.9) (215.9) (380.5) (546.7) (681.1) 
      
Observations 350,481 644,697 484,019 319,733 162,270 
Fstat  1,200.58 1,583.18 941.13 605.08 435.01 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.072 0.060 0.057 0.064 0.098 
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Appendix Table 8.8: Regression output for Figure 4.7 
 
 16-25 
years  
26-35 
years 
36-45 
years 
46-55 
years 
56-65 
years 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 pay2 pay2 pay2 
      
1.d_mass -7,855*** -6,758*** -2,894 367.3 -418.6 
 (1,077) (1,331) (1,986) (3,022) (4,128) 
1.d_mass#2.rel_time_group 1,926** 349.3 -1,907 -3,946 389.3 
 (894.6) (1,041) (1,469) (2,429) (3,215) 
1.d_mass#3.rel_time_group 2,817*** 1,077 -2,140 -4,968* -1,358 
 (981.6) (1,171) (1,658) (2,612) (3,544) 
1.d_mass#4.rel_time_group 3,533*** 1,215 -3,000* -6,148** -1,971 
 (1,017) (1,198) (1,749) (2,648) (3,642) 
1.d_mass#5.rel_time_group 3,943*** 833.5 -4,046** -6,660** -3,772 
 (1,032) (1,212) (1,776) (2,705) (3,777) 
1.d_mass#6.rel_time_group 2,424** -2,003 -6,010*** -4,555 -1,015 
 (1,033) (1,220) (1,788) (2,777) (3,946) 
1.d_mass#7.rel_time_group -8,619*** -20,895*** -33,564*** -33,818*** -28,692*** 
 (1,044) (1,241) (1,820) (2,770) (3,979) 
1.d_mass#8.rel_time_group -5,179*** -16,436*** -29,121*** -30,819*** -22,137*** 
 (1,062) (1,275) (1,912) (2,918) (4,088) 
1.d_mass#9.rel_time_group -2,660** -12,040*** -24,832*** -24,760*** -15,253*** 
 (1,068) (1,294) (1,955) (2,980) (4,150) 
1.d_mass#10.rel_time_group -1,025 -9,116*** -21,449*** -20,482*** -8,388* 
 (1,120) (1,353) (2,122) (3,082) (4,325) 
1.d_mass#11.rel_time_group 752.3 -7,833*** -20,867*** -17,829*** -4,631 
 (1,201) (1,495) (2,248) (3,157) (4,328) 
1.d_mass#12.rel_time_group 2,518* -5,980*** -14,386*** -11,477*** -2,706 
 (1,316) (1,744) (2,703) (3,446) (4,491) 
Constant 15,457*** 33,357*** 43,861*** 45,632*** 42,083*** 
 (821.7) (996.2) (1,429) (2,340) (3,500) 
      
Observations 61,659 102,807 57,919 38,364 20,325 
Fstat  494.74 730.28 305.45 192.96 163.64 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.172 0.201 0.188 0.187 0.252 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 8.9: Regression output for Figure 4.8 
 Closure  
 Irish  
26-45 years 
Non-Irish  
26-45 years 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 
   
1.d_closure -1,509*** -1,178** 
 (334.1) (549.3) 
1.d_closure#2.rel_time_group -1,285*** -1,302*** 
 (233.3) (462.8) 
1.d_closure#3.rel_time_group -508.5* -388.3 
 (270.0) (503.4) 
1.d_closure#4.rel_time_group -1,040*** -332.7 
 (286.0) (518.2) 
1.d_closure#5.rel_time_group -2,283*** -1,228** 
 (297.2) (524.6) 
1.d_closure#6.rel_time_group -3,341*** -2,187*** 
 (302.1) (528.3) 
1.d_closure#7.rel_time_group -14,197*** -11,238*** 
 (314.5) (538.3) 
1.d_closure#8.rel_time_group -9,395*** -6,545*** 
 (345.8) (571.1) 
1.d_closure#9.rel_time_group -6,478*** -4,283*** 
 (363.0) (588.5) 
1.d_closure#10.rel_time_group -6,568*** -3,979*** 
 (424.1) (634.4) 
1.d_closure#11.rel_time_group -5,360*** -2,724*** 
 (500.4) (763.3) 
1.d_closure#12.rel_time_group -5,961*** -2,494** 
 (624.3) (1,138) 
Constant 33,677*** 22,684*** 
 (233.4) (386.9) 
   
Observations 852,148 276,568 
Fstat  1569.00 944.58 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.052 0.081 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Mass Layoff 
 Irish  
26-45 years 
Non-Irish  
26-45 years 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 
   
1.d_mass -5,420*** 1,613 
 (1,350) (2,349) 
1.d_mass#2.rel_time_group -388.9 -5,191** 
 (1,002) (2,017) 
1.d_mass#3.rel_time_group -638.0 -4,535** 
 (1,136) (2,179) 
1.d_mass#4.rel_time_group -1,377 -4,477* 
 (1,174) (2,286) 
1.d_mass#5.rel_time_group -1,943 -5,529** 
 (1,193) (2,304) 
1.d_mass#6.rel_time_group -4,208*** -8,677*** 
 (1,206) (2,297) 
1.d_mass#7.rel_time_group -29,303*** -25,240*** 
 (1,230) (2,333) 
1.d_mass#8.rel_time_group -25,044*** -20,439*** 
 (1,289) (2,365) 
1.d_mass#9.rel_time_group -20,722*** -16,645*** 
 (1,324) (2,376) 
1.d_mass#10.rel_time_group -17,021*** -13,807*** 
 (1,436) (2,449) 
1.d_mass#11.rel_time_group -14,912*** -12,886*** 
 (1,511) (2,739) 
1.d_mass#12.rel_time_group -10,419*** -11,102*** 
 (1,761) (3,094) 
Constant 41,324*** 23,647*** 
 (957.3) (1,490) 
   
Observations 105,755 54,971 
Fstat  563.01 457.68 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.198 0.190 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 8.10: Regression output for Figure 4.9 
 Closure  
  
VARIABLES pay2 
  
1.displ_switch#1b.rel_time_group 29,033*** 
 (424.8) 
1.displ_switch#2.rel_time_group -1,372*** 
 (295.1) 
1.displ_switch#3.rel_time_group -27.53 
 (211.2) 
1.displ_switch#4.rel_time_group -712.5*** 
 (185.7) 
1.displ_switch#5.rel_time_group -1,712*** 
 (165.9) 
1.displ_switch#6.rel_time_group -2,691*** 
 (153.3) 
1.displ_switch#7.rel_time_group -10,590*** 
 (153.4) 
1.displ_switch#8.rel_time_group -4,591*** 
 (164.7) 
1.displ_switch#9.rel_time_group -2,016*** 
 (183.0) 
1.displ_switch#10.rel_time_group -2,256*** 
 (241.9) 
1.displ_switch#11.rel_time_group -1,373*** 
 (324.7) 
1.displ_switch#12.rel_time_group -339.6 
 (465.5) 
1.displ_noswitch#1b.rel_time_group 29,184*** 
 (279.0) 
1.displ_noswitch#2.rel_time_group 701.5*** 
 (228.0) 
1.displ_noswitch#3.rel_time_group 322.4* 
 (169.5) 
1.displ_noswitch#4.rel_time_group 101.0 
 (153.1) 
1.displ_noswitch#5.rel_time_group -655.3*** 
 (139.1) 
1.displ_noswitch#6.rel_time_group -933.2*** 
 (130.9) 
1.displ_noswitch#7.rel_time_group -4,960*** 
 (126.4) 
1.displ_noswitch#8.rel_time_group -1,955*** 
 (136.9) 
1.displ_noswitch#9.rel_time_group -1,131*** 
 (154.7) 
1.displ_noswitch#10.rel_time_group -2,498*** 
 (222.0) 
1.displ_noswitch#11.rel_time_group -3,209*** 
 (296.2) 
1.displ_noswitch#12.rel_time_group -5,366*** 
 (398.8) 
  
Observations 2,001,473 
Fstat  5,793.06 
Prob > F 0.000 
R-squared 0.541 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Mass layoff 
  
VARIABLES pay2 
  
1.displ_switch#1b.rel_time_group 34,588*** 
 (1,643) 
1.displ_switch#2.rel_time_group -3,844*** 
 (919.1) 
1.displ_switch#3.rel_time_group -5,310*** 
 (664.6) 
1.displ_switch#4.rel_time_group -5,658*** 
 (571.7) 
1.displ_switch#5.rel_time_group -5,965*** 
 (488.1) 
1.displ_switch#6.rel_time_group -8,115*** 
 (425.6) 
1.displ_switch#7.rel_time_group -23,446*** 
 (373.3) 
1.displ_switch#8.rel_time_group -16,110*** 
 (399.5) 
1.displ_switch#9.rel_time_group -11,616*** 
 (444.9) 
1.displ_switch#10.rel_time_group -8,395*** 
 (626.4) 
1.displ_switch#11.rel_time_group -6,779*** 
 (772.4) 
1.displ_switch#12.rel_time_group -1,847* 
 (967.2) 
1.displ_noswitch#1b.rel_time_group 29,609*** 
 (1,514) 
1.displ_noswitch#2.rel_time_group -3,196*** 
 (964.4) 
1.displ_noswitch#3.rel_time_group -893.8 
 (633.1) 
1.displ_noswitch#4.rel_time_group -1,580*** 
 (529.6) 
1.displ_noswitch#5.rel_time_group -2,291*** 
 (448.9) 
1.displ_noswitch#6.rel_time_group -2,821*** 
 (407.4) 
1.displ_noswitch#7.rel_time_group -11,524*** 
 (357.0) 
1.displ_noswitch#8.rel_time_group -8,920*** 
 (376.5) 
1.displ_noswitch#9.rel_time_group -5,942*** 
 (394.3) 
1.displ_noswitch#10.rel_time_group -6,494*** 
 (563.5) 
1.displ_noswitch#11.rel_time_group -9,278*** 
 (667.8) 
1.displ_noswitch#12.rel_time_group -13,055*** 
 (831.0) 
  
Observations 284,346 
Fstat  1,013.17 
Prob > F 0.000 
R-squared 0.582 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 8.11: Regression output for Figure 4.11 
 Closure  
  
VARIABLES pay2 
  
1.displ_switch#1b.rel_time_group 37,654*** 
 (1,162) 
1.displ_switch#2.rel_time_group 1,586** 
 (808.9) 
1.displ_switch#3.rel_time_group -603.1 
 (567.0) 
1.displ_switch#4.rel_time_group -1,487*** 
 (432.2) 
1.displ_switch#5.rel_time_group -2,288*** 
 (361.9) 
1.displ_switch#6.rel_time_group -2,502*** 
 (308.0) 
1.displ_switch#7.rel_time_group -12,178*** 
 (299.5) 
1.displ_switch#8.rel_time_group -2,719*** 
 (317.7) 
1.displ_switch#9.rel_time_group 791.5** 
 (320.3) 
1.displ_switch#10.rel_time_group 3,885*** 
 (419.2) 
1.displ_switch#11.rel_time_group 6,680*** 
 (663.2) 
1.displ_switch#12.rel_time_group 6,828*** 
 (888.7) 
1.displ_noswitch#1b.rel_time_group 33,815*** 
 (1,182) 
1.displ_noswitch#2.rel_time_group 3,046*** 
 (774.4) 
1.displ_noswitch#3.rel_time_group 1,748*** 
 (516.6) 
1.displ_noswitch#4.rel_time_group 925.5** 
 (384.8) 
1.displ_noswitch#5.rel_time_group -741.7** 
 (311.0) 
1.displ_noswitch#6.rel_time_group -1,257*** 
 (260.2) 
1.displ_noswitch#7.rel_time_group -8,317*** 
 (229.5) 
1.displ_noswitch#8.rel_time_group -3,146*** 
 (242.4) 
1.displ_noswitch#9.rel_time_group -2,597*** 
 (245.8) 
1.displ_noswitch#10.rel_time_group -3,276*** 
 (292.7) 
1.displ_noswitch#11.rel_time_group -3,962*** 
 (406.8) 
1.displ_noswitch#12.rel_time_group -4,536*** 
 (603.0) 
Observations 372,337 
Fstat  1,548.62 
Prob > F 0.000 
R-squared 0.569 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Mass Layoff 
  
VARIABLES pay2 
  
1.displ_switch#1b.rel_time_group 36,746*** 
 (5,255) 
1.displ_switch#2.rel_time_group -7,796* 
 (4,093) 
1.displ_switch#3.rel_time_group -6,017** 
 (2,578) 
1.displ_switch#4.rel_time_group -4,091* 
 (2,220) 
1.displ_switch#5.rel_time_group -4,040** 
 (2,001) 
1.displ_switch#6.rel_time_group -8,765*** 
 (1,638) 
1.displ_switch#7.rel_time_group -32,336*** 
 (1,549) 
1.displ_switch#8.rel_time_group -17,456*** 
 (1,569) 
1.displ_switch#9.rel_time_group -10,528*** 
 (1,678) 
1.displ_switch#10.rel_time_group -7,732*** 
 (2,584) 
1.displ_switch#11.rel_time_group 3,416 
 (3,979) 
1.displ_switch#12.rel_time_group -5,828 
 (5,442) 
1.displ_noswitch#1b.rel_time_group 42,946*** 
 (6,954) 
1.displ_noswitch#2.rel_time_group 2,480 
 (3,777) 
1.displ_noswitch#3.rel_time_group 1,370 
 (3,014) 
1.displ_noswitch#4.rel_time_group 6,097*** 
 (2,332) 
1.displ_noswitch#5.rel_time_group -398.4 
 (2,043) 
1.displ_noswitch#6.rel_time_group 1,084 
 (1,686) 
1.displ_noswitch#7.rel_time_group -12,060*** 
 (1,450) 
1.displ_noswitch#8.rel_time_group -5,356*** 
 (1,445) 
1.displ_noswitch#9.rel_time_group -4,096** 
 (1,601) 
1.displ_noswitch#10.rel_time_group -7,456*** 
 (2,167) 
1.displ_noswitch#11.rel_time_group -2,925 
 (3,045) 
1.displ_noswitch#12.rel_time_group -5,048 
 (3,965) 
Observations 25,395 
Fstat  210.29 
Prob > F 0.000 
R-squared 0.656 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 8.12: Regression output for Figure 4.12 
 Closure  
 Ire UK W. Euro E. Euro Asia ROW 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 pay2 pay2 pay2 pay2 
       
1.d_closure 61.36 -1,820 -2,700 95.31 15.57 121.3 
 (274.8) (1,493) (1,719) (452.3) (779.5) (1,510) 
1.d_closure#2.rel_time_group -1,454*** -1,502 -2,852* -697.9 -928.0 -2,474* 
 (196.1) (1,223) (1,543) (424.8) (633.0) (1,270) 
1.d_closure#3.rel_time_group -1,318*** -278.7 2,054 -561.1 -240.0 -3,156** 
 (226.0) (1,336) (1,729) (441.4) (774.0) (1,385) 
1.d_closure#4.rel_time_group -1,956*** -407.2 1,426 -757.2* -422.7 -2,500* 
 (237.3) (1,389) (1,771) (451.9) (778.1) (1,395) 
1.d_closure#5.rel_time_group -3,122*** -2,029 483.1 -1,341*** -1,142 -3,840*** 
 (246.5) (1,406) (1,739) (454.6) (794.9) (1,431) 
1.d_closure#6.rel_time_group -4,129*** -3,958*** -812.4 -1,893*** -1,829** -4,372*** 
 (250.0) (1,414) (1,742) (453.9) (782.8) (1,448) 
1.d_closure#7.rel_time_group  -14,163*** -15,031*** -9,435*** -9,912*** -10,262*** -13,713*** 
 (258.3) (1,437) (1,777) (463.1) (803.2) (1,473) 
1.d_closure#8.rel_time_group -9,861*** -9,312*** -5,685*** -5,655*** -5,567*** -9,088*** 
 (278.6) (1,526) (1,878) (474.9) (904.6) (1,558) 
1.d_closure#9.rel_time_group -7,325*** -6,127*** -3,554* -3,721*** -4,789*** -6,301*** 
 (288.1) (1,568) (1,938) (483.8) (970.9) (1,603) 
1.d_closure#10.rel_time_group -7,377*** -5,655*** -4,418** -3,421*** -3,566*** -5,560*** 
 (319.4) (1,714) (2,124) (504.7) (1,032) (1,702) 
1.d_closure#11.rel_time_group -6,357*** -3,050 -2,337 -3,031*** -2,488** -3,308 
 (361.5) (1,939) (2,391) (575.0) (1,212) (2,037) 
1.d_closure#12.rel_time_group -6,568*** -2,101 1,018 -3,196*** -2,564* -3,319 
 (433.1) (2,437) (4,282) (790.3) (1,546) (2,662) 
Constant 30,892*** 32,517*** 27,258*** 16,114*** 18,924*** 25,345*** 
 (190.4) (1,046) (1,184) (295.2) (590.8) (995.6) 
       
Observations 1,606,914 70,755 34,169 197,664 40,443 51,528 
Fstat  2,904.38 164.94 99.28 1,226.47 115.03 169.98 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.053 0.068 0.066 0.170 0.064 0.085 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Mass layoff 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 Ire UK W. Euro E. Euro Asia ROW 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 pay2 pay2 pay2 pay2 
       
1.d_mass -425.1 2,012 4,729 -719.5 -4,041 5,465 
 (1,136) (8,160) (4,709) (2,235) (2,785) (5,264) 
1.d_mass#2.rel_time_group -2,199** 463.5 -7,809* 0.398 -2,384 -1,063 
 (875.5) (7,107) (4,308) (2,040) (3,172) (4,206) 
1.d_mass#3.rel_time_group -3,337*** -1,546 -9,749** 313.8 -1,984 -6,016 
 (975.6) (7,247) (4,555) (2,177) (2,920) (4,771) 
1.d_mass#4.rel_time_group -4,108*** -3,447 -9,041* 285.5 -1,414 -8,988* 
 (1,001) (7,785) (4,681) (2,201) (2,979) (5,007) 
1.d_mass#5.rel_time_group -5,122*** -7,338 -13,463*** 474.6 -1,418 -8,786* 
 (1,023) (7,822) (4,715) (2,213) (2,843) (5,112) 
1.d_mass#6.rel_time_group -6,035*** -10,897 -15,506*** -2,551 15.76 -12,737** 
 (1,043) (7,786) (4,748) (2,219) (2,827) (5,141) 
1.d_mass#7.rel_time_group -29,421*** -36,534*** -28,611*** -16,573*** -17,389*** -28,018*** 
 (1,054) (7,870) (4,788) (2,232) (2,829) (5,197) 
1.d_mass#8.rel_time_group -25,491*** -30,129*** -22,654*** -12,833*** -14,389*** -22,885*** 
 (1,096) (8,074) (4,836) (2,243) (3,004) (5,342) 
1.d_mass#9.rel_time_group -20,737*** -27,227*** -17,513*** -10,392*** -7,356** -20,179*** 
 (1,115) (8,095) (4,821) (2,249) (3,138) (5,365) 
1.d_mass#10.rel_time_group -17,386*** -22,341*** -14,426*** -7,701*** -95.82 -18,497*** 
 (1,167) (8,381) (4,915) (2,283) (3,884) (5,549) 
1.d_mass#11.rel_time_group -15,122*** -19,512** -13,243** -4,679* -701.7 -15,483*** 
 (1,205) (8,697) (5,650) (2,428) (5,067) (5,740) 
1.d_mass#12.rel_time_group -10,723*** -12,217 -8,831 -5,400** -1,620 -17,769*** 
 (1,326) (9,369) (6,894) (2,712) (4,158) (6,332) 
Constant 37,423*** 43,655*** 20,234*** 15,437*** 26,077*** 24,099*** 
 (801.4) (6,379) (3,054) (1,460) (2,229) (3,059) 
       
Observations 203,473 9,743 13,559 42,119 5,953 9,499 
Fstat  943.58 63.71 113.10 583.64 42.57 70.12 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.167 0.186 0.183 0.281 0.166 0.182 
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Appendix Table 8.13: Regression output for Figure 4.13 
 
 Closure 
 Industry (B-E) Services (G-U) 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 
   
1.d_closure 5,643*** -1,206 
 (1,879) (1,016) 
1.d_closure#2.rel_time_group -2,379* -163.0 
 (1,276) (714.4) 
1.d_closure#3.rel_time_group -2,042 1,379* 
 (1,613) (828.7) 
1.d_closure#4.rel_time_group -2,702* 693.6 
 (1,634) (863.5) 
1.d_closure#5.rel_time_group -3,020* 107.3 
 (1,654) (896.7) 
1.d_closure#6.rel_time_group -4,529*** -1,205 
 (1,630) (905.6) 
1.d_closure#7.rel_time_group -16,499*** -9,737*** 
 (1,695) (917.4) 
1.d_closure#8.rel_time_group -10,355*** -2,171** 
 (1,868) (962.4) 
1.d_closure#9.rel_time_group -5,289*** 1,598 
 (1,957) (991.2) 
1.d_closure#10.rel_time_group -9,709*** 1,619 
 (2,102) (1,028) 
1.d_closure#11.rel_time_group -12,415*** 3,873*** 
 (2,399) (1,086) 
1.d_closure#12.rel_time_group -13,355*** 3,013** 
 (3,009) (1,202) 
   
Observations 113,045 675,507 
Fstat  334.88 1,433.31 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.112 0.056 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Mass Layoff 
 Industry B-E Services G-U 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 
   
1.d_mass -2,015** 8,419 
 (864.7) (5,792) 
1o.d_mass#1b.rel_time_group 0 0 
 (0) (0) 
1.d_mass#2.rel_time_group -3,545 -8,706 
 (10,917) (6,059) 
1.d_mass#3.rel_time_group -43.08 -17,913** 
 (5,230) (7,245) 
1.d_mass#4.rel_time_group 1,263 -13,874** 
 (5,034) (6,504) 
1.d_mass#5.rel_time_group -678.5 -14,509** 
 (4,485) (6,441) 
1.d_mass#6.rel_time_group -1,337 -14,687** 
 (3,272) (6,281) 
1.d_mass#7.rel_time_group -23,542*** -35,103*** 
 (3,679) (6,518) 
1.d_mass#8.rel_time_group -5,575* -22,341*** 
 (3,084) (6,325) 
1.d_mass#9.rel_time_group 915.2 -14,434** 
 (2,908) (6,503) 
1.d_mass#10.rel_time_group 5,169** -7,590 
 (2,183) (6,280) 
1.d_mass#11.rel_time_group 2,151 -6,787 
 (2,523) (7,066) 
1.d_mass#12.rel_time_group 4,089 2,786 
 (3,768) (6,390) 
Constant 41,616*** 28,739*** 
 (757.9) (5,761) 
   
Observations 29,921 87,004 
Fstat  - 454.46 
Prob > F - 0.000 
R-squared 0.293 0.219 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 8.14: Regression output for Figure 4.14 
 
 Closure  Mass Layoff  
VARIABLES Pay  Pay  
   
u_gap1 -4,000*** -2,584** 
 (306.2) (1,009) 
u_gap2 -6,189*** -2,753*** 
 (267.1) (661.4) 
u_gap3 -4,704*** -9,932*** 
 (285.6) (595.0) 
u_gap4 -7,014*** -10,922*** 
 (362.1) (783.3) 
u_gap5 -9,529*** -8,728*** 
 (421.5) (919.7) 
u_gap6 -10,449*** -9,785*** 
 (441.8) (1,220) 
t_gap12 -1,603*** -1,233* 
 (197.7) (673.6) 
t_gap13 -1,408*** -3,535*** 
 (233.5) (775.2) 
t_gap14 -2,718*** -3,893*** 
 (247.9) (842.3) 
t_gap15 -4,826*** -4,590*** 
 (264.4) (874.6) 
t_gap16 -5,258*** -5,555*** 
 (266.3) (904.3) 
t_gap17 -28,038*** -35,685*** 
 (279.7) (946.9) 
t_gap18 -13,926*** -22,826*** 
 (318.6) (1,053) 
t_gap19 -11,054*** -19,338*** 
 (347.8) (1,135) 
t_gap110 -14,489*** -19,120*** 
 (392.8) (1,420) 
t_gap111 -14,994*** -18,969*** 
 (486.9) (1,533) 
t_gap112 -15,292*** -22,044*** 
 (592.5) (1,834) 
t_gap23 -1,033*** -2,336*** 
 (174.7) (379.9) 
t_gap24 -1,250*** -2,076*** 
 (203.7) (447.0) 
t_gap25 -2,848*** -3,151*** 
 (210.2) (489.0) 
t_gap26 -3,951*** 293.3 
 (224.9) (502.0) 
t_gap27 -25,849*** -35,517*** 
 (236.3) (562.3) 
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Appendix Table 8.14 continued  
t_gap28 -25,849*** -35,517*** 
 (236.3) (562.3) 
t_gap29 -14,810*** -15,212*** 
 (352.2) (883.2) 
t_gap210 -12,399*** -7,748*** 
 (457.5) (1,093) 
t_gap211 -12,865*** -7,460*** 
 (784.1) (1,208) 
t_gap212 -14,986*** -15,520*** 
 (800.1) (4,881) 
t_gap34 -1,822*** -1,591*** 
 (200.8) (313.6) 
t_gap35 -2,512*** -1,732*** 
 (212.9) (377.1) 
t_gap36 -3,945*** -2,583*** 
 (222.8) (406.6) 
t_gap37 -27,333*** -28,338*** 
 (257.0) (482.4) 
t_gap38 -27,333*** -28,338*** 
 (257.0) (482.4) 
t_gap39 -27,333*** -28,338*** 
 (257.0) (482.4) 
t_gap310 -15,587*** -16,321*** 
 (621.4) (1,012) 
t_gap311 -14,012*** -10,979*** 
 (797.2) (1,535) 
t_gap312 -16,380*** -12,491*** 
 (1,044) (3,657) 
t_gap45 -2,489*** -2,242*** 
 (259.0) (519.2) 
t_gap46 -1,655*** 830.9 
 (282.3) (592.3) 
t_gap47 -25,023*** -27,347*** 
 (340.0) (701.6) 
t_gap48 -25,023*** -27,347*** 
 (340.0) (701.6) 
t_gap49 -25,023*** -27,347*** 
 (340.0) (701.6) 
t_gap410 -25,023*** -27,347*** 
 (340.0) (701.6) 
t_gap411 -14,028*** -10,256*** 
 (882.6) (3,387) 
t_gap412 -10,926*** -3,344 
 (1,465) (9,112) 
t_gap56 -232.1 2,598*** 
 (342.9) (810.7) 
t_gap57 -22,508*** -29,542*** 
 (402.7) (851.2) 
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Appendix Table 8.14 continued 
t_gap58 -22,508*** -29,542*** 
 (402.7) (851.2) 
t_gap59 -22,508*** -29,542*** 
 (402.7) (851.2) 
t_gap510 -22,508*** -29,542*** 
 (402.7) (851.2) 
t_gap511 -22,508*** -29,542*** 
 (402.7) (851.2) 
t_gap512 -11,996*** -20,376*** 
 (1,360) (2,374) 
t_gap67 -21,589*** -28,485*** 
 (423.9) (1,169) 
t_gap68 -21,589*** -28,485*** 
 (423.9) (1,169) 
t_gap69 -21,589*** -28,485*** 
 (423.9) (1,169) 
t_gap610 -21,589*** -28,485*** 
 (423.9) (1,169) 
t_gap611 -21,589*** -28,485*** 
 (423.9) (1,169) 
t_gap612 -21,589*** -28,485*** 
 (423.9) (1,169) 
u_nogap -914.9*** -3,630*** 
 (263.2) (1,207) 
t_nogap2 -665.5*** -2,301*** 
 (188.1) (883.8) 
t_nogap3 -194.0 -1,716* 
 (211.2) (1,029) 
t_nogap4 -698.2*** -3,674*** 
 (217.7) (1,076) 
t_nogap5 -1,303*** -4,333*** 
 (219.7) (1,096) 
t_nogap6 -277.5 -3,245*** 
 (222.6) (1,108) 
t_nogap7 -5,368*** -12,505*** 
 (226.8) (1,116) 
t_nogap8 -4,977*** -12,342*** 
 (251.4) (1,195) 
t_nogap9 -6,632*** -15,199*** 
 (258.5) (1,201) 
t_nogap10 -11,032*** -16,286*** 
 (281.5) (1,232) 
t_nogap11 -11,280*** -17,445*** 
 (314.9) (1,256) 
t_nogap12 -12,705*** -17,311*** 
 (393.8) (1,298) 
u_wgap -6,975*** -11,617*** 
 (494.6) (1,719) 
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Appendix Table 8.14 continued 
t_wgap2 -1,737*** 3,256** 
 (379.0) (1,507) 
t_wgap3 -1,455*** 1,548 
 (423.0) (1,589) 
t_wgap4 -2,014*** 205.5 
 (440.1) (1,594) 
t_wgap5 -1,362*** 1,060 
 (455.3) (1,601) 
t_wgap6 1,584*** 5,214*** 
 (448.2) (1,583) 
t_wgap7 -7,578*** -5,835*** 
 (456.3) (1,597) 
t_wgap8 -14,133*** -14,817*** 
 (462.4) (1,616) 
t_wgap9 -17,570*** -19,110*** 
 (465.3) (1,616) 
t_wgap10 -19,592*** -20,656*** 
 (467.4) (1,609) 
t_wgap11 -20,153*** -21,077*** 
 (470.5) (1,558) 
t_wgap12 -19,872*** -21,062*** 
 (501.4) (1,553) 
Constant 32,038*** 38,269*** 
 (124.6) (348.3) 
   
Observations 2,001,473 284,346 
Fstat  - - 
Prob > F - - 
R-squared 0.150 0.264 
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Appendix 9 : Likelihood ratio test results  
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Appendix Table 9.1: Results of Likelihood ratio test (Closure) 
 
 
 Full  2005-2007 2008-2010 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 pay2 
    
1.d_closure 81.18 -2,167*** 81.18 
 (236.0) (269.6) (237.9) 
1.d_closure#2.rel_time_group -1,488*** - -1,488*** 
 (283.9) - (286.2) 
1.d_closure#3.rel_time_group -1,289*** - -1,283*** 
 (262.9) - (265.0) 
1.d_closure#4.rel_time_group -1,817*** - -1,763*** 
 (257.3) - (262.6) 
1.d_closure#5.rel_time_group -2,940*** -1,259*** -2,780*** 
 (253.9) (330.8) (261.1) 
1.d_closure#6.rel_time_group -3,914*** -1,679*** -3,909*** 
 (251.9) (312.7) (260.3) 
1.d_closure#7.rel_time_group -13,690*** -12,210*** -13,370*** 
 (251.9) (312.7) (260.3) 
1.d_closure#8.rel_time_group -9,339*** -7,329*** -9,202*** 
 (255.6) (312.7) (268.4) 
1.d_closure#9.rel_time_group -6,894*** -5,729*** -5,821*** 
 (262.3) (312.7) (288.3) 
1.d_closure#10.rel_time_group -6,829*** -4,581*** - 
 (286.4) (312.7) - 
1.d_closure#11.rel_time_group -5,873*** -3,625*** - 
 (322.8) (344.9) - 
1.d_closure#12.rel_time_group -6,085*** -3,837*** - 
 (413.9) (427.7) - 
Constant 29,683*** 32,155*** 31,945*** 
 (164.9) (205.7) (175.8) 
    
Observations 2,001,473 610,105 1,391,368 
Fstat  5,178.41 2,202.83 3,480.54 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.056 0.064 0.045 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Likelihood Ratio Test results  
Likelihood-ratio Test        
Model Obs ll(null) ll(model) df AIC BIC 
Full 2001473 -2.31E+07 -2.31E+07 24 4.61E+07 4.61E+07 
Pre 2008 610105 -7032513 -7012272 20 1.40E+07 1.40E+07 
Post 2008 1391368 -1.61E+07 -1.60E+07 20 3.21E+07 3.21E+07 
LR chi2(16) = 6834.74 
     Prob > chi2 = 0 
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Appendix Table 9.2: Results of Likelihood ratio test (Mass-Layoff)  
 Full  2005-2007 2008-2010 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 pay2 
    
1.d_mass -109.0 -4,229*** -109.0 
 (930.7) (766.2) (943.4) 
1.d_mass#2.rel_time_group -2,215** - -2,196** 
 (1,057) - (1,072) 
1.d_mass#3.rel_time_group -3,150*** - -3,238*** 
 (992.6) - (1,006) 
1.d_mass#4.rel_time_group -3,720*** - -3,708*** 
 (976.3) - (996.8) 
1.d_mass#5.rel_time_group -4,734*** -1,682* -4,336*** 
 (965.0) (912.1) (989.2) 
1.d_mass#6.rel_time_group -6,123*** -935.1 -6,640*** 
 (959.5) (860.5) (986.5) 
1.d_mass#7.rel_time_group -27,124*** -19,700*** -28,725*** 
 (959.5) (860.5) (986.5) 
1.d_mass#8.rel_time_group -22,964*** -15,733*** -24,736*** 
 (962.6) (860.5) (993.8) 
1.d_mass#9.rel_time_group -18,375*** -13,188*** -19,333*** 
 (972.1) (860.5) (1,022) 
1.d_mass#10.rel_time_group -15,544*** -11,425*** - 
 (1,016) (860.5) - 
1.d_mass#11.rel_time_group -14,221*** -10,101*** - 
 (1,073) (921.4) - 
1.d_mass#12.rel_time_group -10,382*** -6,262*** - 
 (1,216) (1,072)  
Constant 35,389*** 36,309*** 31,564*** 
 (653.9) (560.4) (689.0) 
    
Observations 284,346 97,916 186,430 
Fstat  2434.07 922.05 2020.25 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.165 0.152 0.171 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Likelihood Ratio Test results  
Likelihood-ratio Test        
Model Obs ll(null) ll(model) df AIC BIC 
Full 284346    -3303882 -3278328 24 6556704 6556957 
Pre 2008 97916     -1132864 -1124804 20 2249647      2249837 
Post 2008 186430    -2169406 -2151953 20 4303945      4304148 
LR chi2(16) = 3143.09 
     Prob > chi2 = 0 
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Appendix 10 : Regression results for closure and mass-layoff 
samples (pre/post 2008) 
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Appendix Table 10.1: Regression output Table 4.10 
 Closure  
 Pre 2008  Post 2008 
VARIABLES Emp Emp 
2.rel_time_group - 0.727*** 
 - (0.00167) 
3.rel_time_group - 0.782*** 
 - (0.00127) 
4.rel_time_group - 0.849*** 
 - (0.00127) 
5.rel_time_group 0.832*** 0.910*** 
 (0.00259) (0.00127) 
6.rel_time_group 1*** 1*** 
 (0.00227) (0.00127) 
7.rel_time_group 0.563*** 0.534*** 
 (0.00227) (0.00127) 
8.rel_time_group 0.574*** 0.570*** 
 (0.00227) (0.00149) 
9.rel_time_group 0.535*** 0.594*** 
 (0.00227) (0.00196) 
10.rel_time_group 0.508*** - 
 (0.00227) - 
11.rel_time_group 0.522*** - 
 (0.00308) - 
12.rel_time_group 0.511*** - 
 (0.00476) - 
   
Observations 313,999 753,711 
Fstat  70,989.62 - 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.644 0.773 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 10.2: Regression output for Table 4.11 
 
 Mass Layoff 
 Pre 2008  Post 2008 
VARIABLES emp emp 
   
2.rel_time_group - 0.658*** 
 - (0.00489) 
3.rel_time_group - 0.622*** 
 - (0.00332) 
4.rel_time_group - 0.726*** 
 - (0.00332) 
5.rel_time_group 0.823*** 0.898*** 
 (0.00630) (0.00332) 
6.rel_time_group 1*** 1*** 
 (0.00538) (0.00332) 
7.rel_time_group 0.353*** 0.233*** 
 (0.00538) (0.00332) 
8.rel_time_group 0.360*** 0.242*** 
 (0.00538) (0.00360) 
9.rel_time_group 0.361*** 0.241*** 
 (0.00538) (0.00452) 
10.rel_time_group 0.341*** - 
 (0.00538) - 
11.rel_time_group 0.382*** - 
 (0.00702) - 
12.rel_time_group 0.409*** - 
 (0.0103) - 
   
Observations 50,778 104,769 
Fstat  9,189.6 34,630.55 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.592 0.726 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 10.3: regression output for Figure 4.15 
 Closure 
 Pre 2008 Post 2008 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 
   
1.d_closure -2,167*** 81.18 
 (266.3) (248.5) 
1.d_closure#2.rel_time_group - -1,488*** 
 - (180.5) 
1.d_closure#3.rel_time_group - -1,283*** 
 - (206.9) 
1.d_closure#4.rel_time_group - -1,763*** 
 - (217.5) 
1.d_closure#5.rel_time_group -1,259*** -2,780*** 
 (201.8) (224.3) 
1.d_closure#6.rel_time_group -1,679*** -3,909*** 
 (220.5) (226.8) 
1.d_closure#7.rel_time_group -12,210*** -13,370*** 
 (246.1) (236.0) 
1.d_closure#8.rel_time_group -7,329*** -9,202*** 
 (254.4) (260.5) 
1.d_closure#9.rel_time_group -5,729*** -5,821*** 
 (260.2) (279.0) 
1.d_closure#10.rel_time_group -4,581*** - 
 (266.9) - 
1.d_closure#11.rel_time_group -3,625*** - 
 (329.3) - 
1.d_closure#12.rel_time_group -3,837*** - 
 (399.6) - 
Constant 32,155*** 31,945*** 
 (241.7) (177.8) 
   
Observations 610,105 1,391,368 
Fstat  1598.07 3,778.34 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.064 0.045 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Mass Layoff 
 Pre 2008 Post 2008 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 
   
1.d_mass -4,229*** -109.0 
 (754.8) (1,034) 
1.d_mass#2.rel_time_group  -2,196*** 
  (809.6) 
1.d_mass#3.rel_time_group  -3,238*** 
  (900.1) 
1.d_mass#4.rel_time_group  -3,708*** 
  (931.8) 
1.d_mass#5.rel_time_group -1,682*** -4,336*** 
 (590.0) (948.1) 
1.d_mass#6.rel_time_group -935.1 -6,640*** 
 (646.8) (957.9) 
1.d_mass#7.rel_time_group -19,700*** -28,725*** 
 (684.8) (972.3) 
1.d_mass#8.rel_time_group -15,733*** -24,736*** 
 (702.7) (1,018) 
1.d_mass#9.rel_time_group -13,188*** -19,333*** 
 (730.9) (1,041) 
1.d_mass#10.rel_time_group -11,425***  
 (743.5)  
1.d_mass#11.rel_time_group -10,101***  
 (859.0)  
1.d_mass#12.rel_time_group -6,262***  
Constant 36,309*** 31,564*** 
 (611.0) (653.8) 
   
Observations 97,916 186,430 
Fstat  500.82 1,446.25 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.152 0.171 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 10.4: Regression output for Figure 4.16 
 Closure 
 Male 
2005-2007 
Female 
2005-2007 
Male  
2008-2010 
Female 
2008-2010 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 pay2 pay2 
     
1.d_closure -2,227*** -2,007*** -75.74 326.1 
 (343.6) (346.4) (354.8) (270.3) 
1.d_closure#2.rel_time_group - - -1,665*** -1,235*** 
 - - (259.9) (201.1) 
1.d_closure#3.rel_time_group - - -1,447*** -1,040*** 
 - - (296.1) (232.7) 
1.d_closure#4.rel_time_group - - -2,099*** -1,262*** 
 - - (311.8) (243.8) 
1.d_closure#5.rel_time_group -1,506*** -916.3*** -3,277*** -2,059*** 
 (263.0) (268.7) (321.9) (249.5) 
1.d_closure#6.rel_time_group -2,177*** -784.2*** -4,826*** -2,594*** 
 (286.3) (293.4) (325.7) (250.7) 
1.d_closure#7.rel_time_group -14,499*** -7,973*** -16,037*** -9,513*** 
 (321.8) (319.9) (339.4) (260.3) 
1.d_closure#8.rel_time_group -8,742*** -4,730*** -10,899*** -6,752*** 
 (332.8) (330.8) (373.0) (295.7) 
1.d_closure#9.rel_time_group -6,791*** -3,789*** -7,013*** -4,071*** 
 (339.7) (341.1) (397.4) (327.5) 
1.d_closure#10.rel_time_group -5,520*** -2,870*** - - 
 (348.6) (350.2) - - 
1.d_closure#11.rel_time_group -4,337*** -2,539*** - - 
 (444.5) (423.6) - - 
1.d_closure#12.rel_time_group -4,892*** -2,016*** - - 
 (542.3) (509.5) - - 
Constant 37,816*** 21,378*** 36,190*** 25,344*** 
 (322.2) (294.5) (255.0) (198.5) 
     
Observations 396,957 213,148 825,916 565,452 
Fstat  1,290.36 432.65 2,711.70 1,326.44 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.079 0.046 0.060 0.035 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Mass Layoff  
 
 Male 
2005-2007 
Female 
2005-2007 
Male  
2008-2010 
Female 
2008-2010 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 pay2 pay2 
     
1.d_mass -4,776*** -2,493** -133.9 -674.3 
 (1,010) (967.8) (1,359) (1,259) 
1.d_mass#2.rel_time_group - - -2,302** -1,901* 
 - - (1,062) (1,019) 
1.d_mass#3.rel_time_group - - -3,149*** -3,014*** 
 - - (1,185) (1,111) 
1.d_mass#4.rel_time_group - - -3,548*** -3,678*** 
 - - (1,226) (1,151) 
1.d_mass#5.rel_time_group -1,365* -3,644*** -4,046*** -4,566*** 
 (795.7) (783.7) (1,246) (1,173) 
1.d_mass#6.rel_time_group -135.8 -3,007*** -7,215*** -4,898*** 
 (878.5) (845.8) (1,262) (1,172) 
1.d_mass#7.rel_time_group -22,635*** -16,839*** -32,010*** -21,654*** 
 (922.1) (910.3) (1,279) (1,202) 
1.d_mass#8.rel_time_group -17,793*** -14,027*** -27,425*** -18,691*** 
 (948.2) (935.5) (1,339) (1,264) 
1.d_mass#9.rel_time_group -15,921*** -10,593*** -21,671*** -14,068*** 
 (989.5) (963.7) (1,370) (1,294) 
1.d_mass#10.rel_time_group -13,757*** -9,358*** - - 
 (1,005) (986.2) - - 
1.d_mass#11.rel_time_group -13,049*** -8,257*** - - 
 (1,203) (1,127) - - 
1.d_mass#12.rel_time_group -8,796*** -4,174*** - - 
 (1,393) (1,338) - - 
Constant 42,133*** 27,818*** 36,000*** 21,693*** 
 (847.3) (743.8) (865.5) (794.9) 
     
Observations 55,539 42,377 124,625 61,805 
Fstat  318.83 247.89 1,067.50 490.94 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.177 0.133 0.185 0.176 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 10.5: Regression output for Figure 4.17 
 Closure  
  Irish  
    2005-
2007 
Irish  
2008-2010 
Non Irish 
2005-2007 
Non Irish 
2008-2010 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 pay2 pay2 
     
1.d_closure -2,450*** 61.36 -1,153** -429.2 
 (303.2) (274.8) (500.5) (491.5) 
1.d_closure#2.rel_time_group - -1,454*** - -1,329*** 
 - (196.1) - (414.3) 
1.d_closure#3.rel_time_group - -1,318*** - -642.3 
 - (226.0) - (453.7) 
1.d_closure#4.rel_time_group - -1,883*** - -725.8 
 - (238.1) - (466.9) 
1.d_closure#5.rel_time_group -1,475*** -2,892*** -621.6 -1,756*** 
 (224.9) (246.6) (426.4) (470.7) 
1.d_closure#6.rel_time_group -1,771*** -4,065*** -1,280*** -2,740*** 
 (247.6) (249.6) (451.9) (473.7) 
1.d_closure#7.rel_time_group -12,395*** -13,852*** -11,462*** -11,009*** 
 (278.5) (260.7) (497.7) (484.5) 
1.d_closure#8.rel_time_group -7,747*** -9,631*** -5,718*** -7,019*** 
 (288.6) (289.8) (512.5) (520.6) 
1.d_closure#9.rel_time_group -6,095*** -6,073*** -4,321*** -4,241*** 
 (295.7) (310.9) (517.4) (555.2) 
1.d_closure#10.rel_time_grou
p 
-4,865*** - -3,484*** - 
 (304.3) - (521.6) - 
1.d_closure#11.rel_time_grou
p 
-3,845*** - -2,372*** - 
 (373.3) - (640.8) - 
1.d_closure#12.rel_time_grou
p 
-4,056*** - -1,996** - 
 (442.7) - (899.8) - 
Constant 29,723*** 30,892*** 22,373*** 22,243*** 
 (215.9) (190.4) (344.9) (338.2) 
     
Observations 485,412 1,121,502 124,693 269,866 
Fstat  1,186.97 2,906.07 692.23 1,229.34 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.057 0.040 0.098 0.065 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Mass Layoff 
 Irish pre 2008 Irish post 
2008 
Non-Irish 
Pre 2008 
Non-Irish 
Post 2008 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 pay2 pay2 
     
1.d_mass -5,990*** -425.1 -1,039 1,602 
 (953.2) (1,136) (1,107) (2,182) 
1.d_mass#2.rel_time_group - -2,199** - -2,527 
 - (875.5) - (1,884) 
1.d_mass#3.rel_time_group - -3,337*** - -3,411* 
 - (975.6) - (2,019) 
1.d_mass#4.rel_time_group - -3,918*** - -4,003* 
 - (1,007) - (2,104) 
1.d_mass#5.rel_time_group -939.5 -4,745*** -2,535*** -4,457** 
 (713.3) (1,024) (975.1) (2,122) 
1.d_mass#6.rel_time_group 703.4 -6,626*** -3,826*** -7,690*** 
 (800.2) (1,041) (1,009) (2,117) 
1.d_mass#7.rel_time_group -19,910*** -31,410*** -18,021*** -23,922*** 
 (846.1) (1,056) (1,101) (2,148) 
1.d_mass#8.rel_time_group -16,257*** -27,692*** -13,279*** -19,609*** 
 (869.8) (1,120) (1,135) (2,193) 
1.d_mass#9.rel_time_group -13,664*** -22,298*** -10,864*** -15,770*** 
 (910.8) (1,162) (1,153) (2,194) 
1.d_mass#10.rel_time_group -11,821*** - -9,304*** - 
 (932.1) - (1,147) - 
1.d_mass#11.rel_time_group -9,557*** - -7,697*** - 
 (1,037) - (1,509) - 
1.d_mass#12.rel_time_group -5,157*** - -6,408*** - 
 (1,193) - (1,840) - 
Constant 35,163*** 37,423*** 22,733*** 23,718*** 
 (728.1) (801.4) (761.5) (1,505) 
     
Observations 70,856 132,617 27,060 53,813 
Fstat  338.62 1073.21 273.76 670.14 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.151 0.162 0.171 0.183 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 10.6: Regression output for Figure 4.18 
 Closure  
 2005-2007 2008-2010 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 
   
1.d_closure -1,381** 4,508*** 
 (675.3) (546.1) 
1.d_closure#2.rel_time_group - -2,292*** 
 - (357.5) 
1.d_closure#3.rel_time_group - -2,460*** 
 - (434.8) 
1.d_closure#4.rel_time_group - -2,802*** 
 - (457.3) 
1.d_closure#5.rel_time_group 47.61 -2,854*** 
 (477.8) (461.8) 
1.d_closure#6.rel_time_group -1,463*** -3,137*** 
 (554.9) (470.5) 
1.d_closure#7.rel_time_group -15,243*** -12,225*** 
 (673.2) (500.8) 
1.d_closure#8.rel_time_group -9,788*** -10,678*** 
 (667.6) (636.5) 
1.d_closure#9.rel_time_group -8,246*** -5,430*** 
 (687.1) (717.3) 
1.d_closure#10.rel_time_group -7,958*** - 
 (702.1) - 
1.d_closure#11.rel_time_group -7,261*** - 
 (897.0) - 
1.d_closure#12.rel_time_group -9,506*** - 
 (1,087) - 
Constant 33,281*** 30,021*** 
 (541.7) (395.4) 
   
Observations 68,630 172,582 
Fstat  214.20 332.52 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.088 0.039 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Mass-Layoff  
 2005-2007 2008-2010 
VARIABLES pay2 pay2 
   
1.d_mass -908.5 -11,261*** 
 (1,490) (1,518) 
1.d_mass#2.rel_time_group - 6,591*** 
 - (1,341) 
1.d_mass#3.rel_time_group - 5,078*** 
 - (1,383) 
1.d_mass#4.rel_time_group - 5,179*** 
 - (1,420) 
1.d_mass#5.rel_time_group -4,095*** 5,287*** 
 (1,256) (1,435) 
1.d_mass#6.rel_time_group -4,036*** 3,332** 
 (1,325) (1,468) 
1.d_mass#7.rel_time_group -20,426*** -24,361*** 
 (1,414) (1,399) 
1.d_mass#8.rel_time_group -17,829*** -19,194*** 
 (1,430) (1,513) 
1.d_mass#9.rel_time_group -20,027*** -16,548*** 
 (1,532) (1,591) 
1.d_mass#10.rel_time_group -18,617*** - 
 (1,569) - 
1.d_mass#11.rel_time_group -20,382*** - 
 (1,680) - 
1.d_mass#12.rel_time_group -17,928*** - 
 (1,876) - 
1.d_mass#2.rel_time_group - 6,591*** 
 - (1,341) 
1.d_mass#3.rel_time_group - 5,078*** 
 - (1,383) 
1.d_mass#4.rel_time_group - 5,179*** 
 - (1,420) 
Constant 35,962*** 37,773*** 
 (1,118) (1,057) 
   
Observations 21,904 39,012 
Fstat  181.91 378.83 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.208 0.167 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 11 : Detailed results for Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
325 
 
Appendix Table 11.1: Weibull & logit model for Table 5.11 
 Weibull: Separations to employment and non-employment  
 To employment  To non-employment 
VARIABLES _t _t 
   
lnwage -0.377*** -0.715*** 
 (0.00268) (0.00127) 
age1 -0.0322*** -0.0144*** 
 (0.000210) (8.96e-05) 
male 0.0475*** 0.257*** 
 (0.00329) (0.00156) 
natd1 -0.390*** -0.380*** 
 (0.00748) (0.00294) 
natd2 -0.224*** -0.129*** 
 (0.0110) (0.00454) 
natd3 0.0827*** 0.0995*** 
 (0.0102) (0.00393) 
natd4 -0.245*** -0.171*** 
 (0.00826) (0.00318) 
natd5 -0.0861*** -0.403*** 
 (0.0107) (0.00467) 
naced1 -0.450*** 0.0365*** 
 (0.0220) (0.00717) 
naced2 -0.245*** -0.0917*** 
 (0.00958) (0.00391) 
naced3 0.507*** 0.623*** 
 (0.0110) (0.00378) 
naced4 0.118*** -0.00238 
 (0.00805) (0.00317) 
naced5 -0.228*** -0.235*** 
 (0.00861) (0.00351) 
Constant -1.865*** 1.281*** 
 (0.0194) (0.00805) 
   
Wald statistic  -99.6 -648.57 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.907 0.738 
 (0.0009) (0.0003) 
   
Wald chi2(13) 83492.75 527996.76 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Observations 1,211,936 3,611,390 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Logit: Hiring from employment  
  
VARIABLES Hiring from employment  
  
lnwage 0.995*** 
 (0.00236) 
male -0.321*** 
 (0.00310) 
age1 0.00729*** 
 (0.000171) 
natd1 0.550*** 
 (0.00735) 
natd2 0.0330*** 
 (0.0105) 
natd3 -0.0179* 
 (0.0102) 
natd4 0.178*** 
 (0.00820) 
natd5 0.499*** 
 (0.0108) 
naced1 -0.741*** 
 (0.0204) 
naced2 -0.105*** 
 (0.00817) 
naced3 -0.989*** 
 (0.00937) 
naced4 -0.0105 
 (0.00699) 
naced5 0.0387*** 
 (0.00742) 
Constant -8.017*** 
 (0.0171) 
LR chi2(13) 295950 
Prob>chi2 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0865 
Observations 3,611,390 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Figure 11.1: Parametric survival and hazard curves; Transitions to 
employment  
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Appendix Figure 11.2: Parametric survival and cumulative hazard curves; 
Transitions to non-employment  
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Appendix Table 11.2: Weibull & Logit model for Table 5.13 
 Weibull: Separations to employment and non-employment  
 Irish 
To employment 
Non-Irish 
To employment 
Irish 
To non-employment 
Non-Irish 
To unemployment 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.358*** -0.427*** -0.711*** -0.709*** 
 (0.00308) (0.00536) (0.00152) (0.00226) 
age1 -0.0338*** -0.0271*** -0.0161*** -0.00925*** 
 (0.000241) (0.000417) (0.000107) (0.000159) 
male 0.0185*** 0.124*** 0.275*** 0.212*** 
 (0.00398) (0.00586) (0.00199) (0.00248) 
naced1 -0.583*** -0.300*** -0.139*** 0.200*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0339) (0.0104) (0.0102) 
naced2 -0.148*** -0.472*** -0.0912*** -0.0816*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0183) (0.00488) (0.00661) 
naced3 0.446*** 0.662*** 0.593*** 0.669*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0213) (0.00461) (0.00653) 
naced4 0.112*** 0.151*** -0.0246*** 0.0591*** 
 (0.00943) (0.0155) (0.00382) (0.00566) 
naced5 -0.285*** 0.0343** -0.250*** -0.194*** 
 (0.00997) (0.0173) (0.00411) (0.00677) 
Constant -2.346*** -1.830*** 1.037*** 0.802*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0366) (0.00920) (0.0141) 
     
Wald statistic  -71.50 -74.02 -547.34 -370.33 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.9178 0.8855 0.7169 0.7671 
 (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
     
Wald chi2(13) 53043.07 17213.74 323864.4 133348.9 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 889,118 322,818 2,336,718 1,274,672 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Logit: Hiring from employment  
 Irish  Non-Irish  
VARIABLES From employment  From employment  
   
lnwage 1.046*** 0.827*** 
 (0.00274) (0.00461) 
male -0.349*** -0.227*** 
 (0.00368) (0.00578) 
age1 0.00580*** 0.0112*** 
 (0.000194) (0.000361) 
naced1 -0.556*** -1.058*** 
 (0.0253) (0.0350) 
naced2 -0.0556*** -0.257*** 
 (0.00954) (0.0159) 
naced3 -0.923*** -1.205*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0188) 
naced4 -0.00911 -0.0562*** 
 (0.00813) (0.0137) 
naced5 0.0633*** 0.00560 
 (0.00848) (0.0155) 
Constant -7.739*** -6.959*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0307) 
   
LR chi2(8) 208894.45 49740.76 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0870 0.0505 
Observations 2,336,718 1,274,672 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 11.3: Weibull & Logit model for Table 5.14 
 Weibull: Separations to employment  
 Irish  UK  Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Asia Rest of the 
World 
       
       
lnwage -0.358*** -0.280*** -0.724*** -0.616*** -0.319*** -0.302*** 
 (0.00308) (0.0129) (0.0174) (0.00945) (0.0156) (0.0123) 
age1 -0.0338*** -0.0277*** -0.0361*** -0.0286*** -0.0303*** -0.0231*** 
 (0.000241) (0.00112) (0.00130) (0.000665) (0.00135) (0.00105) 
male 0.0185*** 0.131*** 0.0954*** 0.108*** 0.256*** 0.217*** 
 (0.00398) (0.0182) (0.0156) (0.00859) (0.0181) (0.0154) 
naced1 -0.583*** -0.574*** -0.911*** -0.199*** -0.108 -0.450*** 
 (0.0294) (0.144) (0.200) (0.0397) (0.179) (0.130) 
naced2 -0.148*** -0.273*** 0.276*** -0.548*** -0.618*** -0.322*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0494) (0.0627) (0.0255) (0.0709) (0.0499) 
naced3 0.446*** 0.523*** 0.618*** 0.824*** 0.412*** 0.421*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0555) (0.0949) (0.0286) (0.104) (0.0592) 
naced4 0.112*** 0.0873** 0.173*** 0.145*** -0.0214 0.257*** 
 (0.00943) (0.0397) (0.0583) (0.0224) (0.0463) (0.0373) 
naced5 -0.285*** -0.330*** -0.103 -0.155*** -0.0628 0.459*** 
 (0.00997) (0.0429) (0.0642) (0.0297) (0.0484) (0.0401) 
Constant -2.346*** -2.794*** -0.0974 -0.598*** -2.377*** -2.919*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0967) (0.119) (0.0625) (0.109) (0.0843) 
       
Wald statistic  -71.50 -21.77 0.70 -62.34 -22.78 -21.92 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.482) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.9178 0.897 1.003 0.8632 0.8948 0.9092 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.0039) 
Wald chi2(8) 53043.07 1928.86 2777.47 10999.63 1852.00 1706.49 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 889,118 43,599 43,276 151,833 37,160 46,950 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Weibull: Separations to unemployment  
 
 Irish  UK  Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Asia Rest of the 
World 
VARIABLES       
       
lnwage -0.711*** -0.585*** -0.858*** -0.812*** -0.702*** -0.619*** 
 (0.00152) (0.00540) (0.00684) (0.00418) (0.00707) (0.00452) 
age1 -0.0161*** -0.0113*** -0.0231*** -0.00668*** -0.0026*** -0.0150*** 
 (0.000107) (0.000423) (0.000538) (0.000226) (0.000628) (0.000407) 
male 0.275*** 0.283*** 0.158*** 0.312*** 0.0793*** 0.113*** 
 (0.00199) (0.00776) (0.00652) (0.00367) (0.00837) (0.00599) 
naced1 -0.139*** -0.0309 0.0483 0.212*** -0.0319 0.283*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0443) (0.0524) (0.0122) (0.0701) (0.0306) 
naced2 -0.0912*** -0.140*** -0.0440* -0.0992*** 0.0107 0.0269 
 (0.00488) (0.0195) (0.0238) (0.00885) (0.0310) (0.0177) 
naced3 0.593*** 0.578*** 0.605*** 0.644*** 0.790*** 0.800*** 
 (0.00461) (0.0181) (0.0277) (0.00883) (0.0371) (0.0163) 
naced4 -0.0246*** 0.0205 -0.0329 0.0287*** 0.0639*** 0.187*** 
 (0.00382) (0.0148) (0.0209) (0.00792) (0.0215) (0.0133) 
naced5 -0.250*** -0.306*** -0.207*** -0.272*** -0.202*** -0.00805 
 (0.00411) (0.0163) (0.0233) (0.0122) (0.0233) (0.0151) 
Constant 1.037*** 0.245*** 2.030*** 1.273*** 0.157*** 0.575*** 
 (0.00920) (0.0364) (0.0426) (0.0248) (0.0467) (0.0290) 
Wald statistic  -547.34 -131.41 -68.24 -268.99 -77.76 -159.25 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.7169 0.7417 0.08613 0.7634 0.8123 0.7559 
 (0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0019) 0.0007 (0.0021) (0.0013) 
Wald chi2(8) 323864.44 16094.43 19620.13 57123.77 15094.83 24947.17 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 2,336,718 139,843 175,657 645,823 109,246 204,103 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Logit: Hiring from employment  
 Irish  UK  W.Europe E.Europe Asia ROW 
VARIABLES       
       
lnwage 1.046*** 0.751*** 0.934*** 1.091*** 0.628*** 0.731*** 
 (0.00274) (0.0108) (0.0124) (0.00948) (0.0123) (0.0101) 
male -0.349*** -0.307*** -0.306*** -0.417*** 0.113*** -0.0111 
 (0.00368) (0.0168) (0.0150) (0.00863) (0.0172) (0.0151) 
age1 0.00580*** 0.0143*** 0.0309*** 0.00577*** 0.00723*** 0.0242*** 
 (0.000194) (0.000916) (0.00107) (0.000553) (0.00119) (0.000965) 
naced1 -0.556*** -0.328*** -0.879*** -1.280*** 0.0443 -0.928*** 
 (0.0253) (0.116) (0.191) (0.0416) (0.150) (0.125) 
naced2 -0.0556*** 0.0468 0.123** -0.444*** -0.356*** -0.0869* 
 (0.00954) (0.0431) (0.0577) (0.0210) (0.0647) (0.0463) 
naced3 -0.923*** -0.676*** -1.016*** -1.397*** -0.957*** -1.248*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0474) (0.0773) (0.0247) (0.0927) (0.0544) 
naced4 -0.00911 -0.00228 0.295*** -0.204*** 0.0569 0.0959*** 
 (0.00813) (0.0354) (0.0513) (0.0186) (0.0462) (0.0369) 
naced5 0.0633*** 0.0919** 0.0343 -0.0617** 0.00764 0.342*** 
 (0.00848) (0.0380) (0.0567) (0.0261) (0.0483) (0.0394) 
Constant -7.739*** -6.726*** -8.645*** -8.092*** -5.528*** -7.234*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0779) (0.0911) (0.0592) (0.0870) (0.0724) 
       
LR chi2(8) 208894.45 6268.55 8936.53 21700.14 4120.05 10198.11 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0870 0.0523 0.0647 0.0464 0.0384 0.0691 
Observations 2,336,718 139,843 175,657 645,823 109,246 204,103 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 11.4: Weibull & Logit model for Table 5.15 
 Weibull: Separations to employment  
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.668*** -0.329*** -0.221*** -0.304*** 
 (0.00593) (0.00430) (0.00555) (0.00815) 
natd1 -0.136*** -0.403*** -0.619*** -0.557*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0105) (0.0151) (0.0336) 
natd2 -0.0218 -0.236*** -0.421*** -0.325*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0162) (0.0201) (0.0406) 
natd3 0.384*** 0.0649*** -0.109*** -0.119** 
 (0.0222) (0.0137) (0.0237) (0.0537) 
natd4 -0.0481*** -0.242*** -0.304*** -0.173*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0114) (0.0191) (0.0393) 
natd5 0.172*** -0.176*** -0.117*** 0.0527 
 (0.0221) (0.0149) (0.0243) (0.0533) 
male -0.0989*** 0.0511*** 0.204*** 0.166*** 
 (0.00600) (0.00494) (0.00803) (0.0127) 
naced1 -0.324*** -0.501*** -0.471*** -0.554*** 
 (0.0421) (0.0350) (0.0462) (0.0697) 
naced2 -0.165*** -0.275*** -0.250*** -0.189*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0147) (0.0222) (0.0347) 
naced3 0.659*** 0.455*** 0.512*** 0.571*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0169) (0.0249) (0.0381) 
naced4 0.179*** 0.113*** 0.0785*** 0.0906*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0127) (0.0194) (0.0288) 
naced5 -0.0888*** -0.235*** -0.252*** -0.332*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0136) (0.0202) (0.0300) 
Constant -1.299*** -3.060*** -3.996*** -3.674*** 
 (0.0374) (0.0292) (0.0399) (0.0633) 
Wald statistic  -27.88 -75.86 -48.44 -17.44 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.9511 0.8963 0.8931 0.9320 
 (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0021) (0.0038) 
Wald chi2(12) 21792.79 20840.89 10220.82 5541.14 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 282,958 517,138 287,147 287,147 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Weibull: Separations to non-employment  
 
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.836*** -0.757*** -0.578*** -0.495*** 
 (0.00257) (0.00220) (0.00256) (0.00345) 
natd1 -0.347*** -0.394*** -0.447*** -0.451*** 
 (0.00581) (0.00442) (0.00627) (0.0124) 
natd2 -0.0756*** -0.135*** -0.180*** -0.168*** 
 (0.0102) (0.00729) (0.00845) (0.0150) 
natd3 0.217*** 0.0620*** 0.0681*** -0.0163 
 (0.00734) (0.00569) (0.00962) (0.0191) 
natd4 -0.168*** -0.207*** -0.0914*** -0.0616*** 
 (0.00620) (0.00465) (0.00720) (0.0136) 
natd5 -0.542*** -0.359*** -0.284*** -0.301*** 
 (0.00884) (0.00663) (0.0114) (0.0239) 
male 0.171*** 0.247*** 0.355*** 0.349*** 
 (0.00269) (0.00251) (0.00379) (0.00523) 
naced1 0.144*** 0.00791 -0.0532*** -0.0290 
 (0.0132) (0.0122) (0.0151) (0.0205) 
naced2 0.0615*** -0.156*** -0.180*** -0.0489*** 
 (0.00700) (0.00634) (0.00887) (0.0124) 
naced3 0.599*** 0.647*** 0.627*** 0.603*** 
 (0.00674) (0.00622) (0.00851) (0.0117) 
naced4 0.0328*** -0.0204*** -0.0234*** 0.0137 
 (0.00550) (0.00527) (0.00740) (0.0100) 
naced5 -0.0432*** -0.272*** -0.334*** -0.279*** 
 (0.00643) (0.00583) (0.00786) (0.0104) 
Constant 1.567*** 1.032*** -0.0410** -0.457*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0129) (0.0162) (0.0239) 
Wald statistic  -322.95 -379.45 -309.74 -204.93 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.7622 0.7499 0.7131 0.7219 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0011) 
Wald chi2(12) 134585.20 205505.58 108073.35 46189.22 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 1,105,203 1,455,292 715,549 335,346 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Logit: Hiring from employment  
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage 0.951*** 1.096*** 0.872*** 0.822*** 
 (0.00588) (0.00386) (0.00440) (0.00612) 
male -0.423*** -0.311*** -0.178*** -0.408*** 
 (0.00637) (0.00458) (0.00684) (0.0103) 
natd1 0.750*** 0.680*** 0.343*** 0.486*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0105) (0.0138) (0.0297) 
natd2 -0.100*** 0.0873*** -0.0593*** 0.0790** 
 (0.0324) (0.0161) (0.0183) (0.0353) 
natd3 -0.277*** 0.122*** -0.0617*** -0.0147 
 (0.0258) (0.0138) (0.0215) (0.0471) 
natd4 0.250*** 0.385*** -0.194*** -0.169*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0115) (0.0177) (0.0354) 
natd5 0.924*** 0.491*** 0.228*** 0.331*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0150) (0.0227) (0.0487) 
naced1 -0.935*** -0.716*** -0.631*** -0.435*** 
 (0.0444) (0.0325) (0.0406) (0.0560) 
naced2 -0.402*** -0.0317** 0.0145 -0.0102 
 (0.0164) (0.0127) (0.0178) (0.0264) 
naced3 -0.996*** -0.977*** -0.964*** -0.913*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0145) (0.0203) (0.0300) 
naced4 -0.121*** 0.0855*** -0.0356** -0.0851*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0110) (0.0158) (0.0227) 
naced5 -0.401*** 0.0933*** 0.174*** 0.327*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0118) (0.0164) (0.0229) 
Constant -7.733*** -8.477*** -6.892*** -6.661*** 
 (0.0399) (0.0271) (0.0325) (0.0513) 
     
LR chi2(12) 47265.64 137749.22 62658.77 30342.99 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0573 0.0920 0.0861 0.0913 
Observations 1,105,203 1,455,292 715,549 335,346 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 11.5: Weibull & Logit model for Table 5.16 
 Weibull: Separations to employment – Irish  
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.639*** -0.272*** -0.246*** -0.334*** 
 (0.00663) (0.00518) (0.00627) (0.00881) 
male -0.147*** 0.0250*** 0.176*** 0.145*** 
 (0.00716) (0.00619) (0.00950) (0.0142) 
naced1 -0.408*** -0.608*** -0.639*** -0.836*** 
 (0.0539) (0.0482) (0.0625) (0.0942) 
naced2 -0.0400* -0.185*** -0.167*** -0.130*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0179) (0.0257) (0.0380) 
naced3 0.613*** 0.399*** 0.450*** 0.473*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0204) (0.0291) (0.0428) 
naced4 0.177*** 0.106*** 0.0680*** 0.0628** 
 (0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0227) (0.0316) 
naced5 -0.111*** -0.302*** -0.347*** -0.402*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0164) (0.0236) (0.0328) 
Constant -1.703*** -3.818*** -4.442*** -4.001*** 
 (0.0392) (0.0352) (0.0443) (0.0603) 
Wald statistic  -12.20 -56.97 -37.96 -15.30 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.9737 0.9002 0.8980 0.09317 
 (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0043) 
Wald chi2(7) 14388.05 8365.47 5085.18 3877.70 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 208,400 353,384 221,515 105,819 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Weibull: Separations to employment – UK 
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.568*** -0.286*** -0.251*** -0.258*** 
 (0.0445) (0.0217) (0.0208) (0.0328) 
male -0.116** 0.0311 0.297*** 0.284*** 
 (0.0490) (0.0279) (0.0330) (0.0537) 
naced1 0.147 -0.482** -0.794*** -1.668** 
 (0.335) (0.224) (0.259) (0.731) 
naced2 -0.332** -0.383*** -0.153* -0.200 
 (0.149) (0.0777) (0.0840) (0.141) 
naced3 0.733*** 0.379*** 0.587*** 0.759*** 
 (0.170) (0.0886) (0.0927) (0.152) 
naced4 0.0940 0.0568 0.110 0.224* 
 (0.109) (0.0604) (0.0717) (0.116) 
naced5 -0.256** -0.305*** -0.365*** -0.200 
 (0.124) (0.0658) (0.0765) (0.122) 
Constant -1.785*** -3.503*** -4.236*** -4.538*** 
 (0.272) (0.146) (0.143) (0.234) 
Wald statistic  -4.21 -14.38 -13.96 -3.48 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
p 0.9423 0.8967 0.8843 0.9462 
 (0.0132) (0.0068) (0.0078) (0.0151) 
Wald chi2(7) 255.23 391.76 539.77 225.56 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 4,240 15,886 16,930 6,543 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Weibull: Separations to employment – Western Europe 
 
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -1.018*** -0.761*** -0.508*** -0.460*** 
 (0.0465) (0.0237) (0.0320) (0.0626) 
male 0.0233 0.0908*** 0.186*** 0.135 
 (0.0328) (0.0202) (0.0425) (0.0964) 
naced1 -0.906** -1.131*** -0.526 -0.614 
 (0.396) (0.311) (0.396) (0.737) 
naced2 0.328** 0.270*** 0.233 0.00610 
 (0.132) (0.0847) (0.148) (0.324) 
naced3 0.142 0.523*** 0.903*** 1.181*** 
 (0.355) (0.125) (0.182) (0.373) 
naced4 -0.00174 0.177** 0.291** 0.513* 
 (0.123) (0.0789) (0.137) (0.280) 
naced5 -0.199 -0.0461 -0.190 0.0214 
 (0.147) (0.0865) (0.147) (0.293) 
Constant 0.809*** -0.946*** -2.799*** -3.513*** 
 (0.287) (0.155) (0.234) (0.449) 
Wald statistic  -4.82 -0.39 -3.85 -0.21 
 (0.000) (0.699) (0.000) (0.830) 
p 1.050 1.002 0.9556 0.9941 
 (0.0106) (0.0059) (0.0123) (0.0273) 
Wald chi2(7) 560.66 1064.38 341.34 90.02 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 8,360 25,064 8,118 1,734 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Weibull: Separations to employment – Eastern Europe 
 
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.853*** -0.563*** -0.348*** -0.236*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0127) (0.0265) (0.0448) 
male 0.0730*** 0.111*** 0.248*** 0.150*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0122) (0.0282) (0.0488) 
naced1 -0.189** -0.307*** -0.174* 0.0521 
 (0.0771) (0.0590) (0.0964) (0.152) 
naced2 -0.530*** -0.567*** -0.619*** -0.443*** 
 (0.0461) (0.0350) (0.0750) (0.134) 
naced3 0.868*** 0.715*** 0.877*** 1.080*** 
 (0.0527) (0.0396) (0.0793) (0.138) 
naced4 0.135*** 0.131*** 0.168** 0.215* 
 (0.0404) (0.0307) (0.0667) (0.118) 
naced5 -0.254*** -0.172*** -0.000599 -0.118 
 (0.0583) (0.0403) (0.0807) (0.146) 
Constant 0.174 -1.763*** -3.523*** -4.272*** 
 (0.120) (0.0782) (0.163) (0.277) 
Wald statistic  -36.68 -43.67 -17.45 -6.53 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.8647 0.8639 0.8735 0.9155 
 (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0067) (0.0124) 
Wald chi2(7) 3483.42 4548.13 998.38 319.28 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 46,259 79,786 19,572 6,216 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 To employment  - Asia  
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.791*** -0.376*** 0.371*** 0.308*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0218) (0.0363) (0.0729) 
male 0.0625* 0.201*** 0.419*** 0.523*** 
 (0.0356) (0.0248) (0.0437) (0.0946) 
naced1 -0.393 -0.649* 0.313 -0.138 
 (0.671) (0.391) (0.218) (0.698) 
naced2 0.0160 -0.580*** -1.065*** -0.952*** 
 (0.162) (0.0970) (0.153) (0.325) 
naced3 0.600** 0.332** 0.413** 0.333 
 (0.250) (0.156) (0.180) (0.468) 
naced4 0.146 -0.0419 -0.157 -0.0600 
 (0.0977) (0.0651) (0.0986) (0.215) 
naced5 0.268** -0.191*** -0.183* 0.167 
 (0.109) (0.0682) (0.0970) (0.216) 
Constant -0.635*** -2.946*** -7.897*** -7.932*** 
 (0.210) (0.143) (0.269) (0.531) 
Wald statistic  -3.25 -15.95 -10.68 -1.99 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.047) 
p 0.9683 0.8964 0.8811 0.9486 
 (0.0096) (0.0061) (0.0104) (0.0252) 
Wald chi2(7) 648.68 736.08 273.55 95.44 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 7,647 20,027 7,795 1,691 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 To employment  - Rest of the World 
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.746*** -0.336*** -0.135*** -0.164*** 
 (0.0327) (0.0173) (0.0222) (0.0494) 
male -0.0289 0.189*** 0.415*** 0.440*** 
 (0.0336) (0.0216) (0.0326) (0.0744) 
naced1 -0.392 -0.530*** -0.313 -0.419 
 (0.316) (0.195) (0.233) (0.511) 
naced2 -0.00128 -0.397*** -0.426*** 0.0164 
 (0.117) (0.0699) (0.101) (0.229) 
naced3 0.663*** 0.369*** 0.348*** 0.690*** 
 (0.142) (0.0826) (0.123) (0.253) 
naced4 0.406*** 0.197*** 0.213*** 0.410** 
 (0.0794) (0.0523) (0.0796) (0.186) 
naced5 0.388*** 0.445*** 0.441*** 0.297 
 (0.0969) (0.0563) (0.0823) (0.195) 
Constant -1.175*** -3.292*** -4.953*** -5.338*** 
 (0.196) (0.114) (0.153) (0.347) 
Wald statistic  -3.50 -17.21 -12.45 -0.71 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.476) 
p 0.9640 0.9014 0.9003 0.9843 
 0.0100 (0.0054) (0.0076) (0.0219) 
Wald chi2(7) 623.85 645.73 282.82 70.54 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 8,052 22,991 13,217 2,690 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 To unemployment  - Ireland 
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.820*** -0.756*** -0.583*** -0.513*** 
 (0.00298) (0.00285) (0.00304) (0.00386) 
male 0.187*** 0.278*** 0.339*** 0.322*** 
 (0.00339) (0.00344) (0.00465) (0.00600) 
naced1 0.0298 -0.192*** -0.237*** -0.219*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0184) (0.0218) (0.0288) 
naced2 0.137*** -0.190*** -0.215*** -0.0634*** 
 (0.00853) (0.00843) (0.0108) (0.0143) 
naced3 0.587*** 0.633*** 0.619*** 0.621*** 
 (0.00779) (0.00808) (0.0104) (0.0137) 
naced4 0.0142** -0.0436*** -0.0541*** -0.00557 
 (0.00637) (0.00681) (0.00878) (0.0111) 
naced5 -0.0344*** -0.306*** -0.378*** -0.314*** 
 (0.00721) (0.00726) (0.00915) (0.0115) 
Constant 1.195*** 0.791*** -0.325*** -0.707*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0164) (0.0184) (0.0232) 
Wald statistic  -272.17 -316.05 -261.91 -181.28 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.7473 0.7180 0.6941 0.0784 
     
Wald chi2(7) 86512.91 101559.81 57002.75 27556.39 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 730,815 857,045 491,468 257,390 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 To unemployment  - UK  
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.773*** -0.654*** -0.534*** -0.418*** 
 (0.0159) (0.00946) (0.00904) (0.0124) 
male 0.104*** 0.213*** 0.413*** 0.340*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0130) (0.0143) (0.0201) 
naced1 0.153* 0.00481 -0.141* -0.0171 
 (0.0930) (0.0803) (0.0753) (0.126) 
naced2 0.00612 -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.0240 
 (0.0496) (0.0336) (0.0337) (0.0490) 
naced3 0.536*** 0.555*** 0.613*** 0.644*** 
 (0.0471) (0.0312) (0.0309) (0.0461) 
naced4 -0.00799 0.0120 0.0121 0.129*** 
 (0.0365) (0.0252) (0.0266) (0.0386) 
naced5 -0.195*** -0.282*** -0.333*** -0.214*** 
 (0.0441) (0.0279) (0.0285) (0.0408) 
Constant 1.005*** 0.255*** -0.559*** -1.221*** 
 (0.0925) (0.0579) (0.0559) (0.0787) 
Wald statistic  -36.61 -71.75 -84.56 -52.08 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.8096 0.7570 0.7174 0.7346 
     
Wald chi2(7) 2579.78 5933.64 5567.44 1835.85 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 20,744 50,096 48,193 20,810 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 To unemployment – Western Europe 
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.988*** -0.906*** -0.620*** -0.430*** 
 (0.0126) (0.00991) (0.0137) (0.0237) 
male 0.104*** 0.146*** 0.266*** 0.279*** 
 (0.0116) (0.00915) (0.0184) (0.0372) 
naced1 0.0941 0.0154 0.0305 -0.173 
 (0.0780) (0.0841) (0.122) (0.231) 
naced2 0.0439 -0.0841** -0.130** -0.106 
 (0.0436) (0.0355) (0.0525) (0.0989) 
naced3 0.189** 0.521*** 0.701*** 0.615*** 
 (0.0813) (0.0394) (0.0511) (0.0887) 
naced4 -0.0510 -0.0542* -0.00310 0.0325 
 (0.0384) (0.0315) (0.0439) (0.0826) 
naced5 -0.220*** -0.194*** -0.240*** -0.282*** 
 (0.0455) (0.0347) (0.0486) (0.0904) 
Constant 2.126*** 1.533*** 0.0303 -1.093*** 
 (0.0747) (0.0632) (0.0856) (0.151) 
Wald statistic  -19.39 -45.38 -48.14 -24.21 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.9244 0.8698 0.7738 0.7815 
     
Wald chi2(7) 6889.98 8905.06 2658.85 596.03 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 52,433 90,032 26,578 6,614 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 To unemployment – Eastern Europe 
 
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.967*** -0.813*** -0.620*** -0.498*** 
 (0.00829) (0.00585) (0.0104) (0.0156) 
male 0.246*** 0.315*** 0.520*** 0.562*** 
 (0.00599) (0.00540) (0.0115) (0.0174) 
naced1 0.250*** 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.234*** 
 (0.0223) (0.0192) (0.0308) (0.0447) 
naced2 -0.0740*** -0.147*** -0.133*** -0.0356 
 (0.0157) (0.0124) (0.0255) (0.0392) 
naced3 0.578*** 0.624*** 0.609*** 0.553*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0124) (0.0248) (0.0377) 
naced4 0.0375*** -0.0134 0.0230 0.0716** 
 (0.0139) (0.0110) (0.0236) (0.0360) 
naced5 -0.261*** -0.274*** -0.236*** -0.148*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0167) (0.0327) (0.0497) 
Constant 2.142*** 0.978*** -0.262*** -0.940*** 
 (0.0462) (0.0335) (0.0605) (0.0904) 
Wald statistic  -153.27 -168.27 -100.94 -61.82 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.7606 0.7769 0.7604 0.7787 
     
Wald chi2(7) 17041.70 29147.22 8701.53 3233.56 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 222,810 302,858 84,471 35,684 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
. 
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 To unemployment – Asia 
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.841*** -0.750*** -0.496*** -0.293*** 
 (0.0154) (0.00966) (0.0165) (0.0347) 
male -0.0313** 0.0637*** 0.257*** 0.362*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0117) (0.0222) (0.0458) 
naced1 0.0691 0.0806 -0.151 0.199 
 (0.250) (0.110) (0.111) (0.214) 
naced2 0.426*** -0.0476 -0.230*** 0.0609 
 (0.0626) (0.0444) (0.0676) (0.139) 
naced3 0.647*** 0.698*** 0.770*** 0.808*** 
 (0.0971) (0.0576) (0.0661) (0.138) 
naced4 0.0440 0.0704** 0.0276 0.251** 
 (0.0426) (0.0308) (0.0508) (0.106) 
naced5 -0.0179 -0.266*** -0.282*** 0.147 
 (0.0490) (0.0327) (0.0533) (0.111) 
Constant 0.745*** 0.303*** -0.947*** -2.184*** 
 (0.0892) (0.0627) (0.107) (0.224) 
Wald statistic  -31.38 -50.11 -43.98 -25.32 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.8529 0.8297 0.7436 0.7075 
     
Wald chi2(7) 3493.76 9457.65 2026.57 264.43 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 28,706 57,290 18,878 4,372 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 To unemployment – Rest of the World  
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.726*** -0.643*** -0.556*** -0.381*** 
 (0.00960) (0.00656) (0.00915) (0.0177) 
male -0.00933 0.0695*** 0.302*** 0.429*** 
 (0.0116) (0.00864) (0.0138) (0.0281) 
naced1 0.338*** 0.217*** 0.329*** 0.375*** 
 (0.0559) (0.0496) (0.0622) (0.110) 
naced2 0.138*** -0.0400 -0.000209 0.155** 
 (0.0385) (0.0257) (0.0352) (0.0691) 
naced3 0.793*** 0.807*** 0.817*** 0.640*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0235) (0.0328) (0.0640) 
naced4 0.265*** 0.157*** 0.166*** 0.0945* 
 (0.0272) (0.0194) (0.0278) (0.0567) 
naced5 0.0404 -0.0151 -0.0559* 0.106* 
 (0.0344) (0.0218) (0.0302) (0.0609) 
Constant 0.776*** 0.235*** -0.419*** -1.345*** 
 (0.0561) (0.0398) (0.0560) (0.111) 
Wald statistic  -71.60 -105.01 -81.63 -40.83 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.7797 0.7653 0.7323 0.7233 
     
Wald chi2(7) 6076.54 11470.83 5413.73 850.11 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 49,695 97,971 45,961 10,476 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Logit: Hiring from employment – Ireland   
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage 0.970*** 1.195*** 0.908*** 0.872*** 
 (0.00657) (0.00474) (0.00508) (0.00676) 
male -0.487*** -0.339*** -0.154*** -0.387*** 
 (0.00745) (0.00567) (0.00786) (0.0113) 
naced1 -0.732*** -0.454*** -0.592*** -0.383*** 
 (0.0533) (0.0414) (0.0507) (0.0677) 
naced2 -0.421*** 0.0471*** 0.0574*** 0.0133 
 (0.0188) (0.0155) (0.0204) (0.0290) 
naced3 -0.959*** -0.889*** -0.916*** -0.872*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0174) (0.0234) (0.0333) 
naced4 -0.105*** 0.102*** -0.0608*** -0.106*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0136) (0.0182) (0.0249) 
naced5 -0.394*** 0.171*** 0.173*** 0.357*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0142) (0.0186) (0.0249) 
Constant -7.083*** -8.460*** -6.783*** -6.508*** 
 (0.0402) (0.0314) (0.0348) (0.0460) 
     
LR chi2(7) 32182.66 92527.40 43167.91 23506.11 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0539 0.0957 0.0810 0.0869 
Observations 730,815 857,045 491,468 257,390 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Logit: Hiring from employment – UK 
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage 0.786*** 0.827*** 0.696*** 0.620*** 
 (0.0479) (0.0192) (0.0168) (0.0242) 
male -0.339*** -0.302*** -0.226*** -0.488*** 
 (0.0565) (0.0262) (0.0284) (0.0445) 
naced1 -0.244 -0.170 -0.354* -0.631* 
 (0.329) (0.193) (0.188) (0.330) 
naced2 -0.166 0.161** 0.0549 -0.151 
 (0.157) (0.0706) (0.0713) (0.105) 
naced3 -0.503*** -0.607*** -0.697*** -0.880*** 
 (0.166) (0.0778) (0.0778) (0.117) 
naced4 0.0621 0.0990* 0.00122 -0.336*** 
 (0.110) (0.0567) (0.0610) (0.0874) 
naced5 -0.112 0.109* 0.0967 -0.0617 
 (0.131) (0.0618) (0.0643) (0.0909) 
Constant -7.059*** -6.707*** -5.809*** -4.999*** 
 (0.304) (0.129) (0.115) (0.164) 
     
LR chi2(7) 331.86 2326.44 2219.34 832.04 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0300 0.0512 0.0482 0.0461 
Observations 20,744 50,096 48,193 20,810 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Logit: Hiring from employment – Western Europe 
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage 1.335*** 1.029*** 0.651*** 0.424*** 
 (0.0410) (0.0173) (0.0225) (0.0423) 
male -0.317*** -0.294*** -0.272*** -0.458*** 
 (0.0375) (0.0190) (0.0358) (0.0801) 
naced1 -0.826** -1.158*** -0.675* 0.216 
 (0.406) (0.316) (0.362) (0.578) 
naced2 -0.291* 0.147* 0.259** 0.633** 
 (0.156) (0.0759) (0.119) (0.265) 
naced3 -0.413* -0.884*** -1.073*** -0.905*** 
 (0.214) (0.106) (0.149) (0.311) 
naced4 0.132 0.339*** 0.242** 0.608** 
 (0.134) (0.0676) (0.106) (0.239) 
naced5 -0.212 0.00581 0.0796 0.561** 
 (0.158) (0.0749) (0.116) (0.252) 
Constant -10.62*** -8.150*** -5.672*** -4.661*** 
 (0.279) (0.125) (0.171) (0.340) 
     
LR chi2(7) 1266.76 4349.69 1141.65 208.59 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0516 0.0550 0.0466 0.0390 
Observations 52,433 90,032 26,578 6,614 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Logit: Hiring from employment – Eastern Europe 
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage 1.122*** 1.131*** 0.828*** 0.643*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0125) (0.0239) (0.0383) 
male -0.400*** -0.424*** -0.504*** -0.778*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0114) (0.0265) (0.0456) 
naced1 -1.410*** -1.321*** -1.127*** -0.787*** 
 (0.0912) (0.0624) (0.0932) (0.136) 
naced2 -0.457*** -0.393*** -0.469*** -0.326*** 
 (0.0405) (0.0279) (0.0602) (0.107) 
naced3 -1.194*** -1.368*** -1.374*** -1.168*** 
 (0.0504) (0.0331) (0.0665) (0.114) 
naced4 -0.299*** -0.141*** -0.155*** -0.0925 
 (0.0352) (0.0248) (0.0547) (0.0964) 
naced5 -0.0219 -0.123*** 0.0347 0.0807 
 (0.0555) (0.0345) (0.0692) (0.122) 
Constant -8.361*** -7.987*** -6.380*** -5.407*** 
 (0.126) (0.0767) (0.146) (0.234) 
     
LR chi2(7) 4443.60 13171.23 2656.60 908.77 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0334 0.0522 0.0469 0.0447 
Observations 222,810 302,858 84,471 35,684 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Logit: Hiring from employment  - Asia  
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage 0.499*** 0.611*** 0.747*** 0.592*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0168) (0.0262) (0.0509) 
male 0.127*** 0.112*** -0.0327 -0.0816 
 (0.0371) (0.0230) (0.0404) (0.0863) 
naced1 -1.313* -0.0477 0.537** 1.002** 
 (0.734) (0.244) (0.237) (0.476) 
naced2 -0.708*** -0.305*** -0.0630 0.0579 
 (0.153) (0.0872) (0.146) (0.286) 
naced3 -0.700*** -0.851*** -0.701*** -0.884** 
 (0.251) (0.137) (0.172) (0.398) 
naced4 -0.139 0.0153 0.326*** 0.208 
 (0.0922) (0.0623) (0.115) (0.227) 
naced5 -1.219*** -0.103 0.671*** 0.663*** 
 (0.116) (0.0653) (0.115) (0.228) 
Constant -4.430*** -5.107*** -6.339*** -5.337*** 
 (0.191) (0.116) (0.195) (0.370) 
     
LR chi2(7) 485.48 1671.29 1726.13 353.01 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0203 0.0289 0.0849 0.0766 
Observations 28,706 57,290 18,878 4,372 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Logit: Hiring from employment  - Rest of the World  
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage 0.672*** 0.743*** 0.791*** 0.483*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0148) (0.0177) (0.0327) 
male 0.0269 0.0322 -0.0589** -0.261*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0211) (0.0297) (0.0623) 
naced1 -1.513*** -0.927*** -0.593*** -1.050** 
 (0.367) (0.197) (0.202) (0.442) 
naced2 -0.218* -0.0625 -0.0424 -0.0336 
 (0.122) (0.0667) (0.0850) (0.178) 
naced3 -1.378*** -1.281*** -1.221*** -0.844*** 
 (0.146) (0.0779) (0.101) (0.199) 
naced4 -0.0299 0.134** 0.0725 0.185 
 (0.0874) (0.0526) (0.0708) (0.150) 
naced5 0.0180 0.277*** 0.486*** 0.367** 
 (0.108) (0.0566) (0.0735) (0.155) 
Constant -6.411*** -6.535*** -6.588*** -4.730*** 
 (0.204) (0.101) (0.124) (0.241) 
     
LR chi2(7) 612.75 3948.07 3462.91 380.00 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0254 0.0546 0.0861 0.0439 
Observations 49,695 97,971 45,961 10,476 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 11.6: Weibull & logit model for Table 5.17 
 To employment – Gender  
 MALE FEMALE 
VARIABLES   
   
lnwage -0.362*** -0.415*** 
 (0.00405) (0.00364) 
age1 -0.0220*** -0.0419*** 
 (0.000299) (0.000300) 
natd1 -0.434*** -0.333*** 
 (0.00995) (0.0114) 
natd2 -0.230*** -0.213*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0166) 
natd3 0.0447*** 0.135*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0153) 
natd4 -0.254*** -0.222*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0126) 
natd5 -0.0744*** -0.0903*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0171) 
naced1 -0.529*** -0.288*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0371) 
naced2 -0.322*** -0.117*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0137) 
naced3 0.515*** 0.391*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0216) 
naced4 0.0925*** 0.141*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0104) 
naced5 -0.216*** -0.197*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0110) 
Constant -2.168*** -1.429*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0273) 
Wald statistic  -70.73 -67.64 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.9078 0.9109 
   
Wald chi2(12) 34607.9 50986.22 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Observations 594,085 617,851 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 To unemployment – Gender   
 Male  Female 
VARIABLES   
   
lnwage -0.735*** -0.721*** 
 (0.00193) (0.00174) 
age1 -0.00648*** -0.0236*** 
 (0.000121) (0.000136) 
natd1 -0.315*** -0.452*** 
 (0.00391) (0.00445) 
natd2 -0.0576*** -0.211*** 
 (0.00600) (0.00689) 
natd3 0.102*** 0.0963*** 
 (0.00527) (0.00589) 
natd4 -0.0986*** -0.278*** 
 (0.00415) (0.00494) 
natd5 -0.394*** -0.376*** 
 (0.00602) (0.00735) 
naced1 -0.00619 0.121*** 
 (0.00919) (0.0125) 
naced2 -0.113*** -0.0451*** 
 (0.00572) (0.00587) 
naced3 0.656*** 0.164*** 
 (0.00540) (0.00936) 
naced4 -0.0122** 0.00874** 
 (0.00509) (0.00409) 
naced5 -0.270*** -0.205*** 
 (0.00598) (0.00442) 
Constant 1.361*** 1.626*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0116) 
Wald statistic  -482.60 -419.60 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.7376 0.7446 
   
Wald chi2(12) 258328.76 262368.37 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Observations 1,911,077 1,700,313 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Logit: Hiring from employment  - Gender 
 Male  Female  
VARIABLES   
   
lnwage 0.985*** 1.019*** 
 (0.00340) (0.00332) 
natd1 0.452*** 0.671*** 
 (0.00971) (0.0113) 
natd2 -0.0751*** 0.170*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0159) 
natd3 -0.0897*** 0.0763*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0152) 
natd4 0.0294*** 0.378*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0126) 
natd5 0.574*** 0.347*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0173) 
age1 0.00499*** 0.00951*** 
 (0.000249) (0.000239) 
naced1 -0.624*** -0.875*** 
 (0.0253) (0.0368) 
naced2 -0.0186 -0.151*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0117) 
naced3 -0.989*** -0.202*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0195) 
naced4 0.0810*** -0.0738*** 
 (0.0114) (0.00889) 
naced5 0.166*** -0.0296*** 
 (0.0126) (0.00924) 
Constant -8.189*** -8.298*** 
 (0.0249) (0.0247) 
   
LR chi2(12) 152251.18 141674.31 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0883 0.0837 
Observations 1,911,077 1,700,313 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 11.7: Weibull & logit model for Table 5.18 
 To employment – Males & Age  
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.714*** -0.355*** -0.137*** -0.198*** 
 (0.00978) (0.00643) (0.00810) (0.0119) 
natd1 -0.149*** -0.409*** -0.682*** -0.678*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0140) (0.0194) (0.0425) 
natd2 -0.00678 -0.243*** -0.427*** -0.375*** 
 (0.0422) (0.0218) (0.0261) (0.0519) 
natd3 0.425*** 0.0521*** -0.191*** -0.247*** 
 (0.0314) (0.0183) (0.0299) (0.0682) 
natd4 0.0135 -0.251*** -0.330*** -0.228*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0151) (0.0245) (0.0511) 
natd5 0.171*** -0.165*** -0.112*** 0.0555 
 (0.0292) (0.0194) (0.0303) (0.0662) 
naced1 -0.446*** -0.549*** -0.520*** -0.635*** 
 (0.0536) (0.0436) (0.0608) (0.0922) 
naced2 -0.294*** -0.338*** -0.287*** -0.280*** 
 (0.0276) (0.0215) (0.0321) (0.0490) 
naced3 0.638*** 0.471*** 0.555*** 0.558*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0229) (0.0340) (0.0511) 
naced4 0.140*** 0.0990*** 0.0576* 0.0123 
 (0.0235) (0.0197) (0.0298) (0.0441) 
naced5 -0.290*** -0.141*** -0.215*** -0.344*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0217) (0.0318) (0.0470) 
Constant -1.028*** -2.890*** -4.260*** -3.931*** 
 (0.0610) (0.0445) (0.0606) (0.0927) 
Wald statistic -21.29 -48.67 -37.96 -16.27 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.9434 09074 0.8889 0.9139 
     
Wald chi2(11) 10206.24 10403.50 4846.43 2157.77 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 127,205 262,854 146,056 57,970 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 To employment – Females & Age  
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.644*** -0.308*** -0.302*** -0.396*** 
 (0.00744) (0.00585) (0.00776) (0.0114) 
natd1 -0.118*** -0.391*** -0.544*** -0.397*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0159) (0.0240) (0.0551) 
natd2 -0.0222 -0.220*** -0.427*** -0.248*** 
 (0.0392) (0.0243) (0.0319) (0.0653) 
natd3 0.358*** 0.0798*** 0.0234 0.0803 
 (0.0312) (0.0206) (0.0390) (0.0875) 
natd4 -0.0916*** -0.226*** -0.252*** -0.0652 
 (0.0251) (0.0175) (0.0303) (0.0625) 
natd5 0.140*** -0.201*** -0.110*** 0.0616 
 (0.0345) (0.0234) (0.0403) (0.0889) 
naced1 -0.154** -0.415*** -0.316*** -0.403*** 
 (0.0714) (0.0620) (0.0729) (0.110) 
naced2 -0.0194 -0.156*** -0.163*** -0.102* 
 (0.0245) (0.0208) (0.0331) (0.0535) 
naced3 0.583*** 0.346*** 0.282*** 0.376*** 
 (0.0414) (0.0341) (0.0470) (0.0724) 
naced4 0.195*** 0.124*** 0.102*** 0.138*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0167) (0.0257) (0.0383) 
naced5 -0.0353* -0.272*** -0.246*** -0.289*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0175) (0.0264) (0.0394) 
Constant -1.505*** -3.147*** -3.614*** -3.420*** 
 (0.0482) (0.0402) (0.0566) (0.0936) 
Wald statistic -17.93 -58.24 -30.39 -8.67 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.9581 0.8855 0.8982 0.9503 
     
Wald chi2(11) 11449.09 10578.05 4829.63 3402.88 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 155,753 254,284 141,091 66,723 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 To unemployment – Males & Age  
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.826*** -0.803*** -0.598*** -0.459*** 
 (0.00391) (0.00340) (0.00370) (0.00485) 
natd1 -0.269*** -0.296*** -0.429*** -0.486*** 
 (0.00805) (0.00594) (0.00798) (0.0152) 
natd2 -0.0295** -0.0489*** -0.119*** -0.180*** 
 (0.0143) (0.00977) (0.0108) (0.0186) 
natd3 0.242*** 0.0826*** 0.0534*** -0.0593*** 
 (0.0103) (0.00762) (0.0119) (0.0229) 
natd4 -0.0864*** -0.120*** -0.0514*** -0.0494*** 
 (0.00859) (0.00608) (0.00880) (0.0163) 
natd5 -0.537*** -0.349*** -0.284*** -0.313*** 
 (0.0116) (0.00863) (0.0141) (0.0292) 
naced1 0.0686*** -0.0115 -0.0544*** -0.0337 
 (0.0169) (0.0153) (0.0200) (0.0272) 
naced2 0.00896 -0.164*** -0.175*** -0.0526*** 
 (0.0103) (0.00939) (0.0129) (0.0178) 
naced3 0.570*** 0.692*** 0.711*** 0.660*** 
 (0.00958) (0.00895) (0.0123) (0.0167) 
naced4 -0.0200** -0.0228*** 0.00957 0.0477*** 
 (0.00895) (0.00846) (0.0117) (0.0158) 
naced5 -0.0911*** -0.291*** -0.354*** -0.298*** 
 (0.0114) (0.00998) (0.0131) (0.0172) 
Constant 1.667*** 1.512*** 0.355*** -0.368*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0205) (0.0244) (0.0343) 
Wald statistic -231.76 -294.33 -232.78 -151.32 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.7602 0.7424 0.7192 0.7291 
     
Wald chi2(11) 58251.13 104699.74 64203.08 25075.83 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 548,581 791,994 394,342 176,160 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 To unemployment – Females & Age  
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage -0.848*** -0.721*** -0.566*** -0.548*** 
 (0.00335) (0.00292) (0.00358) (0.00494) 
natd1 -0.433*** -0.512*** -0.474*** -0.394*** 
 (0.00833) (0.00665) (0.0102) (0.0220) 
natd2 -0.131*** -0.227*** -0.260*** -0.142*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0109) (0.0136) (0.0257) 
natd3 0.182*** 0.0374*** 0.106*** 0.0574* 
 (0.0104) (0.00858) (0.0163) (0.0345) 
natd4 -0.261*** -0.329*** -0.213*** -0.131*** 
 (0.00892) (0.00726) (0.0129) (0.0249) 
natd5 -0.500*** -0.354*** -0.270*** -0.263*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0103) (0.0194) (0.0416) 
naced1 0.243*** 0.0144 0.0124 0.0813** 
 (0.0226) (0.0225) (0.0245) (0.0341) 
naced2 0.0954*** -0.128*** -0.114*** 0.00721 
 (0.0103) (0.00930) (0.0136) (0.0194) 
naced3 0.254*** 0.167*** 0.0784*** 0.0892*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0148) (0.0191) (0.0278) 
naced4 0.0694*** -0.0187*** -0.0429*** -0.0159 
 (0.00699) (0.00676) (0.00956) (0.0130) 
naced5 -0.0108 -0.279*** -0.341*** -0.270*** 
 (0.00790) (0.00728) (0.00987) (0.0132) 
Constant 1.668*** 0.869*** -0.0244 -0.150*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0173) (0.0232) (0.0362) 
Wald statistic -224.74 -232.26 -201.94 -137.34 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p 0.7652 0.7633 0.7071 0.7145 
     
Wald chi2(11) 79067.37 94577.94 37983.19 17850.07 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 556,622 663,298 321,207 159,186 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Logit: Hiring from employment  - Male & Age 
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage 0.959*** 1.111*** 0.859*** 0.706*** 
 (0.00929) (0.00559) (0.00604) (0.00839) 
natd1 0.525*** 0.574*** 0.359*** 0.490*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0141) (0.0175) (0.0372) 
natd2 -0.254*** -0.0365* -0.0994*** 0.0201 
 (0.0482) (0.0220) (0.0235) (0.0454) 
natd3 -0.388*** 0.0222 -0.115*** -0.0898 
 (0.0376) (0.0188) (0.0271) (0.0598) 
natd4 0.0874*** 0.232*** -0.341*** -0.424*** 
 (0.0279) (0.0154) (0.0223) (0.0454) 
natd5 0.989*** 0.592*** 0.241*** 0.408*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0195) (0.0284) (0.0604) 
naced1 -0.903*** -0.656*** -0.465*** -0.216*** 
 (0.0555) (0.0399) (0.0505) (0.0717) 
naced2 -0.445*** 0.000555 0.179*** 0.239*** 
 (0.0255) (0.0191) (0.0263) (0.0401) 
naced3 -1.066*** -1.020*** -0.899*** -0.783*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0200) (0.0279) (0.0423) 
naced4 -0.0813*** 0.149*** 0.0989*** 0.0896** 
 (0.0218) (0.0176) (0.0247) (0.0374) 
naced5 -0.338*** 0.151*** 0.339*** 0.512*** 
 (0.0268) (0.0197) (0.0265) (0.0390) 
Constant -8.032*** -8.833*** -7.113*** -6.469*** 
 (0.0629) (0.0407) (0.0474) (0.0734) 
LR chi2(11) 17928.27 70157.93 38018.03 13884.36 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0494 0.0909 0.0952 0.0848 
Observations 548,581 791,994 394,342 176,160 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Logit: Hiring from employment  - Female & Age 
 21-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 
VARIABLES     
     
lnwage 0.954*** 1.092*** 0.889*** 0.954*** 
 (0.00763) (0.00536) (0.00643) (0.00912) 
natd1 0.942*** 0.802*** 0.331*** 0.496*** 
 (0.0266) (0.0159) (0.0227) (0.0488) 
natd2 0.0388 0.224*** 0.00392 0.174*** 
 (0.0439) (0.0237) (0.0295) (0.0565) 
natd3 -0.171*** 0.240*** 0.0339 0.125* 
 (0.0356) (0.0205) (0.0353) (0.0760) 
natd4 0.394*** 0.592*** 0.110*** 0.222*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0175) (0.0293) (0.0571) 
natd5 0.666*** 0.318*** 0.193*** 0.199** 
 (0.0396) (0.0234) (0.0378) (0.0816) 
naced1 -0.941*** -0.759*** -0.912*** -0.825*** 
 (0.0782) (0.0600) (0.0736) (0.0972) 
naced2 -0.303*** -0.0189 -0.162*** -0.292*** 
 (0.0226) (0.0178) (0.0263) (0.0399) 
naced3 -0.0950** -0.122*** -0.332*** -0.343*** 
 (0.0388) (0.0297) (0.0421) (0.0618) 
naced4 -0.145*** 0.0335** -0.135*** -0.186*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0142) (0.0207) (0.0289) 
naced5 -0.424*** 0.0718*** 0.0772*** 0.200*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0148) (0.0208) (0.0285) 
Constant -7.912*** -8.549*** -6.916*** -7.381*** 
 (0.0527) (0.0375) (0.0473) (0.0776) 
LR chi2(11) 26414.84 65467.85 25455.07 16234.44 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0578 0.0907 0.0775 0.0968 
Observations 556,622 663,298 321,207 159,186 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 12 : Data access & the Central Statistics Office (CSO), 
Ireland  
The data used in this thesis was accessed via the Central Statistics Office (CSO) in 
Ireland.  In doing so, strict protocols and principals are adhered to.  These include; 
 Safe data: Access is only to protected data - no access is given to identifiable 
data. 
 Safe setting: Access to data is only granted in a tightly controlled 
environment at the CSO. 
 Safe project: Research project and access is signed off by Senior 
Management at the CSO. 
 Safe outputs: All material/output taken away from CSO is first checked by 
CSO Statisticians. 
 Safe researchers: Researchers undergo a vetting  process before being 
granted access to data. 
 
